Health and Social Care

Debate between Christopher Chope and Robert Walter

Monday 13th May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robert Walter (North Dorset) (Con)]

I would like to talk on two issues that, although not included in the Queen’s Speech, will come before the House in this Session, one of which needs to be addressed with some urgency.

In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Britain’s automatic blanket ban on the right of prisoners to exercise their vote was incompatible with the convention on human rights, of which we are a signatory. Almost eight years on, the United Kingdom has still not acted on that ruling and time is running short. The Government must submit their response to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers by 30 September. We have less than five months to prepare and present a formula that will be not only satisfactory to the Committee, but acceptable to Parliament and credible in the eyes of the British public.

I would like to state from the outset that I disagree with the ECHR ruling. I believe that the current ban on prisoner voting, which was ruled on and reinforced by successive Parliaments, is a proper and proportionate response following conviction and imprisonment, and I spoke and voted accordingly when the House last debated this matter. I repeat that to my mind the right to vote is not an intrinsic right, but a civic duty reserved for responsible citizens. However, we cannot talk of individual duty and responsibility in the eyes of the law while shirking our national obligations to uphold the international rule of law, one of the basic tenets of British foreign policy. Here is the troubling paradox: if, as the old maxim goes, no man is above the law, surely no country is either. I welcome the fact that this Government, unlike their predecessors, have recognised this responsibility, and I am pleased that the draft Bill on prisoner voting has been presented and that a Joint Committee will consider its options, but I am concerned that matters are progressing slowly against a swiftly approaching deadline and that we are not making a strong enough case for a pragmatic solution.

If the Government choose to maintain the status quo, we will stand in breach of the convention. If we ignore the judgment, we send the message that dissent is an acceptable state of play, and we would damage our reputation and lose the moral authority to demand compliance from those countries that persistently violate international law. Do we want our record on observing the rule of law compared with that of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia? It would be neither right nor desirable, but a solution might be closer to home than we think.

Before the blanket ban came into force under the Representation of the People Act 1969, limited forms of prisoner voting were permissible and even practised. The Forfeiture Act 1870 disqualified convicted felons from voting, but only those serving a sentence exceeding 12 months. Felons serving less than 12 months could legally vote, and where it was practically and logistically possible, some indeed did. In the 1950 general election, for example, postal ballots were returned from prisoners in jails across the country.

There is more. When the Criminal Law Act 1967 abolished the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours, the concomitant disqualification on prisoner voting came temporarily to an end. In fact, all prisoners could vote. In effect, these prisoners had the right to vote, and it might surprise people that this was not an unintended consequence of the legislation, but a conscious decision based on a recommendation by a law review committee that the practice of prisoner disfranchisement should not continue.

That policy continued until a ban was introduced in 1969 under the Representation of the People Act, but the point is that the issue was not historically set in stone—not under the Forfeiture Act and not when the United Kingdom signed the convention in 1950—so past precedents should lead the way. To this end, the Government’s proposals on minimum thresholds are worthy of consideration, as they reflect an approach that was deemed compatible with UK law, public opinion and the convention, but we need to step up the dialogue.

How, then, do we move forward? I believe that the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours is obsolete, but the classification of crimes into indictable and summary offences, which distinguishes between grades of crime, mode of trial and punishment available, continues to apply. Like the old felonies, the most serious indictable crimes are tried before a Crown court, and I believe that this distinction could be used as a building block for a sentence-based solution that recognises the gravity of an offence committed. This is a route that we should consider, and the United Kingdom now has an advantage: the European Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to allowing the UK greater flexibility in how we apply the ruling, providing an opportunity to develop a policy that reconciles both principle with pragmatism and which allows our past to pave the way forward.

[Mr Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

I think my hon. Friend has made a constructive contribution, but would he accept that what he is saying is totally at odds with what the people of this country believe? They do not want prisoners to have the vote and they do not see why European judges should be bossing them around and telling them otherwise.

Inter-Parliamentary Scrutiny (EU Foreign, Defence and Security Policy)

Debate between Christopher Chope and Robert Walter

Thursday 10th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Walter]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention, although I think it goes a little beyond the scope of the motion. However, we and the Assembly of which I have the honour to be president are dealing with what are almost entirely intergovernmental structures consisting of European Union member states and other states in Europe such as Turkey, which has been mentioned several times, Norway or Iceland. We come together as willing partners in collective defence and security operations. Community institutions are not in any way relevant to our debate today; we are debating intergovernmental functions that are entered into freely.

