Charter for Budget Responsibility

Debate between Charlie Elphicke and Ed Balls

Wednesday 26th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

The Chancellor said three times that Labour was proposing a rise in business taxes and that is untrue, Mr Deputy Speaker.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

Will the shadow Chancellor give way?

[Ed Balls]

Let me answer the hon. Member for The Wrekin and then I will come to the soon to be ex-hon. Member for Dover. [Interruption.] If hon. Members quieten down, I will answer the point. Since 2010 there has been a 129% rise in long-term youth unemployment: that is young people on the claimant count who have been out of work for more than 12 months. That figure has gone up by 129%. That is the truth. It is a fact, and I will place the information in the House of Commons Library. There has been a 129% rise since 2010 and I think the hon. Member for The Wrekin should support what I am about to say.

[Charlie Elphicke]

Will the shadow Chancellor give way?

[Ed Balls]

No.

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[Ed Balls]

In the constituency of Ipswich there has been a 140% rise in long-term youth unemployment over 12 months, and long-term youth unemployment is a real problem. I am glad the hon. Gentleman intervened because I was reading his Hansard remarks from 2012 when he said that asking the Office for Budget Responsibility to audit the parties’ manifestos at the next election was the right thing to do. He said there was no reason why that could not be done. I will come back to him in a moment on that one.

We support the welfare cap. We will make different and fairer choices to keep the social security bill down and tackle the root causes of higher welfare spending. Let me explain—

[Charlie Elphicke]

Will the shadow Chancellor give way?

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[Ed Balls]

All the evidence shows that action to get young people back to work, especially the long-term unemployed, pays real dividends. It is what we mean by tackling the root causes, and it is the right way to implement a tough welfare cap. That is the approach we will take.

[Charlie Elphicke]

rose—

[Ed Balls]

Oh, he is back again. Go on then, have your go.

[Charlie Elphicke]

Is the shadow Chancellor committed to a welfare cap on the same benefits and of the same numbers as this Budget—yes or no?

[Ed Balls]

Yes.

Let me end by discussing the role of the OBR, because that is also set out in this charter. Page 5 states:

“The Coalition Government’s major reform to the fiscal framework has been the creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility”.

We agree with that, which is why we have proposed a reform to enhance the OBR’s role and allow it, as the hon. Member for Ipswich has advocated, independently to audit the tax and spending commitments in the manifestos of the main political parties. Why has the Chancellor not used the opportunity of this updated budget responsibility charter to make that reform? If he were to think again, he would be joining not only me, but the Chair of the Treasury Committee and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who have both supported this reform. We need legislation in the Finance Bill to make that happen.

Economic Growth

Debate between Charlie Elphicke and Ed Balls

Wednesday 15th May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

As I said in my opening remarks and as our amendment says, we need a stimulus now. We, the International Monetary Fund, the Business Secretary and The Economist all agree that taking action now to kick-start our recovery is the right thing to do. We should borrow now to get growth moving, so that we get our deficit down.

I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that that very question was asked of the Business Secretary on the “Today” programme just a few weeks ago. He was asked by John Humphries, “So, should you borrow more?” Guess what the Business Secretary said? He said:

“Well we are already borrowing more”.

That is the truth—£245 billion more. I will tell you what I want to do—[Interruption.] I will answer the hon. Gentleman’s question. I want to get the borrowing down. Under this Chancellor, the borrowing has flatlined—the same last year, this year and the year after. That is the reality.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman come clean with the House: how much more would he borrow?

[Ed Balls]

As I said, I want to see the borrowing coming down, and it is not coming down because this Chancellor has flatlined the economy. We have had almost no growth since 2010 and the result is that he is borrowing £245 billion more.

I have made speeches in the last two Queen’s Speech debates: I have said that there should be a temporary VAT cut, which would cost £12 billion. I have called for a national insurance cut, VAT at 5% and for infrastructure investment to be brought forward. If those things had been done, borrowing would be coming down now; under this Chancellor, it is not. The economy has flatlined and the deficit reduction plan has flatlined as well.

With the IMF here in town, what the Government should do is listen to the IMF chief economist, who says they are “playing with fire”. The IMF has said they should slow the pace of deficit reduction, stimulate the economy and get growth moving to get the deficit down. That is what the Government should do.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Charlie Elphicke and Ed Balls

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

In Government regulation, in credit rating agencies and in Governments throughout the world. I shall come to some of the wider failures in a moment.

[Charlie Elphicke]

rose—

[Ed Balls]

But I will take another intervention. Let us hope that this one is better.

