Criminal Justice Bill (Eighth sitting)

Chris Philp Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to resume proceedings with you in the Chair, Ms Bardell. I shall resist the temptation to start again for your benefit; I am sure you can look in the Official Report should you want to see the first part of my contribution.

I was talking about the inclusion of non-disclosure requirements in suspension orders, and I want to understand what the Minister thinks their function is. Is it to stop individuals who have had their domain name, IP address or website suspended or taken off them using it as a marketing tool or tool of notoriety? That would be a restriction on liberty and free speech, so I would be interested in the Government’s evidence base for that. Presumably, that must not apply to them talking to, say, their legal counsel, so what are the factors? There is no test in the Bill that a judge must apply.

Moving on to co-operation, since the internet by its nature is a global venture, we are glad that this is a four-nations provision, but there is some irregularity across the four nations, and I want to probe that with the Minister. Under paragraph 12 of schedule 3, in England and Wales, the “appropriate officers” who can make an application for an order are

“a constable…a National Crime Agency officer…an officer of Revenue and Customs…a member of staff of the Financial Conduct Authority, or…a person designated or appointed as an enforcement officer by the Gambling Commission under section 303 of the Gambling Act 2005”.

That seems quite a comprehensive list.

For Northern Ireland, the list is the same, except that it does not include the designated person from the Gambling Commission. Given the scourge of black-market gambling and the challenge it presents, is there not concern that it might be displaced to Northern Ireland? I wonder if the Minister might explain where he is up to with that. For Scotland, the list is just “a procurator fiscal”. That is a different approach. Presumably, it is the one favoured by the Scottish Government, but I hope the Minister might detail some of his discussions in this regard.

We know that many, if not most, of the sort of sites we have been discussing will be based outside the UK. The clause and the schedule give us a handy tool for UK-based ventures, but what more can the Minister tell us—he mentioned this a little in his opening speech—about his attempts to have some degree of harmony of regimes with our partners abroad, and what conversations does he think UK agencies should be having with their overseas counterparts to make sure that the powers that they have can be used to protect the British people?

[The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Ms Bardell, and I hope that we get to do so many more times during the Committee’s remaining sittings. I thank the shadow Minister for his considered contribution on clause 20 and schedule 3. I will turn first to his questions regarding the conditions set out in schedule 3, in particular at paragraph 4.

Condition 1 sets the threshold for this power to be available to investigative agencies such as the National Crime Agency and the police, meaning that those agencies cannot apply for an order unless the IP address or domain name is being used in serious crime. Condition 2, which operates separately and additively, requires a connection to the UK jurisdiction, and any one of the four limbs listed at paragraph 4(3) can apply; as the hon. Gentleman correctly identified, the word “or” is used at the end of paragraph 4(3)(c), making it clear that only one of the limbs (a) to (d) in condition 2 have to be met. If one is met, that is sufficient for condition 2 as a whole to be met. Those four limbs specify different ways in which the domain name or IP address might link to serious crime in the UK’s jurisdiction. I hope that that makes it clear how those conditions operate.

The hon. Gentleman also asked why the non-disclosure power was needed. Its purpose is simply to prevent the criminal behind the IP address or domain name from being tipped off, inadvertently or otherwise, that a law enforcement agency is looking into them. We would not want the criminals to know they were being looked at. That is why the provision is constructed in that way.

The hon. Gentleman asked about territorial applicability. The Gambling Commission is principally an England and Wales body, and has only very limited functions in Northern Ireland. However, typically, if a gambling service is made available on the internet, it will be available in Northern Ireland as much as in England and Wales. If we go after a service provider in relation to a breach in England and Wales, shutting down the domain or IP address will also have the effect of preventing it from being accessed elsewhere.

For Scotland, the definition of “appropriate officer” is limited to a procurator fiscal. That reflects the different arrangements in Scotland and our discussions so far with the Scottish Government. Generally speaking, we respect the view of the Scottish Government when it comes to the application of the law in Scotland—I am sure Ms Bardell would impartially endorse that from the Chair. Where the Bill touches on devolved matters in relation to the Scottish jurisdiction, we correspond with the Scottish Government and proceed in general—I would not say always—by mutual consent.

For the reasons that we have already discussed, we can all welcome the purpose of clause 20 and the accompanying schedule 3. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 21

Access to driver licence records

[Chris Philp]

I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 21, page 17, line 33, after “subsection” insert

“, and may make consequential amendments of this section”.

