Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Debate
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Damian Green
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Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Damian Green Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Helen Jones
The hon. Gentleman needs to differentiate services that protect women from violence and specialist provision for those dealing with forced marriages. They are two parts of the same thing, but the current evidence is that specialised services for black and ethnic minority women—services that they feel more comfortable accessing because the people there understand the cultural background—are being closed at a greater rate than other refuges. That is a worry.
My point to the Minister is that the legislation is all very well, but unfortunately, unless he ensures that there are services to allow women and girls to make use of the legislation and access the services they need, the Opposition will be forced to conclude that the Government will the ends but are unwilling to fund the means. We need a much more joined-up approach from the Home Office, the Department for Education, the Department of Health and the Department for Communities and Local Government if the legislation is to protect people in future. We do not oppose but welcome the Government’s new clauses, but that is the test we will apply to the Government.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 9 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 10
Fees for criminal record certificates etc
‘In Part 5 of the Police Act 1997 (criminal record certificates etc), in section 125 (regulations), after subsection (1) there is inserted—
“(1A) In prescribing the amount of a fee that—
(a) is payable in relation to applications under a particular provision of this Part, but
(b) is not payable in relation to applications made by volunteers,
the Secretary of State may take into account not only the costs associated with applications in relation to which the fee is payable but also the costs associated with applications under that provision made by volunteers.”’.—(Damian Green.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Damian Green)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 28—Court and tribunal fees.
Amendment 184, page 115, line 19, leave out clause 143.
Amendment 95, in clause 143, page 115, line 26, leave out
‘the person was innocent of the offence’
and insert—
‘no reasonable court properly directed as to the law, could convict on the evidence now to be considered.’.
Government amendments 137, 138, 66, 139, 74 and 83.
Damian Green
I will first deal with the Government’s proposals, although I am aware that hon. Members will wish to speak to other amendments. I will deal with those at the end of the debate on the group.
The Government proposals in the group are on the setting of fees for two distinct public services. New clause 10 concerns fees charged by the Disclosure and Barring Service. It is Government policy—I imagine and hope that this is supported by hon. Members on both sides of the House—to encourage volunteering in our communities. To that end, it has long been the case that criminal record checks, where needed, such as in respect of work with children, are provided free of charge to volunteers. The new clause puts on a clear statutory basis the ability of the Home Secretary to take into account the cost of providing criminal record certificates and other services covered by part V of the Police Act 1997 when determining the fees charged for those services.
Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)
The Minister is making important points about ensuring that people are able to pay. As I understand it, it is not currently possible to get a basic disclosure within England and Wales—it has to go through Scotland. Will he look at ensuring that, where appropriate, basic applications are available and free?
Damian Green
I am conscious that at various times there have been difficulties with the practicalities of the system, and I take on board my hon. Friend’s point.
The other services covered by part V of the Police Act 1997 when determining fees charged for services also apply to the new update service that was launched earlier this year. This will enable employers to verify whether existing criminal record certificates for those signed up to the service remain up to date, allowing us to ensure that the overall costs of the service now provided by the disclosure and barring service are fully recovered through fee income, and not subsidised by the taxpayer.
Earlier this year, when the update service was introduced, we made interim arrangements under the Finance (No. 2) Act 1987 to provide the legal gateway for this measure to apply. However, the overall arrangement was complex and not entirely transparent. For that reason, we believe the new clause will benefit volunteers and the people and communities they support.
New clause 28 contains substantive provisions to replace clause 147, which, as we made clear, was a placeholder clause. The new clause provides the Lord Chancellor with a general power to set fees at a level that exceeds the cost of the related services. The services are those provided by the courts in England and Wales, including the Court of Protection, the tribunals for which the Lord Chancellor is responsible and the Office of the Public Guardian. The primary focus of our proposals for using this power will be the courts of England and Wales. The courts play a vital role in our society, providing access to justice so that the public can assert their legal rights. Ensuring that they are properly resourced is essential to maintaining access to justice. This must be delivered when public spending is required to fall—deficit reduction is one of the Government’s key priorities—and the courts and those who use them must make a contribution.
As new clause 28 makes clear, the purpose of enhanced fees is to finance an efficient and effective court system. This change to the way that fees are set will help to ensure that courts are properly resourced to deliver modern, efficient services so that access to justice is protected. The proposed legislation provides a general power; specific fees would be increased through secondary legislation. When a specific fee or fees are set at an enhanced level for the first time, the order will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure—there will be full debate in both Houses. Any subsequent changes to those fees will be subject to the negative procedure.
We will shortly be consulting on proposals to achieve full cost recovery, less remissions, in the civil and family courts. However, even on this basis the running of the court system in England and Wales costs more than £1 billion a year, so we need to go further in reducing the burden on taxpayers. We believe it is fair and proportionate that those who use the courts and can afford to do so should make a greater contribution to their overall funding. That is why we are bringing forward this provision to allow fees to be set above cost in some circumstances.
