Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Fourteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateChris Philp
Main Page: Chris Philp (Conservative - Croydon South)Department Debates - View all Chris Philp's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 125 to 127 stand part.
That schedule 12 be the Twelfth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 128 stand part.
That schedule 13 be the Thirteenth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 129 stand part.
That schedule 14 be the Fourteenth schedule to the Bill.
Before we adjourned, the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Stockton North, gave a lengthy speech, which we were all grateful to hear. We paused to allow the Minister to prepare himself. I believe he is now prepared, so I call the Minister.
Thank you, Sir Charles. I trust everyone has had a refreshing and congenial break for lunch. Prior to the break, the shadow Minister raised a number of questions relating to clauses 124 to 128 and to schedules 12 to 14. I will endeavour to answer as many of those questions as I can. He asked what procedure offenders could use to challenge orders made under clauses 124 and 125, particularly to ensure that they were not unduly penalised if they then breached the conditions that had been imposed. If a breach does occur and some serious consequence follows, it is always open to the offender to make a representation when attending their hearing at court to either make the case that the breach was technical or minor in nature, or that the condition itself was not varied in a reasonable way. A significant penalty can never be imposed without the intervention of the court.
Questions were asked about circumstances beyond the control of the offender. We heard about the possibility of a device malfunctioning and about particular circumstances relating to disability that might disadvantage certain people. We envisage the power laid out in section 124 being used only in rare circumstances, certainly not routinely.
I confirm that it is the intention to provide clear advice to probation staff, setting out the rare circumstances in which additional supervision may be warranted, to ensure, for example, that disabled offenders are not unfairly or unduly disadvantaged, and to avoid the purpose of these supervision appointments going beyond the very specific purposes that the order has been imposed by the sentencing court.
The same applies to people with learning difficulties. Courts sentence on a case-by-case basis and, where electronic monitoring has been imposed as one element of that sentence, the officer supervising the offender is already able to review notifications of apparent violations and take a reasonable view, on a case-by-case basis. If someone has been genuinely unable to understand how to operate the equipment or had a genuine technical problem, we would expect probation officers to exercise reasonable discretion.
As I said at the very beginning, if a breach did follow and the court was invited to impose some penalty, it would be open to the offender to make a representation at that point to explain the mitigating circumstances. My expectation is that it would never get that far, because I would expect the supervising officer to be reasonable in the meantime.
I recognise what the Minister is saying. I raised the point that people should be able to make representations after their hearings, but some of the people we are talking about have particular challenges in life and special needs. How will the Minister ensure that their problem—their malfunctioning equipment or otherwise—is properly communicated to a court to ensure that they are not penalised?
Clearly, in the first instance we would expect the responsible officer to exercise these powers in a reasonable way and to exercise discretion. Hopefully, as I said a few minutes ago, these cases would not get as far as court because the probation officer would act in a reasonable and proportionate way in the first place. The guidance will reflect that. If someone does get to court, there is the possibility of their being represented in proceedings. However, I also would expect the judge to ask a reasonable question of the person appearing before the court, such as whether there were any mitigating circumstances or technical problems or whether they had failed to understand how to operate the equipment. If there is a vulnerability, the pre-sentence report written prior to the original sentencing would be expected to pick up those issues.
The shadow Minister asked whether the powers in clause 126 were too wide and gave the responsible officer excessive latitude and leeway to vary curfew requirements that a court had previously imposed—to dispense summary justice without proper reference to the courts. To be clear, clause 126 is very limited in the powers that it provides probation officers, and they will be able to amend the requirement in only two limited ways, and only if those changes do not undermine the weight or purpose of the requirement imposed by the court. The power in clause 126 is restricted to two areas: a shift in the start and/or end times of the curfew periods—but no change to the total number of hours imposed—and a change to the offender’s curfew address, where the address was not part of the order in the first place. So they are very limited powers to vary, which I hope provides the reassurance asked for.
The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, who unfortunately is not in her place, referred to the problem-solving courts in Liverpool. I understand that the results from that have been a little mixed, but we are committed on both sides of the House to the principle of problem-solving courts, and I noted the shadow Minister’s recitation of the history of these going back as far as 1999. Both sides recognise the important role that problem-solving courts can play. Other jurisdictions have used them, with the United States being an obvious example. We are starting on a pilot basis rather than a big-bang roll-out because the details of how the model operates is important. The details make a big difference, and the design of the way it works—when the reviews takes place, what they are reviewing and what actions are taken—make a difference to whether the thing is successful or not.
While across the House we are committed to the principle of problem-solving courts to tackle the underlying causes of offending, we have to make sure that they work in practice and the details are right before rolling them out. To answer another of the shadow Minister’s questions, I am sure we will be coming back to Parliament and reporting on the progress of these problem-solving courts. My hope is that we find a way quickly to make these work in practice and can then roll them out. I am committed to community sentence treatment requirements, which are a form of disposal that provides for mental health, alcohol and drug addiction treatment. Quite a lot of money has gone into that recently—£80 million for drug addiction earlier this year. Problem-solving courts are a critical way of supporting the delivery of treatment under community sentence treatment requirements. It is something I want to push, and I am glad that there is agreement across the House on that.