This amendment will ensure that, in the event that the list of bodies to which the new provisions apply is amended by the regulations, any necessary consequential amendments may also be made by the regulations.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 34 and 35.

Amendment 60, in clause 21, page 19, line 11, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must lay an annual report before Parliament providing information on the use of the powers introduced by this section.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the police’s use of the new powers giving them access to driver license records.

Clause stand part.

[Chris Philp]

Clause 21 will facilitate the ability of police and other law enforcement officers to access driver information from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency automatically at the point of need for all policing and law enforcement purposes. The clause contains provisions for regulations and a code of practice to enable changes to be made for the purposes of access to driver data.

Police and other law enforcement officers frequently need to deal with unpredictable circumstances while operating under time pressure, and the police have provided compelling operational examples in which they could deal better with threats and harms faced by the public if they had direct and automatic access to DVLA driving licence data. That is why the Bill contains this clause.

Currently, automatic access to the DVLA driving licence data is limited to matters concerned with enforcing road traffic offences and Road Traffic Act 1988 purposes, which means that the police do not have automatic access to driving licence data for other purposes, such as investigating wider types of crime. They do have manual access to the data, but that is quite laborious and takes a long time. The clause builds on an existing regulation-making power and requires the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying the purposes for which, and the circumstances in which, the police can automatically access the driving licence database, so that all policing and law enforcement purposes are included.

The clause essentially expands an existing manual process and makes it automatic. At the moment, the automatic access applies only to road traffic matters. Given that we hold this data, I am sure that members of the Committee would expect the police to be able to access it in pursuit of criminals. Through the clause, we are delivering on our commitment to support the police by providing them with the tools they need. Members will recall that in the oral evidence sessions back in December, we heard support for the provisions from the National Crime Agency, the College of Policing and His Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary and fire and rescue services, Andy Cooke.

We are also taking the opportunity to make the legislation simpler and more transparent. Under the current system, some law enforcement staff have access to the DVLA driving licence database and others do not. The clause allows all police and law enforcement organisations listed in proposed new section 71(4) of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 to access DVLA driver information. It also changes the current legislative quirk whereby police staff are defined by law as police constables solely for the purpose of DVLA driver data, which is rather anomalous. It will define those permitted to access DVLA driver data as “authorised persons”, and regulations will set out the process for those individuals to become authorised.

We are conscious that police access to such personal data needs to be reasonable and proportionate, as set out in existing data protection legislation. That is why the clause will bolster the governance arrangements in this area by making them more transparent and straightforward, in preparation for the regulations that will broaden the access regime. In particular, the clause makes it clear which bodies can access DVLA driver data, which is necessary as the current legislation could be improved upon. There is a mechanism to amend the list of organisations that have access, while requiring the chief officer to be responsible for ensuring that appropriate training and oversight is provided by their organisation. That obviously includes the delivery of their data governance obligations.

Government amendment 33 ensures that if regulations amend the list of law enforcement bodies in subsection (4) of proposed new section 71 of the 2000 Act, such regulations may make consequential amendments to section 71—for example, to the definition of “chief officer”. Amendments 34 and 35 clarify the meaning of the term “chief officer” for each of the listed law enforcement agencies.

With your permission, Ms Bardell, I will speak to amendment 60 once I have heard the shadow Minister’s comments so I can respond to them. I hope I have set out why it is important that we put on a sounder and clearer footing the organisations and individuals who can access this data, and lay the groundwork to make automatic access possible for law enforcement purposes. I am sure we can all get behind that.

[Alex Norris]

I want to speak to amendment 60 in my name. I do not know whether the Official Report can capture this, but my feeling is, “Hmm!” There are things I hoped the Minister would say, not least because it would have reduced my contribution by half, but he did not, so I will have to see whether I can get him to say them.

This is a very important clause. It is a long-standing, accepted principle that under certain circumstances police officers can use driver information held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. At the moment, it is for purposes related to the enforcement of road traffic offences. It is a well-established and uncontroversial principle that officers can talk to the DVLA and get information. We have no quibble with the clause seeking to make that a smoother process, and we have no problem with subsection (4) of proposed new section 71 of the 2000 Act, which broadens and clarifies who can ask for that information, but the clause potentially contains a very broad extension of powers.

