Strategic Defence and Security Review

Dan Byles Excerpts

Monday 21st June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

We have heard three excellent maiden speeches today, and I am delighted to say that I have some connection with all three. I know that their constituencies are wonderful. I was born near Lancaster, a fabulous place—

[Dan Byles (North Warwickshire) (Con)]

A very long time ago.

[Bob Stewart]

Thank you.

I learned to dive under Royal Navy command at Devonport, despite being a pongo, and I joined my regiment in 1969—a very long time ago—at Weeton camp in the Fylde constituency. When I joined my regiment I joined a battalion that had an establishment of 750. When I handed over command of it some two decades later, it was down to 638. We had lost 20% of the manpower of our battalion. The theme of my speech, then, is resilience at the front line. It is still called a battalion, but it has been salami-sliced and hollowed out. This is a big problem, which the strategic defence review must look at. We must ensure that our front-line troops have the capability to do the job we expect them to do.

On resilience, just consider the 3rd Battalion the Rifles, which returned in April. When it came back after six months of the winter tour in Afghanistan, it had lost eight men killed in action and had 67 casualties. That meant, in terms of the fighting men for that battalion, a 14% casualty rate. My own battalion, the 1st Battalion the Cheshire Regiment as it was—now, for some strange reason, called the 1st Battalion the Mercian Regiment—is in Afghanistan at the moment. It has been there two months: it has lost five men killed in action already, and it has 35 people wounded.

If we think about the basic fighting strength—I return to the theme of resilience—of a fighting unit in our infantry, it is the eight-man section. It is very sad statistically to understand what that means—that in an eight man section, it is likely that one or two of the men fighting at the moment in Afghanistan in 1st Battalion the Mercian Regiment are likely to come back to this country either in a box or on a stretcher. Thank goodness we have the Territorial Army, as it heavily reinforces the regular Army. It does that extremely well. Indeed, in Helmand at the moment, 10% of the troops out there are either Territorial Army or reserves. It was the same in Iraq. When I visited the coalition operating base in 2007, the figure was 10%. In 2004, with the invasion of Iraq, it was 20%, so the strategic defence review has to look very carefully at how we use the Territorial Army, which has now become a proper reserve force for the regular Army.

When our troops are deployed on operations for six-month tours, they have a period in the middle of their tour called rest and recuperation—R and R—which is normally two weeks long. I put it to the House that approximately 1,000 of the 9,500 troops deployed to Afghanistan are either not there or are travelling to or from R and R. Effectively, in resilience terms, some infantry sections—I see the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) nodding his head, because he knows what I am going to say—are down to four or five men. Infantry cannot fight with sections of four or five men, so they are put together, with the result that combat power is reduced. Whatever the outcome of the strategic defence review, we must ensure that our front-line units are properly manned and that their ORBAT—organisation for battle—is good enough to sustain them properly.

I have concentrated on the Army, but the principle remains the same for the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. We have a problem with the Navy, and we must ensure that the ships deployed on operations are manned and equipped properly. The Royal Air Force currently has 74 Harrier jump jets, less than a third of which are operational. We must get this right across the services.

I totally understand how difficult it is for Governments of either persuasion to get money for defence. It is extremely difficult, and I will not be found criticising the Opposition on that matter. However, we must ensure that the question of resilience is dealt with properly in the strategic defence review. We must not send our young men and women into battle without adequate manpower to sustain operations when things go wrong.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Byles (North Warwickshire) (Con)]

It is an honour to speak after so many fantastic maiden speeches, in particular those of my hon. Friends the Members for Castle Point (Rebecca Harris), for Winchester (Mr Brine), and for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray). I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester on his wedding anniversary. Mine is tomorrow, so I know the feeling of being away from family down here in London. It is also an honour to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), who spoke with such passion and authority on the necessity of ensuring the resilience of our front-line units in Afghanistan.

It is well known that the percentage of gross domestic product that we spend on defence is at historic lows. However, as a result of our equally historic deficit, it is now likely to fall even lower. I was a soldier, and I do not want that, but I am a realist on the state of Government finances, so I recognise that the Ministry of Defence must take its share of the pain. I am hopeful that if that is done through the prism of a comprehensive strategic defence and security review, we can ensure a sustainable balance between resources and requirements.

The SDSR cannot be conducted independently of a thorough review of the defence industrial strategy. A quarter of our defence budget is spent on equipment and services, and our current approach to acquisition is, at best, a mixed bag. The urgent operational requirement system allows for a valuable degree of flexibility and provides a way into the procurement system for our strong phalanx of small and medium-sized defence companies, but in too many cases, the core programme level is a disaster.

At this stage, I must take issue with the hon. Member for Alyn and Deeside (Mark Tami) and my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti), who praised the A400M aircraft. They said that it was a fantastic aircraft with which we should be delighted to be involved. I do not doubt that the aircraft that finally results from the programme will be a fine aircraft, but the acquisition process that has got us to this point is an example of how not to procure an aircraft. It is more than three years late and almos £10 billion over budget, and arguably, it is now considerably over-specced for the initial requirements.

Earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt), in her maiden speech, noted that the United Kingdom has not exported a naval vessel since the 1970s. Type 45 destroyers were originally supposed to cost something like £280 million each, but they now cost more than £1 billion each. Is it any wonder, given the gold-plating that happens in our procurement process, that we end up with bits of kit that are simply too expensive to export? It cost the previous Government £100 million simply to avoid making a decision on the future rapid effect system for a year. The frictional costs at Abbey Wood have been estimated at some £0.5 billion a year. That would pay for a brigade of soldiers.

I am a strong supporter of the UK defence industry. It is a UK good news story, employing some 300,000 people and representing 10% of UK manufacturing jobs, and these are high-quality jobs—they are high-tech, high-value added jobs. The industry turnover is some £35 billion, of which 22% is from exports. However, the question must be asked whether the current acquisition process is designed to support our armed forces or our defence industry. It is supposed to do both; it is in danger of doing neither.

I am old fashioned: I believe that the defence budget is there to equip and train our armed forces, and to support them in performing their duties at home and abroad. The defence budget is not there to support industry—there are other Departments with that remit. I am not even convinced that the defence industrial strategy as it currently operates is good for our defence industry. We have some of the most successful high-tech, highly skilled companies in the world—companies that are hampered, not helped, by the MOD’s constant gold-plating and moving of the goalposts. The MOD too often limits the industry’s export potential by specifying equipment that is simply too expensive and too specialised for the export market. I am not arguing for scrapping the defence industrial strategy or for abandoning partnering between the MOD and industry, but anybody who thinks that the current acquisition programme is working is deluding themselves.

[Alison Seabeck]

I am listening with interest to the hon. Gentleman, but from the tone of his argument, he seems to be suggesting that those on his Front Bench should perhaps have the opportunity to purchase off-the-peg items from overseas, rather than from British industry.

[Dan Byles]

There is a balance to be struck. In fact, before the hon. Lady intervened, my very next sentence was going to be: there is a balance to be struck between supporting our vibrant defence industry and ensuring that our soldiers get the equipment that they need in a timely manner. I recognise that there is a balance to be struck—it is not about one thing or another—but we are simply not striking it at the moment. We have to look hard at how we equip and sustain our armed forces, and we must do so as part of the strategic defence and security review, not later as a stand-alone review. I sincerely hope that that will be the case.