[Charlie Elphicke]

Does the shadow Chancellor accept that it was a failure of regulation when, to buy a home, people were lent more money than that home was worth? Was it not wrong to have mortgages of more than 100%, and was that not a failure of regulation?

[Ed Balls]

The problem was the US sub-prime mortgage market, and that the failure of regulation there rippled around the world. There were failures also of lending and regulation at Northern Rock here in Britain. I do not in any way deny that there were failures here in Britain and failures of regulation, but I do not accept that it was solely a UK failure, because it happened in America, France, Germany, Japan and all around—

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[Ed Balls]

I am going to come on to explain my analysis. I am not sure I fully understood the question, but I might as time passes.

At its heart, the regulatory failure of the global financial crisis was not a failure of one approach to the institutions of regulation, but a failure of understanding and risk assessment which covered central bankers, regulators and Treasuries throughout the world. That line is not in the Conservative party Whips’ briefing, but it is absolutely true none the less.

[Charlie Elphicke]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Ed Balls]

In a second.

And yes, it was a failure shared here in the UK, across the Treasury, the FSA, the Bank of England—and I have to say the then Opposition, too.

Let me remind the House that the legislation to give the Bank of England independence, and to shift from self-regulation to statutory regulation after 1997, for the first time established a Bank of England deputy governor with explicit responsibility for systemic financial stability and with an ex officio seat on the FSA board. As the seeds of the crisis were sown in the years before it, neither the FSA nor the Bank of England nor the Treasury rang the alarm bells, despite meeting every month in the tripartite standing committee.

The Chancellor, in a second breath a moment ago, said that we are now rightly taking the Treasury out of making such decisions, having criticised the Treasury for not triggering a crisis meeting that neither the Bank of England nor the FSA asked for—a point that seemed to be deeply confused. That demonstrates not that structures do not matter, but that there is no evidence from Britain or throughout the world that a different and arguably more complex structure, the new quartet structure before us, would have spotted a crisis that neither the Bank of England, the FSA, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank nor anybody in a regulatory position of responsibility spotted.

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[Ed Balls]

I have apologised to the country and have asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to do the same. Did this Chancellor ring the alarm bell in the crisis? No, he did not. Did he worry that regulation was insufficiently tough? No; he said in 2006 that financial regulation was

“burdensome, complex and makes cross-border market penetration more difficult”

and that it

“threatens the global competitiveness of the City of London.”

If the hon. Gentleman wants to have a debate about who should apologise and who should accept responsibility, he should look at the evidence and the judgments of the past 10 years. Let us not forget that it was the Conservative party that voted against Bank of England independence and the move from self-regulation of the City by the City to statutory regulation for the first time in this country. It was this Chancellor who personally opposed the rescue of Northern Rock, saying:

“I am not in favour of nationalisation, full stop.”—[Official Report, 19 February 2008; Vol. 472, c. 186.]

It was this Chancellor who opposed the rescue of RBS; who negotiated the flawed and foolish Merlin deal; who refuses to enact proposals on transparency for bonuses of more than £1 million; who resists the reform of remuneration committees; who is selling off Northern Rock at a loss, prompting a National Audit Office investigation; and whose decision to cut the deficit too far and too fast has choked off the recovery and led to us borrowing £158 billion more. We will take no lectures on judgment from this Chancellor of the Exchequer.

[Charlie Elphicke]

A few moments ago, the shadow Chancellor told the House that he had no involvement in the merger of Lloyds and HBOS. Will he confirm that he was not consulted, that his advice was not sought and that he provided no advice in relation to that matter?

[Ed Balls]

Yes.

I will set out what needs to be done to turn this bad Bill into a good Bill and to put the public interest, not party politics, in the driving seat in financial regulation. I will set out four objectives that should guide this legislation. The first is stability. We must ensure that we have a system of financial regulation that is robust in good times and in bad times. The second is to protect the taxpayer. We must guarantee that the public purse is protected from irresponsible decision making and wider systemic failures. The third is to be on the side of the consumer. There must be effective regulation, more competition and action on financial education and exclusion. The fourth is to support growth and employment. Let me take each objective in turn.

On stability, provisions to improve the structures for financial regulation and financial stability are at the heart of the Bill. As I have said, we support the FPC and we look forward to debating its powers. We are pleased that the Chancellor has today done a U-turn and decided that the Government will take up the recommendation of the Joint Committee that the macro-prudential tools to be used by the FPC should be properly scrutinised by Parliament. I hope that he will ensure that that happens not just when they are introduced, but when they are subsequently changed and updated. We believe that a new scrutiny committee should be established in this House to play that role. We will propose such an amendment.

