House of Commons Business

Debate between Christopher Chope and Angela Eagle

Thursday 8th May 2014 Commons Chamber

[Ms Eagle]

That is an important point. In this House, simply because the Government normally have a majority and because timetabling exists, there is the capacity for Bills pass through their stages fairly quickly. No such capacity exists in the other place, and the Government of the day are therefore tempted to try to get their Bills through this House as rapidly as possible and then fix them in the other House. That is a real problem when the other House is not democratic. I think that we must see what we can do to improve the capacity of this House to scrutinise legislation, albeit in the context of the generally accepted view that, in the British political system, the Government should be allowed to secure their legislation. The Opposition and other Members ought to be allowed to scrutinise Bills adequately as well, and it is with that balance that we are wrestling now.

Another issue that I raised in a letter to the Chair of the Procedure Committee about the proposed trial is the importance of giving Opposition parties enough time to respond to Government amendments when they are tabled. I know the Government say that they try to table amendments a week before the deadline, but that happens too infrequently. Perhaps the Deputy Leader of the House will tell us whether he would consider extending the trial and giving the Government a deadline perhaps a day before that given to other Members, so that opposition Members—be they small groups of Government Members, large groups of Government Members, or members of the Official Opposition—have a chance to respond to Government amendments in a sensible way.

The final motion proposes changes to Standing Order No. 33, which relates to amendments to the Queen’s Speech. To date, Mr Speaker, you have had discretion to decide which amendments will be called in the debate following the Queen’s Speech, which sets out the Government’s legislative programme for the parliamentary Session. The amendment to the Standing Order proposes to change that by limiting the number of amendments that you may call to four. That extends by one the number to which the Government were originally determined to limit you, and it represents a welcome Government climbdown in the face of a likely defeat. We naturally support it, with good grace and, perhaps, a little snigger.

I am sure that Members will recall last year’s Queen’s Speech, when nearly 100 Conservative Eurosceptic Back Benchers tabled an amendment to “respectfully regret” their own Government’s legislative programme, and 130 Members backed it in what was a humiliating blow to the Prime Minister’s authority. The amendment forced the Prime Minister to commit to legislating for a referendum in this Parliament on possible European Union treaty changes which have not yet even been talked about and which may or may not happen. This shows we have a Prime Minister who is more interested in managing his own unruly party than acting in Britain’s national interest, but it also demonstrates that his own Back Benchers are running scared of UKIP and do not believe a word he says on Europe.

In the light of last year’s debacle, it is no wonder the Government are so keen to limit the number of Queen’s Speech amendments and it is ironic that the threat of mutiny on their Back Benches, supported by the Opposition, is what forced the Leader of the House to concede that he should now perhaps agree with the Procedure Committee’s figure of four, rather than his original number of three.

[Mr Chope]

If the hon. Lady is so concerned about this, why did the Opposition not table a blocking motion to the original Government proposal, which would have gone through on the nod if it had not been for my blocking motion?

[Ms Eagle]

I cannot recall the intricacies of what happened. The hon. Gentleman is always assiduous in these things, but I think there was somebody on the Labour Benches who objected at the same time. The hon. Gentleman has a very loud voice and has a lot more practice in objecting to these motions than almost anyone else in the House, which is why he probably got his objection in first.

I accept that the Leader of the House has now backed down on this, and because he has, we are happy to accept the motion before us today, which will limit, for now, the number of amendments to four. I listened with interest to the earlier debate about how that might change and I welcome the Leader of the House’s admission that if the composition of the House were to change or the circumstances of a future Parliament were different, Standing Order No. 33 may once again come under the microscope. At least he has accepted the inevitable and changed his motion, and because of that we are more than happy to support him should there be a vote today.

Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill (Joint Committee)

Debate between Christopher Chope and Angela Eagle

Tuesday 16th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

I rise to support the motion on the draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill and the Joint Committee therein, and to oppose the amendment.

The first thing to say is that the draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill is a highly contentious piece of legislation. The Bill will offer the choice of three options for Parliament to consider on prisoner voting: a blanket ban on all prisoners having the vote; entitling prisoners serving four years or less to the vote; or entitling prisoners serving six months or less to the vote. It is crucial that legislation as contentious as this be given extensive pre-legislative scrutiny. We on the Opposition side thus support the establishment of a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to scrutinise for a period of six months the proposals in this Bill.