Let me assure the House that we will not be using the power to set excessively high fees. In setting fees, the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied. The new clause requires him to have regard to the overall financial position of the courts and tribunals, and the international competitiveness of the legal services market. We are not bringing forward specific plans for charging enhanced fees at this stage. We want to take some time to ensure that we get the measures right. As I said, we will consult widely on the proposals and look carefully at how any proposed court fees might compare with the overall cost of litigation, the value of the issues at stake and the fees charged by our international competitors. Following the consultation there will, as I have indicated, be full parliamentary scrutiny of any enhanced fees that we decide to introduce.
Amendments 184 and 95 relate to the tests for eligibility for compensation following a miscarriage of justice. I propose that the House hears from the hon. Members who tabled them before I respond.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)
I, with my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), tabled amendment 95. Does the Minister not recognise that he is proposing a dangerous step forward that would actually reduce the chances of overturning a miscarriage of justice case? Would the Guildford Four or the Birmingham Six have been declared innocent under his proposals?
Damian Green
As I said, I think it would be sensible, for the purposes of the debate and the convenience of the House, if the hon. Gentleman makes his case and I then respond to it at the end of the debate. I think that is better than pre-responding to the speech I suspect he will make. [Interruption.] I am happy to make the same speech twice, but you, Mr Speaker, might feel that that was out of order. If the hon. Gentleman wants a taste of what I am going to say, I do not agree with him, but I will wait to hear his fuller analysis to see if he can convince me in the course of the debate.
Mr Speaker
Order. I note the spirit in which the Minister of State made his remarks, but the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) has said nothing disorderly. He might not have said as much as he has to say or as the Minister would like to hear, and we wait with bated breath to see whether the hon. Gentleman will spring from his seat to seek to catch my eye, but his behaviour has been orderly and respectful, as always.
Damian Green
This has been a serious debate, appropriately, because these are serious issues. Having listened carefully to the views of Members on both sides of the House, I believe that there are some genuine misunderstandings about what is proposed and what its effect will be. I will seek to deal with those as briefly as I can. It is a complex issue.
As we have heard, amendment 95 seeks to maintain the current definition of a “miscarriage of justice” derived from case law, which is therefore subject to ongoing litigation. Amendment 184 goes further and would prevent us from creating a statutory definition of a “miscarriage of justice” at all, leaving the definition subject to the shifting view of the courts. Over the years, the courts have provided complicated definitions of a miscarriage of justice, which are often confusing to a lay person and are by definition subject to change over time. In this instance, it is unlikely that an applicant for compensation would know what
“properly directed as to the law”
means in a particular case. That would have disadvantages for applicants, who will find it difficult to know whether they have a valid claim, or to understand the Secretary of State’s decision on their case.
Emily Thornberry
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that, although there has been a challenge in respect of the case of Adams in the Supreme Court, the position has not moved and the law on the definition of miscarriage of justice has been settled since 2011?
Damian Green
I will come to the Adams case in a moment, if the hon. Lady will be patient.
Many disappointed applicants seek judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision, because they do not fully understand its basis or because the case law is unclear. In practice, very few such claims succeed, and they place a significant burden on the applicant involved and on the taxpayers who have to fund them. Therefore, the purpose of clause 143 is to restore the law to the pre-2011 position and to make the definition of a miscarriage of justice more consistent, clearer and easier for the public and potential applicants to understand. That is fairer than using an obscure and confusing definition, or continuing to work, as we have to now, with a definition that is subject to unpredictable change. We are firmly of the view that the provision is compatible with our international obligations and the convention rights. I am conscious that we are in discussions with the Joint Committee about that and that we hold different views on the matter.
Simon Hughes
Although this issue is being dealt with very carefully, there is clearly a difference of view, and the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) made the case for the legal justification. Rather than just have a battle at the other end of the building and a lottery of an outcome, will my right hon. Friend undertake to facilitate a meeting of all those interested in both Houses with members of the relevant Committees so that we can hear evidence and try to do the job properly, and see whether the Government have adopted the right position or we need to do something else? I would far rather we got it right and were really clear and all signed up than we had a maverick outcome that satisfied very few or nobody.
Damian Green
I am happy to continue to engage in the discussions that the Departments have been having with the Joint Committee or anyone else, but I regret to say that I am not sure that having a meeting at which a definitive view could be arrived at would be possible, as that would be subcontracting the right of Parliament to be that Chamber—that is the purpose of this House and the other place, and I do not think it is constitutionally right to try to subcontract that to a meeting of experts.
The nub of Members’ complaints about clause 143 is that it is in some way incompatible with the presumption of innocence—I do not think I am traducing hon. Members in saying that—and that is the issue we need to address. Of course the Government recognise the fundamental constitutional importance of the presumption of innocence and we would not introduce legislation that cuts across that. We consider that article 14.6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 gives effect, provides only for compensation to be paid to those persons whose convictions have been overturned because a new fact shows that they did not commit the offence. In the Government’s view, that is the proper definition of a miscarriage of justice. Compensation should not be payable where the basis for the conviction being overturned does not demonstrate the applicant’s innocence.
The hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) brought up the European Court of Human Rights. We are aware of its decision on this issue and we have written in some detail to the Joint Committee on Human Rights about it. However, we continue to consider that this provision would not interfere with a person’s fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. We take firm support for this view from the Supreme Court in the Adams case, which held unanimously that the presumption of innocence is not infringed by the current arrangements for compensating a miscarriage of justice. In our view, the proposed change does not alter that analysis. As the European Court acknowledged, more than an acquittal is required to establish that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Through clause 143, we are determining where that line should be drawn.
Under clause 143, there is no requirement for a person applying for compensation for a miscarriage of justice to “prove” their innocence. What is determinative is the fact on which the conviction was overturned. So, for example, if a person’s conviction is overturned because DNA evidence comes to light showing they could not have committed the offence, it is only right that they should be compensated. Following the coming into force of clause 143, they will, as now, be eligible for compensation.
The proposed new test for determining eligibility for compensation does not require the applicant to demonstrate his or her innocence; it focuses on the new fact. When the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently ruled in the case of Allen that the presumption of innocence is engaged when deciding whether to pay compensation for a miscarriage of justice, the Court made it clear that states were entitled to conclude that more than an acquittal was required. This clause will enable us to say, for the first time in statute, what beyond an acquittal is necessary for there to have been a miscarriage of justice. It introduces for the first time some certainty in the process.
I should say in response to a point made by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) that the clause will have no impact at all on the very valuable work being done every day by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, and nor will it change the basis on which a conviction is overturned.
Emily Thornberry
I hope the right hon. Gentleman recognises that the wording of amendment 95 reiterates the wording in the settled case law I have been telling him about.
Damian Green
Yes, indeed, and I have addressed directly the cases the hon. Lady raised.
We are returning the law to where it was in 2008 under the previous Government, where following the decision of the House of Lords in Mullen, compensation was held to be payable only where a person could be shown not to have committed, or to have been demonstrably innocent of, the offence for which he was convicted.
As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Adams, it is difficult to glean exactly what the framers of the ICCPR intended on this point from the papers now available, and nor is there international consensus on what the ICCPR requires in this regard. Signatories to the ICCPR have some latitude in determining the requirements of article 14.6. For example. New Zealand and Canada restrict the payment of compensation for a miscarriage of justice to cases where the applicant was innocent. Further, while the Supreme Court in Adams ultimately held that eligibility for compensation was not limited to cases of innocence, four members of the Supreme Court, including the current Lord Chief Justice, considered that compensation should be payable only in cases of innocence. We are therefore confident that what we are doing achieves the aim of creating a more readily comprehensible test which meets the Government’s policy objectives, while also complying with our international obligations.
We recognise the fundamental constitutional importance of the presumption of innocence, and there may simply be a disagreement in this Chamber as to whether we are breaching it, but I can assure the House that there is no intention of doing so, and I am firmly of the belief that clause 143 does not do that. All it does is require compensation to be paid to those persons whose convictions have been overturned because a new fact shows that they did not in fact commit the offence. This, in the Government’s view, is the proper definition to be given to a miscarriage of justice
I hope I have cleared up what I think are genuine misunderstandings about the effect of clause 143, and I urge the Members concerned not to press their amendments.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 10 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 11
Power of community support officer to issue fixed penalty notice for cycle light offence
‘(1) Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Police Reform Act 2002 (powers of community support officers) is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (2)(b) of paragraph 1 (power to issue fixed penalty notices)—
(a) for “in respect of an offence” there is substituted “in respect of—an offence”;
(i) an offence”;
(b) at the end there is inserted “, or an offence, under section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, of contravening or failing to comply with a construction or use requirement about lighting equipment or reflectors for cycles;”.
(i) an offence, under section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, of contravening or failing to comply with a construction or use requirement about lighting equipment or reflectors for cycles;”.
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 11A (power to stop cycles)—
(a) for “has committed an offence” there is substituted “has committed—
(a) an offence”;
(b) at the end there is inserted “, or
(b) an offence, under section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, of contravening or failing to comply with a construction or use requirement about lighting equipment or reflectors for cycles;”.’.—(Damian Green.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 16—Control of new psychoactive substances—
‘(1) Any person supplying, or offering to supply, a synthetic psychoactive substance including but not restricted to—
(a) a powder;
(b) a pill;
(c) a liquid; or
(d) a herbal substance with the appearance of cannabis,
which is likely to be consumed by a person for the purpose of causing intoxication will be subject to a Synthetic Psychoactive Product Order prohibiting its supply.
(2) Any subsequent breach of that Order will be an offence.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
(4) This section does not apply to alcohol, tobacco, or any drug currently scheduled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 or the Medicines Act 1968.’.
