Trade Union Bill (Ninth sitting)

Chris Stephens Excerpts

Tuesday 27th October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, may I ask everybody to ensure that all electronic devices are switched off or in silent mode? We will now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill.

[Chris Stephens (Glasgow South West) (SNP)]

On a point of order, Sir Alan. I apologise to the shadow Minister for intervening at this stage. The Standing Orders of the House were changed on Thursday in terms of what is referred to as English votes for English laws. Can you advise, Sir Alan, if those Standing Orders apply to any clauses of the Bill or any amendments to it?

[The Chair]

I have to inform the hon. Gentleman that the changes are not in being yet. It is a proposal that is not as yet completed, so it therefore does not apply in this case and certainly not to this legislation.

Clause 13

Reserve powers

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 101, in clause 13, page 9, line 31, at end insert—

‘(c) Save that no such regulation shall have the effect of altering, in respect of any of the matters to which the reserve powers may be directed, any provision of a contract of employment or a collective agreement or of limiting an employer’s discretion as to the contents of contracts of employment or collective agreements to which the employer is a party”.

It is good to be back under your chairmanship, Sir Alan, for what I hope is the last day of our line-by-line consideration of the Bill. I am sure, given the number of inconsistencies and problems that have been exposed during the course of our debates, that we are all looking forward to coming back to the Bill on Report to raise those concerns again.

Clause 13 proposes further regulation of facility time by the extension of a very wide-ranging reserve power of Ministers of the Crown. I do not wish to detain the Committee unnecessarily by repeating the fundamental arguments for why facility time is so important; I simply draw the Committee’s attention to my previous remarks. I believe there is a serious problem with the nature of the power proposed in clause 13 and how it cuts across the devolution settlement, as was touched on in the point of order from the hon. Member for Glasgow South West.

Under current legislation, trade union workplace representatives have a right to reasonable paid time off to perform certain duties. As we have previously discussed, that has huge benefits for employees and employers alike. The clause could allow the Government to cap the percentage of the employer’s pay bill that is invested in facility time. It will give the Government the power to impose an arbitrary limit on the amount of time that public sector union officials can spend on facility work during working hours. That might be time spent on negotiating improved pay and conditions; training, as outlined in section 168 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992; promoting learning opportunities as union learning reps under section 168A of the 1992 Act, which the Minister said he was very supportive of; accompanying individuals in grievance and disciplinary hearings, under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999, which is a very important function that I have been involved in; or on health and safety duties and training, under the regulations made under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.

The potential consequences of this are deeply concerning. The Government have not set out exactly which of those duties they seek to cap or which particular sectors the clause will apply to. They are leaving themselves a very wide-ranging power for intervening. They say, as they have so often told us, “Trust us, we’re the Ministers,” but that is simply not good enough when it comes to such important matters.

The clause is particularly troubling to Opposition Members because it establishes a clear democratic deficit in three main areas. First, the provisions will mean that Government Ministers can use as yet unseen secondary legislation to push through restrictions or repeal trade union rights contained in primary legislation. While hon. Members on both sides of the Committee recognise the important role that secondary legislation plays, many would also accept that it gives Parliament less opportunity to debate and amend such regulations than would otherwise be the case.

Secondly, the provisions could prevent public sector employers, including in Scotland and Wales who have responsibility for a number of wholly devolved areas of public service provision and who have their own democratic mandate, from deciding how to manage employment relations in their workplace and how to engage with their staff.

Thirdly, the provisions mean that the Government can be selective as to which public and local authorities may be forced to impose a cap, introducing an element of significant discrimination on quite wide-ranging powers to behave in a very partisan and nakedly political way over these matters.

There are significant questions about the legality of such a change. We heard during the oral evidence stage from Professor Ewing, the Welsh and Scottish Governments and others, about the potential contraventions that the Bill provides. There is a risk that the proposal for a cap could conflict with EU law which protects the rights of health and safety representatives to paid time for their duties and training; the rights of trade union representatives to paid time off and office facilities during consultations on collective redundancies and outsourcing under their TUPE rights; and even under general information and consultation arrangements covered by the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations.

The measures also represent a significant attack on rights that are protected by the European convention on human rights and ILO conventions. We have many questions about the clause. I hope that the Minister can explain what legal advice he has taken on the question of whether the proposal for a cap conflicts with EU law, with TUPE rights and with the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004. I would like him to be very specific on those three points.

