Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Monday 9th September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point. The point of transparency and registration is about being able to say that, if all such engagement is absolutely above board and matter of fact, there is nothing to hide and nothing to worry about. When the picture is created, or when it can be canvassed by some, that there is something untoward about such contacts and representations—that they are an attempt to get undue influence in pursuit of a particular vested interest—the whole public policy system and Parliament suffer. That is what happens when those suspicions abound. We are trying to protect ourselves and the public understanding and trust of Government and parliamentary processes by ensuring we have a more meaningful Bill.

That is why the amendments before us are important, not least amendment 48—which, as we know from the Chair of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, will probably be put to a vote—and the Opposition amendments, beginning with amendment 2, which basically take to task the Bill’s deliberately narrow definition of “consultant lobbying” by replacing it with a wider term, “professional lobbying”. This group of amendments also contains amendment 161, which stands in my name, which also tries to add more definition to the type and character of lobbying that we want the Bill to capture. Indeed, the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon said that there are issues with lobbying activity that is clearly carried on in firms and on behalf of firms. Such lobbying is a dedicated, professional wing of activity on the part of corporations, and it should be captured in any appropriate Bill.

[Chris Bryant]

Not least in broadcasting, which is one of the most lobbyacious parts of society, and for a very good reason—a lot of broadcasting depends on legislation. However, broadcasting firms hardly ever employ third-party consultants; rather, they always use their own, normally enormous in-house operation. Also, those lobbyists would not bother going to see the permanent secretary, because the permanent secretary would not be bright enough to understand the technicalities. Instead, they would go to the junior officials in the Department who do. None of that would be captured by this Bill.

[Mark Durkan]

I fully agree with the hon. Gentleman. I will not be tempted to wander away from the issues that we are meant to be dealing with in this group of amendments, but he is right to point out some of the flaws that exist elsewhere in part 1 of the Bill and to the wholesale escape by corporate lobbyists working on behalf of various bodies. Whether those lobbyists are working on behalf of allegedly public bodies, private commercial bodies or much larger international conglomerates, they should not be able to escape the scope of the Bill as lightly and handily as they are going to do. As the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon has pointed out, the Bill is framed in such a way that some people will simply be able to recast their business in order completely to escape being touched by the legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Such is the paucity of the drafting of the Bill—cobbled together, I think, at the last minute—that the real danger is that even the people who the Government think do consultant lobbying do not do it in the terms of the Bill, and will therefore be excluded from the register. The Government may think that 350 organisations will be covered, but I think that that is a very dubious, dodgy number. I think that it is more likely to be 35 or three and a half or even three.

[Mark Durkan]

rose—

[Mr Cox]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I will give way first to the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), and then to the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon, although he was unkind enough not to give way to me a second time.

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Gentleman is entirely right about not just the existing paucity of the definition in the Bill, but about the tautology that we are being asked to introduce in the form of the circular definition in amendment 84. Would it not be more honest for the Government simply to propose that the Bill should define a consultant lobbyist as anyone who places an entry in the section of the Yellow Pages that is headed “Consultant Lobbyists”, and that those who do not so define themselves should be exempt?

[Chris Bryant]

I think that that would be slightly to treat the legislation with contempt—so I am right up there with the hon. Gentleman.

Succession to the Crown Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 22nd January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

I do not intend to detain the Committee for long. I merely wish to ask the Minister to address herself to questions that have been raised about the number six. The hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil) suggested one explanation, and other Members made further suggestions. I should also like the Minister to consider how the Government envisage the discharging of the sovereign’s consent in practice, and whether the decision on granting that consent could depend on the religion of the person concerned.

[Chris Bryant]

Would it not be helpful if the Minister at least told us that the Government would consider amending the Bill in another place to ensure that the provision could not be used to prevent an heir to the throne from marrying a Roman Catholic?

[Mark Durkan]

Absolutely. Earlier, a Government Member referred to clause 2(1), in which we seem to think we are telling ourselves that we are removing the bar on the marriage of an heir to the throne to a Roman Catholic. However, it could well be that clause 3 allows the sovereign to continue to exercise such a bar, or a future monarch to exercise it, precisely to avoid some of the issues that other Members have already raised.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

My contention and, I think, Lord Pannick’s contention is that this is a fix in a different way, because it is essentially rigging the constitution so as to make it possible for the coalition to remain in government until 2015—against the manifesto commitment.

