Financial Services (Market Abuse)

Chris Leslie Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend missed out on the opportunity that I and the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) had of serving on the Financial Services Bill Committee. We spent a considerable amount of time developing the details of jurisdiction in the UK, through giving powers to the Financial Services Authority. There are areas where rules are made at a European level, but, equally, there are areas where rules are made in the UK, and it is not appropriate to say, “There’s only European law.” There is a whole raft of UK law on these matters.

To date, the UK has used the flexibility of the minimum harmonisation EU directive to create a stronger standard, applying the regime to more venues and having stronger rules. Now we have the opportunity to have a better framework applied across the whole of the EU, and that is in our interests.

It is clear that market abuse can take place beyond our borders and yet still affect securities traded within our borders. For that reason, the Government support the Commission’s objective to revise the EU market abuse framework. Improving the strength and consistency of the framework is vital to investor confidence.

There are challenges and opportunities in shifting to a regulation. There are challenges if the UK’s own practices are compromised. There are opportunities from having a more consistent and stronger EU regime and potentially reducing the cost and complexity of compliance for market actors.

Clearly, our prime objective is to ensure that the powers currently available to competent authorities are not weakened, which would damage the UK and the creditable work of the FSA. Secondly, we wish to deliver a robust framework for tackling market abuse within Europe.

Interest in changes to the market abuse framework extends beyond this House. In March, the European Central Bank published its opinion of the market abuse proposals. Its commentary focused largely on the new provision in the regulation for competent authorities to be able to delay the publication of inside information with systemic consequences. The Government echo the ECB’s support for seeking the legal framework to be improved in this respect. This is a key provision for the Bank of England and the FSA following the financial crisis and the difficulties experienced surrounding the disclosure of emergency lending assistance.

I want to outline briefly the EU market abuse package proposed by the Commission. In October 2011, the Commission published a regulation and an accompanying directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse. Those proposals together update the framework formerly established by the market abuse directive 2003, including proposing EU harmonisation of criminal law for market abuse for the first time. The legal basis for the criminal directive is article 83(2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. This is the first use of the relevant provision since the Lisbon treaty was agreed. It means that the directive is subject to a justice and home affairs opt-in. The UK and Ireland have discretion on whether it should apply to them. Denmark is automatically opted out. In light of the fact that this was the first use of the article, it was important that the Government carefully contemplated the issues and came to the appropriate decision.

The European Scrutiny Committee also considered the use of the opt-in. In its 52nd report of the last Session, the Committee noted that the full potential impact for the UK of the draft directive will become certain only once negotiations are concluded. The European Affairs Committee concurred with that opinion, but we are, of course, bound by the regulation.

The Government’s decision not to opt in at this time is a reflection of the sequencing of the directive compared with related legislative proposals. The proposed directive is entirely dependent on the outcome of the market abuse regulation, and the markets in financial instruments directive, which are both in relatively early stages of negotiation. The Government believe that it is very challenging to assess the implications, scope and way in which the criminal directive may develop, given the broader uncertainty of the market abuse framework, which itself is simultaneously subject to a major review.

The key issue here is ensuring that the interaction between the criminal and administrative regimes is clear and workable for all member states. Above all, we need to address the flexibility of when to apply a criminal penalty and when an administrative penalty needs to be retained within member states’ national systems. That must be determined on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the evidence of an individual case. In addition, there was uncertainty about whether the powers of competent authorities would be weakened in respect of accessing telephone records in the regulation and, potentially, the accompanying criminal directive.

It is essential that competent authorities have the flexibility to determine the appropriate type of penalty—whether it is criminal or administrative—and the powers available to them to investigate suspected cases of market abuse. The Council has itself recognised the difficulties involved in trying to complete negotiations on the criminal directive, with linked proposals being negotiated simultaneously. Therefore, the presidency decided to pause progress on the directive, in order to wait for policy progress to be made in the market abuse regulation.

