Investigatory Powers Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Christian Matheson and Suella Braverman

Thursday 24th March 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Suella Fernandes]

Q Evidence was given to the Joint Committee by Sir Stanley Burnton, the Interception of Communications Commissioner, and Lord Judge, the Chief Surveillance Commissioner. Both said that the double lock involves an intensive analysis including analyses of necessity and proportionality. It is not simply rubber-stamping. Again, do you maintain your disagreement with those senior judges?

Sara Ogilvie: I respect and agree with the fact that an extent of necessity and proportionality analysis will be done, but there is still very limited capacity for judges and judicial commissioners to undertake this exercise. We have seen, and judicial review case law tells us, what level of scrutiny can be applied to different kinds of decision, and we know that where a decision does not involve a restriction on the physical liberty of an individual, a lesser scale of judicial review scrutiny will be applied.

We also know that where cases involve national security, judges must apply a lesser level of review. Although I recognise that there is a difference of views, I think it needs to be much clearer in the legislation. Judicial review should be avoided as a standard in this circumstance.

[Christian Matheson]

Q I will ask only one question. Mr King, you talked about the astonishing amount and huge volumes of data that are collected. Can you both comment on the statement that the sheer volume of information means that there is less of a threat to personal privacy, simply because individuals’ personal data are almost swamped within the mass of data collected?

Eric King: It is an interesting idea, isn’t it, that the more widespread the intrusion, the less potentially bad it is. That is not a view that I can understand myself, particularly now. Computer analytics of such material is going to increase. It is going to get better and faster. The more data being collected, the more intrusion will be applied year on year as GCHQ engineers find cheaper, better and faster ways to process it. Perhaps five years ago, swamping agencies with material might have resulted in people passing through, but every day, that becomes less likely and less real.

We have seen in the last five years a 7,000% increase inside GCHQ of the analytical capability on material. That means that 7,000% more material is being touched, analysed and scrutinised by those agencies. Perhaps it was an idea that could be comprehended 20 years ago, when it involved physical piles of paper that no one ever looked at, but now it is all being automated, and I am not sure that the notion stands up today.

Sara Ogilvie: I clearly agree with what Eric has said. The only thing I would add is that I ask you to consider the fact that we are not just concerned about the state having this information. All this information that is stored somewhere can be accessed by other individuals for nefarious purposes. We have seen the TalkTalk hacks this year. We have seen the VTech hacks. There are real and legitimate concerns about the way this vast amount of personal information can be used, not just by the state but by other people who really do wish to do us harm.