The final question that the shadow Minister asked was whether a guilty plea was needed to qualify for an appearance before a problem-solving court. Problem-solving courts do not require a guilty plea, and this Bill does not stipulate that as a prerequisite, but a willingness to engage with the court and comply with the community interventions will be an important factor. The problem-solving courts working group in 2016 considered making a guilty plea a key factor in creating the engagement necessary, but it recognised the number of complexities across the cohorts targeted, and did not think it was necessarily required. People who plead not guilty, and are then convicted, would be eligible for the problem-solving court, and I hope they can be helped as much as anyone else. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 124 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 125 to 127 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 128 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 13 agreed to.
Clause 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 14 agreed to.
Clause 130
Duty to consult on unpaid work requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will follow your direction, Sir Charles, by saying just a few words on this clause, which is relatively straightforward and, I think, pretty inoffensive.
Clause 130 simply creates a requirement for probation officials to consult key local and regional stakeholders on the delivery of unpaid work. Unpaid work—or community payback, as it is sometimes known—combines the sentencing purposes of punishment with reparation to communities. We believe that, where possible, unpaid work requirements should benefit the local communities in which they are carried out. Nominated local projects are already popular with sentencers and the public, but there is currently no requirement for probation officials to consult stakeholders on the design or delivery of unpaid work, so members of communities and organisations within particular local areas that are best placed to understand the impact of crime and what might be useful in the local area do not necessarily have their say.
Clause 130 simply seeks to address the gap by ensuring that key local stakeholders are consulted, so that they can suggest to the probation service what kind of unpaid work might be useful in their local area. We hope that local community groups and stakeholders come up with some good ideas that the probation service can then respond to. That seems to be a pretty sensible idea. The probation service in some areas may do it already. This clause simply creates a proper duty, or a requirement, for the probation service to do it. Of course, if we understand the needs of local communities and their thoughts, we can improve the way unpaid work placements operate to support rehabilitation and also help the local community. If the local community can visibly see offenders doing unpaid work in their local area, whether it is cleaning off graffiti, cleaning the place up or whatever else it may be, that will, we hope, demonstrate that the programme is giving back to and improving the local community, but delivering a punitive element as well.
When I used to run a children’s hospice, we had offenders under probation supervision come in. They were meant to be doing gardening at the children’s hospice, but instead they sat around smoking cigarettes. We kept on raising that with the probation worker, because we had invited the offenders there to give them a second chance, to help with their rehabilitation, to enable them to contribute to the community and so on. But the probation officer said, “What do you want me to do? I can’t beat them; I can’t make them work, but they have to come on these schemes.” Could the Minister give some examples of how the probation service will have the resources and the influence to ensure that people who are out in their local community are actually—
The hon. Lady makes a very good point. First, I am extremely disappointed and somewhat shocked to hear that people who were supposed to be doing work at a hospice in Rotherham in fact sat around smoking cigarettes. That is obviously shocking and not what the orders are supposed to be about. The hon. Lady says that the probation officer shrugged their shoulders and said, “Well, what can I do about it?” Of course, if the person, the offender, was not doing the work that they were supposed to be doing, that would amount to a breach of the unpaid work requirement, and they could be taken back to court to account for their breach, so I am extremely disappointed by the attitude of the probation officer that the hon. Lady just described.
The hon. Lady asked about resources. Extra resources are going into the probation service for it to supervise exactly these kinds of activities, and I would expect them to be supervised and policed properly. I will certainly pass on her concern to the relevant Minister. I have already made contact about fixing a meeting for the hon. Lady and the Prisons Minister that we talked about in this morning’s session, in relation to victims being consulted about probable decisions. The same Minister, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, is responsible for the probation service as well—I am just adding to his workload. I will raise it with him, but I would certainly urge the hon. Member for Rotherham to raise this issue in the same meeting, because I know that the account she just gave will concern my hon. Friend as much as it concerns me.
I echo the points made by the hon. Member for Rotherham in that there is a variation in the enthusiasm that some of those who conduct this work display, on both sides. I was told, for example, that a lad who came from a farming family had thrown his back into it very strongly and was encouraging others to join him. I would add that we do consult with the local community, and many of the jobs that are done in my constituency are at the behest of either a local authority or other local groups.
Wonderful. We would like to see the kind of consultation that already takes place in Scarborough and Whitby take place across the country as a whole, and that is precisely the intention behind clause 130. Where Scarborough has led, the rest of the nation, thanks to this clause, will follow.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 131
Youth Remand
I beg to move amendment 128, in clause 131, page 122, line 12, at end insert—
“(ba) after subsection (5) insert—
(5A) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6) “recent” is defined as having occurred in the previous six weeks.””
I am pleased to speak to amendments 128, 129 and 130 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham and myself. However, before I do that, if the Minister could give me a list of where he has influence, perhaps he could fix a few meetings with Ministers for me as well.
I thank the Minister very much for that—it will, of course, be on the record, which I am very pleased to note. Before I get into my speech, I would like to thank Transform Justice and the Alliance for Youth Justice for the extremely helpful work they have done on this part of the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hove (Peter Kyle), the former shadow Justice Minister, who worked extremely hard on these particular issues. I am grateful to him.