[Mark Durkan]

rose—

[Naomi Long]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

Let me finish my point. Lord Pannick also cited the Constitution Committee in the House of Lords, which said:

“the origins and content of this Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand.”

I think their lordships were right. I will now give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) and then to the hon. Member for Belfast East (Naomi Long), who is slightly my hon. Friend.

[Mark Durkan]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. Earlier, he indicated to the Minister that he assumed that the resolution provided for under the amendment would be moved at the start of a Parliament on the basis that any Government worth their salt would do it then. Can he tell us what he believes any Opposition worth their salt would do in relation to such a resolution? Would not the scenario that he is arguing for, of a Government doing that at the start of a Parliament, mean that the very unedifying spectacle that we have seen in this Parliament of a Government fixing the term to suit themselves would happen in every Parliament?

[Chris Bryant]

I suppose it is true that every Opposition will always want to take an opportunity to have an early general election. The nature of opposition means wanting to become the Government, so the Opposition would want the chance to have a general election. I think that is the drift of what my hon. Friend said. As I have said, I think we would have a better piece of legislation if we had had pre-legislative scrutiny and had been able to sit around a table, not just with the main parties but with the smaller, minority parties too.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman says, and that was why I indicated my support for earlier amendments that would have narrowed the ambiguity and reduced the possibility of political and procedural chicanery, with which the Bill is riddled.

[Chris Bryant]

Will my hon. Friend point out to the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) that there is a picture of the heffalump in several of A. A. Milne’s books?

[Mark Durkan]

I accept that point fully.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Wednesday 24th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Gentleman raises some wider questions, and you, Mr Hoyle, have said that the next group of amendments deals with confidence, but this debate has strayed well on to that ground and conflated the two issues of whether the House, by a weighted majority, calls for an early election or whether it passes a motion of no confidence in the Government.

In 1994, the Government changed in the Dail. The Labour party left its coalition with Fianna Fail, supported a motion of no confidence in the then Taoiseach and reappeared in a new coalition with Fine Gael and the then Democratic Left. In that situation, as in the Bill before us, provision has been made for a Government to change—a new Government to be constituted—in the lifetime of a Parliament, and in 1994 the people of Ireland settled quite happily for that.

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend does not like my “immediate” provision, but I shall suggest one reason why he is wrong. The Bill, if unamended, means that Her Majesty by royal proclamation under the Great Seal, after conferring presumably with the Privy Council, determines the date of the general election, but that in essence is down to the Prime Minister. Surely, if the whole point is to take that power away from the Crown and to place it here in Parliament, there should be provision for an “immediate” general election.

[Mark Durkan]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about trying to remove powers from the Prime Minister, but I am not sure that all the amendments that he supports would do that. I think that, in a fairly effective way, the powers would remain pretty heavily with the Executive.

I am not fully persuaded of the case for the amendment. I fully accept the argument that it would bring some clarity and put some control in the hands of the House. However, there could well be good, logical reasons for having an election that occurred to people at the time, possibly well in advance of a due election date. There could be political difficulties in one of the devolved regions that are leading to elections there, or particular market issues, or all sorts of crises in Europe—although I do not want to excite the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) with that prospect. A variety of reasons could create a coincidence of interest across a number of parties from a number of places to say, “We’ll have an early election”, and a date could be set without necessarily having to do it in crisis mode for six weeks hence.

The beauty of a fixed-term Parliament is meant to be that, because we all know the dates, we do not create uncertainty and have political rushes and get all sorts of brinkmanship games being played. However, if this House is to have the power to dissolve early, it can have that power but not necessarily the power to do it immediately. It can have the power to give due notice that the date is being brought forward but without waiting until just six weeks beforehand. If there is merit in a fixed-term Parliament, there is also merit in leaving this House the opportunity to bring forward a date other than just by a vote six weeks beforehand, because that would create surprise and difficulties and a sense of crisis. I fully accept that the terms of the clause are not fully adequate: the hon. Member for Rhondda is absolutely right about that. We do not have a complete or adequate provision on fixed-term arrangements.

