Countess of Mar
Main Page: Countess of Mar (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Countess of Mar's debates with the Department for Transport
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I feel I have been here before. During the passage of the previous Civil Aviation Bill in 2006, I recall long discussions on Clause 8, relating to health—the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, may recall our exchanges then. These included my concerns, and those of injured pilots, over the effects of breathing what is known as “bleed air”, which could contain organophosphates, on the health of both airline crew and passengers.
The Civil Aviation Bill before us today includes the requirement under Clause 84, “Environmental information”, that:
“The CAA must publish, or arrange for the publication of, such information and advice as it considers appropriate relating to—
(a) the environmental effects of civil aviation in the United Kingdom,
(b) how human health and safety is, or may be, affected by such effects, and
(c) measures taken, or proposed to be taken, with a view to reducing, controlling or mitigating the adverse environmental effects of civil aviation in the United Kingdom”.
This is to be welcomed, but I would suggest that there is one environment in particular where this duty is avoided: the cabin environment. Despite growing evidence, contaminated cabin air continues to be a very serious threat to the safety and health of air crew and passengers of all ages. This has been known since 1954. Indeed, a year later, an engineer from the company that is now part of Boeing recommended that,
“in light of the risk of exposure to oil fumes in flight, airlines should either operate non-bleed ventilation systems or filter the engine bleed air before supplying it to passengers”.
The Civil Aviation Act 2006 clearly sets out the responsibility of the Secretary of State and the Civil Aviation Authority for,
“organising, carrying out and encouraging measures for safeguarding the health of persons on board aircraft”.
Five years ago, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, welcomed the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee’s 2007 report on air travel and its call for urgent action on contaminated air, saying that this was a,
“very serious matter of public safety”.
Since that time, some research has been undertaken by the Department for Transport-sponsored Institute of Environment and Health at Cranfield University—more of which later.
I believe that more rigorous action is required and this duty cannot be abdicated in favour of the European Aviation Safety Agency—EASA. In 2007, the House of Commons Transport Committee’s report on the work on the Civil Aviation Authority stated that EASA was,
“not yet ready to do its job and it is vital that the UK transfers no further responsibilities to it. I see no evidence that the position has changed”.
Apart from the new Boeing 787, passenger aircraft use unfiltered, heated air drawn directly from aircraft engines and auxiliary power units for cabin air conditioning. This is termed bleed air, because it is bled from the compressor section of the engine. This system has been used since just after World War II, when engine temperatures and pressures were considerably lower than today. The use of compressed air for ventilation was described in 1946 as “fortuitous”. With rising oil prices, the aviation industry was faced with huge commercial challenges; since the initial introduction of bleed air, both performance and efficiency have become critical. As a result, it is normal for the temperatures to which oils are now exposed within the engine to be far higher. This is a serious toxicity concern because the base stock of the oil is known to thermally degrade when exposed to extreme temperatures. Combine this with the known design fault in engine oil seals and you have the perfect conditions for low-level oil leakage that can expose passengers and crew to toxic fumes through the unfiltered air they are breathing.
As highlighted in the recently published Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority—CASA—report:
“Exposure to … fumes and vapours can result in acute short-term symptoms”.
The report stated that the organophosphate family of TCP includes TOCP, which is a known substance in engine oils and can cause adverse health effects. In some individuals, long-term disability and forced retirement have resulted from long-term exposure. Pilots and air crew are particularly vulnerable.
It was also proven in the 1950s that other parts of the TCP family in the oil were even more toxic than TOCP, and these were later acknowledged to be in the oil at far greater levels than TOCP. Even more concerning is the recent research undertaken by the University of Washington, which has found that the entire family of TCP chemicals is toxic. I am sure that I do not need to remind your Lordships that organophosphates are neurotoxins—also commonly known as nerve agents. A small ongoing study undertaken at the University of Nebraska has recently published an astonishing finding that 50% of airline passengers tested positive to exposure to TOCP. This was one flight only with a wide spectrum of people on board—it could have been you or me, or a member of our families. There have been many reports of contaminated air incidents for many different airlines. I can provide details if any noble Lord is interested.
A report from the German air accident investigation bureau, the BFU, showed a serious incident late in 2011 in which a Boeing 737 co-pilot was partially incapacitated shortly after take-off and again on descent after smelling a pungent smell. Blood tests undertaken at the University of Nebraska found,
“that the blood sample (was) positive for exposure to TOCP”.
