Environment Bill (Tenth sitting)

Daniel Zeichner Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 5th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir George. I also send my good wishes to the hon. Member for Taunton Deane and wish her a speedy recovery.

Much of the discussion on Tuesday was about—as it will be today—the independence of the OEP. Of course, organisations cannot be truly independent if they are heavily dependent on another organisation for their funding and resourcing. I echo many of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Putney and the shadow Minister. This might seem a slightly arcane discussion about how the funding is separated and arrived at, but a point that I have already made, and will, I suspect, continue to make, is that the organisation is so important that it has to be independent, and be seen to be independent, and has to have public confidence, because it replaces a very strong regime.

Sadly, we saw on Tuesday, and will, I fear, see as we go through further clauses today, that the sense of independence is being eroded. That is important, because when we look at other organisations that are involved in environmental protection, we see that the record, particularly under this Government, is absolutely atrocious.

The Lords Select Committee in 2018 described the cuts made to many of these organisations as having a “profound negative impact” on England’s biodiversity. The funding cuts to Natural England under this Government have been absolutely astonishing—there was a cut of some £265 million in 2008-09, and of a mere £85.6 million in 2019-20. This matters because we are being asked to trust the Government to resource the organisation properly. I am sure many of us are regular watchers of “Countryfile”; just a few weeks ago, it had a feature based on Unchecked UK’s report, “The UK’s Enforcement Gap”, which looked at the impact of funding cuts on these organisations. Natural England had a 72% cut between 2009 and 2019, and the Food Standards Agency a 51% cut. The report concluded:

“The implications of these cuts are significant, with declines in almost every metric of regulatory activity—including food safety checks, water pollution sampling”,

and many others. That is the evidence before us regarding past promises from the Government.

Talking of environmental issues and the cuts to Natural England, staggeringly, the monitoring of sites of special scientific interest has declined by 62% between 2010 and 2019. There are many other damaging statistics that one could cite, but it all leads one to conclude that the new organisation—the key organisation for protecting our environment—must be properly resourced to do the job. All the evidence suggests the Government cannot be trusted.

[The Chair]

I should apologise to the Committee; I should have brought in other speakers before the Minister. That is what I will do in future. I am sorry if that has caused any confusion, but seven months’ absence has made me a little too rusty.

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Let us not make these mistakes with the OEP, which, if set up correctly from the start and left to do its job without interference, has the potential to transform our environment and be a crucial partner to the Government in achieving their aims and policy statements. I hope that the Committee will support amendment 156.

[Daniel Zeichner]

My hon. Friends have made a powerful case, to which I will not add much more. Looking at what we are losing through leaving the European Union, I was very struck by the Library briefing, which states:

“EU law is monitored and enforced by the European Commission under Article 258…as the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’. It is overseen by the Court of Justice of the European Union… which can levy fines on Member States that are found to be in breach of EU law.”

That is an incredibly powerful position. Although we had only a certain amount of influence over that arrangement as a member state, it could be used to considerable effect.

I was very struck by the evidence to the Committee from ClientEarth, which has obviously used that arrangement to good effect on behalf of the citizens of the UK in challenging the Government’s record on air quality. Even back in March, before the amendments before us and others were tabled, ClientEarth was very clear:

“Despite the Government’s words about the independence of the OEP, the funding structure envisaged in the Bill places the OEP too close to Defra and too much discretion is given to the Secretary of State in the appointment of the OEP’s members.”

Those at ClientEarth are concerned because they know that, in the past, they could intervene and act on behalf of UK citizens, but under this system, they will not be able to. That key change weakens our protections, and it is why it is so important that amendments such as this are pursued, although I suspect they will not be successful. However, I think that these provisions in the Bill will be torn to shreds in the other place, quite frankly.

[Leo Docherty]

I agree with Opposition Members who have spoken about the need to protect the independence of the OEP. That is why we have introduced a new duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to the need to protect the OEP’s independence, and placed a duty on the OEP to act objectively, impartially and transparently. Unlike with most public bodies, the Bill gives Ministers no power to set the OEP’s programme of activity or to direct the exercise of its functions. Parliament can scrutinise the actions of the Secretary of State in exercising functions in relation to the OEP to ensure that the Government are not interfering in the delivery of the OEP’s statutory functions.