Amendment 4 would remove the requirement for a two-thirds majority. I accept the argument made by many hon. Members that that is a very high threshold. I do not agree that it should be two thirds of all Members regardless of whether they are voting. If we are going to set any majority, or any weighted majority, it should comprise those who are present and voting, so I do not accept the Bill as it stands. However, I cannot just simply go along with the argument that says that there should not be any sort of weighted majority, because then we are not sure what proof we are providing against anybody abusing the numbers in this House to dissolve Parliament early. Other hon. Members have referred to the powers of the Prime Minister and the powers that are exercised through party machinery—the Whips, and so on. Leaving the calling of an early election to a simple majority that can be activated to call an election within six weeks means that huge power remains in the hands of the Prime Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

Because the legislation is changing that provision in two regards, one of which is the subject of an amendment in this group. The Government—I think rightly—want to say that after a motion of no confidence, there could be two weeks during which the House could, if it wanted, pass a motion of confidence in either the same Government, presumably, or another Government, with either the same Prime Minister or a different Prime Minister, with a different set of ministerial colleagues. That is a change from the situation thus far. There are those who want to remove that two-week element from the Bill. We on the Labour Benches disagree with them, so we will not be supporting that amendment.

There were two occasions, on 11 March 1976 and 20 July 1977, when the motion “That this House do now adjourn” was declared by the then Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition to be a motion of no confidence, first by Harold Wilson and then by Mrs Thatcher, now Baroness Thatcher. On occasion, the mere involvement of the Prime Minister, by turning up at the Dispatch Box to defend a particular motion or piece of legislation, has effectively turned it into a motion of confidence, and that has transpired during the debate. As we are abolishing the Prime Minister’s right to dissolve Parliament and placing that right in the hands of Parliament—we are putting that in statute—it would be better to state in the Bill, in clear language, precisely what constitutes a motion of no confidence, so that there can be no doubt.

I say that for several reasons. First, it would remove the Prime Minister’s power to force legislation through by calling it a matter of confidence. Perhaps Members on the Government Benches have not got used to this yet, but when we were in government, it was a fairly common occurrence whenever there was a difficult piece of legislation—whether on trade unions, the war in Iraq or whatever—for the Prime Minister to say, not necessarily in public but certainly in private, that it was a matter of confidence. That has led to some bad legislation in the past, which was certainly not helpful to us, and I am sure that there will be plenty of moments like that coming along for Government Members.

[Mark Durkan]

Just to reinforce the hon. Gentleman’s argument, a case in point when legislation was forced through with the threat that it would be treated as a confidence issue was the Counter-Terrorism Bill allowing for 42-day detention. The then Prime Minister made it clear in his pleadings to me that it would be treated as a confidence motion. He said, “Do you want an election? If you turn up and vote against, there will be an election.” He tried threatening me and his Back-Bench colleagues with an election, precisely abusing the notion of a confidence motion, which is why amendment 25, which the hon. Gentleman has tabled, is so good.

[Chris Bryant]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s support. He is absolutely right. However, I must confess to the Committee that Prime Ministers rarely said that to me personally, because I was too ludicrously loyal. Almost before the Prime Minister had even thought that a vote might be difficult, I had already decided I would be supportive. In fact, I rarely got to see the Prime Minister for that very reason. I would therefore advise Government Members that if they want to see the Prime Minister on a regular basis, they should start wondering whether they will support Government provisions. However, the serious point is that the freedom of individual Back Benchers will be tethered, because they will constantly be persuaded by the argument, “You don’t want a general election, do you? You must support this piece of legislation, because otherwise I’m going to call it a motion of no confidence.”

The second reason touches on an important element, on which the Minister got into difficult waters—I know that he does not think that he did, but others of us do, and I think that the courts will feel that too. He said that it would be for the Speaker to decide and to announce before any debate what counts as a motion of confidence or, presumably, a motion of no confidence. A minor point is whether a motion of confidence will count as a motion of no confidence if it is not carried. In the past it has, but I am not sure whether the Government intend that.