Recent PhD findings by Dr Susan Michaelis, specifically investigating this issue, found that 32% of the UK pilots in the survey population experienced medium to long-term ill health, 44% reported short-term effects and 13% experienced such chronic ill health that they were no longer able to fly. What we have here are threats to flight safety combined with a public health issue that can no longer be ignored.
The United States Air Force’s newest fighter aircraft has been having major problems with the oxygen system, with pilots reporting a range of hypoxic-like physiological symptoms. With a growing number of in-flight incidents, the United States Air Force grounded its F22 fleet for several months from May until September 2011. Several investigations failed to find the root cause of the problem and the US Secretary of State for Defence recently limited the aircraft’s operational capabilities and required NASA to resolve the issue. The F22 on-board oxygen-generating system takes some of its supply from the bleed-air system, and contaminated bleed air is one of the two issues considered to be the potential cause of the problem.
While attention is often focused on certain aircraft types, such as the BAe 146 and the Boeing 757, in fact the bleed-air system suffers from a flawed design affecting all aircraft using bleed air to supply cabin air for breathing. These fume events are alarming, both in their severity and their frequency. However, many sources—including Dr Susan Michaelis, the European Aviation Safety Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration in the US—have shown that these dangerous events are actually being underreported. What we have is a failed reporting system.
A survey for BALPA undertaken in 2001 and later published in a leading occupational health journal showed that less than 4% of the contaminated air events experienced by pilots in aircraft were recorded on the CAA mandatory occurrence report database. Pilots and cabin crew are too often unaware of, or complacent about, the health and safety implications and come from a culture that accepts fume smells as normal. Worse still, too many are too frightened to report such incidents for fear of losing their jobs. They are aware of the commercial pressure on airlines as, once a defect such as contaminated air is reported, it must be investigated before the aircraft can fly again. I am aware that DHL instructed its pilots not to report selected fume events, confirmed by the CAA in the House of Commons, because these are “acceptable”. This is in direct contradiction of European regulation 859/2008, which states that incidents that could endanger aircraft safety should be reported to the regulator and recorded in the aircraft technical log. Furthermore, European Directive 2003/42/EC requires all suspected oil fume or contaminated air events to be reported to the national authority. I know that the Minister is aware of this because he has given me that answer in reply to a Written Question.
Pilots can also be reluctant to report any symptoms experienced for fear of exposing themselves to a medical that could, ultimately, lead to their licence to fly being revoked. This is acknowledged by the Department for Transport, which notes in its FAQs on cabin air quality that a UK study is unlikely to be successful as,
“pilots … would be legally obliged to report any health impairments found ... to the CAA, who licenses them”.
A recent example of two British Airways pilots who were cited by the airline to be filing a higher than average number of contaminated air reports illustrates this point: one had his medical certificate withdrawn after TCP was found in his blood, while the second pilot died in his mid-40s of a brain tumour after repeated exposures which were in many cases reported, but clearly ignored. The British Airways head doctor, however, is quoted in the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee’s 1st Report of Session 2007-08, entitled Air Travel and Health: an Update, as saying that he had,
“no evidence to suggest there is a serious medical problem”.
It is against this background of underreporting and an industry eager to avoid the commercial implications that the research by Cranfield was undertaken. In the House of Lords 2007 report, it was noted that as the original proposal was to sample “around 1,000 flights”, the size of sample offered only a,
“remote chance of capturing an event”,
if the incidence of contaminated air events is as low as the Government claim. In fact, the sample used was just 100 flights, yet the presence of TCP was detected in 23% of flights. Additionally, 38 reported fumes of which the majority were described as oil or oily-type smells. A mandatory occurrence report, or defect report, was not triggered on one single flight despite this being a requirement under the European directive and regulation. Clearly, the Government’s accepted estimate of the frequency of fume events is flawed and, despite government denials, this problem is being seriously underreported. Indeed, despite censuring the Government while in opposition for their dithering on air cabin quality, with secret studies behind closed doors, putting air crews and passengers at risk, when in office, the Secretary of State for Transport, Theresa Villiers, appears to have done an about-face. Ms Villiers’ interpretation of the Cranfield report was that,
“there was no evidence of pollutants occurring in cabin air at levels exceeding available health and safety standards and guidelines”.—[Official Report, 10/5/11; col. WS37.]