We had a partial debate about the clause in our discussion of clause 12, and I was intrigued by some of the Minister’s comments. He promised that he would write to the Committee and he has done so. He reiterated the point he made in line-by-line consideration and said:

“I promised to write to the Committee before we debate Clause 13 to indicate who will exercise the powers in Clause 12 to require the publication of information about facility time and who may exercise the reserve powers in Clause 13 having regard to that information…It is right that Ministers have the flexibility to propose and, as a last resort, set caps on paid facility time…This will allow the relevant Minister to make regulations tailored to that. So, for example, the Secretary of State for Health will make regulations imposing publication requirements on NHS and other health employers and may exercise the reserve powers in relation to them if he considers appropriate to do so taking account of the information relating to facility time that they are required to publish.”

I am extremely concerned that this cuts across the devolution settlement. It cuts across the powers of Welsh and Scottish Ministers to make arrangements in their own sectors. The Welsh First Minister, on hearing the Minister’s comments in our sitting on Thursday and learning of the contents of the letter, has made it clear publicly that he believes it would require the consent of the Welsh Government.

Will the Minister to clarify the position because it seems to be matter of considerable debate? There are clearly conflicting legal opinions—I know which side I am on—and this is a serious matter, given the wider constitutional debates that we are having at the moment. It appears that the Secretary of State for Health or the Secretary of State for Education would use the powers in the clause to intervene in the day-to-day running of the Scottish or Welsh health services.

[Chris Stephens]

My reading of the letter indicates that there would also be interference in local government. There will be an impact, given the devolved Administrations’ funding arrangements and agreements with local government.

[Stephen Doughty]

Indeed, and the Minister skirted round this issue when we discussed it briefly. Will this power on facility time and, more broadly, the powers in the Bill apply retrospectively and therefore affect existing employment contracts up and down the land, whether in local government or devolved public authorities or in other agreements? The measure could lead to the extensive unwinding of contracts that have been entered into in good faith by individuals, employers and public sector authorities.

Furthermore, when we look at public sector contracts going forward, should Welsh and Scottish Government Ministers and local authority cabinet members engaged in discussions with their employers about the nature of the contracts and the balance of responsibilities and rights expect those contracts to be undermined at any time at the whim of a Minister of the Crown, who could strike out clauses or imply that they are not valid because of some arbitrary decision taken about facility time? I fear that this poses an extraordinarily dangerous precedent, where Ministers will be able to act in a partisan and political way to attack, for example, a local authority or a devolved Government of different political persuasion, to intervene in their powers and democratic mandate to run public services in the way they see fit.

Amendment 101 is intended specifically to prevent a breach of article 11 of the European convention, which precludes a state from negating the provisions of a collective agreement. It would prevent the Government from using regulations and powers under the clause to rewrite existing collective agreements and contracts, which is that retrospective point I made. Those contracts of employment had been voluntarily agreed by public sector employers, employees and unions, and provided union reps with time off to represent their members.

The provision would also mean that public sector employers could agree new collective agreements and contracts of employment providing union reps with time off for union duties, effectively setting aside any arbitrary cap imposed by the Government. I draw the Minister’s attention to the case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey in 2008 in which the ECHR affirmed the fundamental right of workers to engage in collective bargaining and take collective action to achieve that end.

The power in the clause falls foul not only of legal precedents but of decisions, conventions and standards that we are party to. It would fundamentally cut across the country’s constitutional arrangements and the devolution settlements. It is extraordinarily unwise for the Government to do that, given precedents. I hope the Minister can give a fuller explanation, given the nature of those concerns.

[Chris Stephens]

I reiterate the comments I made on clause 9. This is a bad Bill and this is a bad clause. As the shadow Minister has outlined, we now know the wider implications.

I wish to confine my observations to the comments made by the Minister on Thursday, which he has followed up in writing. First, it appeals to my dry sense of humour that, having rejected amendments on publishing percentages, the Minister writes to us with percentages, in the letter on spending. I am encouraged by that and I hope the Minister will go back and consider publishing percentages on facility time.

The Committee owes a debt of gratitude to the shadow Minister for skilfully wheedling out of the Minister the prospect of the Secretary of State for Health dictating to devolved Administrations on the level of facility time. Presumably the same applies to local government. I am willing to wager that the Minister has not thought through the implications for local governments that have agreements with devolved Administrations on funding and powers through agreements or concordats. It leaves the public with the impression of a Government who conduct first-rate bullying, only days after they declared some Members second class, by a third-rate Administration whose casual approach to legislation does not even provide them with the foresight to realise the constitutional crisis they are sprinting towards.