New clause 26—Assault on workers in public facing roles—
‘(1) A person, being a member of the public, who assaults a worker—
(a) in the course of that worker’s employment, or
(b) by reason of that worker’s employment, commits an offence.
(2) No offence is committed—
(a) under subsection (1)(a) unless the person who assaults knows or ought to know that the worker is acting in the course of the worker’s employment;
(b) under subsection (1)(b) unless the assault is motivated, in whole or in part, by malice towards the worker by reason of the worker’s employment.
(3) In this section—
“worker” means a person whose employment involves dealing with members of the public, to any extent, but only if that employment involves—
(a) being physically present in the same place and at the same time as one or more members of the public; and
(b) (i) interacting with those members of the public for the purposes of the employment; or (ii) providing a service to either particular members of the public or the public generally.
“employment” in this context means any paid or unpaid work whether under a contract, apprenticeship, or otherwise.
(4) Evidence from a single source is sufficient evidence to establish for the purpose of subsection (1) whether a person is a worker.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this Act is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.’.
New clause 27—Long-term police authorisation requiring independent approval—
‘( ) The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows—
(a) after section 32A (Authorisations requiring judicial approval) insert—
“32AA Long-term police authorisations requiring independent approval
(1) This section applies where a relevant person has granted a long-term authorisation under section 29.
(2) The authorisation is not to take effect until such time (if any) as the relevant independent body has made an order approving the grant of the authorisation.
(3) The relevant independent body may give approval under this section to the granting of an authorisation under section 29 if, and only if, the relevant independent body is satisfied that—
(a) at the time of the grant—
(i) there were reasonable grounds for believing that the requirements of section 29(2), and any requirements imposed by virtue of section 29(7)(b) are satisfied in relation to that authorisation, and
(ii) the relevant conditions were satisfied in relation to that authorisation, and
(b) at the time when the relevant independent body is considering the matter, there remain reasonable grounds for believing that the requirements of section 29(2), and any requirements imposed by virtue of section 29(7)(b) are satisfied in relation to that authorisation.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) the relevant conditions in relation to a grant by an individual holding an office, rank or position in a relevant law enforcement agency, that—
(a) the individual was a designated person for the purposes of section 29,
(b) the grant of an authorisation was not in breach of any prohibition imposed by virtue of section 29(7)(a) or any restriction imposed by virtue of section 30(3), and
(c) any other conditions that may be provided for by the Secretary of State were satisfied.
(5) In this section—
“relevant law enforcement authority” means—
(a) a police force in the United Kingdom, and
(b) the National Crime Agency.
“relevant judicial authority” means—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, the High Court of Justice in England and Wales,
(b) in relation to Scotland, the Court of Session, and
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland.
“relevant person” means—
(a) an individual holding an office, rank or position in a police force in the United Kingdom, and
(b) an individual holding an office, rank or position in the National Crime Agency.
(6) In this section—
“relevant independent body” must be set out by the Home Secretary in a motion passed by both Houses of Parliament before this Clause is enacted.
“long-term” must be set out by the Home Secretary in a motion passed by both Houses of Parliament before this Clause is enacted.”.’.
New clause 31—Annual review of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act—
‘(1) The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation shall monitor and publish a report to Parliament providing an analysis of the application of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000.
(2) The report shall include an assessment of those persons stopped, questioned or detained who have protected characteristics within the meaning of section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 (The protected characteristics).
(3) A Minister of the Crown, must not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.’.
New clause 32—Sunset provision for Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000—
‘(1) Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 shall be repealed, five years after the commencement of this Act, unless continued in force by an order under subsection (2).
(2) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument provide—
(a) that those provisions which are in force shall continue in force for a period not exceeding five years from the coming into operation of the order; or
(b) that those provisions which are for the time being in force shall cease to be in force.
(3) No order shall be made under subsection (2) unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament.’.
New clause 34—Public order offences committed against constables in private dwellings—
‘(1) In section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986, after subsection (3) there is inserted—
“(4) Subsection 2 and subsection 3(a) do not apply where the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is a constable who is present in the dwelling in the execution of his duty.”.
(2) In section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, after subsection (3) there is inserted—
“(4) Subsection 2 and subsection 3(b) do not apply where the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is a constable who is present in the dwelling in the execution of his duty.”.
(3) In section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986, after subsection (2) there is inserted—
“(3) Subsection 2 and subsection (4) do not apply where the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is a constable who is present in the dwelling in the execution of his duty.”.’.
Government amendments 51 to 55
Amendment 148, in clause 127, page 98, line 17, leave out lines 17 and 18 and insert
‘Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is repealed.’.
Amendment 150, page 98, line 18, at end add—
‘(2) The Secretary of State shall by order make any amendments to Schedule 7 or 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 recommended by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to limit the scope of its application.’.
Amendment 136, in clause 144, page 116, line 4, leave out subsection (2).