Clause 131 amends the legislative threshold for remanding a child to custody. It will mean that remand to youth detention accommodation can be imposed only in the most serious cases, where a custodial sentence is the only option and the risk posed by the child cannot be safely managed within the community. It will introduce a statutory duty which states that courts must consider the interests and welfare of the child before deciding whether to remand them to youth detention. It also imposes a statutory requirement for the courts to record the reasons for the decision.
First, let me say that we are pleased with the direction of travel that this clause indicates, and we are keen for the Government’s work in this area to succeed. We are in complete agreement with the Government that custodial remand should be used only as a last resort for children. However, we do think that there is scope for these proposals to go further in tightening the threshold for remanding a child into custody. I will speak more on that when we discuss our amendments.
The current youth remand provisions were introduced in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and I well remember the Public Bill Committee, where I had the privilege of serving as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sadiq Khan, now our excellent Mayor of London, and also my good friend. By 2019, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse noted a significant increase in the use of custodial remand for children. The Opposition warmly welcomes measures which aim to reduce the number of children remanded into custody, especially in light of the fact that in 2018/19 only a third of children remanded to custody or local authority accommodation later received a custodial sentence.
Our concerns about the use of custodial remands for children are compounded by the extreme racial disproportionality on remand, and the record proportion of children in custody who have not yet been tried in court.
Against the backdrop of the record court backlog and the waiting times for trial, there could not be a more opportune moment to address these issues. We particularly welcome the introduction of the statutory duty to consider the welfare and best interests of the child. We believe that, while these proposals can go further—I know that the Minister will listen carefully to our proposals shortly—these changes will help to reduce the number of children who are unnecessarily remanded to custody, so we are pleased to support them.
However, there are a couple of points on which I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts. Has he any further information to share with the Committee on his Department’s considerations of the impact that police remand has on custodial remand? Are there any plans to address that? Research by Transform Justice shows that police remand, where the child is detained by the police until court either in a police cell or in a local authority PACE bed—under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—is a driver of custodial remand. Transform Justice explains that point:
“This is because any child remanded by the police has to be presented in court within 24 hours, meaning Youth Offending Team staff often don’t have enough time to develop a bail package that will satisfy the court. Children who appear from police custody also usually appear in the secure dock, which can bias courts to view the child as more ‘dangerous’ and therefore more suitable for custodial remand.”
The criteria for police remand are spelled out in section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and are very different from those used by the court for remand. In fact, the criteria for police remand of children are almost identical to those for adults, unlike the child-first approach taken in so many other areas of the justice system.
We know that the police remand more children than the courts. Of the 4,500 children who appeared in court from police custody in 2019, only 12% went on to be remanded by the court. Some 31% of those remanded by the police went on to be discharged, dismissed or have their case withdrawn, while 37% went on to get a fine or community sentence. The figures illustrate that police use of remand is seriously out of synch with the courts already. This clause may further widen that gap.
Is the Minister not concerned that the police may continue to overuse post-charge detention, undermining the positive efforts of the clause to reduce unnecessary custodial remand for children? Will the Government consider updating the police remand criteria, so they are in line with the new court remand criteria, to ensure consistent decision making across the whole criminal justice system?
I am greatly supportive of the provision in the clause that requires courts to record their reasons for remanding a child, not least because it will provide valuable data on the use of remand, which will enable us to continue to make improvements in this area. For that to be most effective in informing future policy decisions, we would need to have some sort of centralised monitoring system. Will we have such a system? It would mean that the need to record reasons would not only focus the mind of the court in a specific case; it would also benefit the system as a whole, as each case can inform our ongoing learning process about the use of remand and its effectiveness. Has the Minister considered the possibility of such a centralised monitoring system?
It has been suggested that the obligation on the court to record reasons would be most effective if courts had to specify why non-custodial alternatives were deemed unsuitable and how each of the custodial remand conditions has been met. Is that the kind of detail that the Minister envisages the obligation should entail? I am sure we all agree that it would be helpful for that level of information to be provided, so I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.
Turning to the amendments, as I said earlier, the reforms to the threshold for remanding a child in custody are welcome, but there are a couple of areas where we believe they should go further. The Opposition amendments, if adopted, would get us closer to the goal of custodial remand being used only as a truly last resort.
Amendment 128 seeks to tighten the history test by defining a recent history of breaching bail or offending while on bail as having been committed within the last six weeks. The clause currently makes provision to amend the history condition so that the previous instances of breach or offending while on bail must be “significant”, “relevant” and “recent”. In order to reduce the number of children held unnecessarily on remand, it would be helpful to amend the clause so that there is a clear definition of “recent”.
In defining recent, we have to be mindful of what that means to a child. As the Alliance for Youth Justice notes:
“If we are to take a child-centred approach, we must consider how children experience time, and recognise the well-established principle that children change and develop in a shorter time than adults.”
The Youth Justice Board for England and Wales has recommended that “recent” be no longer than within a six-week period. I hope that the Minister will agree that clarity on that point would be of great assistance to the courts. I would be interested to hear from him what discussions his Ministry of Justice colleagues have had regarding defining a time limit for this condition.