I was told in 2005 that there are no safe levels set for exposure to the mixture of substances from heated synthetic oils or for the organophosphate TCP. Peer reviewers for the Cranfield study used descriptors such as “very serious deficiency”, “very varying quality”, and “serious weaknesses in sampling”. Interestingly, earlier research by the same establishment on behalf of the Government concluded that because,
“current risk assessment practices are largely based on evaluating the toxicity of single chemicals at high doses”,
and because humans are exposed to a mixture of chemicals on a daily basis,
“there could be many uncertainties in the hazard assessment”,
particularly related to low-level exposures. It would appear that we are making the science fit the policy, not the policy fit the science.
As long ago as 1997 I used the term “intellectual corruption” in a speech in your Lordships’ House on the subject of organophosphates. I was not in the least surprised to learn that the second and final Department for Transport-sponsored air-monitoring swab-sampling study by the Institute of Occupational Medicine, in Edinburgh, recently found TCP in aircraft at low levels, with estimated airborne concentrations of TOCP found to be very low.
My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Countess, but if she could move one pace to her left, we could hear a little better what she is saying.
I have a chest problem caused by organophosphates.
The Department for Transport publicly states that,
“it would be proper for DfT to be alerted of any findings out of the ordinary. Should that happen the DfT will consider what action might be appropriate to ensure that people can continue to fly without risk to their health”.
However, I must remind noble Lords that, as with the Cranfield study, no fume events were reported, and yet TCP at higher levels than TCP found elsewhere was detected, indicating that the substance originated from the aircraft. Of great concern is that the levels of the neurotoxic parts of the TCP stated to be in the oil are a direct contradiction of what Mobil advised in 2000. While ExxonMobil, formerly Mobil, the manufacturer of the oil, stated at the Australian Senate inquiry into this issue that the levels of the most toxic part of the TCP were over 600,000 times higher than the TOCP part, this Department for Transport-sponsored study has stated that the difference is only three times higher. One might ask who would know better. Making science fit the policy provides a wonderful excuse for inertia.
TCP has clearly been found in all aircraft surveyed. Controversially, the Institute of Occupational Medicine study states that there are government-set exposure standards available for the neurotoxic parts of TCP, but this is not the case. TCP as a whole and the most toxic parts do not have established exposure standards and, as we know, there are no exposure limits set for the mixture of ingredients in the aircraft environment. How can the researchers compare the enclosed environment of an airline cockpit with a normal office environment?
As well as organophosphates, there is a chemical known to be in the oil as an antioxidant at 1%, N-phenyl-alpha-naphthylamine, which is quite a mouthful, or PAN, which is much easier. It has an acknowledged contaminant as a by-product, beta-naphthylamine, or BNA. This is a prohibited schedule 1 category 1 carcinogen that has long been known to cause human bladder cancer. While oil certification standards used to say that suspected human carcinogens are prohibited in the oil, here we have a known human carcinogen in the oil as a contaminant totally ignored. The levels might be low, but repeatedly exposing people to human carcinogens is not acceptable. The new certification standards have removed this prohibition and simply say that all the regulations must be met. The other phrase that has been removed by the Civil Aviation Authority stated that,
“the lubricating oil shall have no adverse effect on the health of personnel when used for its intended purpose”.
My Lords, I remind the House that it has resolved in favour of shorter speeches and that the Companion recommends that Second Reading speeches be no longer than 15 minutes.
My Lords, I am aware of that. I apologise to the House. I will now sit down.
My Lords, I will say a few words in the gap. I apologise to the Minister and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for my absence at the beginning of the debate. I was in a Select Committee of the House.
I will take the opportunity to pick up on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Soley, who pointed out that our aviation sector is still number two in the world and a very important provider of high-quality jobs in the United Kingdom. I take this opportunity to congratulate Bombardier, which secured a massive order yesterday for more than 100 Challenger business aircraft. The fuselages, nacelles and other component parts are made in Belfast. It is excellent news that has done a lot to lift some of the economic gloom that there is around. It proves the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Soley, that this is one of our key sectors in which we are still a world leader and able to bring home orders. The sector deserves significant support.
Like many noble Lords, I support the broad thrust—
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. The rules are very strict. One should be present at the beginning of the debate when the Minister opens, and if one is not able to be there one should not speak. I am sorry to stop the noble Lord at this stage, but perhaps the Front Bench will agree with me.
My Lords, the noble Countess, Lady Mar, is absolutely right.
The noble Lord’s comments are accurate but the words I have just repeated are very carefully thought out. I must move on.
These measures are consistent with the Government’s commitment to runway alternation at Heathrow and the trial—that is, the operational freedoms—will not increase the number of flights at the airport, which remains capped at current levels. I can assure my noble friend Lord Patten that the Bill does not interfere with the aviation policy framework. The two issues are separate; future developments will not be inhibited.