However, I note that although the Government have decided not to opt in at this stage, we have continued to participate fully in negotiations. It is important that we use our expertise in combating market abuse, including the fact that the UK already covers market abuse in its criminal law today. If we are able to do that, and further progress the related proposals in the market abuse regulation and the markets in financial instruments directive in a manner that meets our objectives, we may consider opting in to the criminal directive. We can assess this only when the trio of proposals are properly progressed.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

The Minister is giving a lucid and paced description of Government policy. Let me cut to the chase. It is important that he has the opportunity to hear my question. Are we as a nation—are the Government—opting in to the criminal sanctions market abuse directive, or is he proposing to opt out of it? Which is it?

[Mr Hoban]

At the moment, let me clarify the position by saying that we have not opted in. As I was saying, we need to see how discussions on three linked legislative proposals work through before deciding whether or not to opt in, but our priority is to ensure that we have a proper market abuse regime in place—one that maintains the highest standards and ensures that the Financial Services Authority, which is responsible for this area of policy, is enabled to use its powers fully to ensure that there is confidence in the integrity of markets.

So I can reassure the House that this Government will not allow legislation on market abuse to be insufficient, and we would not opt into a directive that would undermine the FSA’s current powers in this area. I welcome the opportunity to debate this issue tonight, including the opt-in decision. This is an important issue, and it is right that hon. Members have an opportunity to debate it.

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

This is indeed an important debate. Market abuse, insider dealing and market manipulation are issues that do not get the airtime that they deserve. It is important that white collar crime and abuses of what we might call white collar financial services activities are properly attended to. We know that in recent years the regulators, or the relevant authorities, have sometimes struggled properly to prosecute or pursue issues where allegations have been made and there are difficulties in pinning down the right level of evidence. This is an important opportunity to see how, when the European Union proposes new regulations to tighten up some of the rules, the UK Government approaches such questions. I was interested to see in the Financial Services Authority’s recent annual report the quite shocking statistics on potential market manipulation that still takes place and often goes uncaptured.

The statistic that leapt out at me concerned something called APPM monitoring—I know that hon. Members enjoy their acronyms—or abnormal pre-announcement price movement monitoring. Apparently, such movements are still at a level of more than 20% in respect of announcements of mergers or acquisitions. If we look back at share transactions and other dealings, we can see that there are palpably instances when information has leaked out and people have taken advantage of information asymmetry. Such market abuses are notoriously difficult to pin down and prosecute, but they are unfortunately still a feature of many of our markets and financial services and we need to do a great deal to bear down on them.

The original market abuse directive was adopted back in 2003, but the new set of regulations proposes to try to tighten up the arrangements in a number of areas. There are gaps in the new markets that have emerged, for example, particularly in commodities trading and derivatives trading. I shall talk about those in a moment. There are problems with regulatory enforcement, where outdated arrangements are in place. There is a lack of legal certainty, particularly when issues cross nation state boundaries, and a risk of regulatory arbitrage. I was not surprised, therefore, that that was one area in which the Commission made proposals.

[Mr Cash]

In the context of acronyms, I wanted to draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the fact that the market abuse directive is, of course, MAD.

[Chris Leslie]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for showing that sanity is sometimes tested in these debates. I should also pay tribute to his work and to that of the European Scrutiny Committee, without which many of these important debates would never materialise on the Floor of the House—even if this debate is in the middle of the football, possibly with less exposure and fewer viewers watching on BBC Parliament than might normally do so. I am sure that there will be a rerun of these proceedings and people will be able to watch them at their leisure.

What is different about the market abuse regulations? We know that a parallel criminal sanctions directive is being discussed, although the Government’s position is far from clear. They are almost saying that they will not opt in at this stage, but might change their mind later depending on a number of rather strange factors. There are important reasons why we need to tighten up the criminal offences regime for market manipulation and for insider dealing, and those important steps must be taken. I agree with some of the proposals in the market abuse regulations that will broaden the definition of insider information to cover information that is not generally available for reasons of transaction opacity.

I am particularly keen to see improvements in the market abuse regulations in areas such as commodities and derivatives trading, which were not as large and significant as they are now. About 15 years ago, some £300 million of commodities trading took place in the UK, whereas that has now increased by almost 1,000%. Billions and billions of pounds are now moving from investment-based activity to speculation-based activity. These issues are serious. One might think about speculation in metals and gold and wonder where the harm is, as that is the nature of the world we are in today. However, speculation in wheat, cocoa and other basic food and commodity substances that can have a bearing on the nutrition of many millions of people in developing countries is an issue that matters in the real world.

