Railways Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Daniel Francis and Jerome Mayhew

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse.

I hear what was said about amendment 63, and I will wait to hear what the Minister says. I have sat on a passenger watchdog, although not this one, and worked in that role alongside Passenger Focus, as it was back then—it is now Transport Focus. I served as a member of the board of London TravelWatch, which is referred to as the London Transport Users Committee in the legislation, for four years, although that was a long time ago now. Many of the provisions we will see in later clauses are inherent in the aims and work of such organisations. Investigations, reports, representations and referrals come to the attention of the organisation from all passengers.

The amendment is not necessary. I did this work as a member of a board for four years, and chaired many meetings of sub-committees looking at some of that work, and, in the work of a watchdog, these issues are there, they are referred to the organisation and they are in the reports that are presented on behalf of all passengers.

[Jerome Mayhew]

The hon. Gentleman notes that clause 36 is about the general duties of the council. It sets out what the passengers’ council is for and those general duties. Does he not think that it is odd that the clause does not refer to passengers, other than one subclass of passengers? Would it not be better for the general duties of the passengers’ council to refer to all passengers?

[Daniel Francis]

If the hon. Gentleman looks at the clauses in the group, he will see that there are significant issues that the passengers’ council needs to take into account for all passengers, which come to the door and—as I know, having sat on a watchdog for four years—come in the form of casework and meetings. I am sure that I will talk later about why nationalisation, and having trains, signals and rolling stock under one operator, is much better for a passengers’ council, but those issues come to the organisation’s attention anyway.

I fully support the need to look at the issues for disabled passengers who come to the council’s door, and I will hear what the Minister has to say, but I believe that how things are investigated and brought to the organisation’s attention are set out in the legislation, just as they are, in many regards, for Transport Focus and for the London Transport Users Committee. I do not believe that the amendment is necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Francis]

I do not think this provision needs to be on the face of the Bill. These issues already exist; there are examples where the passenger watchdog and the Transport Committee would be looking at the same matter. There would be examples with other Departments where an ombudsman would also be looking at something in a similar vein to a Select Committee. My view is that it would be an overly bureaucratic system. Passenger watchdogs issue many reports, and some are on very serious matters, but sometimes they need to issue a report that is not at that level, and I do not believe these amendments are necessary.

[Jerome Mayhew]

Under clause 43, the passengers’ council can prepare, send and publish a report of its findings in an investigation, but it must obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before sending or publishing a report if the investigation was undertaken following a referral. Similar provisions exist for the Scottish and Welsh Ministers. The wording of subsection (3) makes publication discretionary even after a full investigation and subsection (4) requires ministerial consent before publishing any report arising from a referral.

As the explanatory notes confirm, that structure gives Ministers an effective veto over publication. Why should the Minister have a veto over publication when the organisation being investigated is their own creation? If the state has created a toothless investigation watchdog body that, despite its lack of enforcement powers, has managed to do an investigation, write a report that is no doubt critical of the state, GBR or perhaps even the Secretary of State and the Department for Transport, the Secretary of State, or the Scottish or Welsh Minister can, for whatever reason they like, veto its publication. They can muzzle the watchdog at whim.

That risks undermining the whole process—where is the transparency?—and weakens the credibility of the new watchdog. If the aim is to strengthen passenger oversight, investigation reports should be published as a matter of course, with only narrowly defined exemptions for confidentiality or commercial reasons. Transport for All explains in its written evidence to the Transport Committee how that will affect passengers:

“Clauses 42-47 empower the Passengers’ Council to receive complaints, investigate issues, and identify potential breaches of licence conditions. However, the Council has no power to compel corrective action, issue penalties, or enforce compliance. If it identifies significant accessibility failings, it must refer the matter to the ORR, which retains full discretion over whether to investigate or take enforcement action.

Disabled passengers already face disproportionate obstacles when raising complaints, and this indirect model appears to add another layer of bureaucracy without increasing accountability. We worry that it will create further delays, weaken enforcement, confuse passengers, and result in inconsistent redress. A watchdog without enforcement powers is fundamentally limited in its capacity to protect passengers’ rights or drive accessibility improvements.”

Amendment 69 requires the passengers’ council to publish any report on a matter investigated under clause 39. That will create greater transparency and accountability in the new watchdog. Frankly, if the Government are serious about supporting the rights of passengers, rather than designing in an ability to hide embarrassing conclusions, they must support this amendment.

Amendment 70 would require the passengers’ council to publish its report within six months of completing the investigation. Having in statute a specific timeframe in which a report must be published would create a sense of urgency, or at least of purpose, and a culture would develop within the organisation that placed high importance on those reports—exactly as it should.

Amendments 138, tabled in the name of the Liberal Democrats—presumably the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage—would require the passenger’s council to prepare a report of findings after an investigation and ensure that any report is laid before Parliament. It is another attempt to strengthen the reporting requirements from a different angle and should be supported because it is seeking to achieve a similar outcome to my own amendments.