It would be wholly inappropriate for the Chair to say at the beginning of, for example, a Budget debate that if the House does not carry the Budget and if the Finance Bill falls on Second Reading or Third Reading that would be a motion of confidence in the Government, so he would issue a certificate. The Minister was sighing but is now smiling, and we prefer the smiling. I accept that in that example I am imagining what might happen, but I am more concerned what would happen if hon. Members chose to ask the Speaker whether a motion of censure counted as a motion of confidence. As I understand it, the Minister is saying that the Speaker would be required to adjudicate on whether it was a motion of no confidence. That would be wholly inappropriate, particularly at a time of political uncertainty and high drama, because the Speaker would lose his or her impartiality and be drawn into the political mêlée, and that would be wrong.

Amendment 5 would remove the two-week provision for a new Government to be formed on the basis of a confidence motion. We may have to return to some of these issues on Report, and I would be grateful if the Minister will clarify whether, if that second motion fell, there could then be a subsequent two weeks. We quite like the provision for two weeks—it seems sensible if an alternative coalition or Government could be formed. I see some hon. Members casting a wry glance as though I am eyeing up the Liberal Democrats. We are not getting on very well with the Liberal Democrats at the moment, so I do not think he needs to worry about that, but obviously if the offer is on the table, we will take it.

Amendment 22 is a minor one, and I would be interested in the Government’s view. The clause refers to the provision of 14 days being allowed after a motion of no confidence. We have suggested that it should be 10 working days simply because all other references in the Bill are to working days. I suppose it is possible that the period could coincide with a royal wedding, a day of thanksgiving, a bank holiday, Easter or Christmas, and it would seem to be sensible to specify working days instead of days.

However, we have not moved to the suggestion in other Committees of 10 sitting days, because if the House were adjourned, there would be a specific problem. I hope that the Minister will say what he thinks should happen if the House had been adjourned for a recess—for example, the day after a motion of no confidence. Should there be a requirement for the Government to bring the House back, and should there be a specific provision for the Speaker to be able to require the House to be recalled within the two weeks? We will come to Prorogation later.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 16th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

I apologise if the hon. Lady has been there and I have not happened to notice her—she usually sits closer to the Front Benches.

The hon. Lady’s point is wrong. The main reason for large elements of the Bill, particularly in relation to when an earlier general election can be called, is the desire to keep the coalition together. That is why we had the options for 55% majorities, as originally proposed, and then 66%. It is the superglue element of the legislation, which is there wholly for cynical purposes to try to keep the coalition together. Otherwise, I suspect that there might be a point at which the leader of the hon. Lady’s party might want to cut and run and get rid of her unpopular lightning conductor of a Deputy Prime Minister.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this is not a fixed-term Parliaments Bill that will entrench anything in the system, but rather a “fix for this Parliament” Bill that merely represents the expedient and the ephemeral embracing each other to cope with the unexpected?

[Chris Bryant]

Yes, indeed. That would be the ultimate “Brokeback coalition”, I suppose.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

I am very keen to abandon the Dispatch Box as soon as I possibly can, but I shall give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan).

[Mark Durkan]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the impact of thresholds on referendums—remember that we are told that the whole issue of constituency changes in this Bill is about creating equal votes—is that they create unequal votes? Those who do not vote—even those who do not vote because they are dead—have more influence and more say than those who go to the bother of voting. Is not the real issue that people want to learn the lesson from Irish referendums? As well as creating confusion and saying, “If you don’t know, vote no,” they will say in some places, “If you don’t know, don’t vote.”

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend made that point in a previous discussion, and he is absolutely right. We should have a straightforward system where people fight to win their side of the argument. They win that side of the argument by getting people past the ballot box to vote either yes or no. That is why I am, broadly speaking, opposed to referendums.

Let me issue one tiny note of caution, which comes from the problems that the Government are giving us by combining the polls on 5 May. As the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) said earlier, this has absolutely nothing to do with whether people are bright enough or stupid enough to understand two different propositions that might be put to them—the voters are perfectly intelligent enough to be able to do that—but we will have different turnouts in different parts of the country, which will cause a significant problem. When my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) said earlier that a no vote in the referendum would be a significant problem for the Deputy Prime Minister, the Deputy Leader of the House said from a sedentary position, “No, it wouldn’t really.” So the cat is out of the bag: the Deputy Prime Minister could not care less whether the referendum is successful—whether it leads to a yes or no vote. I think, as do many Members on both sides of the House who would really like a reform of the electoral system, that that betrays the cause that many people had thought essential to the Liberal party. That is why many of us have a profound suspicion that the Deputy Prime Minister is in this less for sound principle than for self-advancement.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Monday 25th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

Indeed. There is a series of complications that I shall come on to, if my hon. Friend will bear with me for a while. Amendments specifically refer to that point, but they amend the Government’s new schedules rather than the new clause, and I want first to deal with the amendments to new clause 20 tabled by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, other colleagues and me.