I believe that the decision to pursue the scrutiny of the draft legislation by the means of a Joint Committee of both Houses is perfectly reasonable given the nature of the Bill under consideration, and given the fact that it contains different options on prisoner voting for Parliament to consider. Since 2010, 10 Joint Committees of both Houses have been set up to scrutinise draft Bills. These Committees have tended to be used to scrutinise the most complex pieces of legislation, including on the detention of terror suspects and the reform of the House of Lords. They have also been deployed where Government policy is still to be formed in detail or where cross-party agreement is felt to be crucial to the success of the proposals. Labour Members welcome the establishment of a Joint Committee to scrutinise this particular draft Bill, which I suspect falls into all of those categories at once and has probably managed to create some entirely new ones of its own.

I believe that it is also right in this instance that the membership of this Joint Committee should be decided in the usual way via the Committee of Selection. It is important that the Joint Committee be filled by Members of both Houses and of both parties who possess the necessary skills and expertise to scrutinise the Bill fully. While I acknowledge that some in this House believe that everything that emanates from the Whips Office of any party is somehow hopelessly tainted, I have to say that I do not share this analysis. I do not think that the usual channels are inherently tainted; in fact, they often work extremely well.

I make that observation as someone who in my years in this House has both served in the Whips Office and voted against the Whip—not at the same time, I hasten to add. I have also been elected as vice-chair of the parliamentary committee for the Labour party and on the Labour party’s national executive committee against the wishes of this supposedly “all-powerful” Whips Office—so they do not always get their way. It follows that I do not believe that it is necessarily always virtuous if the House bypasses the Whips Office. Deciding to bypass the Whips Office simply because one wishes to bypass the Whips Office is not an argument for changing the way we do things in this instance.

In the circumstances, I am content for the members of the proposed Joint Committee to be selected by the Committee of Selection. I think that it would be odd for us to change the procedure on a one-off basis for the purpose of this particular Joint Committee, and I agree with the Leader of the House that the Wright Committee did not suggest such a reform in its report. I understand that the Procedure Committee and its Chairman, the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), recently announced that they planned to conduct an inquiry into the operation of the Committee of Selection in the coming year. I suspect that the Leader of the House and I may be approached to give evidence to that Committee.

[Mr Christopher Chope (Christchurch) (Con)]

Is the hon. Lady surprised that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) supports my amendment?

[Ms Eagle]

I am somewhat surprised. Although I would never criticise an hon. Member, I should have thought that if the Chairman of the Procedure Committee wished to look into the way in which the Committee of Selection works, he might want to hear the evidence before putting his own views on record. However, he is his own very competent man, and he has his own views on these matters. I hope that he will also have an open mind when the Procedure Committee looks into how we might sensibly change the way in which the Committee of Selection works. I look forward to the work that it will devote to the subject.

Dissolution of Parliament

Debate between Christopher Chope and Angela Eagle

Tuesday 25th May 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Chope]

I do not think that the hon. Gentleman is correct constitutionally to say that the Prime Minister has the power to call the general election. He has the power to recommend to the sovereign that an election be called. The sovereign has the constitutional right to say, “No, I do not think the time is right for a general election. I think that another group of people are willing and able to form a Government and therefore I will not call a general election.” I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on putting forward the argument in support of the Government.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Gentleman confirm my reading of the situation that, as a result of the 55% rule, the mathematics of the current Parliament mean that an early general election could be called, regardless of a pledge to have a five-year Parliament, if both of the member parties of the Government coalition decided that they wanted an election, as between them the two parties can muster more than 55% of MPs?

[Mr Chope]

The hon. Lady makes a fair point and has thought through the possible implications of this. She may be aware of the German precedent, as referred to in some of the excellent briefing provided by our fantastic Library. The most recent German precedent—there have been others—was where the partners in a German coalition Government decided that it would suit their joint interests effectively to engineer a general election. A vote of no confidence was called in which a number of the coalition partners’ Members of Parliament abstained, thereby ensuring that the vote of no confidence was carried against the Government. That triggered an election in circumstances that wholly suited the purposes of the coalition. That was despite the fact that in German law there is provision for fixed-term Parliaments. The hon. Lady raises an important point, which along with similar points will I am sure be looked at in detail if and when we get any legislation on this subject.

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[Ms Angela Eagle]

The hon. Gentleman has made precisely the right point in respect of the Scottish Parliament, but will he also therefore agree that the 66% that has been prayed in aid was agreed by all parties and became part of a consensus before the Parliament existed?

[Mr Chope]

I have not gone into the detail of that, but I am sure the hon. Lady is correct.