Paragraph 370 of the explanatory notes says:

“This clause replaces existing section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 with a new section 71, and inserts a new section 71A into that Act. It provides for police and law enforcement bodies to have access to driving licence data held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (“DVLA”) and provides powers for the Secretary of State to make regulations concerning the purposes for which such data may be used and any conditions which need to be met by any person accessing the data.”

That is a really significant change. The police had access to DVLA information in relation to a very narrow set of offences, but the clause is essentially saying that the information is fair play for enforcement agencies, subject to whatever regulations a Secretary of State may set in the future. That is an egregious use of Henry VIII powers. If the Government have a regime in mind, they should say what it is. Instead, we are possibly giving over the entire DVLA database to the Secretary of State, and it is currently not clear what it will be used for.

[Chris Philp]

First, for clarity, I should say that the purpose for which the information might be made automatically accessible is circumscribed by the words at the very end of the newly created section 71(2), which says the that Secretary of State

“may prescribe only such purposes and circumstances as are related to policing or law enforcement.”

It is not for any purpose; it has to be related to policing and law enforcement.

Secondly, I pointed out that the police already have the ability to access the data manually for police and law enforcement purposes. The clause simply paves the way for them to do what they currently do manually and instead do it automatically, provided that it is for a police or law enforcement purpose.

I hope those two points give some reassurance that the clause is not some gigantic land grab. It simply makes automatic what is currently manual and it is circumscribed in the way that I described.

[Alex Norris]

The second point and the tone of the Minister’s contribution certainly give me a degree of comfort. The first point does not give me any comfort at all. The line that he quoted, which provides that the Secretary of State

“may prescribe only such purposes and circumstances as are related to policing or law enforcement”,

is a landing zone as wide as could possibly be needed to give police access to the DVLA database for all sorts of things. I will get on to that shortly. I would be delighted if the scenarios I am about to talk about are not what the Government intend, or even silly ones. I do not think that is the case, but I will be the gladdest person in the room if it is.

At the moment, I think the public would think there are sensible uses of the data, such as to double-check the last known addresses of a wanted person. Taken in extremis, however, the clause could mean that all the photos on the DVLA database become fair game for law enforcement. There are 41.2 million vehicles registered with the DVLA. We are talking about the data of tens of millions of people and, crucially, their photographs. The landing zone that I described under subsection (2) of proposed new section 71 means that someone’s photo could be used for a huge range of things.

Starting from where we think the public would be on this, the public expect and know that retrospective facial recognition is already used routinely. If a person commits a crime, they know that their custody photo will be held on file and that, if they are convicted, it could be held for six to 10 years, depending on the nature of the offence. It is a tale as old as the technology that the photo might subsequently be checked against footage relating to another crime and used for its detection. Similarly, if someone commits an act that means that their DNA is kept on file, that might be used in relation to unsolved crimes that happened in the past or to tackle offending in the future. All that is sensible.

On both fronts, we start in a sensible place, with the use of the DVLA database for cross-references to help detect crime, and the use of photos of offenders that lie on file to detect crime. The risk comes when we mix those two sensible principles.

[Alex Norris]

I absolutely agree, and that is exactly the point I am about to make. It is a legitimate anxiety. If that is wrong and I am somehow being conspiratorial, albeit it is not my nature, the Minister can tell me and that would give me a degree of comfort, but I think, and it has been expressed to me by interest groups, that there is a legitimate anxiety that the clause could mean that the police will access tens of millions of driver photos to solve crimes.

There is a problem with that on two fronts. First, we have the question whether that is a fair balance between individual liberty and collective safety. If that is what the Government want, we need to have that debate much more clearly before we get to these specifics. Secondly, certainly for the photos that are on file today, probably each one of us in the room, Members and beyond, is on that database, but none of us will have given our photograph with informed consent, knowing they were going to be used for the proposed purpose. That is a huge problem, not least because it is a kind of coercion. I would still give my photo on that basis, because the ability to drive is fundamental to my needs—certainly for work, never mind family life. But, again, it is a form of state coercion, rather than something that would necessarily be the right thing to do. Many people—many of my constituents, I know—would not consent on that basis. We live in an age of high-profile conspiracy theories and those who make an industry of them, and we should not give grist to the mill of yet another one.

[Chris Philp]

rose—

[Alex Norris]

I give way to the Minister; nothing would please me more than to be contradicted.