In no other case do the UK Government have such powers to interfere or dictate to a devolved Administration how to conduct their affairs. The fact that the Government do not consider a legislative consent motion to be appropriate in these circumstances is either remarkable ignorance, gross incompetence or simply the act of a bully. This is dangerous terrain for the Government. I hope the Minister declares what discussions he has had with the devolved Administrations surrounding the reserve powers in the clause, and how they will be enacted.

These proposals are being made in the context of the Scotland and Wales Bills, which have still to conclude their parliamentary journey. It seems extraordinary that the Government can reveal their intentions at the last stages of this process. As the shadow Minister said on Thursday, creating reserve powers signals the intent to use them. The Minister must tell us what, if any, discussions he has had in that regard.

I signal our support for amendment 101. There are clear contractual obligations, and there will be clear costs to public sector employers, which will have to issue new statements of particulars or new contracts to public sector employees.

The proportion of spending on facility time is extremely low, as the Minister confirmed in his letter. Will the Government consider democratic mandates? The Conservative share of the vote at the general election in Scotland was the lowest since universal suffrage. The Conservatives have no mandate in that regard. I was considering whether to press amendment 85 to a Division but, because of the correspondence that we have received, I now feel obliged to do so.

[Ian Mearns (Gateshead) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve again under your chairmanship, Sir Alan. In the context of clauses 12 and 13, I have been remiss in not declaring a non-financial interest in as much as I am a vice-president of the Local Government Association, which is the umbrella body for local authorities in England and Wales.

Clause 13 includes a Henry VIII power whereby Ministers will be able to use secondary legislation to push through restrictions on or to repeal the right to paid time off for trade union duties in the public sector contained in primary legislation, and Parliament will have very limited opportunity to debate or amend such regulations. It is worrying that Ministers are taking such powers unto themselves and, in essence, sidelining Parliament from effective overview and scrutiny of their actions.

The clause demonstrates the Government’s total lack of understanding of the practice of good industrial relations. First, the clause is, in effect, a blank cheque for the Government: if passed, it would give Ministers the power to limit facilities for trade union officials. It contains no explanation of how or why that power would be exercised, and it certainly provides no logic or justification.

Secondly, the provision applies only to the public sector, just like the provision to record time off for facility time, and we need to ask ourselves why that is. First and foremost, like bad employers, this Government feel it is appropriate to threaten and intimidate their own workforce. Of course, the other people who will be affected by the measure are not directly the Government’s workforce but people who work for other public bodies such as local authorities, local government and the emergency services—public servants. The main reason why the provision does not apply to the private sector is because private sector employers do not really want it.

Good employers know and understand the value of working together with their workers and with trade unions. Good employers know and understand that their greatest assets are the good people who work for them. Good employers invest in their workers—they pay them well, train them and reward them; they do all they can to encourage loyalty and dedication. They try to retain their workforce because it costs a lot of money to train staff in a range of different skills and professions. That is why the best employers work in partnership with their workers, and it is why they encourage independent trade unions.

Trade union officials are an integral part of the best companies, working tirelessly to improve relations, productivity and profits. Trade unions know and understand that workers prosper only in growing, profitable firms.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Boles]

We keep going around this merry-go-round. The Government receive a great deal of legal advice from their own officers and sometimes they seek other advice. We do not publish that advice; we are satisfied with the compatibility of all our proposals with all the laws and treaties to which we are signed up. Any cap on facility time will only apply prospectively. It is, on the other hand, possible in theory—though, as I have said, unlikely in practice—that a cap may apply to ongoing, legally-binding relationships; either legally enforceable terms in a collective agreement, or in the contractual rights of individual employees. This is what is flagged in the European convention on human rights memorandum to the Bill. The Government acknowledge, however, that even the potential impacts upon pre-existing contractual arrangements should be fully debated. That is why we considered the affirmative procedure to be necessary to provide the correct level of parliamentary scrutiny.

Before asking hon. Members to withdraw their amendment I want to respond to a question, which is not specific to this amendment, about the devolution settlement. The devolution settlement does not define which individual Ministers in the Government can do things. It defines which areas of policy are devolved and which are not. We have established, and there is general consent—although it might well be wished otherwise—that employment law is not a devolved policy but a reserved policy, and therefore Ministers in the UK Government are entitled to exercise those reserved powers in relation to their responsibilities. That does not imply that, say, the Secretary of State for Health, would be breaching the devolution of health to the Scottish and Welsh Governments by exercising the reserve powers under employment law in the way that we have outlined.