Amendment 129 is a straightforward amendment to the necessity condition that would again help achieve the aim of using custodial remand for children only as a last resort. Although we welcome the strengthened wording of the necessity condition included in the Bill, which would require remand to be used only when the risk posed by a child cannot be safely managed in the community, we share the concerns of the sector that the benefits arising from this change may be undermined by its drafting. The amendment would therefore tighten and strengthen the wording. Transform Justice says that these benefits of the current proposed change to the necessity condition
“will be undermined by the loose wording of one of the other necessity conditions: that remand to YDA is necessary to prevent further imprisonable offences. This condition is highly subjective and casts a wide net, which may be widened further by youth sentencing provisions elsewhere in the bill.”
We share the concern expressed by the Alliance for Youth Justice that
“the latter part of the condition (to prevent the commission of an imprisonable offence) sets such a low threshold for meeting the Condition as to render the first threshold (to protect the public from death or serious personal injury) somewhat redundant.”
The amendment would tighten the latter part of the condition by ensuring that it applies only to serious imprisonable offences, which we think better reflects the intention of the clause.
Finally, amendment 130 would compel the court to record the age, gender and ethnicity of a child remanded in custody in order to provide better data on remand, particularly on disproportionality. We believe that this could be a helpful tool in addressing the deeply concerning and increasing levels of disproportionality at this point in our justice system. The numbers beggar belief. Nine out of 10 London children who are remanded are from black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. A deeply comprehensive report that was published by the Youth Justice Board in January shows that race alone is a factor in remand outcomes for children. The researchers gathered data on thousands of English and Welsh cases, and information provided in practitioner assessments. Even when other related factors were controlled for mixed ethnicity black children, they were, as the Youth Justice Board notes,
“still more likely to be remanded in custody and, if not remanded, more likely to be subject to restrictions on bail.”
This is a serious injustice in our system that needs to be urgently addressed. More needs to be done than this amendment makes provision for, but it would be a helpful tool in breaking down the disproportionate outcomes that we are seeing. The amendment would at the very least provide accurate data to help understand this disparity, in line with the “explain or reform” principle outlined in the Lammy review, which I think is an eminently sensible step in the right direction. I hope that the Minister agrees and look forward to hearing his thoughts. I would also be grateful if he could share with the Committee any other initiatives his Department is working on to address this flagrant disproportionality in youth remand.
We have to be aware that, under successive Tory Governments, youth services budgets have been cut by 73%, which is nearly a £1 billion since 2010, and we have to consider the impact that is having, particularly in my area of Rotherham, where the early interventions that could put children on the right path to a successful future are just not there any more. Now, rather than preventing the crime, we are looking at heavy-handed ways to punish it. I urge the Minister to speak to us and consider what his Government are doing to address those early intervention gaps to make sure that the measures in this legislation apply only in exceptional circumstances.
As the shadow Minister said, clause 131 aims to ensure that children are remanded into youth detention accommodation only where absolutely necessary and as a last resort. As the hon. Member for Rotherham and the shadow Minister said, that is something that we can all agree on. We do not want to remand children into custody prior to conviction unless it is absolutely necessary.
The hon. Member for Rotherham said that prevention was important, and of course we agree, although it is outside the scope of these clauses. Money is being invested, significantly, in serious violence reduction units that aim to prevent, but also to divert young people who might otherwise get into serious crime on to a better path.
We are mindful that over a third of children in custody are on remand and that, of those, only around a third go on to receive a custodial sentence. While custodial remand is perfectly justified in some cases, the threshold for confining an unconvicted child to a secure environment must, rightly, be set very high indeed. It sounds like we broadly agree on these principles, and that is why we are amending the provisions of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which sets out the test that the courts must satisfy when deciding whether to remand a child into custody. I think everyone agrees with the aim of the clause, which is to make sure that remand custody for a child is an absolute last resort. The shadow Minister welcomed this direction of travel and the steps that are being taken.
The clause introduces a statutory duty for the court to consider the welfare and best interests of the child when making remand decisions and a statutory requirement for the court to record its reasons for imposing custodial remand to ensure that the welfare of the child is at the forefront of the court’s mind and promote a child-first approach to decision making. We are also strengthening the sentencing condition to ensure that the mere possibility of a custodial sentence would not on its own necessarily warrant custodial remand. Similarly, a relatively minor or fairly recent breach should not, on its own, justify remand. We are reinforcing the history condition so that only a recent, significant and relevant history of breaching while on bail should be taken into account to justify custodial remand. The current tests already require the court to satisfy itself that a child can be remanded to custody only where it is necessary to protect the public from death or serious harm. We are reinforcing that necessity condition by making it clear that it means when the risk posed by the child cannot be managed safely in the community. These measures, taken together, significantly elevate and strengthen the test for child remand to custody.
Will the Minister confirm whether there is likely to be some form of time limit relating to the recent history of the child?
The shadow Minister leads me to his amendment 128, to which I was going to speak in a moment, but I shall address it now as he has raised it. There will not be a hard or specific time limit in the way that his amendment specifies six weeks. We think that a hard-edged limit of six weeks specified so precisely would unduly fetter judicial discretion. The judge should be able to make a judgment in the round, taking into account all the considerations. A hard cut-off of six weeks is too binary. It is made clear that the judge needs only to look at circumstances where there is a history of breach or offending while on bail that is recent, significant and relevant. That is quite a high test, but we do not propose to go as far as amendment 128 does in specifying six weeks. We do not support the amendment for that reason, although, in spirit, our clause as drafted is pushing in a very similar direction. We just think that six weeks is too precise and that the judge should have some residual discretion.