All of this brings me to chapter 24 of the coalition agreement, which states that the Government believe that it is necessary to make

“changes to our political system to make it far more transparent and accountable.”

The chapter continues:

“We will establish five-year fixed-term Parliaments. We will put a binding motion before the House of Commons stating that the next general election will be held on the first Thursday of May 2015. Following this motion, we will legislate to make provision for fixed-term Parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the House votes in favour.”

It is because of the various ambiguities in that passage that I thought it would be a good idea to explore these matters in this Adjournment debate.

I have set out a number of questions to ask. I am sure that many others could be asked as well, but the following are the questions that immediately came to mind when I looked at the wording of chapter 24. What is meant by a “binding motion”? Surely any motion that is passed can later be amended or revoked by Members of this House? Will this binding motion also be put before the House of Lords; will it need to be approved by both Houses? Will the binding motion include reference to the proposed 55% threshold for Dissolution, or will that be dealt with later in the proposed primary legislation? Will the binding motion be brought before the House before the summer recess? It was stated in the original draft coalition agreement that this motion would be put

“before the House of Commons in the first days following this agreement”,

but those words are omitted from the final version. Does this indicate a welcome ingredient of consultation and opportunity for full debate inside and outside the House, in the context of our commitment to more transparency and accountability? I hope that the Deputy Leader of the House will be able to confirm that that is the correct interpretation to put upon that change of wording.

Will the legislation that is promised in the coalition document to make provision for

“fixed-term Parliaments of five years”

only apply to future Parliaments, or will it apply retrospectively to the Parliament elected on 6 May 2010? If it is going to be retrospective legislation, how can that be justified constitutionally?

What is meant by the following statement in the coalition document:

“This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55 per cent or more of the House votes in favour”?

Does the 55% figure mean 55% of those voting on any motion, or 55% of those eligible to vote, or 55% of all MPs elected at the 2010 general election, including Sinn Fein Members and you yourself, Mr Speaker? What role, if any, will there be for the House of Lords in the legislation?

Will Members other than the Government be able to move a motion for Dissolution? If so, what safeguards will there be to require the Speaker to give such a motion precedence over ordinary business? Those of us who have been in the House some time know that it is all very well having a motion on the Order Paper. Indeed, during the last Parliament, there were motions reflecting decisions taken across the House in important debates on future House business and our organisation of our affairs, yet the then Leader of the House refused to put those motions above the line on the Order Paper, thereby preventing Members of the House from voting on them, even though, collectively, we were in a majority. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome and I were seething with frustration and anger about that, so I am sure he would not wish us to be in a similar situation under this new regime.

Will there be constraints on the Government’s tabling a motion for Dissolution? That point was raised in an intervention. I mentioned Germany, and an example of how something that on the face of it seems plausible could actually be cynically used for the self-interest of a coalition Government when they see that their opponents are in a particularly weak situation.

In what circumstances will a Dissolution follow if the Government are defeated on a confidence motion by a bare majority? There has been a lot of debate about that outside, and perhaps some confusion and misunderstanding, which I hope can be cleared up this evening. Are there any circumstances in which a Government defeated on a confidence motion could remain in office? If they did not remain in office could an alternative minority Government be formed even if they did not enjoy the support of a majority of MPs on confidence and supply measures? What would prevent Parliament from repealing by a vote of 50% plus one legislation requiring a 55% threshold for Dissolution?

I shall expand on some of those points in a minute, but I now turn to some fundamental procedural questions. Will the proposed legislation to establish a fixed-term Parliament and a 55% threshold for Dissolution be published first in draft, and be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny? When we were, collectively, in opposition, we were very much in favour of draft Bills and pre-legislative scrutiny. There could be no more critically important constitutional legislation than the proposals we are talking about this evening.

Will the Government set up a special Joint Committee of both Houses to consider the matter, along the lines of the Joint Committee on the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill in the last Parliament? My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House—I am delighted to see him on the Treasury Bench—and I were privileged to serve on the Committee. It drew on expertise not only from this House but from the other place; for example, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, who has recently written on the subject in The Times, gave some important evidence and his counsels were very well received. Such a Committee would be a sensible way forward.