[Chris Philp]

Existing DVLA data, including photographs —I have a driving licence; I am sure that the hon. Member has one and everybody on the Committee probably does as well—can already be searched by the police; or rather they can request information on a manual basis. That can happen already, to each and every one of those 40-odd million records, for law enforcement purposes. That has a statutory basis, via schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018, which allows access to that kind of data for police and law enforcement purposes. The principle of police access to that data for law enforcement purposes is already there.

I pose a brief example: if somebody was wanted for an offence such as rape, and the police could not track them down and they were not on the custody image database—let us say that they had never been into custody—would the Committee want the database to be searched to see whether a recognition match could be obtained to find that person? That can happen at the moment, and I think that is right. I would like to check whether the shadow Minister agrees.

[Alex Norris]

There is a significant difference between what the Minister talks about, which is using, on an individual basis, information that is available to cross-reference—perhaps to deal with known aliases or known addresses—and where this could go. I mean a broad-scale use of surveillance, seemingly without any guardrails, that would essentially allow tens of millions—I think it is in the 40-something millions—of photos to be put on essentially the same footing as photos from the custody suite.

--- Later in debate ---

[Vicky Ford]

I was just coming to that point. I completely hear what the hon. Gentleman is saying about widening out the potential dataset of photographs that could be used. I suspect that most members of the public would say it is utterly reasonable to widen out the set of faces we could look at. For instance, we might have a picture of somebody who is a rapist and was never known before, but their photograph might have appeared on a wider database such as that from the DVLA, rather than on a known potential suspect list. If that helped to find really dangerous criminals, I suspect most members of the public would accept that.

I agree that there need to be very strong measures to make sure that we do not turn into a surveillance society, such as we have seen in some much more autocratic countries, where those pictures can then be used against innocent people. I believe the Minister is trying to say that the protection is there in the Bill. When these cameras have been used, there have been very strong rules about where they can be used. The cameras used in both Chelmsford and Southend were highly publicised, with signs and alerts that the technology was being used in that place on that day. Those sorts of measures are important.

I would be interested in a bit more clarity from the Minister about ensuring that we do not turn to inappropriate use, as we have seen in some autocratic countries, while also ensuring that we can help the public by making use of the best technology to identify those who have committed the most serious crimes.

[Chris Philp]

I would like to speak to a couple of matters concerning the clause, and then talk about the read-across into facial recognition. I think there is some conflation of two different kinds of facial recognition—live and retrospective—only one of which is relevant here. I will explain how that works and how it might be relevant.

Let me speak first to the to the substance of the clause. First, just to be precise, this is not a Henry VIII power, which is a piece of secondary legislation that can amend primary legislation. This does not create a regulation-making power to amend primary legislation; it simply creates a list. It is not technically a Henry VIII power, but it does specify the circumstances, or the policing and enforcement purposes, for which data can be used.

Secondly, we are not passing clause 21 expressly to authorise the use of DVLA data for facial recognition or indeed for any particular law enforcement purpose; we are simply creating a regulation-making power. Regulations might be brought forward using this power to do any number of law enforcement activities, including facial recognition, but that would, of course, have to be debated at the time and subject to the affirmative procedure. This is enabling legislation; we are not actually passing the substance of any particular power today.

Since members of the Committee have raised questions about facial recognition, I would like to address them. There are essentially two different kinds of facial recognition—separate concepts—one of which is relevant and one of which is not. Let me start with the one that would not be relevant here: live facial recognition. Live facial recognition would never need to use images from the DVLA database, the passport database or anything else. Live facial recognition takes a watch list of people wanted for criminal offences or wanted by the court.

Such technology was run recently in Croydon—my borough—where I think there are about 12,000 people wanted for criminal offences. The camera was set up, as it was in Southend and Chelmsford, in Wales, for the coronation and at the Silverstone Grand Prix. Everyone who walked past those cameras in Croydon town centre got scanned. There were public signs up; the authorised professional practice says that public signs have to be put up, which I would have thought would mean criminals would not walk past the cameras—but they do.

Over a couple of afternoons in Croydon, several thousand people walked past the cameras, despite the fact that there was a sign up saying, “The police are using live facial recognition” and in the course of those two afternoons, there were 17 alerts and all were accurate. The police would stop each person, have a conversation, ask for ID and so on, and all 17 had been accurately identified. Those 17 people were all arrested because they were wanted for offences. One of them was a wanted rapist who would otherwise not have been caught. It was just good fortune that that wanted rapist had to walk past the camera and was apprehended. Were it not for that, that wanted rapist would still be wandering around. There was another person who had been wanted for grievous bodily harm since 2015—for eight years—and they were arrested as well. In Croydon, the scheme was run in the first couple of weeks of December.