Before moving to amendments 129 and 130, I would like to touch on a question that the shadow Minister raised about whether police remand almost inevitably and inappropriately leads to custodial remand. He said that could be because there is not enough time to consider bail arrangements and that it could create a sense of bias because, if the judge sees the person in the dock, it may lead them to believe that they are a more serious offender. I do not accept either argument. The statistics that he himself gave a minute or two later support that. He said that only 12% of children going into police remand end up in custodial remand. That demonstrates that 88% of children on police remand do not go into custodial remand, which suggests that there is not a strong linkage in the way that he feared there might be.
We need some clarity around the 12% and the 88%. My point is that the police are remanding into custody a very high proportion of children who do not then go on to receive a custodial sentence. That is the problem, not the other way round.
I think that the shadow Minister also pointed out to the Committee that there is a 24-hour time limit on police remand for children, so it is an extremely short period of time. For that very short window before the court appearance, it ensures that the police do not lose control of the person in their care. Clearly, if that was going on for days or weeks, it would be a matter of concern, but it is a very short time window, as he said.
The shadow Minister’s amendment 129, on the necessity condition, proposes the insertion of the single word “serious”. I contend that any imprisonable offence is in itself serious but, more broadly, we are again relying on judicial discretion. We do not want to unduly fetter the judge’s discretion. The provisions in clause 131 as drafted will send a fairly clear signal to the judiciary that this is something that should be taken very seriously in making these decisions and that Parliament does not want children remanded to custody lightly or inappropriately. The clause as drafted makes that pretty clear. It also makes it clear that not only do the conditions that we have talked about have to be met but, in the opinion of the court, the risk posed cannot be managed safely in the community. Clause 131 as drafted sends a very clear message that custodial remand should indeed be a last resort.
Amendment 130, proposed by the shadow Minister, would require the court to state in open court the age, sex and ethnicity of a child remanded to custody. In all honesty, we believe that the amendment is unnecessary because the data is already collected and published, so the information is there already. The important point about the new record being created is that the reasons for custodial remand have to be spelt out expressly to ensure that the court is properly considering those things. We can then be absolutely assured that the court has to consider those matters and record them so that they are there to look at subsequently and be reviewed, not forgotten in the rush of a court appearance. The substance is captured already by the requirements in clause 131. It seems that both sides of the Committee broadly agree on this, so I do not think that amendments 128 to 130 are particularly necessary, although I do understand the spirit in which they are moved.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I am prepared to withdraw amendment 128, given his explanation, but I ask that he look seriously at time limits, whether in some form of guidance from the Department or otherwise.
On police remand, I am still very concerned that the police are far, far more likely to remand a child in custody than a court is. I ask that the Minister think again and review the advice given to police officers to try to reduce the number of children who are automatically remanded to custody. I am content with the Minister’s explanation on amendment 129 and I will not press it.
When it comes to data, as the Minister will know because I assume that he signs them all off, I get lots of answers to written parliamentary questions saying that the information cannot be provided because it is not available or it can be provided only at disproportionate cost. If we do not gather the data, I will get more of those answers from the Minister, so I intend to press amendment 130. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 130, in clause 131, page 123, line 3, at end insert—
“(aa) after subsection (4)(b) insert—
“(c) state in open court the age, gender and ethnicity of the child.””––[Alex Cunningham.]
Question put, That the amendment be made.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 133 stand part.
Clause 134 stand part.
That schedule 15 be the Fifteenth schedule to the Bill.
We want a youth justice system that recognises the unique needs of children, tackles the underlying reasons why children offend and intervenes early to provide support and divert them where possible. There is a distinct and separate sentencing framework for children aged 10 to 17, which recognises that children have their own specific needs that require a different and tailored approach.
The clauses and schedule amend existing legislation to enable us to make the necessary changes to the most common youth custodial sentence, the detention and training order, or DTO. The changes are to make the DTO more flexible, fairer and more in line with other youth custodial sentences.
In that spirit, clause 132 amends the sentencing code to remove the fixed lengths of the DTO, meaning that any length of DTO between four months and 12 months can be given. The court can pass the right sentence instead of being constrained to give only sentences of DTOs of four, six, eight, 10, 12, 18 or 24 months. Removing those very fixed lengths does not change the maximum or minimum sentence but just means that any length of sentence can be given between the limits of four and 24 months. Removing the fixed lengths also means that the reductions made for time spent on remand that we have just been talking about, or bail, which is subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition, and for a guilty plea, will be more accurate. At the moment, there is not always a DTO length that directly fits once remand, bail or guilty pleas have been considered, and the court must instead refer the sentence to one of the fixed lengths of four, six, eight, 10, 12, 18 or 24 months. With the proposed changes, the court may go between those sentence lengths, if it needs to, to fit in with the reductions for time spent on remand and so on. It is a fairly straightforward change, which makes a great deal of sense.
Clause 133 amends the sentencing code and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to fix a current inconsistency in relation to early release. That inconsistency means that different lengths of early release are available for offenders sentenced consecutively to a DTO and another sentence, depending on the order in which they receive those sentences. The change means that where an offender is serving a DTO and another sentence consecutively, the offender may benefit from the same amount of early release, regardless of the order in which sentences are given. I think that is a fairly innocuous and sensible technical change to the 2003 Act.
