Banking Union and Economic and Monetary Union

Chris Leslie Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

No pressure there, then, Mr Deputy Speaker.

I have a lot of sympathy with the Minister today. Let us hope that he is a little luckier than he was last Wednesday, although of course the curse of Tunbridge Wells will have its way. In a way, as he explained, banking union is a natural downstream consequence of monetary union. It would be wrong to resist it for the eurozone, as the eurozone crisis has exposed a series of risks to economic stability, not least of which is the relationship between sovereign debt and banking debt and the need to find credible ways to prevent private banking losses from dragging down sovereign fiscal positions. The UK has its own banking union and our monetary policy sovereignty has given us a measure of protection during the sovereign and bank debt crises that have engulfed the eurozone.

I thought the Minister was perhaps labouring under the impression that his plucky Members of Parliament kept us out of the euro between 1997 and 2010—that is too funny, as of course that was the decision of the previous Labour Administration. It was the right decision.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

rose—

[Chris Leslie]

I will not give way yet, as I am conscious of the time.

We were right, too, to bail out the banks in 2008, but that came at a high cost for the taxpayer and for the country’s economic prospects. UK public debt was adversely affected by the purchase of banking assets and the subsequent loss of revenues from financial services. These issues are now affecting countries around the world, especially in the EU. Monetary policy sovereignty has allowed the UK to adopt an active interest rate policy to counteract those economic headwinds—something less available to those in the eurozone.

To save the euro, the eurozone has looked at new rules to grip the fiscal policies of its member states. Fiscal union in the EU is now widely recognised as dependent on banking union. Germany initially insisted on that, and it has asked that the single supervisory mechanism—the eurozone nation state regulators and Governments—be completed before banks can access the European stability mechanism and the European Central Bank’s outright monetary transactions programme, hence the imperative to agree these matters. In recent weeks, however, Germany is rumoured to have lost some enthusiasm for that tougher banking union and its consequences, especially as some of its smaller banks face major regulatory upheaval.

It is right that the ECB’s role in supervisory policy should be triggered, by unanimity if necessary, as required in the Maastricht treaty. Central banks are increasingly in the driving seat in financial regulation, as is the case in the UK, and it is necessary for the ECB to have a clear capability in its role overseeing the operation of the eurozone. The ECB is a full treaty institution, and it must be governed by treaty rules and member state unanimity, as we heard from the Minister. In that process, the rights of non-eurozone members, particularly the UK, must be safeguarded in several ways. We should not be party to any deposit guarantee mechanisms or pre-fund recovery or resolution mechanisms. The UK has undertaken its own measures in that respect, and there are no proposals on the table that would affect our taxpayers directly.

The rules for the single market, including a single rule book for the financial services sector in the EU, should involve all 27 member states. The European Banking Authority—as well as other European supervisory authorities—is the vehicle for preserving the integrity of the single market. The Commission says in its documentation that

“it is proposed that voting arrangements within the EBA should be adapted to ensure EBA decision-making structures continue to be balanced and effective and preserve fully the integrity of the Single Market”.

That is absolutely crucial, but we need far more details about how that will work. The 17 eurozone countries will act en bloc through the ECB in their seats on the EBA, which could represent a permanent majority on all issues, as the Minister explained. The EBA has rule-making powers under qualified majority voting decisions, it mediates between supervisory institutions, and it shares supervisory best practice. There is a real risk of the ECB bloc acting as a permanent caucus to overrule the 10 non-eurozone nation states.

[Mr Baron]

What does the hon. Gentleman understand our guarantees to be to ensure that City interests are not adversely affected by QMV if the regulations go through unamended?

[Chris Leslie]

As I shall come to, we should seek such key guarantees. I do not think that there is a sufficiency under the proposals on the table. As I said, I am sympathetic to the Government’s situation. However, there is a crucial difference between the Opposition and the Government. We believe that it is really important that we stay in the room somehow so that our voice continues to be heard and we can shape and mould supervisory rules, given the importance of financial services to our economy. How can we continue to be involved while not being at risk of being overridden by the 17 eurozone members? That is the conundrum with which we are trying to grapple, and it is shaping up to be a test case in the two-speed Europe debate.

[Mr Clappison]

The phrase, “Staying in the room” is one we often hear. However, is it not the reality of the voting arrangements that the hon. Gentleman would be staying in one room and the important decisions would be made in another?

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[Chris Leslie]

It is right for the hon. Gentleman to voice that anxiety. I do not want us to be on the margins, unable to promote the best interests for our nation and our economy. Given that our financial services sector represents approximately 40% of the total of the European Union’s financial services sector, that is absolutely at the core of our vital national interests. It is therefore imperative for us to remain an active driving force in the EU single market in financial services.

[Mr Jenkin]

It seems to me that the hon. Gentleman is trying to have his cake and eat it. Either he is going to be in the room—in the banking union—or not. If he is not going to be in the banking union, the question that he is failing to grapple with is this: what safeguards and protections do we need given that we will not be in the room because we will not be in the banking union? Perhaps he could provide an answer to that question instead of just waffle.