On the splitting of the PRA and the FCA from the FSA—I know that these acronyms are hard to keep up with, but this is quite a complex system—it is fair to say that there are advantages and disadvantages. The jury is out. The Chancellor’s decision to put all this new and more complex architecture under the umbrella of the Bank of England, and arguably under the personal direction of its Governor, raises serious questions of accountability and clarity in decision making, as has been highlighted by the Treasury Committee and the Joint Committee.

We share the Treasury Committee’s concerns about accountability within the Bank and accountability to Parliament. As the Committee stated,

“the governance of the Bank needs strengthening and…it needs to be more open about its work. The Bank must be held more clearly to account”.

The Committee has proposed that

“the role of the Court of the Bank of England should be substantially enhanced. It should be transformed into a leaner and more expert Supervisory Board, with the power to conduct retrospective reviews of Bank policies and conduct.”

The Chancellor has said that he does not want to go down that road. He has made some moves, but we think that there is further to go to ensure that there is proper accountability. Again, we will propose reforms in Committee.

It is on the issue of crisis management and the processes for deliberation and decision making within the new, more complex structure, that we have misgivings. The Joint Committee was right to state:

“The powers and responsibilities of the Bank of England and the Treasury during a crisis are key.”

However, the Bill and the memorandum of understanding are deeply confused and opaque, as we have just heard from the Chancellor. We welcome the fact that the Chancellor has accepted the Treasury Committee’s recommendation that the Chancellor should be provided with a discretionary power to direct the Bank when there is a material risk to public funds. The British Bankers Association also welcomed that in its submission, but stated that it was

“unclear that the assignment of powers now proposed is consistent with the strategic division of responsibilities envisaged by the Government, including the proposed power of direction over the Bank.”

Article 20 of the memorandum of understanding exposes the hole. I will quote it in full:

“During a potentially fast-moving crisis, it will become especially important to ensure close and effective coordination so as to maintain coherence in the overall crisis management process. At the heart of institutional coordination during a live crisis will be frequent contact between the Chancellor and the Governor. However, the Chancellor and the Governor may agree to establish ad hoc or standing committees at other levels to support this process.”

Under the Bill, there will be three deputy governors at the Bank, a new Financial Policy Committee, two new sub-agencies at the Bank—the PRA and the FCA—and a new quartet of relationships, in which there are separate statutory responsibilities for the Treasury, the FPC, the PRA and the FCA, as well as for the MPC. Will the Chancellor hear any of the views in a crisis, or pre-crisis, from the statutory office holders? Only, according to the MOU, if the Chancellor and the Governor decide that he should. It states that there will be frequent contact just between the Chancellor and the Governor. It is inevitable that there will be a variety of views and dissenting voices, not only at senior levels within the Bank, but between the different statutory agencies, because those agencies have overlapping and, in certain types of crisis, contradictory objectives. Those different statutory responsibilities are being put under one umbrella organisation—the Bank of England.

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[Ed Balls]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but to be honest I do not have strong views on that. The reality is that there was not cross-party support or support more widely in civic society for Bank of England independence when we established it. The Conservatives voted against it. In those circumstances, it would have been difficult for the then Government to pass legislation for one eight-year term—there would have been a lot of opposition to the idea of giving one unelected individual such power for an eight-year term. This Bill moves us not only from a four-year to an eight-year term, but gives one individual massively more power than they ever had. That is what concerns me.

[Charlie Elphicke]

rose—

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[Ed Balls]

The Chancellor referred to his years of thinking about this legislation. I am afraid that his former adviser demonstrates the kind of muddled thinking that has got the Chancellor into this difficulty.

I am not saying that the tripartite system is the best one. I am quite happy to go along with the shift to the quartet system—I can see the advantages of the FPC and the split of the FCA and the PRA. I am not worried because individual statutory agencies will be under the umbrella of the Bank of England; I am worried because the deputy governor and head of the PRA, who has a clear responsibility, is not part of the decision-making process. That is what I am worried about. I want the MOU to say that at the heart of the system—in pre-crisis and crisis—there will be a “clear view” group, in which the Governor and his key deputies, who will have separate and sometimes contradictory statutory responsibilities, come together with the Chancellor to make the decision.