Concerns have been raised previously about accuracy and disproportionality: does the technology pick on members of certain ethnic communities, as it were? There was litigation that preceded South Wales using it, back in about 2020. I join the shadow Minister in commending Alun Michael for his work on live facial recognition, where he has shown real leadership, and for his long career in public life—in Parliament as a Secretary of State, as Welsh First Minister, and as a police and crime commissioner for the last 12 years or so.

The litigation happened, and the court set out certain conditions that had to be met, one of which was around accuracy—I think the false positive rate had to be one in 1,000—and disproportionality. The algorithm was improved and tested by the National Physical Laboratory at 0.6, which is the setting that the police use. At that setting, it found that the false positive rate was, I think—I am speaking from memory—one in 6,000, which is six times more accurate than the court specified, and that there was no disproportionality based on either gender or ethnicity.

For the one-in-6,000 false positive, what would happen—this has not happened in Croydon, because only 17 people were stopped—is that the police would say, “Excuse me, sir or madam, can you just identify yourself?” If they turn out not to be the person the police think they are, obviously the police will say, “Sorry to disturb you—off you go.” But that is one in 6,000, and it did not happen in Croydon, because the police did not stop 6,000 people.

So that is live facial recognition. The police do not need access to a DVLA database or password database, or even the custody database; they just need a list of people who are wanted. In the examples in Chelmsford, Southend and Croydon, they caught people who were wanted for offences or who had absconded from court, who would otherwise still be wandering around. It was used at the coronation. Three camera points were set up and, similarly to the Welsh example, the watch list included known terrorists, fixated people—people who are obsessed by the monarchy—and also wanted offenders. I think three wanted people were caught on the coronation day, including a wanted sex offender who happened to wander past the camera. The technology has also been used in Soho to try and catch robbers who were stealing mobile phones and so on.

I hope that illustrates to the Committee how live facial recognition is useful. It comes under the auspices of the Supreme Court judgment in the Bridges case, and authorised professional practice is published by the College of Policing. I think the Information Commissioner’s Office has also looked at it. Live facial recognition, which does not need DVLA data anyway, has a good basis, and it is catching people who would otherwise not get caught.

[Peter Dowd]

We can all come up with our examples, whether they be of rapists or a missing person, for example—who would not want to find a missing person who might have been missing for years and who we are trying to find? That is not the issue. We have used DNA in the past, and we all think it is wonderful, but it is used within parameters. Yes, let us have CCTV and facial recognition, but they have to be used within a certain context.

Then there is body-worn video and the move towards using algorithms in the detection and prevention of crime —and, in some places, the deterrence of crime—and also the issues around AI. I do not think there is a problem with that at all, but it has to be set in a context. We should not take a piecemeal approach to the whole question of technology. We are dealing with a vast area, and this must be set in that wider context. Perhaps the Minister can go off and think this through, outside this Criminal Justice Bill, and set in process a review of the whole question of artificial intelligence and so on, as part of crime reduction, crime prevention and crime detection.

[Chris Philp]

The hon. Gentleman is making a very reasonable point. In fact, I was going to come on to it later, but I will address it now. As for the current deployments of live facial recognition in places such as Wales, Croydon, Southend, Chelmsford, Soho and elsewhere, a framework was set out by the case of Bridges v. South Wales Police. There is authorised professional practice from the College, but that framework is there. The hon. Gentleman is, however, making the valid point that it would be useful to set out—outside of this Committee, as he said—a broader strategy, framework or explanation of how the technology can be used. That is not just the case for live facial recognition, but also for the retrospective recognition, which I will come on to in a minute. It is all set out, and we could perhaps debate and discuss it in the round.

The hon. Gentleman is making a reasonable point about something that I had in mind to do in the relatively near future. That is something that I am working on in the Home Office, and his suggestion has spurred me on to expedite that. We want to have this set out transparently and comprehensively so that everybody can look at it and know where they stand. It has actually been done in relation to live facial recognition, but it would be helpful to set it out in a broader context.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle (Peter Dowd) made is far more eloquent than mine. The Minister is clearly very enthusiastic and learned about this issue. When he was talking about how live facial recognition does not rely on DVLA data or any photographic data at all, the Minister said that we just need a list. What does that rely on, then? It must rely on some sort of photographic data.