Government amendments 61, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 78 and 79 to 81.
Amendment 149, page 146, line 26, leave out schedule 7.
Amendment 151, in schedule 7, page 147, line 15, at end insert—
‘Power to stop, question and detain
1A (1) Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) Paragraph 2(4) is repealed.
(3) After paragraph 4 there is inserted—
4A An examining officer must ensure that all questioning, beginning at the commencement of the examination, is recorded and retained for as long as is deemed necessary, which must be no less than one year, so that it may be used in any complaints process that may follow.’.
Amendment 179, page 147, line 16, at end insert—
‘Limits on duty to give information and documents
1A In paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, before “A person who is questioned” there is inserted “Subject to paragraph 9A below”.’.
Amendment 178, page 147, line 25, at end insert—
‘(2A) A person questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be detained under paragraph 6 unless the examining officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that he is a person falling within section 40(1)(b).’.
Amendment 180, page 147, line 33, before paragraph 3 insert—
2A In paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, before ‘An examining officer’ there is inserted ‘Subject to paragraph 9A below.’.
Amendment 181, page 148, line 20, at end insert—
3A In paragraph 9(1) of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, before “An examining officer” there is inserted “Subject to paragraph 9A below.”.
3B In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, after paragraph 9 there is inserted—
“Data stored on personal electronic devices
9A (1) For the purposes of this Schedule—
(a) the information or documents which a person can be required to give the examining officer under paragraph 5,
(b) the things which may be searched under paragraph 8, and
(c) the property which may be examined under paragraph 9,
do not include data stored on personal electronic devices unless the person is detained under paragraph 6.
(2) “Personal electronic device” includes a mobile phone, a personal computer and any other portable electronic device on which personal information is stored.”.’.
Amendment 156, page 148, line 38, at end insert—
‘(4) The copy, and information derived from it, may be used for no other purposes than those specified in subparagraph (3).’.
Amendment 182, page 148, line 38, at end insert—
‘Audio and video-recording of interviews
4A In paragraph 3(6) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, the words “if the interview takes place in a police station” are omitted.’.
Amendment 157, page 148, line 38, at end insert—
‘Right to silence
4A In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, after paragraph 18 there is inserted—
18A Right to silence
Nothing in this Schedule—
(a) imposes a duty on a person to respond to questioning; or
(b) allows inferences to be drawn from their silence.”.’.
Amendment 152, page 148, line 42, at end insert—
‘(2A) In paragraph 6(1) the words “Subject to paragraph 8” are omitted.’.
Amendment 153, page 148, line 43, after ‘7(1)’, insert—
(a) the words “Subject to paragraphs 8 and 9” are omitted;
(b) ’.
Amendment 154, page 148, line 43, at end insert—
‘(3A) Paragraph 8 is omitted.’.
Amendment 155, page 149, line 1, at end insert—
‘(4A) Paragraph 9 is omitted.’.
Amendment 183, page 150, line 2, after ‘officer’ leave out
‘at such intervals as may be specified in, and otherwise in accordance with, the code of practice’
and insert—
‘(2A) The first review shall be carried out as soon as is reasonably practicable after the time of the person’s detention and not more than one hour from that time.
(2B) Subsequent reviews shall be carried out at intervals of not more than 2 hours.’.
Government amendments 84 to 86 and 91.
Damian Green
I propose to run through the Government amendments in this group briskly, so that other Members can speak to their amendments. Given the linkage to the Government amendments on low-value shop theft, I also intend to touch on amendment 136 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies). With the leave of the House, I propose to respond to the other non-Government amendments in this group when winding up.
New clause 11 follows up a debate in Committee initiated by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay), who raised some important points about the powers of police community support officers. In particular, he proposed that two new powers should be conferred on PCSOs: first, that they should be able to issue a fixed penalty notice for riding a bicycle without lights; and, secondly, that they should be able to search someone for controlled drugs.
I gave a commitment to consider my hon. Friend’s proposals over the summer, in the context of the specific role that PCSOs play in our communities. As my hon. Friend pointed out, there is an inconsistency in PCSOs’ powers around cycling. They can issue a penalty notice for riding on a footway, but not for riding without lights. Extending their powers in respect of cycling, as provided for in new clause 11, would end this anomaly and complement their important engagement role. Being on foot patrol, they are well-placed within their communities to increase awareness and educate people about the importance of cycle safety. Backing this up with the power to issue a penalty notice could enhance the impact they have in their neighbourhoods.
The power to search for controlled dugs is more complicated. We do need to keep a clear distinction between the role of a PCSO and that of a constable. We need to be mindful of the risk that new powers could increase the element of confrontation in the role of PCSOs and detract from their presence on the streets. It is vital that we get this right and, accordingly, we are still considering whether such an expansion of powers is appropriate. I assure my hon. Friend that I will let him and the House know the outcome of that consideration as quickly as possible.
Dr Huppert
I shall do my best to be brief to allow the Minister time to respond to the debate.