I welcome the comments on the environment—particularly from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, and many other noble Lords. The issue was also debated at some length in another place. I have listened very carefully to the points raised today. I agree that further consideration should be given to the clarity in the Bill regarding the role of the CAA in allowing licence holders to recover the costs of taking reasonable measures to mitigate the adverse environmental effects of airports in carrying out its functions. Therefore, I look forward to further discussions in Committee. It will, however, be important to get the correct balance between conflicting interests. This will be challenging and we must get it right.
Many noble Lords raised the issue of the NAO auditing the CAA. I am still not persuaded that there are convincing reasons to believe that NAO scrutiny would deliver a better result than the current and planned mechanisms by which the CAA’s functions are audited and scrutinised. In his review of the CAA, Sir Joseph Pilling considered this and concurred that he saw no need for the NAO to be involved directly. Ministers in the previous Government subsequently accepted this recommendation. I have yet to see convincing reasons why they were wrong and nothing has happened since to suggest that this advice needs to be reviewed.
I am not convinced that NAO scrutiny would be more effective than the current system which includes the following elements: the Secretary of State appoints the CAA’s auditors; the Secretary of State places the CAA’s accounts before Parliament; the Secretary of State approves the CAA’s borrowing and sets its required rate of return on capital; the Secretary of State appoints the CAA’s chair and non-executive board members; the CAA’s audit committee is made up of non-executive members who are appointed by the Secretary of State; and the CAA consults on its fees and will be required to do so under the changes set out in Clause 100. In addition, over the period 2001 to 2011, the CAA reduced its operating costs in real terms by 20%. I note that some noble Lords suggested additional functions or capability that the CAA should acquire.
Following discussion in another place on 25 April in the Bill Committee, the Minister, my right honourable friend Theresa Villiers, announced a new non-legislative measure to increase the transparency of the CAA’s moves towards greater efficiency. On an annual basis, the Department for Transport issues a report direction and an accounts direction to the CAA specifying the matters that should be addressed in the authority’s annual report and accounts. From 2013 onwards, the Secretary of State will strengthen the scrutiny of the CAA by including in the annual directions a requirement to include an efficiency statement in the annual report.
I am grateful for the contribution from my noble friend Lord Trefgarne about general aviation. The primary duty will be capable of capturing general aviation interests where they are aligned with the interests of users of air transport services. Broadly speaking, users of transport services will be passengers and freight owners using air services to and from the UK—including future users. In so far as owners of small aircraft fall within this, they will be covered. It can also be noted that only around 0.1% of flights at regulated airports comprise general aviation.
My noble friend Lord Jenkin of Roding raised concern that an airline right of appeal touching on an airport’s financial arrangements would seriously inhibit the airport’s ability to raise finances. The noble Lord, Lord Soley, and my noble friend Lord Bradshaw raised similar concerns. The Government remain of the opinion that there are good reasons to include financial resilience licence conditions, with appropriate derogations where these cut across existing financing. We also remain of the opinion that the broad rights of appeal in the Bill provide an effective means of improving the accountability of key regulatory decisions and enable the interest of both airport operators and materially affected airlines to be taken into account in the licence process.
We believe that it is correct that the right of appeal extends to financial resilience licence conditions. Any dispute as to whether a derogation would cause a breach of the existing financial arrangements is most likely to arise from questions of law over the true construction of a loan agreement and/or licence condition. These could ultimately be resolved through judicial review and, in the mean time, an airport operator could seek an injunction to preserve the status quo. Markets should therefore be reassured that the risk of existing creditor protection in an airport operator’s funding structure being unintentionally removed, triggering an event of default, is extremely unlikely. Investors are experienced in managing regulatory uncertainty in their normal course of lending to the regulated sector and we would expect them to manage this situation as well. However, I know how strongly BAA feels about the issue and I will be meeting with it shortly.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised issues about staff in the event of the transfer of security functions from the Department for Transport to the CAA. It is important to ensure that the CAA has the skills and resources to undertake its new security functions. The Government are working to a plan that would aim for the CAA to take on the aviation security regulation function from the spring of 2014. The Government hope that existing staff will want to continue working in the security environment, but if any of them decide to move elsewhere, there will be enough time to manage this.
The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, raised the issue of aviation safety standards. The UK is a signatory to the Chicago convention and is required by the ICAO to have in place a state safety programme to achieve an acceptable level of safety in civil aviation. The Civil Aviation Bill currently before Parliament does not deal with safety issues as there is already sufficient European and international legislation in place which addresses them.