If there is market abuse and manipulation, it can have a serious impact on real lives. That is why it is important that when we see so many giant corporations with very deep pockets so often being accused of distorting markets and purchasing whole monthly future contracts, potentially hurting consumers in poorer countries, we should take the opportunity to ask whether we have the right market abuse arrangements in place and whether we could make changes. If companies were cornering the market in equities or listed shares it would trigger regulatory action, but when large corporations corner the market in commodities it does not. That is a bizarre anomaly and we need to modernise the arrangements.

We need to see other important changes in the market abuse regulations. How do we identify insider dealing and market manipulation? What are the rules about information being delayed before public announcements? After the financial crisis, there were serious lessons to be learned about revealing information about abuses that might have a bearing on systemically important transactions and organisations. There are some proposals in the arrangements to deal with these issues. These are very serious questions that need to be addressed.

There is a parallel proposal for a criminal sanctions directive that defines the two offences of insider dealing and market manipulation, which should be regarded by member states as criminal offences if committed intentionally. The intention is to introduce a minimum level of harmonisation for criminal sanctions and, in particular, to provide that the competent authority should have the power to impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of profit gained or lost.

There is virtue in the criminal sanctions directive and the market abuse regulations, but we are now in this rather byzantine legislative Committee treacle trying to move these issues forward. The Minister may well be personally involved in these areas—I do not know to what extent—but if hon. Members care to take the time to look at the voluminous documentation associated with this debate they will find some interesting correspondence between the Minister and the European Scrutiny Committee. The Minister will have to forgive me if I paraphrase him incorrectly, but in that correspondence he says that the Council discussions have been somewhat fractured—I think that was the word he used—as a result of the fact that the criminal sanctions directive is taken through the Justice and Home Affairs Council whereas the market abuse regulations are taken through ECOFIN.

We then have the added little twist that the Cypriot presidency is taking over on 1 July an issue that has not been resolved and is still in abeyance. The Justice Secretary attended the Justice and Home Affairs Council at the end of April, which kept open—this is where we get into Eurospeak—the “horizontal articles” for a “partial general approach”. I know that is something that Members will be familiar with. In other words, those involved were saying, “Nothing is really going to change on this particular issue. We are just going to tread water for quite some time.”

Then we have the crazy situation in which the market abuse regulation grinds slowly forward while in a parallel universe the criminal sanctions directive enters an entirely different Council Committee. One almost, but not quite, feels sorry for the Minister trying to balance or juggle this particularly tricky set of negotiations, but rather than waiting, reacting and observing the process, he needs to grip this issue by the scruff of the neck and move it forward.

Ultimately, this is the main question I want to ask him: what is he doing to move matters forward? Can he give a proper explanation of where he stands on the substantive elements of the market abuse regulations and of the criminal sanctions directive in particular? He says that it is difficult to assess the scope and implications so far because it depends on the review of the markets in financial instruments directive and various other factors. Difficult or not, he needs to set out the Government’s position on the substantive policy issues. That is what I expected him to do this evening. The issues are not rocket science. He should set out his position. Even if it is a negotiating position, I would like to know the Government’s starting point in this set of discussions. This is a poor way of making decisions.

Clear leadership is not being shown in sorting out the matter and getting a grip of the question. It is necessary to improve and modernise the regulations on market abuse because modern-day financial markets have left behind the old regime. I understand the Commission’s attempts to get some coherence and harmony on market abuse issues and to deal with the regulatory arbitrage issues that arise from time to time, but the Government must answer a number of questions. Why do they feel that they are still unable to set out their position on the substantive policy issues? When does the Minister expect some resolution of the issues? In particular, who does he think should be moving matters forward? Is he just a bystander, waiting for others to do that—the Cypriot presidency or someone else? When will he, as a Minister, show a lead, tackling market abuse, dealing with insider trading arrangements and ironing out some of these important questions? He is too relaxed and a little complacent on these questions. He needs to take charge and grasp the issue.