I welcome Government new clause 11. It is right to extend powers to PCSOs, allowing them to issue fixed penalty notices to cyclists riding without lights. I am a huge champion of cycling. I was delighted when the House passed a motion to get Britain cycling. One of the banes of my life in that context is cyclists who do not obey the rules of the road. Anything that we can do to get people to cycle safely and legally will make it easier for those of us who want to extend facilities for cyclists. There are sensible ways forward. In Cambridge we have been using a “lights instead of tickets” campaign to make sure that people get their lights. I welcome the new clause as a sensible step forward.
I shall spend most of my time talking about schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, to which I have tabled a series of amendments. There has been particular controversy recently, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) mentioned, because of the detention of David Miranda, the partner of The Guardian journalist working on the Edward Snowden leaks. This has led to the Independent Police Complaints Commission taking the Met to the High Court over failure to address complaints and how schedule 7 is used. This is a very broadly written power. It should not be a surprise that it has expanded from its original use in Northern Ireland in the 1970s to become worse and worse as illiberal Governments have made it even heavier.
It seems to me that it is not right for people who “look like terrorists” to be detained. That is exactly what happens under schedule 7. StopWatch has done a huge amount of work on this. Last year there were 64,000 schedule 7 stops—a huge number. Twenty-seven per cent. of those stopped for under an hour were Asian, much more than their proportion in the community, and 77% of those stopped for more than an hour were from ethnic minority populations. We should not consider that acceptable. StopWatch cites some chilling quotes from one man Glasgow who said that
“the first thing you ask your friend is . . . not how was the holiday, it’s did you get stopped and what did they ask you?”
If we are setting up a power that creates huge concern in the Muslim and ethnic minority populations, that will separate people from the bulk of our country and is deeply alarming. The Equality and Human Rights Commission and David Anderson QC have also commented on how damaging that is.
This is a matter that Liberal Democrats have been concerned about for a long time. It is not just about David Miranda, who has the support of The Guardian. It is also about people who are detained routinely. That is why my party has debated this and why I tabled a range of proposals. There are many concerns about schedule 7. One option would be to get rid of it. There are alternative powers in section 47A. I hope the Minister will comment on that. There are other options that we have looked at. I would like to see us committed to David Anderson QC’s proposals to limit the scope of schedule 7. The Government should introduce provisions to that effect in the other place.
I have also proposed implementing proposals that my party made at our conference. They include getting rid of the principle that authorities can stop people without any suspicion at all, restoring the right to silence for those who are detained, and questioning to be recorded from start to finish. Restoring confidence and the basic principles of the rule of law to that process and making sure that data collected are not used inappropriately should be important in the case of David Miranda. I also propose a statutory principle of annual review and a sunset clause. The Government should look at these proposals and I hope they will take advantage of the process to make sure that that happens. I am glad that that is supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I would love to deal with the proposals made by the Opposition and their proposals to ban synthetic caffeine, but in the interests of time I will allow the Minister to respond.
Damian Green
I am grateful. I shall be brief.
On new clause 26, as I said in Committee, I entirely agree with the sentiments behind the clause. The work of a great number of people, whether within the public or the private sector, brings them into face-to-face contact with members of the public, and we know that some of these people suffer violence in the course of their jobs. It is essential that we are satisfied that the law adequately addresses this issue. However, I do not think the new clause is necessary to achieve that. There is already a range of offences that have general application and that criminalise violent behaviour and they would already apply in the context envisaged by the clause. Sentencing guidelines specify that where an assault is committed against someone providing a service to the public, whether in the public or private sector, this is an aggravating factor and so could well result in a higher sentence within the current maximum. So I do not think the clause is necessary, although as I said, I sympathise with the sentiment behind it.
New clause 27 seeks to introduce a system of independent authorisation for undercover policing operations. I announced to the Home Affairs Committee in June our intention to legislate to enhance oversight of undercover law enforcement officer deployments. This can be done through secondary legislation and I will lay the appropriate order before the House shortly.
The changes will mean that law enforcement agencies will need to notify the Surveillance Commissioners, all retired senior judges, at the outset of undercover operations and get their prior approval for every deployment that lasts longer than 12 months. In addition, I am increasing the rank of the authorising officer. Deployments of undercover law enforcement officers will be authorised at assistant chief constable level or equivalent. Deployments lasting longer than 12 months will be authorised by a chief constable or equivalent. The rank of an authorising officer for emergency deployments will increase from inspector to superintendent level or equivalent. These changes will promote the highest standards of professionalism and excellence in this most sensitive area of policing and therefore achieve the aims of new clause 28. I hope they will be welcomed by the House.