Even if the Chancellor—this is not an ad hominem point—has the umbrella of the Bank of England and the quartet system, he should want to hear from the person whom he appoints on a very large salary and in law to be the head of the PRA. What I do not understand is why that would not be written into the MOU. Actually, I sort of do understand. There is a history in the Bank of England of the Bank equalling the Governor of the Bank—of wanting to personalise the appointment—as the Chancellor has described. However, we cannot personalise something as complex as the proposed system. It is not just that the system is complicated; there are also tensions and differences of view.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) is quite right that it is hard to operate a tripartite system in which there are different views, but those differences will not be avoided by burying them under the table and pretending they do not exist. Had that happened at key moments in the previous crisis, the wrong decisions would have been taken.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I thank the shadow Chancellor for giving way once more. The Chancellor’s plan is for the financial and prudential regulation buck always to stop with the Bank of England. The shadow Chancellor has concerns about moral hazard on the part of the Governor, which suggests that he is not as strong a fan of the independence of the Bank as he has previously made out. Should we not trust a Governor of the Bank of England to work effectively with the Chancellor?

The Economy

Debate between Charlie Elphicke and Ed Balls

Tuesday 6th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

I think that the bibulous parties might be starting in the morning, Mr Deputy Speaker. The euro is not succeeding as a single currency, which is why we were right not to join in 2003. There is no possibility of a British Government joining the euro at any time in my lifetime.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

Given that the shadow Chancellor seems to be making up policy on the hoof in this debate, is it any surprise that one shadow Cabinet colleague has said that his policy is hurting but not working, and that he has no credibility?

[Ed Balls]

If we want to know about hurting, we should think about the 9,100 families in Dover hurting because of the cuts in tax credits. That is what hurting is all about. What do we hear from the Chancellor—an apology, or an admission that he got it wrong?

[Charlie Elphicke]

rose—

[Ed Balls]

The more publicity I can give the hon. Gentleman, the better.

[Charlie Elphicke]

The shadow Chancellor talks about my constituency, but let me talk about his. How does he account for the rise in the claimant count in his constituency of 1,056, or 141%, in the last Parliament? Was that an economic success?

[Ed Balls]

If the hon. Gentleman is quoting the figures for this year, they might be the result of the Chancellor’s policies. Let me return to concerns about Dover and Deal. While campaigning for a new hospital in Dover, the hon. Gentleman said:

“I am very, very concerned that Dover has not had and does not get its fair share of health care. I have taken this up with ministers and hammered home just how angry people are”.

Perhaps he should also hammer home with his Front Bench the failure of cuts in tax credits.

In last week’s statement, in today’s debate and in every interview the Chancellor has given, we hear him give excuse after excuse and blame anyone except himself. Earlier in the year he blamed the snow, the earthquake, the royal wedding and higher oil prices. America was badly affected by the snow, and every country was affected by the Japanese earthquake and higher commodity and oil prices, so why did Britain have slower growth than any other country in the G7 except Japan? Why do we have higher inflation than any other country except Estonia? It was the Chancellor’s decision to raise VAT in January that pushed up fuel and petrol prices, hit confidence and reduced real living standards for families. He then blamed the euro crisis, but the fact is that our economic recovery was choked off a year ago, well before the recent crisis.

The Office for Budget Responsibility has downgraded its growth forecast for Britain in 2011, but it has upgraded its growth forecast for the euro area. Only Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Cyprus and Slovenia have grown more slowly than Britain over the past year. As the OBR figures show, the fact is that it is the lack of domestic demand that has slowed down our economy. It is only net trade, the contribution of exports, that has kept us out of recession over the past year. If the eurozone countries fail to sort out their problems, that will of course have an impact, which is why it is important that they are sorted out. Far from the eurozone dragging us down this year, it is actually the euro that has been buoying us up.

Jobs and Growth

Debate between Charlie Elphicke and Ed Balls

Wednesday 12th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

The hon. Gentleman will have to convince his constituents because, despite the fact that we were told a year ago that the recovery would be on track, growth has flatlined for a year and unemployment is rising right across the country, which means that borrowing will be higher, not lower.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

The shadow Chancellor responds to questions about his failing to convince his shadow Cabinet colleagues and former Cabinet colleagues by talking about convincing constituents, so why have his poll ratings for economic credibility fallen among his constituents and my constituents and across the whole country?

[Ed Balls]

I would be happy to have a debate with the hon. Gentleman on economic credibility. He said in June this year:

“Employment has gone up in my constituency and unemployment has been falling, which is welcome.”—[Official Report, 22 June 2011; Vol. 530, c. 426.]

The figures show that unemployment in his constituency has gone up by 456 in the past year. Perhaps he should apologise to his constituents for getting it wrong.

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[Charlie Elphicke]

rose—

[Ed Balls]

I will make a little more progress, but I will take interventions from people who have not intervened. Good grief, I have given the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) enough of the wrong type of publicity already and do not want to do his career any more damage.