Clause 134 introduces schedule 15, and that schedule amends the 2003 Act and the sentencing code, so that time spent on remand and bail, where that bail is subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition—a tag—is counted as time served and credited accurately against the custodial part of the DTO. That is a change to the current approach, where time on remand or bail is taken into account when determining the length of the DTO, rather than being credited as time served. The schedule also makes further amendments where an offender is given two or more sentences, of which one is a DTO. Those sentences are treated as being a single term for the purposes of crediting the days spent on remand or bail. The schedule also makes changes to the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make sure that there is consistency.
Those are relatively technical and, I hope, relatively straightforward changes.
We all recognise that DTOs are the most common custodial sentence for children. Between 2010 and 2019, 20,000 offenders under the age of 18 were sentenced to a DTO. It is important that we get this right. We are tentatively supportive of the proposals in the clauses, and I look forward to the Minister’s response, which will I hope will be able to allay some of our concerns.
As the Minister has outlined, DTOs currently have to be of a fixed length. I have some sympathy with the Government’s view that having such fixed periods restricts the courts in deciding the most appropriate length of sentences. Clause 132 will address that by removing the fixed length and providing that a DTO must be for at least four months and no longer than 24 months. We agree with the Government that is important that the minimum period for a DTO is retained to ensure that extremely short, unhelpful and, indeed, counterproductive custodial terms are not given out.
I do wonder, however, whether four months is still too short, and I question the real benefits of such a short sentence. Clause 133 provides that where an offender is given two or more sentences, one of which is a DTO, those sentences are to be treated as a single term for the purposes of crediting days spent in custody, or in qualifying for bail. The explanatory notes state that this clause is intended to
“fix an existing discrepancy in relation to early release which meant that different lengths of early release were available for offenders sentenced to a DTO and another sentence consecutively, depending on the order in which they received those sentences.”
The clause aims to ensure that
“where an offender is serving a DTO and another sentence consecutively, the offender is able to benefit from the same amount of early release regardless of the order in which the sentences are given.”
Clause 134 and schedule 15 provide that time spent on remand or bail subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition is counted as time served and credited against the custodial part of the DTO.
Taken together, the clauses increase the flexibility in the system for sentencers and should mean that the sentence length can accurately account for remand episodes already served, electronically monitored bail or a guilty plea, rather than nearest permissible length based on the fixed tariffs that currently exist.
I note that the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales broadly welcomes these proposals as well. It notes that the changes may help to solve the issue whereby the fixed lengths of the DTO sentences held the potential to create a barrier to resettlement—for example, where a fixed sentence length would mean that a child would be released just after September and therefore miss out on the intake of a new school or college year. In this instance, the fixed terms would push children out of education for longer than necessary. The more flexible approach proposed here by the Government can help to address such issues.
On the face of it, these reforms seem sensible, and like something we would support. However, the impact assessment contains some concerning projections, on which I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts. The impact assessment notes an unfortunate adverse impact of removing the fixed-term nature of DTOs, in that individuals who receive early guilty plea discounts under the current system may receive longer sentences than they currently do. While there will be no additional children sentenced to DTOs under this option, the Youth Justice Board has said that it anticipates that the increase in average sentence length may lead to a steady-state increase in the youth custody population of around 30 to 50 places, costing around £5.3 million to £8.5 million per year. It has said that there would also be an equivalent uplift in the number of children supervised in the community at any one time at a cost of around £0.4 million to £0.6 million a year.
The Government’s impact assessment predicts that the proposals will increase the steady-state number of children in custody by up to 50 children by 2023-24, costing the youth custody service between £38.6 million and £61.4 million. That is of very serious concern to the Opposition. We share the Government’s stated vision of reducing the number of children in custody, and there has been great progress in that area over the past decade. The number of children in custody has decreased by about 75%, for which the Government ought to be applauded. It would be a terrible shame if we were to roll back any of the progress that has been made in this area, especially as I know how proud the Justice Secretary is of the work that has been done.
I would be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on how these proposals can be introduced without increasing the number of children in custody. Let us remember that it is the Youth Justice Board that is saying this will happen. Does the Department intend to introduce any safeguards in this area? The Opposition would like safeguards to be put in place to help to avoid the possibility of children spending longer than necessary in custody, which could also mean an increase in the number of children in a secure establishment at any one time.
I would also welcome a reassurance from the Minister on a further point raised by the Youth Justice Board in its briefing. It notes that the impact assessment states:
“Time spent on remand will be taken away from time to serve in custody as opposed to from the overall sentence length. There will be some individuals that spend longer on supervision in the community under this option, which would incur additional YOT costs. It has not proved possible to quantify these additional costs.”
We recognise that it might be beneficial for children to spend longer with the support of the youth offending team as opposed to being in custody, but there is of course an attendant impact on youth offending team budgets, which are already stretched. The Youth Justice Board says:
“Some children may spend longer on the community part of the order which gives youth offending teams more time to work with them but there is no evidence to support this as a benefit.”