On schedule 7, there is clearly debate on whether this requires further modification along the lines proposed in some of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and others. For the purposes of the debate today, I put it to my hon. Friend and to the Chair of the Joint Committee that it is premature to consider making such changes because the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, has decided to investigate and report on the exercise of these powers in the case of David Miranda. The Government, sensibly, will want to examine carefully any recommendations he makes in his report, and I am sure that the Joint Committee on Human Rights and my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) will want to do likewise. It would be wrong to pre-empt that report or commit now to implementing its recommendations. It is for the independent reviewer to make recommendations, but it is for the Government and Parliament to decide what legislative changes should flow from them.
Given the importance of these issues, any such legislative proposals should be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny, as with the provisions in the Bill, rather than being implemented through secondary legislation, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge suggests in amendment 150. Although I welcome this contribution—
Damian Green
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I take the opportunity to welcome for his last hurrah on this Bill the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), before he moves to the equally exciting field of immigration policy. It is an area that—I say this with some experience—I know he will find life enhancing.
The Bill has been much improved by the scrutiny of this House. We often beat ourselves up—and are beaten up by people outside—about the level and quality of scrutiny we apply to legislation in this House, but I think the Bill is now in better shape than it was when it entered Committee, and for that I thank hon. Members from across the House. Foremost among the improvements is the insertion of a whole new part of the Bill at the instigation of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood), and 67 other right hon. and hon. Members from across the House who supported new clause 5. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for the energy and perseverance she has shown in pursuit of her Childhood Lost campaign.
In 2012-13, well over 1,000 people were convicted in this country of offences relating to child sexual exploitation. It is a horrible and repulsive crime and we owe it to the victims, and to all children, to do all we can to eliminate it. Prosecutions and convictions are essential, but by then, of course, the damage is done—or, as my hon. Friend put it, a childhood has been lost. We must therefore do more to prevent such horrendous crimes from occurring in the first place.
Civil orders, which help protect the public from individuals whose behaviour means there is a risk that they will sexually abuse or otherwise sexually harm others, play an important part in our prevention strategy. Although provision for such orders has been in statute for 10 years, and there are many cases in which they have been used effectively, it is clear that the current regime in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is too inflexible. Instead of supporting the protection of vulnerable children, it places unreasonable obstacles in the way of keeping them safe. The new sexual harm prevention order and sexual risk order will simplify and strengthen the current powers available to the police, rebalancing the scales of justice in favour of children and vulnerable adults.
In many respects, the approach we are taking to the reform of civil prevention orders under the Sexual Offences Act mirrors our approach to antisocial behaviour powers, and as in that case, the Bill sweeps away the complex and bureaucratic array of powers that put unnecessary obstacles in the way of front-line professionals taking fast and effective action to protect vulnerable people and communities. With the ASBO, however, there was an additional problem because the existing powers simply do not work. ASBOs can take many months to obtain, and, once secured, most are breached with more than four in 10 breached repeatedly. We need powers that will not only offer fast and immediate protection for those at risk of harm, but drive a change in behaviour and provide a long-term solution.
In her article in The Independent last month, the hon. Member for Ashfield (Gloria De Piero) bemoaned the fact that the ASBO is “much maligned”. She has recently moved on from the Home Affairs brief, on which I congratulate her, but I put it to her and to her colleagues who remain on the Front Benches that it is also time to move on from the ASBO. The ASBO is maligned for the good reason that it has been ineffective, and the Bill will rightly see the back of it.
As well as ensuring that front-line professionals have the powers they need, our reforms place the victim at the heart of the response to antisocial behaviour. The community remedy will be enhanced if it is developed locally within a national framework. Out-of-court disposals must be seen to be a fair and effective way of dealing with offending behaviour if they are to have the confidence of the community. To achieve that, each and every one should have a punitive, restorative or rehabilitative element, or a combination of those. I commend my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) for his comments about strengthening the provisions of the Bill to that end. Out-of-court disposals must be used appropriately, and as I have repeatedly said, they should only be used as the first response to low-level offending. When the seriousness of an offence, or the frequency of the offending behaviour, warrants prosecution, prosecution is what should happen.
Under the Bill, victims of antisocial behaviour will be able to take advantage of the community trigger. No one should have to suffer repeated incidents of antisocial behaviour because the police, local authority or landlord repeatedly fails to respond to the victim’s call for action.
The community trigger will give victims the power to demand a case review. That case review must assess whether further action is required, and it can result in the relevant authority being required to take appropriate action. That is real accountability. It gives ordinary people real power to compel the authorities to respond in a way that will stop them being victimised.
After the debate on Report and the House’s clear rejection of new clause 3, I hope we can move on from the debate about dog control notices. Hon. Members on both sides of the House agree on the need for more effective preventive powers to tackle irresponsible dog owners. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has published the draft of a comprehensive practitioners manual that shows how the new antisocial behaviour powers in the Bill can be used to tackle dog-related problems. I put it to the House that the time has come for all parties, including animal welfare groups, the police, local authorities and others, to work together to ensure that the provisions in the Bill deliver the outcomes we all want.
