Chilcot Inquiry and Parliamentary Accountability

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Wednesday 30th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Alex Salmond]

And those countries the hon. Gentleman mentions voted against the war in Iraq for very good reasons.

Rather than speculate on that, thanks to the Chilcot report we now know what evidence the Prime Minister had at his disposal from the Joint Intelligence Committee, which on 15 March 2002 stated:

“Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction…and ballistic missile programmes is sporadic and patchy… We continue to judge that Iraq has an offensive chemical warfare (CW) programme, although there is very little intelligence relating to it. From the evidence available to us, we believe Iraq retains some production equipment, and some small stocks of CW agent precursors, and may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons… There is no intelligence on any BW agent production facilities.”

That highly qualified assessment from the Joint Intelligence Committee was presented to the House of Commons as a certainty that Iraq possessed weapons that were an immediate danger to the United Kingdom.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman share my concern that if we do nothing following the seven-year, £10 million inquiry and take no steps towards accountability for the clear evidence that the former Prime Minister was fixing the evidence around the policy to go to war, it will be almost impossible to begin to restore the faith that has been lost in our political system?

[Alex Salmond]

Yes. The loss of faith in the political system is another dramatic consequence of the disastrous events in Iraq.

--- Later in debate ---

[Fabian Hamilton]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. The important words he used were “in the future”. We must be held to account by the people who elected us—by the public of this country—and we must hold our Government to account for the decisions that they bring to this House for approval. It is very clear, as Sir John Chilcot said, that this was a collective and institutional failure.

[Caroline Lucas]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise the results of the freedom of information requests a few weeks ago that demonstrated precisely that the Chilcot inquiry had been designed to “avoid blame”. Sir Gus O’Donnell has been quoted as saying that he recommended using the inquiry’s terms of reference to prevent it reaching

“any conclusion on questions of law or fact”

or to attributing any blame. If we look at the Glen Rangwala report, which simply puts the evidence in front of us—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)]

Order. May I make a plea to those who are looking to catch my eye later on to keep their interventions to the minimum, as there are a very large number of people wishing to contribute to this debate?

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion)]

Few would now dispute that the Iraq invasion was the biggest foreign policy failure of recent times. The Chilcot report provides detailed confirmation that military intervention was by no means a last resort, and that all other avenues were not exhausted.

[Graham Jones (Hyndbura) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Caroline Lucas]

I will make a bit of progress and then I will.

Chilcot also showed that Iraq posed no immediate threat to the UK, and, crucially, that hindsight was not necessary to see those things. That seven-year Iraq inquiry, which cost £10 million of public money, also officially recorded detailed evidence of the vast discrepancy between the former Prime Minister’s public statements and his private correspondence. If we do nothing about that and take no steps towards accountability for it, it is unclear to me how we begin to restore faith in our political system.

Sir John Chilcot made it clear earlier this month that Tony Blair did long-term damage to trust in politics by presenting a case for the Iraq war that went beyond

“the facts of the case”.

Sir John told MPs he could “only imagine” how long it would take to repair that trust.

That need to restore trust in politics is a key reason why I support the motion. This should not be pursued as a personal or party political attack, and this should be reflected in our language and approach. This process must be based on the facts and the evidence.

[Paul Flynn]

Does the hon. Lady recall that world public opinion, especially in the Security Council, was greatly influenced by a presentation by Colin Powell in which he showed photographs of what he thought was biological weapons equipment? He has since retracted and said he was hopelessly deceived, that the pictures were nothing of the sort and that there was no threat from those weapons. He has shown some penitence; would it not be better if those responsible in this House showed some penitence as well?

[Caroline Lucas]

I am grateful for that intervention and, unsurprisingly, I agree.

The evidence in the Chilcot report does show that Tony Blair was responsible for fixing evidence around a policy while telling us that he was doing the opposite. It shows he was treating his office, the Cabinet, this House and our constitutional checks and balances with disrespect amounting to contempt. For that he should be held responsible.

But more than that, accountability must mean ensuring that any future decisions are taken with systems in place that guarantee proper Cabinet and parliamentary scrutiny and discussion.

In his report Chilcot does not judge the former Prime Minister’s guilt or innocence, and, as we have recently learned, secret Cabinet documents show the Chilcot report hearings were set up precisely to stop individuals being held accountable and specifically to avoid blame, and that is another key reason why we need a Committee to look at the issue of accountability.

Hon. Members have already cited numerous examples of what could be called misleading statements, deception, untruths or whatever word we choose, but I want to add just one more. Tony Blair stated in March 2003 that diplomacy had been exhausted in efforts to seek to avoid an invasion of Iraq. Yet the Chilcot report shows, without question, that this was not the case, and central to his case was the role of France. To get support from his own MPs, Blair argued that diplomatic efforts to secure a resolution had been exhausted, because the French President was unreasonably threatening to veto any resolution. That was not true, and Chilcot shows that Tony Blair knew it. In a phone call with George Bush on 12 March 2003, Blair and Bush agreed publicly to pretend to continue to seek a second UN resolution, knowing that it would not happen, and then to blame France for preventing it. [Interruption.] I suggest that those who are saying from a sedentary position that that is not true look at paragraph 410 of page 472 in volume 3, section 3.8—

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Caroline Lucas]

No I will not give way.

[Mr Jones]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Caroline Lucas]

No I will not.

Chilcot then reveals that Tony Blair did two misleading things. First, he told his Cabinet the very next day that work was continuing in the UN to obtain a second resolution and that the outcome remained open. Secondly, he went on to repeat a deliberate misrepresentation of the French position at Prime Minister’s questions on 12 March, in spite of the fact that, just minutes before, the French ambassador had telephoned No. 10 again to correct this repeated distortion. Blair did this again in his key parliamentary statement of 18 March 2003 and he also included it in the war motion before the House.

In short, the French position was to request more time for weapons inspectors, with war an explicit possibility, but Tony Blair kept deliberately taking out of context phrases from an interview by Chirac given on 10 March, saying that they showed that France would veto in any circumstances. France kept correcting that untruth, as the Chilcot report shows in black and white. Chilcot records that despite this Tony Blair instructed Straw to “concede nothing” in talks with the French Foreign Minister who was, in essence, calling for more time. Tony Blair needed to continue the misrepresentation of France to provide cover for his failure to get UN support for war.

Hon. Members have covered a great deal of other evidence in the debate, including the gross misrepresentation of Iraq as a growing threat to the region and to this country. Blair said that Saddam’s weapons programme was “active, detailed and growing”, and that the intelligence behind that assertion was “extensive, detailed and authoritative”, yet the Joint Intelligence Committee had said just six months earlier:

“Intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction…and ballistic missile programmes is sporadic and patchy.”

I appreciate that it is hard for Labour Members to hear some of these facts, but to barrack us for citing what is in the Chilcot report is deeply disrespectful and shows that we are not learning from that hideous escapade.