[Chris Stephens]

First, can the Minister confirm that the Scotland Bill has still to reach the end of its parliamentary journey and so the issue of devolving employment law has still to be settled? The Secretary of State for Scotland is considering that matter, as I moved the devolving of employment law in Committee.

Secondly, can he confirm which Government Ministers will have the reserve power to dictate facility time for local government and health in Scotland?

[Nick Boles]

It is very clear. First, we are following the Smith commission recommendations. It may be the case that a particular Bill has not yet received Royal Assent and anything is possible, as we are in the process of discovering in our vibrant parliamentary democracy. No doubt, if there is an unexpected result, future legislation will be adjusted to reflect it. The Government’s intention to follow the Smith commission recommendations that employment law remains a reserved policy is very clear. It would be odd if we brought forward a Bill that conflicted with another Bill that we were trying to take through Parliament at the same time by presuming that that Bill was going to fail. We are presuming that the Bill will succeed, because we are following the Smith commission.

I have been clear that Ministers of the Crown can exercise the reserve powers that are reserved to the United Kingdom Government. There is no detailing that this Minister can do this and that Minister can do that. We are all Ministers of the Crown and the reserve powers of the UK Government are clearly set out in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I did not expect the Minister to do anything other than stick to his guns, but I find it extraordinary. There are very serious questions, not only about how the measure cuts across existing conventions and legal treaties and provisions that we are party to. I hope the Government’s legal advice is very good because I suspect there may be a number of significant challenges to the Bill.

I remain astonished at the admission that the executive powers that have been devolved since 1999 to the Welsh and Scottish Governments are being exposed as limited by the Bill. On top of the debates on the Scotland Bill and the draft Wales Bill, that is extremely revealing. Has the Minister had consultations with the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales about this?

[Chris Stephens]

Does the shadow Minister take the same view as I do, given the Minister’s answer, that there has been no discussion with devolved Administrations as to how this would be enacted? It should require a legislative consent motion—a point that the Minister omitted from his remarks.

[Stephen Doughty]

It is certainly the view of the Welsh and Scottish Governments that they may well require a legislative consent motion to be passed in order for the legislation to go forward. The level of consultation at a whole series of stages of the Bill, before and during the process, has been very weak. I think that is reflected in the potential undermining of the clause in many respects by existing provisions to which we are party.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jo Stevens]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. I think that we will see more of that during this Parliament.

What was the inspiration for the changes? The Government propose to give the certification officer a whole armoury of weapons. They will be able to investigate, demand documents, demand explanations and start proceedings, which they themselves will hear, acting as prosecutor and judge, before giving a verdict and delivering a sentence. They will be able to impose a fine and, as we heard in evidence, a quasi-criminal sanction. This is an extraordinary attack on the rule of law.

Certification officers’ powers will be extended into areas that have historically been way outside the remit of the role. The CO’s role is to regulate the internal workings of unions and their relationship with their members. That is clear from the existing jurisdictions and procedures involving complaints by union members. The certification officer’s website states that his role is to

“maintain a list of trade unions…ensure compliance with statutory requirements for annual returns…determine complaints concerning trade union elections…rules”

and trade union mergers,

“oversee the political funds”

and

“certify the independence of trade unions”.

That work involves seven staff, and the net cost of the certification officer’s office, according to his most recent annual report of July this year, was £560,232. That represents a 3.7% decrease. Hon. Members might think that that is good value for money, yet the Government want to increase massively bureaucracy, cost and intrusion.

I also note from the annual report that in March 2015, the certification officer’s premises were found to be structurally unsafe. I fear that the proposals in the Bill are equally structurally unsafe. No longer will the CO’s role be confined to legitimate complaints that are not ruled out as scandalous, vexatious, hopeless or misconceived. The real purpose of the proposals was revealed in the questions from the hon. Member for Banbury to Professor Ewing in Committee on the afternoon of 15 October. The hon. Lady envisaged the certification officer being required to take action at the behest of

“someone with a legitimate cause for complaint—someone who is affected by strike action…The certification officer himself might be able to take a view that it was appropriate to investigate non-compliance.”––[Official Report, Trade Union Public Bill Committee, 15 October 2015; c. 131, Q352-354.]

Professor Ewing was understandably perplexed by that question, as even the certification officer’s expanded role would not encompass non-compliance with industrial action requirements, yet it is clear that Government Members believe that it should, and that the certification officer should act as a state enforcer who steps in at the behest of any individual to interfere in the workings of trade unions. One can imagine that the Conservative party’s friends in the TaxPayers Alliance will be keen to waste more public money and resources by pestering the certification officer on all manner of issues and seeking enforcement orders on unions, especially in the light of the oppressive reporting requirements on industrial action and political funds.