My next question is for my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House: will all these important and novel matters—which were not raised in the Conservative manifesto at the general election, when we said we were in favour of more free votes—be the subject of free votes for all Conservative Back Benchers? That would take quite a lot of heat out of the situation, because it would then be obvious that in order to win parliamentary support for these novel propositions, my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench would need to win not only the votes, but the arguments. A free vote would, I submit, be useful; indeed, it might be a good example of the new politics in action. To balance that out, I ask the Deputy Leader of the House why, when a fixed term of four years was proposed in the Liberal Democrat manifesto, we are now talking about a five-year fixed-term Parliament.

Some of those questions and others were raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) in an article in one of the national newspapers, and in other media outlets. He has said that he is sad that he is not able to participate in this debate, but he has been kind enough to share with me the response that he received to a letter that he wrote to the Prime Minister. It might help the House if I quoted from it a little. Members will make their own judgment about whether it clarifies or obscures what we are talking about. It says:

“I do take on board your concerns about our suggested proposal to require a 55 per cent majority to dissolve Parliament. Let me set out why I think this is an important, progressive and necessary step.

As we know from last week, the country wants strong and stable government.”

I do not want to pour cold water on anything that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister says, but I thought that in the general election campaign we were saying that the only way to deliver strong and stable government was for the Government to have an overall majority in Parliament. Indeed, I can remember distributing leaflets that were strongly against the threat of a hung Parliament, and which said that if we had a hung Parliament, there would be deals done behind closed doors; that nobody would know what was happening; that hon. Members of this House would be the last people to know what was going on; and that the country’s economic crisis demanded strong and stable government, and that is why we needed a Conservative Government with a strong majority. I still believe that proposition, and that is what I was campaigning for.

I disagree with the Prime Minister’s interpretation of what the country wanted, because the country voted for a hung Parliament. The essence of a hung Parliament—this is important for those of us who have the privilege of being Members of this Parliament—is that it is not a strong Government, but a strong Parliament. A strong Parliament is one that can hold the Executive or the Government to account. It means that we can put pressure on the Government if we disagree with them, whether on relatively minor matters such as the details of Bills, or on slightly more important matters, such as those that we are discussing this evening.

A strong Parliament and a strong Government are two separate propositions. My interpretation of the fact that we have a hung Parliament is that the people decided to have a strong Parliament. I am privileged to be a Member of this Parliament, and I hope that it will be known in due course as the strong Parliament, rather than be given the epithets that the previous Parliament was given.

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[Ms Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. What does he think about the propriety of attempting to change a long held, easy-to-understand mathematical concept of 50% plus one, simply to deal with anticipated issues in a coalition? Would it not be better for there to be open statements from the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister about their intentions, instead of this extremely convoluted—and, I think, quite improper—way of proceeding?

[Mr Chope]

I would not say at this stage that it is an improper way of proceeding, because these are very early days. This is the first Adjournment debate of this Parliament, and the first on this very subject. Many hon. Members, particularly Labour ones, have already raised the issue in their contributions to the Queen’s Speech debate, and I have not seen what amendments there will be to the Queen’s Speech.

I go back to the questions that I posed at the beginning. These are fundamentally important constitutional issues, and they should be referred soberly to a Joint Committee of this House and to any other Select Committee that wants to look into them. Evidence should be taken from constitutional experts and from the experts in our own House who are ready and available to assist us. We have already heard from Peter Hennessey, who thinks that this is of dubious constitutional propriety. I am no expert on the constitution, but I can see when a problem is in danger of arising, and we are in danger of getting ourselves into a mess in this regard. The last thing I want is for my party and the Government whom my party support to be put in a position where they can be subject to accusations by the hon. Member for Wallasey (Ms Eagle) and other Opposition Members that we have dealt with matters unfairly. I can imagine what it would have been like if I had been on her side of the House and she had been on my side and, immediately after a general election in which the matter had not been raised in debate, the Government said, “We think that we’re now going to change the arrangements for the Dissolution of Parliament.” I would have needed quite a lot of persuading; certainly, I would have wanted to have a lot of debate about it.

I fear that I have indulged myself by going on at greater length than I had intended, but I ask this question: am I wrong to be concerned that in the euphoria following the general election, this House may be seduced by the Executive into giving up its collective and powerful deterrent weapon for defeating and bringing down the Government? The Government seem to be seeking, essentially, a guaranteed five-year term of office—a five-year Government dressed up as a five-year Parliament. I hope that I am absolutely wrong in my concerns about that. However, I think that there is a flaw running through the argument that has been put so far in support of this proposal—that is, an inability to understand the difference between a strong Parliament and a strong Government. I look forward to hearing the response—a full response, I hope—from the Deputy Leader of the House.