The Youth Justice Board also notes that a cost-benefit analysis of these proposals, in terms of the additional spend for youth offending teams, would be helpful. Will the Minister provide such a cost-benefit analysis? Will he also confirm whether youth offending teams will be provided with appropriate further resource to handle any increased workload as a result of these proposals?
I am glad that the shadow Minister welcomes the broad thrust of these changes. That is very welcome indeed. In response to his questions about the impact assessment, it is important to say that it makes it clear on the second page that
“there will be no additional children sentenced to DTOs”.
The question therefore arises: why, then, will there be this very slight increase in the population, of between 30 and 50 places? The reason, as far as I can see, is that where the DTO sentence length falls between the two fixed points, at the moment it gets rounded down to the lower of the two, whereas under these proposals it can be calculated precisely. No additional people will be subject to a DTO; however, we will no longer have this rounding-down effect. In a sense, when we account for the time served and so on, and particularly the early plea discount, at the moment there is an inappropriate rounding down, because of the fixed points, which will now be eliminated. The time served will therefore better reflect the law and the court’s intention, and that will lead to a very slight increase in the number of people subject to these orders at any given point. However, the total number receiving the order will not change.
I accept that the total number receiving the orders will not change, but does the Minister not accept, and regret, that these proposals will lead to some children—it might only be a handful—being subjected to more time in custody than they would be under the current system? If he does accept that, what will he do to try to change it?
It is more that, owing to an anomaly in the current system that is a consequence of the fixed points, people are being let out slightly early. This change really means, among other things, that the law as written can be fully implemented, rather than this little rounding anomaly occurring. However, I stress that the effect is very slight.
By the way, I should take this opportunity to thank the shadow Minister for his earlier commendation of the Government’s record on reducing unnecessary child imprisonment.
In answer to the shadow Minister’s last question, which was about youth offending teams and longer time potentially being spent under their care, clearly it is our hope and expectation that youth offending teams will be effective—indeed, they are effective—in helping to divert young people on to a better path in life. We are generally increasing resources in this area, and I hope that that will have precisely that effect.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 132 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 133 and 134 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 15 agreed to.
Clause 135
Youth rehabilitation orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 122, in schedule 16, page 255, line 26, at end insert—
“(2A)After sub-paragraph 4(1) (Duty to give warning or lay information relating to breach of order), insert—
“4 (1A) For the purposes of this paragraph, a reasonable excuse for breach of an electronic compliance monitoring requirement shall include design faults in any necessary electronic apparatus, including (but not limited to) poor battery life; but shall not include intentional failure by the offender to charge necessary electronic apparatus.””
This amendment would introduce a safeguard to prevent children from being criminalised due to design faults, including poor battery life, on electronic monitoring devices.
Amendment 120, in schedule 16, page 258, line 34, at end insert—
“24(1) Paragraph 35 of Schedule 1 (Further provisions about youth rehabilitation orders) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1), for “The Secretary of State may by order” substitute “The Secretary of State must by order”.
(3) In sub-sub-paragraph (1)(a), omit “enable or”.”
This amendment would make panel reviews of youth rehabilitation orders routine by amending Paragraph 35, Schedule 1 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
Amendment 121, in schedule 16, page 258, line 34, at end insert—
“24(1) Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 (Further provisions about youth rehabilitation orders) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is amended as follows.
(2) At end insert—
“(6) The Secretary of State shall take steps to ensure that there are sufficient resources in place to allow for a court to make a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance in all appropriate cases.””
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that intensive supervision and surveillance is available in all youth offending areas.
That schedule 16 be the Sixteenth schedule to the Bill.
I call the Minister.
I look forward to the Minister’s response.
As we have said previously, and as I think the Opposition would agree, we believe that, wherever possible, children who offend should be managed in the community, as it is better for their rehabilitation and therefore wider society, as it is less likely that they will reoffend. In that spirit, clause 135 introduces and refers to schedule 16, which makes amendments to YRO provisions set out in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and in the sentencing code, which we believe will give the courts and the public confidence in YROs as an alternative to custody. The amendments are listed in schedule 16 and include the introduction of a new electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement and changes to the YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance, ISS, a high-intensity alternative to custody, with mandatory extended activities, supervision and curfew requirements.
The clause sets out the functionality for piloting the new electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement and the changes to YROs with ISS to ensure that they are robust and effective before being rolled out nationally. The clause also enables us to restrict the use of the requirements, for example, by age or offender profile, in the light of evidence uncovered in the trial and in practice.
Before we move on, it has come to my attention, courtesy of the Whips, that there will be a vote in the House at 4.30 pm. I am sure that none of you want to come back afterwards. It is up to you if you do, but I thought I would bring the Whips’ discussion to a wider audience, so we know what their ambition is for the Committee.
Clause 136
Abolition of reparation orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Given your suggestion, Sir Charles, I will place a premium on brevity. Clause 136 is straightforward. We believe that restorative justice is an important part of the justice system. However, the reparation order itself has been made redundant, having been overtaken by the evolution of the wider youth justice sentencing framework. Instead, referral orders and youth rehabilitation orders now provide a wider range of interventions, including elements of restorative justice, and are more flexible than a reparation order. They have essentially replaced reparation orders.