The first amendment is amendment (a) to new clause 20. I realise that some hon. Members might be slightly confused that there are lots of amendments (a) in this group, because some refer to the new clause and some to each of the new schedules. Amendment (a) to Government new clause 20 states:

“Where the date of the poll for a local authority election in England is the same as the date of the poll for the referendum, the polls are to be taken together.”

That is narrower than that which the Government have provided. The Government are suggesting that the polls can happen together when there is the referendum, and a local authority election in England, and a local referendum in England, and a mayoral election in England. In other words, it is theoretically possible that, if we stick with the Government’s proposal, one voter might come in to vote on the referendum on AV, a local authority election, a local referendum and a mayoral election all at the same time. It is one thing to consider all this in relation to someone coming into a polling station, and people might conclude that it is perfectly legitimate—that there is the franchise for the AV referendum, which we have already discussed, and the franchise for all three other issues, which would be the same—but what happens with postal votes for all those polls? If there are four postal votes and four polling cards, that provides a right old tagliatelle of a constitutional settlement for ordinary voters to try to sort out. That is why our amendment, instead of allowing all four polls at the same time, would allow only a local authority election in England to happen at the same time as the referendum. We do not think that is ideal, but at least it would tidy things up a little. I very much hope that the Minister will accede to that amendment.

Amendment (b) would also amend new clause 20 in relation to Northern Ireland. The Government propose:

“Where the date of the poll for one or more of the following is the same as the date of the poll for the referendum, the polls are to be taken together—

(a) a Northern Ireland Assembly Election;

(b) a Northern Ireland local election.”

In other words, they are providing for all three to happen at the same time. Up to now, there has been no legal provision enabling that to happen in Northern Ireland, which is why the Government are bringing forward relevant statutory instruments. We do not believe it is right to have all three elections at the same time, so we suggest, in a consensual way, that the Government might at least limit the combinations to a degree by taking one of the polls out of the measure.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

A few minutes ago, my hon. Friend was very critical of the Government’s lack of consultation with the devolved interests, but who in Northern Ireland has he consulted regarding his amendment, which would prevent local elections from taking place on the same day as the referendum and Assembly elections? People in Northern Ireland have said that they do not want the referendum on the same day, and that they want the two elections together, but his amendment would mean that the elections could not take place on the same day.

[Chris Bryant]

The difficulty that we have as Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition is that if I had tabled an amendment to that effect, it would have been ruled out of order and would not have been considered because we have already debated, in relation to clause 1, amendments on separating the referendum from those elections. I fully understand my hon. Friend’s point and there have been extensive conversations on the amendment over the weekend with a wide variety of his friends and others in Northern Ireland. The point that we are trying to make is fairly simple: combining everything on the same day brings not clarity for voters but more obscurity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

If multiple polling cards go to each individual elector, in a household where there are five people living and two elections taking place, that would be 10 polling cards turning up. Apart from anything else, there is quite a strong likelihood that they will all get binned. The other difficulty is that political parties will step into the breach and produce leaflets which say, “You may not want to vote in the AV referendum, or you may want to vote in a particular way, but don’t forget, you’ve also got the Assembly elections.” Different political parties may want to step into the breach in various ways.

[Mark Durkan]

Surely if we have separate polling cards for each of the polls taking place, whether those are elections or referendums, we will get more of the problem of some cards being delivered and some not, which has been a constant problem in recent elections in Northern Ireland. In my constituency in particular, there has been an ongoing issue concerning postal workers, who feel that they are not getting paid the same for delivering election-related material, whether it is from parties or from the electoral officer. We will only add to those difficulties, which have meant that party material is not delivered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Durkan]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Zac Goldsmith (Richmond Park) (Con)]

I wish to speak very briefly in favour of the new clause. There is a long history in this House of Members challenging the ever-increasing power of the Executive. We heard recently from the Leader of the House, who is not in his place:

“The terms of the trade between Government and Parliament have shifted too far in the executive’s favour. That is not good for Parliament; but neither does it lead to better government.”