Lady Hermon
The Minister will know very well that responsibility for policing and justice was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2010, but bits of clause 98, on dangerous dogs, appear to apply to Northern Ireland. I do not understand why some bits and pieces apply to Northern Ireland when other bits and pieces do not, but on the bits that apply, what consultation was there with the Northern Ireland Department of Justice and the Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, which is responsible for dogs?
Damian Green
I am happy to assure the hon. Lady that, throughout the passage of the Bill and on many other matters, there has been regular, continuous contact at all levels. I see the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice regularly, and our officials are in contact on detailed matters. We work closely with the Northern Ireland Department of Justice.
Julie Hilling
The Minister says he hopes the charities and so on get behind the Bill. It is not too late for him to reconsider and listen to what they say on how to improve the Bill rather than asking them to support measures that they believe are second best.
Damian Green
I sense the hon. Lady is trying to lure me into a debate she has just had with my hon. Friend the Minister. I heard his speech, in which he replied fully to the points made by her and others. She says it is not too late, but, in practical terms, it is—we have just had a Division and have moved on to Third Reading. [Interruption.] There will indeed be debates in other places.
The examination and detention of David Miranda at Heathrow airport in August has put a renewed spotlight on the changes we are making in the Bill to the powers in schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Schedule 7 remains a key part of the UK’s border security arrangements and is vital to preserving the safety of the public. I welcome the renewed scrutiny of the provisions. It is right that, as part of his function of reporting on the operation of the Terrorism Acts, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, has decided to investigate and report on the exercise of the powers in Mr Miranda’s case. The Government will carefully consider his report when it is received.
Dr Huppert
We had a slightly truncated debate on that earlier. The Home Secretary has rightly expressed concern about the use of stop and search—it disproportionately affects the ethnic minority population— and taken steps to deal with it. Given that a huge proportion of people who are stopped under schedule 7 are ethnic minorities—it is massively disproportionate—does the Minister agree that similar actions should be taken on schedule 7 stops?
Damian Green
The sensible thing to do is to wait for Mr Anderson’s report and then decide what changes, if any, are needed. Let us look at the evidence and then decide what changes are necessary, because the police need the power to stop, question and, when necessary, detain and search people travelling through airports and ports if they are to be able to determine whether an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism. That power is essential to the prevention of terrorism because it enables the police to detect and disrupt individuals who might be travelling for the purposes of planning, financing and training for terrorist attacks.
The amendments to schedule 7 are in line with the Government’s continuing commitment to ensure that respect for individual freedoms is balanced appropriately and carefully against the need to reduce the threat of terrorism to the British public and British interests overseas. I have no doubt that the other place will want to examine the provisions particularly closely, including in the light of Mr Anderson’s report, but we should wait until we have all had the opportunity to look at the report before rushing to make a judgment on whether we have the balance right.
I should say a few words about the much expanded part 11, which deals with extradition. The ability to extradite people to and from this country is an important component of our criminal justice system. Those who commit serious crimes should not be able to evade justice by crossing international borders to escape arrest. We owe it to the victims of crime to ensure that there are efficient and effective arrangements in place to prevent justice being denied in that way.
Nick de Bois (Enfield North) (Con)
The Minister says that the Bill was improved in Committee and on the Floor of the House. While I am sure that that is the case for most of the Bill, he is well aware that we did not have the opportunity to scrutinise Government new clauses on extradition, or discuss the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) and 28 other hon. Members from across the House. How confident is the Minister that we are providing protections that British citizens have lacked in the past?
Damian Green
I am conscious of my hon. Friend’s particular constituency interest, which he has pursued diligently. I am sure that he and I agree that our extradition arrangements need to be fair and proportionate. It is a big step to extradite a person from one country to another. The impact on family life and employment will be far greater than in cases where a person is prosecuted in his or her own country of residence. We should not, therefore, be hoovering up British residents and dispatching them to all corners of Europe to spend months in prison awaiting trial for minor offences. I am sure he would agree with that. That is why in July I recommended to the House that the United Kingdom opt back into the European arrest warrant, but only on condition that we first rectify a number of serious weaknesses in the way it has operated. That is what we are now doing.
Part 11 introduces a new proportionality bar to extradition to prevent people from being extradited for trivial offences. It also introduces a new bar to extradition where the prosecuting authorities in the requesting state have not yet taken a decision to charge and try the accused. That will stop extradited persons languishing in a foreign jail while an investigation takes place. We will amend the Extradition Act 2003 so that a British citizen cannot be extradited for conduct that is not a crime in this country.
These are all important new safeguards that will help to ensure that our extradition arrangements with other EU member states are fair both to the victims of crime and the accused. They are not particularly difficult or onerous. They could and should have been included in the Extradition Act 2003. To leave them out was a mistake, which is being rectified by this Government.
This is a significant piece of legislation, one much enhanced as it has made its way through the House. It will help us to cut crime further, to protect the public and to extend the modernisation of the police. I commend the Bill to the House.