The noble Countess, Lady Mar, raised the issue of organophosphates. This is a separate matter and one of research rather than legislation. I am pleased to be able to tell the House that the last piece of research that your Lordships asked the Department for Transport to commission, under successive Governments, into allegations regarding airplane cabin air quality, has now been completed and published. All the published research studies have now been formally referred to the Committee on Toxicity, the independent adviser to the Government on matters concerning the toxicity of chemicals, for it to consider.
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his comments. Does he agree that there is a serious problem in that the Civil Aviation Authority is responsible for people in an aeroplane both when it is on the ground and when it is in flight, but it does not impose health and safety regulations, as would be the case with the Health and Safety Executive? It looks after people on an airport site who are not in aeroplanes, but does not consider the COSHH regulations. Numerous Questions for Written Answer have been tabled on this issue, but no one takes responsibility for the passengers, pilots or aircrew.
My Lords, the noble Countess will recognise that these are complex matters. I will write to her on all the points she raised.
The noble Lord, Lord Soley, asked if the Bill will cover military airports and whether they could be exempted under Clause 77. In certain circumstances, military airports can be exempted from economic regulation under Chapter 1 and Clause 77.
My noble friend Lord Bradshaw was concerned about the market power test set out in Clause 6. His specific concern was that unless an airport operator has market power, it should not be regulated. I would like to reassure my noble friend that, under the Bill, where an airport does not and is unlikely to acquire substantial market power, it will not be made subject to economic regulation. It is a specific requirement of the market power test in Clause 6.
The noble Lord, Lord Rogan, talked about the aviation needs of Northern Ireland. The Government and the Civil Aviation Authority have no role in the slot allocation process. EC regulations established a mechanism for the allocation of slots at congested airports. This has been transposed into UK law under the Airports Slot Allocation Regulations 2006, which came into effect on 1 January 2007. Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester and London City airports are all designated by the Secretary of State for Transport as co-ordinated airports with their slot allocations managed by Airport Coordination Limited, an independent company which has powers under the UK regulations to monitor the conformity of air carriers’ operations with the slots allocated to them, and to take enforcement action against those airlines that do not operate according to the regulations, in particular by introducing sanctions for slot misuse. The ring-fencing of slots at Heathrow to protect regional services, other than where a public service obligation has been implemented, would be incompatible with EU law. The UK has highlighted the issue of regional connectivity with the European Commission in the context of the current reform of the EU slot regulations and is exploring the scope for including measures to help secure the ongoing provision of air services between UK regions and congested London airports. Beginning this summer, Commission working groups will examine the slot proposals, and I commend the work of the noble Lord, Lord Empey, who has been extremely active and effective in Brussels.
The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Davies of Stamford, commented on the UK Border Force. It is not covered by the Civil Aviation Bill and is accountable to Ministers and Parliament as a Home Office agency. Queues at airports are caused by many factors, including the border force receiving incorrect flight manifests and early or late airplane arrivals, resulting in bunching. The Minister for Immigration and Citizenship is reviewing what additional data may be published by the Home Office and shared with port operators. Meanwhile, the UK Border Force has responded to recent problems with queues in a number of ways. It is tackling short-term peaks with a pool of trained staff, and working with airports and airlines to ensure that they provide more accurate passenger manifests and flight schedules so that the force can flexibly deploy staff at the right times and in the right places. It is creating a new central control room for the UK Border Force at Heathrow that will use mobile teams for rapid deployment, and it will implement new rostering and shift patterns. It is also working with Gatwick and Heathrow airports to improve passenger flows using more specific measures such as e-gates and other biometric checks.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked why there is no obligation on the CAA to require airports to develop passenger welfare plans. The indicative licence prepared by the CAA included, at the request of the Department for Transport, an example condition that would strengthen an airport’s resilience where appropriate. The proposals contained in Condition 7 require the licence holder to operate the airport efficiently and to use its “best endeavours” to minimise any detriment to passengers arising from disruption. It would also require the airport to draw up, consult on and gain the CAA’s approval for an annual resilience plan setting out how it will secure compliance with its obligations under the condition. The licence holder would be obliged to comply with the commitments it has made in its resilience plan.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Chesterton, mentioned the issue of the difference in the quality of the air between first and economy class. The air is the same throughout an aircraft. First class seats and economy class seats are usually separated by a curtain, which is not an airtight medium.