Payday Loan Companies

Damian Hinds Excerpts

Monday 20th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Damian Hinds (East Hampshire) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue), who, as always, speaks not only with great passion but expertise and first-hand experience. This is an important debate, and not just because of the widespread detriment that is acknowledged to result from the payday loan market and the huge growth in it, which is not new but continues to happen and is set in the context of a much wider high-cost sub-prime market in this country. We cannot consider one without thinking about the interaction with the others.

The debate is also timely. This is debt awareness week and this Friday, the 24th, has been dubbed payday loan danger day as apparently it is the day of the year on which, as a result of Christmas and so on, people are most likely to take out a payday loan. To look at the more positive side, we are also in a period of regulatory change and an evolving FCA regime. This is Parliament’s opportunity to have some input into that and, I hope, to shape it.

We should also acknowledge what has already been done and welcome it: the enhanced enforcement from the OFT; the referral of the entire sector to the Competition Commission; and the FCA’s announcements on its regime, including the affordability checks, measures on roll-overs, advertising restrictions and what is being done on the continuous payment authorities, which the hon. Member for Makerfield mentioned. It is also worth acknowledging some of the wider things the Government have done, such as putting financial education on the national curriculum and providing great support for credit unions, putting £38 million behind the credit union expansion project and liberalising that sector.

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

On credit unions, does the hon. Gentleman agree that we need to put a lot more effort in if the system is going to work? The credit union in my constituency is run by volunteers and operates from an upstairs office, without a shop front. The payday lenders and the like are in glossy high street operations. Perhaps local councils could help credit unions to get out on the high street.

[Damian Hinds]

The hon. Lady is right. Of course, many local councils do that, providing premises and soft support in all sorts of ways. What the Government are doing, which is key, is trying to help the sector get to a point where it stands on its own two feet. Although subsidy and direct support have a role, we eventually want the sector to thrive, to be self-sustaining and to be able to take on the other lenders. That will include brand awareness and a product range that is right and that attracts people, but essentially we want the sector to be a bigger, professional operation that provides a real alternative. I think that we are moving in that direction, both through the Government’s support and through the liberalisation of the sector, with the legislative reform order and the move from a 2% cap to a 3% cap on interest a month. That puts credit unions a little closer to being able to compete with payday lenders, although it is still very hard to break even at 3% per calendar month on a payday loan.

The biggest change by far that the Government are putting in place is the duty to have a cap on the cost of credit. That is an enormous change—not just for a Conservative or coalition Government, but even for a Labour Government. I was reluctant about such an idea, but a couple of years ago I finally concluded that we needed to cap total costs in this market.

Why was I reluctant and why did I change my mind? I was reluctant because, in this country, with the exception of natural monopolies and a few other very specific examples, we do not do price control. It goes against the philosophy of our economy and of our politics. We—by which I mean most people in this House, not just those on the Government Benches—tend to believe in the efficacy of markets, in consumer sovereignty and in the beneficial impact of price competition. Why did I change my mind? I was trying to reconcile all those beliefs about what markets do with what we see in this market, and in many ways the normal laws of economics do not seem to apply to high-cost sub-prime credit.

The hon. Member for Makerfield talked about how pessimistic some people can be, but in some ways people are incredibly over-optimistic, even about their ability to pay back a loan. They feel that they are not the type of person who will get into difficulties. The hon. Member for West Bromwich West (Mr Bailey) set out very clearly how consumers in this market tend not to buy on the basis of price, so, unlike in other markets, bringing in more competitors does not tend to bear down on price.

If the normal rules do not apply, in many ways the normal remedies that one might apply to a market that was not working well do not apply either. Of course we want clarity about what a product offers, disclosure, health warnings and so on, but there is a limit to their effectiveness. Warnings quickly become part of the wallpaper of life, just like that thing that goes, “Your home is at risk if you do not…blah, blah, blah.” People stop paying attention and, as I say, borrowers do not anticipate that they are the ones who will end up with a problem.

As for sound financial education, of course we want educated, empowered consumers but there are limits here too. There is a big time lag. If we educate the next generation, we will have to wait quite a long time before they are in a position to need to use that education—and I can guarantee that by the time they do need it, everything will have changed. If we had had financial education when we are at school, we would have learned about clearing houses and endowment mortgages. They would have said, “Don’t worry—at least a final salary pension will see you safe,” and we probably would have been told that payment protection insurance was a damn good idea and we should get as much of it as we could.

Of course competition is a good thing, but if it does not affect prices there is a danger that more competition can mean more ubiquity, more advertising about speed and convenience and more proposals of instant solutions that do not really exist—and, I am afraid, more people believing in those things.

Micro-interventions are another suggested solution. We think that if we find an abuse in a market we should stamp it out, but there are limitations in that regard. If we restrict roll-overs, I can guarantee that the industry will find a different way to make money. That even applies to the real-time database that people are setting such store by—we should always beware when people think that one solution will solve a lot of problems. Quite apart from the other problems caused by the creation of mega-databases, there is also the issue of scope. In Florida, for example, there is no home credit market on the same scale as ours. If a real-time database is to be really effective, it must include the other parts of the market too.

If we believe that the current levels of payday lending are a social ill, that it will not go away as the economy improves, as there is growth and real wages increase, and that to some extent the market creates its own demand through advertising and supply, we should ultimately conclude that we must make the market less attractive. We must reduce its ubiquity so that we reduce both supply and demand. Not only do we want to make the market work better, we want less of a market. A cap on the cost of credit is a fundamental part of that, not only in ensuring that consumers are not ripped off but in making it less attractive to players coming into the market. We do not want to make it unattractive, because, as the hon. Member for Makerfield said, there are of course times when the short-term borrowing of relatively small sums of money makes perfect financial sense, but we want to make it less attractive.

A cap is, of course, not a panacea either. First, stimulation, whether big or small, at the margin of the illegal market will definitely be a problem. Of course, firms will find other ways to make money. When people hear that, they say, “Oh, but I’m not talking just about a cap on interest. I mean a cap on the total cost of credit,” but what do they mean by that? I suggest that people mean different things and think that everyone else is using the same definition. Sometimes, people mean restricting behavioural charges or penalties. That is a perfectly legitimate goal, but it is not the same as reducing the overall cost of credit. Such a cap would have to be really rather high to tackle the real abuses.

Some people say, “Ah, but we’re talking not about penalties, but the overall cost and the hidden fees.” Well, that is what annual percentage rates cover. If a fee is paid by everyone, it is already included in the APR. Because people do not understand percentages very well, they could be presented with a cash number for the total cost of credit, but I suggest that there is a big difference between using a cash number for disclosure where it makes perfect sense—“You will pay x per £100”—and using it for a limit where it can be generalised. That probably explains why most usury caps use APRs, and I suggest that the twin caps approach now used in Australia is probably the most effective.