The situation shows that the Government and Conservative Members are proceeding on the basis of a fundamental misunderstanding of the law and of the role of a certification officer. They are creating a bloated and distorted role that undermines the independence of the office and offends universally accepted legal principles. As a final insult, they will require trade unions to pay for the privilege. Under the Conservatives, we are used to attacks on trade unions, but now we will have an open-ended tax on trade unions—a blank cheque—on which unions will have no say and no control. It is taxation without representation at its most extreme, enabling ideologically motivated complaints to target union resources. It is another direct, politically driven attack on the finances of unions and their capacity to represent their members.

[Chris Stephens]

The hon. Lady is making an excellent speech. Is it not ironic that trade unions are being asked to contribute to the costs of a certification officer, but will be prohibited from contributing to employers administering check-off?

[Jo Stevens]

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point that shows the inconsistencies throughout the Bill.

I hope that the Government will rethink their proposals on the certification officer. I believe that they should be withdrawn, as they are pernicious, and that the current role of the certification officer, which is widely respected, should be retained. To do otherwise betrays a disdain for independence, impartiality, fairness and, most importantly, the rule of law.

[Ian Mearns]

I rise to support the amendments. The clause will increase substantially the investigation powers of the certification officer, giving him or her powers to investigate the activities of a union even when a complaint has not been received from a member of that union, or from any trade union member at all. Surely the provision completely misses the point of a trade union certification officer’s role. Trade unions are independent organisations whose function is to represent the interests of their members. Whether or not this Government approve of trade unions, the fact remains that they perform a legitimate—some would say essential—role within a free society.

The certification officer performs a vital role, but that role does not and should not involve attacking the rights of trade unions and their members who, after all—apologies to my colleagues from north of the border—are citizens of the United Kingdom. The role of the certification officer is to protect the rights of trade union members by ensuring that unions operate openly, democratically and at all times in the interests of their members. The guidance on the Bill describes the provision as giving the certification officer new enforcement powers so that action can be taken without the need for an application or complaint from a member to be received first. The certification officer will therefore be able to investigate and take enforcement action in a number of areas where that is currently not possible or appropriate. In particular, the guidance states:

“For example the Certification Officer could act upon information or concerns he had received from a third party or on his own initiative.”

That provision is totally unacceptable in a free society.

There are more than 6 million trade union members in the UK. They are all intelligent and fully capable of raising a complaint or concern with the certification officer if they have a problem with their trade union. Why does the certification officer need powers to act when not one single trade union member raises a concern? On whose complaint or on whose authority will the certification officer act? We all know on exactly whose authority that will be. Every scare story and sensationalist headline in the “Daily Wail” or the “Daily Hexpress” will be followed up. Six million members may be completely content and satisfied, but the editor of the “Daily Wail” screaming about Len McCluskey, Sir Paul Kenny or Dave Prentis having the bare-faced audacity to stand up for their members will in future be the subject of a full investigation. That is a total waste of time, and the costs of such investigations will be passed on to the trade unions, which will have no alternative but to pay.

[Chris Stephens]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the provision could lead to more malicious complaints being sent to the certification officer? It could lead to fascist organisations making complaints about the funding of anti-racist groups.

[Ian Mearns]

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. Once enacted, the provision will give the certification officer the right, or possibly even the duty, to act on any complaint, no matter its source. That is a matter of grave concern. The provision is concerning and an expensive waste of time for trade unions.

As a means of restricting the rights of trade unions and their members, the provision is nothing short of disgraceful, and that has been borne out by the evidence from a whole range of international organisations and lawyers representing many interests. The provision will turn the certification officer’s role from one of protecting trade union members into one that is highly political. They may be forced to react to politicians and newspaper editors, instead of members. Where the certification officer becomes the investigating power, they will become judge and jury over trade unions, their members and officials. Trade union members—the ones we are all concerned about with the Bill—will have to foot the bill while having no easy mechanism to hold the certification officer to account for their actions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Boles]

That is exactly right. I apologise to the Committee if I created a slightly false impression.

[Chris Stephens]

Just so I am clear, is the Minister indicating that he is amenable to amendment 55, which would provide that the complainant must be a trade union member? He said earlier that he was going away to consider some aspects of picketing, in relation to what could be defined as outside interference.