My final point on the Foreign Affairs Committee report relates to the reference to the EU Speakers’ Conference, which will take place in April. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee has already referred to the Belgian text—Belgium holds the EU presidency—which proposes an inter-parliamentary conference for common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy, composed of delegations of the national Parliaments of EU member states. Paragraph 2 of that text suggests:

“Each national parliamentary delegation shall consist of four members.”

Paragraph 3 requests that

“The total number of delegates from the European Parliament shall not exceed one third of the members of the Conference.”

Therefore, if there are 108 members from national Parliaments, there will be 54 from the European Parliament.

On a reasonably rough approximation the UK and France together contribute around 60% of Europe’s defence budget, and we will have eight votes between us. However, the European Parliament, which makes absolutely no contribution to Europe’s defence budget, has no troops at its disposal, does not buy any aircraft carriers or other warships, aircraft or fighters, and has no troops deployed anywhere in the world, will have 54 votes. Is that the right proportion in terms of democratic accountability? I hasten to suggest that it is probably an imbalance. I am not averse to the European Parliament having some role and that its voice should be heard, but the presumption that its voice should somehow be considerably greater than that of the United Kingdom, France and others that contribute to Europe’s defence is nonsense.

The Belgian text goes on to suggest:

“The Conference shall have its seat in the European Parliament in Brussels. Meetings shall be organized twice a year in Brussels or in the country holding the rotating Council Presidency…The meetings shall jointly be presided over by the national Parliament of the Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency and the European Parliament.”

That means that responsibility is now to be divided 50:50. Paragraph 9 proposes:

“The secretariat of the Conference shall be provided by the European Parliament.”

The agenda will be set by the European Parliament, the conference will meet in the European Parliament and one third of the conference’s members will be Members of the European Parliament. My view is that that body will simply be an extraordinary meeting of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee: twice a year, it will invite Members of national Parliaments to come along to Brussels to hear what it has been doing. It will not be exercising genuine parliamentary scrutiny.

[Mr Chope]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Does he accept that what is proposed is inconsistent with article 10 of protocol 1 of the treaty on the European Union, which mentions a conference of parliamentary committees submitting contributions for the attention of the European Parliament? That is completely different from what is being proposed by the Belgian presidency.

[Mr Walter]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I do not want to become too legalistic, but I will refer to a number of principles that I and colleagues have laid down that suggest we should have a much stronger inter-parliamentary standing conference. The principles on which we based that suggestion are all entirely consistent with the Lisbon treaty, which I know my hon. Friend and others were not enthusiasts for; none the less it is where we are.

Article 12 of the Lisbon treaty states:

“National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union.”

Article 10 of protocol states:

“A conference”—

which my hon. Friend has just referred to—

“of Parliamentary Committees for Union affairs may…organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy.”

The most important words in the treaty are in declaration 14, which states:

“The Conference also notes that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not…increase the role of the European Parliament.”

In fact, the European Parliament has therefore no new competence as a result of the Lisbon treaty, but if we read the Parliament’s documents we find that it assumes that it does have that new role. Even if it does not, it is jolly well going to grab it and take it, because national Parliaments are doing nothing about it. That is why we need a strong functioning body. Madam Deputy Speaker, I know that you do not propose to call my amendment, but the spirit of my proposal was that we should have a much stronger body than that which the Foreign Affairs Committee proposes.

We propose a standing conference of inter-parliamentary representatives, which would carry on the work of the European Security and Defence Assembly, the Assembly of the Western European Union, enabling us to have effective inter-parliamentary scrutiny that would embrace at least the ground that it covered and include the five non-EU European NATO members, who provide considerable support to the work of the European Union and, collectively, to European defence.

We believe that that inter-parliamentary standing conference could be based in Brussels. It could have been based in Paris, but the Minister tells us that we are going to sell the building, so it cannot. The conference’s prime role would be to engage on European foreign affairs and defence issues with the Council of the European Union, its supporting and executive agencies, member Governments and Parliaments as appropriate. Recommendations and opinions would be made, but they would not necessarily bind national Parliaments.

The Council of the European Union, and especially the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, would make regular reports to that standing conference.