The operational independence of the OEP, however, which we wholeheartedly support, should not impede the Secretary of State in exercising appropriate scrutiny and oversight of the OEP. That is important because the Secretary of State, as an elected representative of the Government, is accountable to Parliament and the public for the overall performance of the body and for the use of public money. Requiring the Secretary of State to actively protect the OEP’s independence at all times would be incompatible with that ministerial accountability, which is one of the Government’s key principles of good corporate governance.

The amendment would prevent DEFRA, the OEP’s parent Department, from exercising appropriate oversight, including accounting officer responsibilities. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to withdraw his amendment.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I think we can claim a little collective win on this. We have been concerned about the possible clash between the remit of the Committee on Climate Change and that of the OEP, almost since the publication of the Bill. I think the matter was raised in proceedings before they were suspended earlier in the year. To avoid duplication and a possible treading on each other’s toes, it is really important that there is not a mix-up between what the OEP does on elements of the climate change and environmental remit, and what the Committee on Climate Change is doing.

The amendments that the Government tabled to clarify and codify that distinction, which also refer to Northern Ireland, seem a positive step forward in how we decide what we are going to do. In a moment, we will come to an amendment that tries to clarify that for another Government body. I welcome these amendments.

[Daniel Zeichner]

I, too, welcome the amendments, but does my hon. Friend agree that they demonstrate that the overall architecture of the whole system has been flawed from the outset? I am thinking of the relationship with other organisations and, for instance, the interaction with the Agriculture Bill and the Fisheries Bill, which we have long argued were done in the wrong order.

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It indicates that the thinking when the Bill was constructed in the first instance did not take account of those distinctions. We may need to go further in deciding who has what brief, as far as these issues are concerned.

On this particular issue, the Minister’s clarification is welcome. Obviously, the Opposition have not won many amendments so far, so being on the right side of a new amendment can be the cause of some rejoicing. We do not wish to oppose the amendments; on the contrary, we support them.

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[Dr Whitehead]

That is kind of you, Sir George; thank you. These amendments follow on from the debate that we had on the last series of amendments. As the Minister said, they would make proceedings consistent across the Bill, but that is precisely the point that we have been making. This series of amendments consistently seeks to introduce different levels of judgment necessary for the OEP to carry out a range of things, including, in the case of amendment 220, applications

“to intervene in a judicial or statutory review relating to an alleged failure by a public authority to comply with environmental law”.

The amendment states that the OEP may apply to intervene in proceedings

“only if it considers that the failure, if it occurred, would be serious”.

As there is no definition of “serious”, the OEP is left in the dark about whether it may intervene or not if it considers a failure to be serious—its definition may not be in line with the Government’s. It is really curious that the explanatory statement to amendment 220 states:

“This amendment provides that the OEP may apply to intervene in a judicial or statutory review relating to an alleged failure by a public authority to comply with environmental law only if it considers that the failure, if it occurred, would be serious”

but that

“If that test is satisfied, it may apply to intervene”.

What test? Who can satisfy it? There is no test in the Bill or, apparently, in the remit of the OEP, yet the explanatory statement refers to a test being satisfied. I can draw no other conclusion: the only way to reconcile the amendment and its explanatory statement is for the Government to provide guidance—separately from the OEP—on how that test can be satisfied. That is one of the fundamental problems that we are grappling with here. Although I accept that the amendments are consequent to the central idea of seriousness, unless we bottom out what seriousness is and how the test can be satisfied, we will not have made any further progress on amendments that sort things out in the Bill.

[Daniel Zeichner]

My hon. Friend is explaining quite a complicated situation really well. What I find baffling about this discussion is that earlier this morning Government Members asserted the independence of the OEP, and here they are introducing an amendment that restricts its independence and makes a judgment as to where to intervene. Does he share my puzzlement?

[Dr Whitehead]

I do share my hon. Friend’s puzzlement because we appear to be having things in different ways. If the question of seriousness were so straightforward, we would not have to worry about putting these things in the Bill in the first place; the previous formulations would be perfectly adequate.

There is a purpose behind the Government amendments, and that purpose has to be, as I have explained, to take the definition outside the work of the OEP. For that reason, we really have to divide on amendment 220 to establish clearly what we think about this particular activity taking place.

Question put, That the amendment be made.