Amendment 140, also in the name of the hon. Member,

“removes the requirement that the Passengers’ Council must obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before sending or publishing a report if the investigation resulted from a referral by the Secretary of State”.

Amendment 69 is a mandatory requirement that they must publish every report. If that is not acceptable to the Government for whatever reason, then amendment 140 is a slight variation on the theme in that it takes the discretion away from the Secretary of State and leaves it where it properly lies, if there is to be discretion: with the passenger watchdog. That body, surely, having undertaken the investigation, written the report and come to a conclusion, are best placed to decide whether it is in the public interest to publish, not the owner of the nationalised industry that is being investigated.

Railways Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Daniel Francis and Jerome Mayhew

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

The clause sets out that the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers’ power to give directions to GBR under clauses 7 or 8 may be exercised to give a direction relating to fares. That direction could cover the general level and structure of fares that the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers expect to see on the passenger train services that GBR is running on their behalf. Likewise, the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers can use the power in clauses 9 or 10 to issue guidance about the general level and structure of fares. Clause 33(3) also allows for provision about the general level and structure of fares to be set out in the public service contract under clause 31, which we have just debated. That allows Ministers to manage overall fare levels on their designated services.

Clause 33 centralises control of fares in the hands of the Secretary of State, allowing Ministers—not GBR—to determine the general level and structure of fares. That cuts directly against the idea that GBR will operate as an independent guiding or directing mind, and leaves the organisation responsible for outcomes that it does not control. The clause provides no statutory principles, tests or transparency requirements for how fare decisions should be taken—by the Secretary of State, presumably —and recent written parliamentary questions 84697, 86756 and 86754 underline the risk built into the model. In response to the questions, Ministers were unable to define what the “right” fare means, they were unable to say which fares will go up or down under GBR, and they confirmed that all future fare decisions remain entirely at ministerial discretion.

If Ministers are to retain that power, the Bill needs at least a duty to publish the assumptions, criteria and objectives underpinning fare setting, so that decisions can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability. At the moment we have none of that. The clause is in complete contradiction to the assertion in the explanatory notes that the Secretary of State’s directions

“are intended to be used as a responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR”,

or in other words,

“they are a last resort”.

The clause says, “No, that’s absolute rubbish. We’re not doing that. We’re keeping in the hands of the Minister the power to guide and then direct and establish what the right fares are.”

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

Does the shadow Minister accept that in recent years, when Transport for London was negotiating its fare settlements, the previous Government dictated the level of fares that should be charged not just for the congestion charge, but for passenger rail services? The Conservative Secretary of State and Government were doing that very thing in negotiations with Transport for London for rail passenger services in London.

[Jerome Mayhew]

I think we have to decide what GBR is going to be. Is it going to be a stand-alone organisation that is trying to run itself efficiently, providing value for money for the taxpayer and hopefully, one day, a check on the Secretary of State? Or is it going to be a creature of the Department for Transport that is told what to do and having its decisions second-guessed? This is a big decision that the Government have to take.

The clause creates a huge risk of stasis, as GBR gets bossed around and becomes a passive recipient of instructions from the Department for Transport. I worry that it is a recipe for future disaster, so I have questions for the Minister. What factors will the Secretary of State take into account when deciding the general level and structure of fares? Why is the Secretary of State in a better position to take those decisions than GBR is, given the objects that she has set the organisation? What additional information will she use that is not available to GBR? I will be grateful for the Minister’s answer. At least it is clear that any future failure of the railways will be down to the Department for Transport and the Secretary of State, not to GBR, since the power to guide and then direct and then set fares lies expressly with the Secretary of State.

My amendment 45 would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions and set guidance as to the general level and structure of railway fares, thereby preventing ministerial intervention in how fares are set and making that decision separate from political influence. When considering amendment 45, Rail Forum said:

“We support this as it should be for GBR, as an arm’s length body and the directing mind, to determine fares not the Secretary of State.”

Amendment 148 in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage would remove the power to give binding directions over fares—another version of our approach.

The clause as drafted is overreach by the Department for Transport and exactly the kind of micromanagement that the Minister claims will not happen. Why do we need these powers?

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[Jerome Mayhew]

Amendment 61 would remove GBR’s ability to set unrestricted conditions about discounted fares. The amendment probably goes too far, so I will treat is as a probing amendment to flush out what conditions the Minister anticipates will be imposed under subsection (3). Will the Minister undertake that the intention is to minimise constraints on discounts, to afford maximum advantage to the groups that discount schemes are in place to promote? I would be grateful if he could clarify the Government’s position on that.

Amendment 62 would ensure that discounted fares remained at one third lower than the price of a standard fare. That would give certainty to those currently using the variety of railcards mentioned above that their discount will remain the same. The Government claim that GBR will bring savings; all the amendment does is prevent discounted fares from costing more. If the Government do not support the amendment, they would be paving the way for GBR to reduce focus on the passenger and revert to the typical standard of a nationalised organisation, where you get what you are given and expected to be grateful for it.