The Prime Minister also highlighted those concerns in February, saying:

“We’d want to reduce the power of the executive and increase the power of Parliament even if politics hadn’t fallen into disrepute.”

We also heard from the Deputy Prime Minister before the election, which he described as

“an opportunity to turn the page on decades of relentless centralisation within government.”

He argued for a dispersal of power away from the centre and a cut in the number of Ministers and Government Whips, saying:

“The rules of the game at Westminster are stacked in favour of the ruling party; parliament is rendered largely impotent to hold ministers to account.”

We have heard over the past few days and weeks very strong arguments for equalising the size of constituencies and reducing the number of MPs, but to do that without also reducing the number of Ministers would profoundly undermine the authority of Parliament. The proposal is not radical, or even a solution to the problem that so many hon. Members have identified. It would neither minimise the power of the Executive nor increase that of the legislature. It merely calls for a reduction in the size of Government in line with the planned cuts to the number of Members of Parliament. In effect, it will do no more than prevent trends from getting worse.

If the Government are truly committed to decentralisation, they can demonstrate that today by backing the new clause. I strongly urge them to do that.

[Mark Durkan]

I support the new clause, to which my name, along with those of so many others from different parties, is attached in the unpublished list.

When considering the new clause, the Committee should bear in mind not only the experiences of the parties that form the Government and occupy the Government Benches, but those of the rest of us who come to the Chamber and the Committees of the House and are confronted with the realities of the Government Whip system and Parliamentary Private Secretaries—part of the peculiar ecosystem here—who can represent their constituents but are at times bound not to represent their consciences. The idea that someone can represent their constituents but never their conscience is a peculiar political creation, from which the House should try to get away. It brings politics into some disrepute if we appear effectively to neuter ourselves. The straits into which PPSs are cast are unnecessary; they should be allowed more freedom than they generally exercise or are encouraged or permitted to exercise.

New clause 7 led me to that issue by way of making a general observation about the dominance of the Executive in the House. In recent years there have been attempts to reduce the Executive’s absolute control of the agenda and the timetable, and changes have been made from appointing Chairs of Select Committees to electing them. That is all to the good, but new clause 7 is the reality check. As the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) said, it is the genuine test of whether the new politics means anything.

I have no argument with reducing the number of Members of Parliament. I did not vote for 650 the other night; I am happy if there is a reduction. However, alongside that, we need a reduction in the size and voting dominance of the Executive in the Chamber.

Of course the answer to the problem of the over-supply of Ministers in this House is not to over-supply them in another place. In the previous Parliament not only many Ministers, but Cabinet Ministers—Secretaries of State—sat in another place. I joined others in criticising that lack of accountability. For me, the answer was not to bring Ministers from the Lords into this House—the last thing I wanted was to bring Peter Mandelson back anywhere, not least to the Dispatch Box, given our experiences of the man. On that famous occasion in Hartlepool, he said that he was not a quitter but a fighter. I always believed that his theme tune should have been the Simon and Garfunkel song “The Boxer”—not for the lyrics of the verses but for the chorus, which is simply “Lie la lie” throughout.

[Chris Bryant]

Certainly not “I am just a poor boy”!

[Mark Durkan]

I said, not for any of the words of the verses, but for the chorus. That alone would make a good theme tune for Peter Mandelson.

The answer was not to bring Lords Ministers into this place; the question was: why were there so many Cabinet Ministers in the Lords? The hon. Gentleman referred to the fact that there are limits in statute on the number of Cabinet Ministers, but we saw how the previous Government got round that. They went to the limit for Cabinet Ministers and then had a series of ministerial high chairs put around the Cabinet table, so that lots of other Ministers had rights of attendance at Cabinet, simply to ensure that more Members of the House of Commons were in the Cabinet room than would have been there otherwise. That is the sort of lazy, sloppy, self-serving thinking that seizes parties in government. They use and abuse, and bend and flex rules and limits in ways that suit themselves, which does nothing to enhance the reputation of politics in general or this House in particular.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Chris Bryant and Mark Durkan

Wednesday 20th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

We have had 51 speakers—or rather, 52, counting the Deputy Leader of the House, who has just spoken. Despite his rather petulant and “ad hominate” speech last night, we have none the less had a good debate. He did, however, correctly excoriate me for not fully adumbrating the amendments that we tabled. That was partly because I took 31 interventions, more than half of which were from Government Members, but perhaps it would be of assistance if I were now to explain precisely why our two amendments are important.