My second point—I will try to be slightly more eloquent and not sound like I am asking my kids to turn the telly on for me because I do not understand it—is about my kids. I do not mind my DVLA data being used; I will tick the box or whatever. It strikes me, however, that my son has a driving licence, and I feel slightly anxious about the way that large groups of young boys get treated like they are a rabble. There are all the brilliant examples of this, such as finding missing people or catching rapists—“Great. Wahey! Let’s lock them all up”—but I feel slightly less comfortable about my son’s photo being used, funnily enough, in what might be a broad-brush police and crime approach.

[Chris Philp]

I thank the hon. Lady. On the first question, which was about how live facial recognition works, we first of all need a watchlist—the list of wanted people—and then the photographs. Maybe there will be someone who is wanted for rape, and we have that person’s photograph. Maybe it is someone the police have encountered before, but they just cannot find them. Maybe the police have gone to what they think is the person’s home address, and the person is not there, but they have their photograph. They have that data. Then, in the case of the Croydon deployment in early December, there were 12,000 photographs of people who were wanted for different offences—the police had those photographs.

Then, the faces of people walking down the road are scanned. Each time someone walks past, their face is scanned to see whether it matches. For the vast majority, there is no match, and the scan is instantaneously, immediately and automatically deleted. There is no need for any manual intervention; it gets deleted straight away, like this—although I am not sure how my clicking my fingers will be rendered in Hansard. If the hon. Lady or I had walked past, we would be scanned and, one hopes, there would not be a match. Then there would be instant, automatic deletion. If someone is scanned and their photograph is one of the 12,000 on the list, however, there is a flash—that was a double click, for the benefit of Hansard—and an alert is sounded. The officer will then go over and say, “Excuse me, sir”—all of the 17 who were stopped were men, by the way.

[Jess Phillips]

You shock me!

[Chris Philp]

The officer will go over and say, “Excuse me, sir, what is your name?” When he has established that the match is accurate and that they are who the system thinks they are, it is a case of, “You are under arrest for X, Y or Z”.

That is how the live system works. There is no need to access any standing database such as that of DVLA; we just need the pictures of the 12,000 wanted persons. Depending on the deployment, we can choose who goes on that list. In the South Wales deployment, they were particularly concerned about terrorists who might try to cause an explosion in the arena or paedophiles who might seek to prey on the young girls going to the Beyoncé concert. The list can be varied depending on the location. I would hope, though, that any watchlist would always include people who are wanted for offences.

I will now come on to retrospective facial recognition. I repeat that we are not authorising this today by passing this clause; we are simply creating a power to make regulations in the future to do so. I just thought I would be clear about that. We are not creating this power; we are simply creating a legislative framework through which future regulations might be brought forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

On a technical point, could this technology also be used to find witnesses on the bus, for example? I do not expect the Minister to know the answer to that question, but just to add a bit more enthusiasm to his love of this technology, I can see that there might be such uses for it.

[Chris Philp]

That is a really good question and I do not know the answer to it. However, I can certainly find out and come back to the Committee. I know that this technology can be used to find missing persons. If someone has gone missing, the police can do a search and see if they pop up somewhere.

As for finding witnesses, of course the witness has not committed a crime, so one would have to be a little bit careful about infringing on their rights. However, I will take that question away and get an answer, and I will write to the hon. Lady and the shadow Minister, and indeed the rest of the Committee, because it is a very good question. I am afraid that, as I stand here today, I do not know the answer, but that could help to find witnesses.

[Alex Norris]

The Minister is being very generous with his time. There is a degree of comfort with the point about regulation. If concerns continue to grow about the use of DVLA data in retrospective facial recognition, Parliament will have its day. And on that basis, I will not divide the Committee.

However, I want to press the Minister on something else. He is right to say that this clause is an enabling clause, but he must have an idea of what he wants it to enable. Why is it in the Bill? The Government must have something in mind for it; otherwise, there is no point in it standing part of the Bill.

[Chris Philp]

I think that I have just spent the last five minutes or so—

[Alex Norris]

So it is for that, then.