There is a credible alternative. Why will the Chancellor not act? He used to be so confident that his plan was working. It is patently not working. He and his cheerleaders on the Government Benches claim that however bad things get, he is trapped by the financial markets. He cannot take the advice of the IMF and the OECD and change course because it would lead to higher interest rates and recession. However, the IMF has said that we cannot have credibility without growth.

The markets know that rising unemployment and zero growth are undermining the Chancellor’s deficit reduction plan. One chief economist in the City at Baring Asset Management said last week:

“Growth is essential if the UK is to be able to finance new debt, repay old debt and convince the markets and credit rating agencies there is a modicum of competency in policymaking. The longer we pursue current policies, the more likely it becomes that the UK will be the next target”.

That is the real market view. We know that the credit rating agencies put out their press releases, but the real view, as the IMF has told us, is that having a flatlining economy and rising unemployment is the wrong way to get the deficit down. As I said, even the Chancellor’s friend at the IMF has said that

“growth is necessary for fiscal credibility”.

Britain has no growth. That is why our Chancellor is losing credibility.

The Economy

Debate between Charlie Elphicke and Ed Balls

Wednesday 22nd June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

Who shall we have? The hon. Gentleman.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. On that particular point, why is the right hon. Member for Dulwich and West Norwood (Tessa Jowell) reported as being unhappy and feeling that she had not been consulted? Why did he not consult the shadow Cabinet?

[Ed Balls]

I do my politics on the record. I am not going to comment on that kind of trash. [Interruption.] In view of all the Cabinet Ministers who have been briefed against in recent weeks by the Treasury—the Defence Secretary, the Health Secretary, the Lord Chancellor—perhaps the Chancellor should take a leaf out of my book on how to do things.

It is the contention of Labour Members that the Chancellor is wreaking long-term, as well as short-term, damage on British investment, incomes and employment. We know from the downgraded OBR forecast that our economy is already £5.6 billion worse off than it would have been if the Chancellor had got it right. The danger is that these policies will have a long-term impact, leading to a return of the long-term unemployment of the 1980s, a new lost generation of jobless young people and a permanent dent in our nation’s prosperity.

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[Ed Balls]

The IMF is there to help countries through situations like this. We are a shareholder and a contributor to the IMF and that is quite right. It is a different matter our putting liquidity money into a eurozone strategy that patently is not working because it is flawed. My argument to the Chancellor is that it is ironic to see a British Conservative Chancellor backing the German Finance Ministry’s view over sanity and common sense. We have not seen that in our country for a very long time.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I put it to the shadow Chancellor that this is not just about the business of the unfunded VAT cut that he proposes; it is also about some £10 billion-plus of spending commitments on the Welfare Reform Bill. Billions here, billions there—that does not add up to a credible economic policy from the Opposition.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Charlie Elphicke and Ed Balls

Monday 13th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

My right hon. Friend is making the point that the previous Home Secretary would have fought his corner for the police and Home Office budgets. In the spending review, the Home Secretary did not exactly lead the police chiefs up Downing street, as the Secretary of State for Defence did with the defence chiefs. We heard nothing—not a squeak. The Home Secretary calls what we ended up with a fair settlement, but it is a deeply unfair settlement, compared with that for schools, health and defence, that hits the police disproportionately with spending cuts. Police chiefs around the country ask me, “Where was the Home Secretary?”

[Charlie Elphicke]

I have been listening to the right hon. Gentleman for the past 10 minutes, and I have yet to hear a credible alternative plan. All we have is another blank sheet of paper.

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[Ed Balls]

As I said at the beginning, we will propose amendments in Committee to strengthen accountability at force and neighbourhood level, but in a way that is consistent with an approach to policing that respects political independence and ensures broad-based accountability across an area. Concentrating power in one individual will lead inevitably to political interference, and it will be impossible for one individual to represent, for example, the individual point of view of every town and community in West Yorkshire.

[Charlie Elphicke]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Ed Balls]

Oh, go on.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his patience with me. In Kent, the police authority’s idea of accountability seems to be to sue people who question it for libel, which I regard with serious concern. That should not be done with public money. The Library report to which he referred states that two thirds of the public said that they did not know who to go to if they had a complaint, and that 59% said that it was very difficult to have a say on how their area was policed. Surely an elected police commissioner would be more responsive.

[Ed Balls]

I do not know whether the Library report quotes the Conservative chair of the police authority in Kent, who, as I understand it, totally disagrees with the hon. Gentleman and says that the proposal is flawed and will not work. It will not be properly representative.

Bizarrely, the coalition came along and proposed the abolition of police authorities, but then realised that it was a flawed policy. It then decided to reinvent police authorities and give them a new name so that they would be called panels rather than authorities. The problem of representation needs to be solved, because it is serious.