The Deputy Leader of the House was quite right last night to say that our two amendments, 127 and 135, which refer to different parts of the Bill, are not necessarily readily comprehensible at first sight—partly because one refers to clause 8 and the other to clause 16. Both appear at different points in the amendment paper. Consequently, Members will have to turn to pages 429 and 445 to find them.

Amendment 127 would include in clause 8 the words

“within twelve months of part 2 of the…Act…coming into force in accordance with section 16(2) thereof’.”

In other words, the Boundary Commission would produce its report within 12 months of an addition to clause 16(2), which we would insert through amendment 135, stating,

“after the referendum on the determination of powers devolved to the National Assembly for Wales under the terms of the Government of Wales Act 2006”.

The Deputy Leader of the House rightly told me off last night for not explaining precisely why we believe that that is important. As I tried to say in yesterday’s debate, historically, we have constructed Parliament in this country by determination according to the four different constituent parts of the Union. That has included the representation that each part requires in order for the Union to be solid and hold together, which is precisely what happened in the 1536 Act of Union, the 1707 Act of Union and the 1801 Act of Union. With all three, the first thing determined was how much representation there should be from Wales, Scotland and Ireland. Obviously, that was subsequently changed with the creation of the Irish Free State.

The further change to Scottish representation occurred when we introduced devolution, so, following the Scotland Act 1998, it was agreed that because a variety of powers would be given to the Scottish Parliament, it was right and proper for the number of seats that Scotland accounted for in the Westminster Parliament to be reduced.

The first referendum in Wales on devolution brought about the creation of the National Assembly for Wales, which does not have law-making powers or enjoy any powers over crime, justice or policing, so it is a somewhat different body from the Scottish Parliament. However, there is a proposition that follows on from the Wales Act 2006, and it will be tested in a referendum, which the Government have said will take place in the first quarter of next year, but for which as yet no date has been set. The Welsh Assembly Government have requested that it should be on 3 March, but the Secretary of State for Wales has not yet assented to that. We do not know whether a date has been agreed or whether the referendum will proceed. The date of 3 March may well be problematic, as—how can I put it?—it sometimes rains in Wales in March. Sometimes we have fairly excessive conditions in large parts of Wales at the beginning of March, so the date may well end up being inappropriate.

However, be that as it may, we need to be assured of what powers the Welsh Assembly will have if we are then to have a coherent Union-based understanding of how much representation there should be from Wales in the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That is why we have tabled the two amendments, and I shall press them to a Division, because I have not heard anything from the Deputy Leader of the House to alter my opinion that we should proceed on a Union-based understanding of how we create this House, not on a purely mathematically based assumption.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Further to that point, does my hon. Friend recognise that because of the arithmetical formula, the Bill will ensure not just that boundaries will change every five years, but that the number of seats allocated to each Boundary Commission could change? The number of seats in Northern Ireland could go up in one review and down in another, and that in turn would affect the seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, because the constituencies of the Assembly and of Parliament are absolutely coterminous. The proposal will create havoc.

[Chris Bryant]

The seats in the Welsh Assembly are coterminous with those for this Parliament at the moment, although there is a provision later in the Bill to change that through decoupling. That is something that we must analyse. My hon. Friend is right that there may be a change in the number of seats between each segment. If there is a boundary review every five years, there might well be a change in the number of seats, and in the end I am not sure whether that is likely to lead to a more stable constitutional settlement between the four constituent parts of the Union.

There are those who like to think that there is just the Union, not any constituent parts, and there are those who want to think that there are just the constituent parts—which should not be constituent parts but independent. However, I believe that they are constituent parts of the whole, and I say gently to Ministers that the way in which they are proceeding in relation to some parts of the Union is not likely to aid the Unionist cause. It will be detrimental.

We do not say that the provision in our amendments should be introduced solely if the referendum is successful in granting further powers to the Assembly.