[Chris Leslie]

The hon. Gentleman is too kind, as uncharacteristic of him as that may be.

I am afraid that this is a tall order for the Government to negotiate. It is a conundrum. I do not in any way shrink from the mountain that needs to be climbed in squaring this circle, if I may mix my metaphors in that way. I am just concerned that the Government’s approach—perhaps an echo of their approach to the EU budget—is not ambitious enough. I urge hon. Members to talk to institutions across the City of London and to financial services practitioners across the country. They are very worried about their position if they are not able to be part of a single market. They know very well that there are forums in which the rules will be made and shaped, and yet of course they want to reserve our rights from a UK position. Somehow, we have to try to forge a negotiating strategy that manages to do better.

[Mr Cash]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Leslie]

I will in a moment, but I am conscious of time.

The motion expresses, in only the most general terms, the Government’s policy to

“remain outside the new supervisory arrangements while protecting the single market in financial services.”

That is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Perhaps it would be better if Ministers found ways to stay outside the scope of the eurozone’s rules—the point made by the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin)—but somehow still be in the room on EU-wide supervision matters as they develop, and to secure protections in any future settlement on EBA rule-making and mediation.

[Mr Cash]

Surely the hon. Gentleman is missing one major point, which is that the transfer of the jurisdiction under the single market arrangements that took the City of London away from the United Kingdom and gave it to the European Union was a decision taken by his Government. That is why the problem he is now having to deal with—the anxieties he referred to—has arisen. That the coalition has acquiesced in that is another story. The fact is, however, that the real responsibility lies with those who transferred the jurisdiction, as I pointed out in the Financial Times three years ago.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

I do not want to get too much into the history of these things. We could go back to the Maastricht treaty, the formation of the eurozone and the inexorable logic of how we have got to where we are today. All I know is that it is important that we try our best and redouble our efforts to ensure that we have a negotiating strategy that secures the best deal possible for the UK.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Leslie]

I should like to make a little progress if I may.

I know that hon. Members will say, “How can we manage to secure these particular arrangements? What should our stratagem be?” Government Members will recall Lady Thatcher’s invocation of the Luxembourg compromise—a quiz question for hon. Members who recall that device. It has not been in use in recent times, but it was a way, in certain circumstances for qualified majority voting arrangements, to ensure that there was a capability of promoting vital national interest. There was at one point a recognised device for ensuring that one could stay in the room. If vital national interests were affected, then certain levels of protection were possible. I do not in any way deny that that is a difficult position, but that is the sort of scale of proposition that the Government should be more actively asserting. The Government need to negotiate a clearer and more distinct set of rules that protect our status outside the eurozone while ensuring that we have an ongoing role in how new rules develop across the whole EU. In our view, that must be the Prime Minister’s negotiating objective.

We have other concerns and questions about the SSM. How can it connect with the wider public and be subject to democratic accountability? That is an important point, because the bodies at the heart of the SSM will need to be more transparent. I am not clear whether they will publish their minutes in the same way as the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve, but we need to start addressing some of those transparency questions. Furthermore, what will be the relationship between the ECB’s monetary policy stance and its approach to decisions on financial supervision?

The composition of the SSM is complex and lines of accountability are extremely confused. For example, the European Central Bank is a superior treaty institution, yet the EBA will in theory sit on a junior institution. It is extremely difficult to see lines of accountability and how the legal issues raised in the amendment will be resolved. What will happen in the intervening months and potentially years before this complex constitutional wiring is settled? What if new market pressures force banking crises that require the stability mechanism or outright monetary transactions to be triggered, and what if there is no SSM in place?

How do we prevent City of London institutions and firms, which contribute about one sixth of Britain’s GDP, from changing their opinion about London in the long run as the right place to locate, when there is a risk that we will be marginalised in the decision-making forum for EU banking rules? They will worry about the prospects of operating under a different set of rules from those on the continent. Our vital national and economic interests are at stake, so we need to ensure that we keep involved, do not get pushed out and avoid being marginalised, while of course reserving our rights.

[Wayne David]

My hon. Friend has set out a precise and appropriate agenda for the country to pursue, but does he agree that for that agenda to be pursued effectively we need the ability to put across arguments and to persuade? What we do not want is rhetoric and empty gestures, which is what we are getting from the Government.

[Chris Leslie]

I worry that that is the problem with the Government’s approach to the negotiations. I do not deny for a moment that this is a tall order as a negotiating strategy, but it is necessary to protect our national interests. Of all the 10 non-eurozone countries, we have the most at stake. As I said, 40% of the EU financial services sector comes from Britain. We cannot allow ourselves to be treated as an afterthought in these negotiations. Why are the Government letting others shape the thinking and make all the running on EU banking union reform? Our vital national interests are on the line. We need a clearer negotiation strategy from the Government from the one we have seen to date.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—