[Nick Boles]

No, I am not indicating that, but we believe that the Bill already makes it clear who has the power to complain and who has the power to enforce. Moving on, I have explained that the appointment of investigators is not new; it happens under existing powers regarding the investigation of financial matters, and the Bill simply extends it to other potential breaches. The new investigatory powers contain specific provisions to impose a duty of confidentiality on any inspector that the certification officer appoints to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of personal information about union members. I therefore ask Opposition Members to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I am somewhat bemused by the Minister’s comment that the certification officer is not a judicial officer. He has explained the wide powers that the certification officer has, so I am very interested to know what positions the Government consider to be comparable. Most people would consider the certification officer to have a quasi-judicial role, at the very least, and therefore we need some very strict controls about how it is regulated. The crucial point is that we are moving well beyond the original role set out for the certification officer. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff Central said, this is not to comment on the suitability or the work that has been done by the current certification officer, who, from all my experience and that of the stakeholders I have engaged with, has done a very good job, but this is a complete change in the role and its powers. That change requires a fresh look at how the certification officer is appointed.

Our new clause would provide that the certification officer in Great Britain would be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. Currently, as we have heard, the role is appointed by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in consultation with ACAS. The Minister went through the process of shortlisting and so on, and obviously, it is great that a number of stakeholders are involved. However, of course the final decision rests with the Secretary of State and that, again, gives wide latitude to a Secretary of State to veto or to appoint someone partisan or political. Given the nature of the rest of the Bill, many of us might strongly suspect that that would happen.

The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills of course regularly consults many different stakeholders, but as we saw in debates about the steel industry he seems willing to ignore all the advice and carry on regardless. I have no faith as to whether things would continue in that vein, when I consider the intent and purpose of the Bill.

We all agree that the certification officer should be independent of Government and required to have expertise in trade union law rather than just knowledge of it. Demonstrable knowledge could be an ability to list by rote the clauses of the Bill. Someone who takes such a wide range of powers needs a detailed understanding of the provisions. The 1992 Act does not specify the qualifications required, but the Bill gives the certification officer extensive new powers and remits, and it is only reasonable to expect the person appointed to have expertise in that regard, particularly given the various aspects of the role.

If the Minister intends to reject the new clause, will he explain what consultation, as a minimum, he would expect for the new role? Will things just carry on as they do under the old system, with the limited involvement of the TUC, CBI and so on at the shortlisting stage, or does he envisage a wider range of people being involved? Will he give wider assurances about the type of qualifications and other requirements? Given the nature of the proposed role, we believe that the certification officer should be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission—that is only right—and that there should be a clear requirement for expertise in trade union law.

New clause 7 is essentially similar to our new clause in its purpose; I understand why the hon. Member for Glasgow South West and his hon. Friends have tabled it, in relation to Scotland. As I have said before in similar debates, we want the fairest settlement in the Bill for workers and trade union members across the UK, and I hope the hon. Gentleman understands that that is what we intend with our new clause. It would deal with the whole of Great Britain, not just Scotland.

[Chris Stephens]

As the shadow Minister said, the new clauses really deal with who should be the certification officer. If the powers are being enhanced, the new role needs to be reconsidered, because—the shadow Minister is correct—it is at the very least quasi-judicial. The aim of new clause 7 is to ensure that the holder of the post has adequate qualifications and expertise.

The Minister has said he expects the person appointed to have expertise in trade union law, but his successors may not. An adequate provision would make it clear, as the new clause does, that the certification officer should have expertise in trade union law. It cannot be someone we met down the pub, who may be able to recite all the clauses of the Bill. It needs to be someone of a very high standard, with expertise in trade union law, who knows the intricacies of that law. More importantly, the person should be independent of Government, and that is why it is appropriate in the circumstances to involve the Judicial Appointments Commission.

The new clause has another purpose. As the Minister pointed out, there is currently an assistant for Scotland. The enhanced role will have an impact on elections where they are now devolved to the Scottish Parliament, in terms of Scottish parliamentary and local government elections. If there are questions about election funding, that will be a Scottish issue and we believe it would require a certification officer in Scotland to consider it.

Also, there are differences between the legal jurisdictions. There is different civil and criminal law in Scotland, and we believe the new provisions about the certification officer can only impinge on the consideration of civil and criminal law in relation to complaints and so on. The effect of the certification officer provisions will be that Scotland will need not an assistant but a certification officer of equal status to the certification officer for Great Britain.

We have no issue with new clause 10 and we will support it in a vote, but we are seeking a Scottish provision of equal status due to the impacts that the new role of a certification officer will have.