Also, reparation orders cannot be given in conjunction with a referral order or a youth rehabilitation order, which significantly reduces the circumstances in which they can be used. As a consequence, reparation orders have dropped out of usage—they dropped by 98% over the last decade because the other disposals have taken up the slack. Only 51 have been handed down in the year to March 2020. It is by far the least-used non-custodial disposal. Therefore, in the interests of clarity and simplicity, the clause abolishes the reparation order to enable those other forms of disposal to be used, as they are used anyway.
As the Minister explained, the clause would abolish reparation orders, which require the child to make practical amends to the victim or other affected party. The Government White Paper noted that the orders are little used, probably as they have been replaced by some of the more widely used sentencing options, and so have become redundant.
Reparation orders are the least used orders in the children’s sentencing regime, too. Between 2010 and 2019, around 5,000 offenders under the age of 18 were sentenced to reparation orders. The number of reparation orders handed down fell in each year during that period. In 2019, 66 of those sentences were passed, compared with 2,400 in 2010. In the year ending March 2020, there were just under 16,900 occasions where children were sentenced at court; only 51 of these were reparation orders.
While it is not clear why the use of the order has fallen so sharply, it has been suggested that it is as a result of changes in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which removed restrictions on the use of cautions and conditional cautions, which means that children who may have proceeded to court are possibly now receiving out-of-court disposals, which is a good thing. Do the Government plan to do any research to confirm this suggestion? I think it could be helpful if they did so, since this is quite a significant change in sentencing patterns, and it would be helpful to better understand how restorative justice processes are now manifesting themselves, given that usage is low and that reparation can also be included in other sentences, such as the referral order and youth rehabilitation order.
We support the removal of reparation orders and support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 136 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 137
Temporary release from secure children’s homes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The vote might come at quarter past 4, although the Whips will be better informed of that than me, and the Whip cannot move the adjournment while someone is speaking, I just remind him of that.
With that thought in mind, I will try to deal with the important points raised as quickly as I can.
We recognise that young people in detained accommodation or in custodial settings need a lot of support. Secure schools are being developed to do precisely this.
To support this, we think it is important that secure schools are provided by people who have a certain level of autonomy. Many charities have the necessary skills to do this. That is why, starting with clause 138, we are ensuring that providing a secure 16-to-19 academy can be counted as a charitable activity, enabling charitable secure school providers to improve outcomes in youth custody.
We always take changes to charities law seriously. We have to ensure that charities are properly regulated. The Ministry of Justice has worked closely with the Charity Commission and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to make sure that is done in a way that preserves the integrity of charity law.
Clause 137 ensures that there is a clear statutory power to enable providers to allow for temporary release where someone is sentenced to custody, which applies to secure schools as well. It is important that these children can be released into the community as part of the rehabilitation that we want to do with them. This clause puts that release provision on a statutory footing. We think that temporary release provisions are an essential tool in the rehabilitation journey, and this makes sure that can happen.
The Youth Custody Service and secure children’s homes that make temporary release decisions always do so subject to proper risk assessments. The YCS will develop formal guidance for SCH managers, outlining the necessary steps to be taken when making a balanced temporary release decision. Both these measures are helpful in ensuring that charities are able to come into this space to provide these services and that temporary release can be facilitated as part of the rehabilitation package, all of which is important.
Amendments 123 and 133 speak to the inspection regime. Like other academies and children’s homes, secure schools will be jointly inspected by Ofsted and the Care Quality Commission. They will also be inspected monthly, not annually, by independent visitors. As co-commissioners for secure schools, the Youth Custody Service and NHS England will be responsible for ensuring high standards of performance. The minimum frequency of inspection is also set out in the regulations.
As secure 16-to-19 academies will fall under the definition of a children’s home in the Care Standards Act 2000, they will be inspected on an annual basis in any case. The definition of children’s home in the Children’s Home (England) Regulations 2015 makes it clear that they will fall under the frequency of inspections regulations, so they will be annually inspected in any case, making amendment 123 unnecessary.
We have consulted HMCIP on the question of inviting it into the inspection regime, and it agrees with the Government’s position. Although secure schools are a secure environment, they are essentially schools and children’s homes, and so should be inspected by Ofsted and the CQC. Involving the prisons inspectorate in these institutions would run counter to the ethos we are trying to develop.
In speaking to amendment 146, the hon. Member for Rotherham made a compelling contribution on some of the failings that have occurred in the past, which we all agree we want to avoid. We are clearly talking about the new secure 16-to-19 academies. I want to speak to the concern about the profit motive, which amendment 146 addresses. As part of the existing academies legislation, an academy trust is, by definition, a not-for-profit charitable company, so I can confirm to the hon. Member and other members of the Committee that because academy trusts have to be not-for-profit by their nature, this new provision does not open up the possibility of introducing the profit motive into the provision of these secure schools.
I hope that my remarks achieve the twin objectives of giving commitment and assurance on these clauses, as well as avoiding a clashing with a vote that may be imminent.
The hon. Member for Rotherham looks happy. I will ask her if she is happy in relation to her amendment, but I will first go to the shadow Minister.
Excellent.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 137 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Amendment proposed: 123, in clause 138, page 126, line 40, at end insert—
“(8) A secure 16 to 19 Academy will be subject to annual inspection by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This amendment would make secure 16 to 19 academies subject to annual inspection by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons.
Question put, That the amendment be made.