New clause 13, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would ensure that the Secretary of State conducted a report into the potential benefits of a rail miles programme for passenger numbers. That is an idea—but in our view, it is not one that should be included in primary legislation. It is qualitatively different from discounts for veterans and young persons.

[Daniel Francis]

I again declare my interest as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for wheelchair users.

Amendment 62 appears to refer not to railcards but to all ticketing. As I have said, it would result in an increase for many tickets for wheelchair users and blind and visually impaired people. As the parent of a child who is a wheelchair user, I know that the discount on a ticket for wheelchair users is 75%, and it is the same for an adult day return. For blind and visually impaired users the discount on an adult day return is 50%.

Some discounts also apply to the carer or companion of the wheelchair user or blind or visually impaired passenger. That provision is not included in the Bill, yet the Opposition thought it was more important to table an amendment to introduce a discount for 26 to 30-year-olds than to table one on a discount for the carer of a wheelchair user or blind or visually impaired passenger. I anticipate that the Government will confirm that the discount remains for carers and companions, and in my mind that does not need to be included in the Bill. I certainly do not support amendment 62, as it would undo the current, more generous discount arrangements for wheelchair users and blind or visually impaired passengers, and cause an increase in their fare.

[Jerome Mayhew]

This may shock the Committee, but I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, and his expertise has exposed a lack of knowledge on my part. I was not aware that the discount in that circumstance was in excess of one third. Given that, I will not press the amendment to a vote. I am grateful for his contribution.

Railways Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Daniel Francis and Jerome Mayhew

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

Clause 6 deals with co-operation between GBR and Transport for London. The clause seems to exist in direct juxtaposition to clause 5, and, interestingly, to the general spirit of the Bill expressed in other clauses. While many aspects of the Bill bring powers back to the Department for Transport, GBR and the Secretary of State’s office, the clause is unusual in being one of few examples where those on the Treasury Bench do not seem to want to be involved. That is out of character. Through the clause, the Government seek to remove the Secretary of State’s position in the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and replace that responsibility with a similar one for Great British Railways. That is not based on enhancing accountability or strengthening value for the taxpayer, which should be core principles of the Bill.

The clause presents special status for Transport for London that is not enjoyed by other mayoral combined authorities; that relates to a point that Committee members will recall Andy Burnham making during our oral evidence session on Tuesday. He expressly referenced the difference in how the Greater Manchester mayoral combined authority is treated on transport matters compared with how TfL is treated. We need to ask why that is. Mayor Burnham’s evidence highlighted that difference, yet the Government have given no effective answer about the rationale behind treating large, regional mayoral combined authorities differently from Transport for London.

The amendments in this group seek to correct that, proposing that, until such a time when the other mayoralties require their own special dispensation, which clause 5 of the Bill actively prohibits, clause 6 should be amended to maintain reference to the Secretary of State, and include the Secretary of State and GBR side by side, so that the relevant subsections of section 175 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 refer to both “the Secretary of State” and “Great British Railways”. That would ensure that the Secretary of State continues to have a duty of co-operation with TfL, alongside GBR.

[Daniel Francis]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Alec. As a Member of Parliament for a London constituency, and as a former member of the London TravelWatch board who understands some of the passenger watchdog issues in London, it is incumbent on me to speak to some of the clauses.

Of course, the GLA Act 1999 originally gave the liaison power to the Strategic Rail Authority, not the Secretary of State, and it was the Railways Act 2005 that amended the words “Strategic Rail Authority” to “Secretary of State”. Clause 6 will in fact put back the relationship that was there in the original 1999 Act, so that the actual rail operator, rather than the Secretary of State, has that liaison right with Transport for London.

Look at how the passenger interacts with some of those services. Some people living in the very northern part of my constituency—I have a very small part of Abbey Wood in my Bexleyheath and Crayford constituency—use Abbey Wood station, where rail usage has trebled since before the pandemic. During that time, we have seen the introduction of the Elizabeth line and the nationalisation of Southeastern, and the station has been transferred from Southeastern’s operation to Transport for London’s. Yet there are three different railway services serving that station: the nationalised Southeastern, the privatised Thameslink and the Elizabeth line, which is operated by Transport for London. There therefore absolutely has to be liaison by the operator, not the Secretary of State. Under this arrangement, Southeastern and Thameslink would come under one ownership, under Great British Railways, and with Transport for London.

Also, if my constituents catch the Bexleyheath or Barnehurst service to London Victoria, or to Denmark Hill, if they are using King’s College hospital, they will use a service that is currently operated by Thameslink but on a line that also has Southern and Southeastern services on it, as well as TFL services on the Windrush line. The liaison power should therefore be with the operators, not the Secretary of State. If we went down the Opposition’s route, we would be saying that that liaison should be between the Secretary of State and the Mayor of London. However, it should rightly be between the rail operators, given that stations such as Denmark Hill or Abbey Wood have Transport for London services, and there will be some stations operated by Transport for London, but some stations, such as Denmark Hill, will be operated by Great British Railways. That is where the liaison powers should lie, and as I say, that will bring us back to the original arrangement under the 1999 Act. For those reasons, I oppose the amendments and support clause 6.