[Chris Philp]

It could be; that is certainly a possibility that I have in mind. If those regulations were brought forward, and maybe there would be some further clarifying codes of practice and so on that will be needed as well, it would in theory be possible to bring forward regulations such that, if the person or the suspect—it might be the murderer in that Coventry nightclub, or the sex offender on that bus. Imagine if their image was not on the custody database; imagine that they had never been arrested, or convicted, or anything. The police did not have their picture; they would not have found them. It would obviously be useful, particularly for more serious offences, to be able automatically to search other facial image databases besides the custody one, in order to catch the rapist, the serious sex offender and so on.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley asked a question about her son. There is a question of proportionality here. For example, regarding this database, in these regulations one could—this is not for the Committee today, but I am just saying it—specify a threshold, and say that this would only be used for crimes over a certain level of seriousness. Obviously, rape and murder would meet that. GBH, drug supply, firearms, knives and so on, might also be specified, but a parking ticket would probably not be. In these regulations—this is one of the reasons why the wording is flexible—one could specify that threshold, and we would obviously then debate where that balance should lie. One does have to be cognisant of proportionality and privacy considerations, as indeed data protection law in any case requires us to do.

I hope I have given the Committee a bit of a flavour of how these regulation powers—

[Jess Phillips]

An education, Minister!

[Chris Philp]

It is not often that someone says that after I have been speaking. I hope I have given a bit of a flavour of how this could help catch serious criminals who might otherwise not be caught. We would debate the specifics when the time came. There would, of course, be a code of practice and everything else to set out those guard rails. I have already indicated in response to, I think, the hon. Member for Bootle, that there is a case for a wider policy statement setting out the strategy in this area, which we can discuss and debate.

I appreciate that we have strayed a little beyond the strict confines of this clause, Ms Bardell, but the Opposition raised some reasonable questions that I really wanted to try hard to answer. I will finish by saying that I spoke to my local police commanders, Superintendent Mitch Carr and Chief Superintendent Andy Brittain, encouraging the deployment of live facial recognition in Croydon. I know 17 people got arrested. We have heard how it was done in Essex: in Southend and in Chelmsford. I encourage members of this Committee to talk to their local police and say, “Try it out in your area,” and see who gets caught. At the moment, South Wales police and the Met have the necessary vans, but they will lend them. I think South Wales police lent the vans to Essex. If anyone wants to suggest it, they could ask their chief constable to borrow the van from South Wales police or the Met, try out in their constituency, and see who gets caught.

Amendment 33 agreed to.

Amendments made: 34, in clause 21, page 18, line 19, leave out “police force listed in subsection (4)” and insert “body”.

This amendment and amendment 35 specify in more detail the relevant chief officers of bodies to which the provisions will apply.

Amendment 35, in clause 21, page 18, line 20, at end insert—

“(aa) in relation to a police force listed in subsection (4)(b) to (d), the chief constable of that police force;

(ab) in relation to a service police force listed in subsection (4)(p) to (r), the Provost Marshal of that service police force;

(ac) in relation to the tri-service serious crime unit, the Provost Marshal for serious crime;

(ad) in relation to the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, the Service Police Complaints Commissioner;”—(Chris Philp.)

See the statement for amendment 34.

Clause 21, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship, Ms Bardell. I am pleased to be able to speak to the provision contained in clause 22, which has had widespread support from Members across the House. In the past year or two, several high-profile murderers—Thomas Cashman, Jordan McSweeney, and most recently Lucy Letby—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings, causing the victims’ families significant further distress. This can be seen as the final insult, and it is also the coward’s approach, affronting the victims one last time by robbing their families of a chance to look them in the eye as the judge determines their fate. The worst offenders should be required to face the consequence of their actions, and hear society’s condemnation expressed through the sentencing remarks of the judge. Indeed, it is with those words ringing in their ears that they should hear the prison door clang shut.

Clause 22 inserts new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the sentencing code. New section 41A creates an express statutory power for a Crown court judge to directly order the most serious offenders to attend their sentencing hearing. It applies to adults and children who are convicted of a sentence for which the maximum potential penalty is life. Any offender falling in that category who refuses to attend without a reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court. In the case of an adult offender they could face a maximum penalty of an additional two years in prison; in the case of a child offender who refuses to attend, the maximum penalty is a £2,500 fine.

New section 41B is intended to enshrine current common law practice in statute, making it absolutely clear that the Crown court has a power in law to direct a prison to produce any adult offender, not just those looking at a potential life sentence, to court for their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that prison officers and prisoner escort officers may use reasonable force to produce an adult offender to court for their sentencing hearing where it is necessary and proportionate. The final decision on reasonable force remains with the prison governor and the escorting staff working under his or her authority. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for that purpose, in line with existing policy. It will remain a matter for judges to decide whether to order an individual to attend court or to require a prison to produce them.