Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Department of Health and Social Care
Caroline Johnson
Main Page: Caroline Johnson (Conservative - Sleaford and North Hykeham)Department Debates - View all Caroline Johnson's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
Health Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Caroline Johnson Excerpts(1 month ago)
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The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 55, in schedule 8, page 110, line 23, at end insert —
“(10) If the Secretary of State certifies that it is in the interests of national security that the powers conferred by subsection (1)—
(a) should not be exercisable in relation to certain premises in which there is a Crown interest, or
(b) should not be exercisable in relation to certain specified premises for other purposes,
those powers are not exercisable in relation to those specified premises.
(7) In this section, “Crown interest” means—
(a) an interest belonging to a government department or held in trust for His Majesty for the purposes of a government department;
(b) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Crown;
(c) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster;
(d) an interest belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall.”.
This amendment makes provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers under subsection 51J(1) to the Health and Social Care Act 2008, inserted by Schedule 8 of this Bill.
Amendment 56, in schedule 8, page 116, line 8, leave out subsection (9).
This amendment would allow the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.
Amendment 5, in schedule 8, page 120, line 16, at end insert—
“(2A) After paragraph 6(8) insert—
“(9) A committee of the Commission is to be appointed in accordance with regulations.
(10) The purpose of the committee is to oversee the health services safety investigation functions formerly conducted by HSSIB, transferred to the Care Quality Commission under the Health Act 2026.
(11) The committee is to be operationally independent from the Care Quality Commission.
(12) The committee is to consist of a chair appointed by the Secretary of State, and not less than six and not more than twelve other members appointed by the chair.
(13) A majority of the members of the committee must not be members of the Care Quality Commission.
(14) So far as is reasonably practicable, the persons appointed to the committee must include persons with knowledge or experience relevant to the discharge of functions under this paragraph.””.
This amendment would ensure that oversight of HSSIB’s functions would remain operationally independent of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) following the transfer of its functions to the CQC.
Schedule 8.
Clauses 60 and 61 stand part.
New clause 42—Funding for Care Quality Commission (CQC) investigations—
“The Secretary of State has a duty to make provision for adequate funding and resources for patient safety investigations conducted by the CQC, including some initiated by the CQC themselves.”.
I believe Dr Caroline Johnson was mid-intervention.
Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was talking about the importance of the perception of the safe space, in relation to people being able to come forward, and the fears of whistleblowers. Does he agree with me that it is not just this perception that causes potential whistleblowers to worry? If they read the newspapers on a regular basis, or are on social media, they will see examples of people who have suffered mistreatment as the result of having been whistleblowers.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
The shadow Minister is absolutely right. Perception is a problem, but the reality on the ground is perhaps an even greater problem. Both are issues here with what the Government plan.
There could be a reason why this merger, or the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, needs to happen, but we have not seen that compelling argument. We have seen some attempts at justification, but they seem to be incredibly thin—and that is being generous.
The principal argument seems to be that there is a busy and confusing landscape when it comes to investigatory and regulatory bodies. The figure Dr Dash put forward was something like 150 different organisations; she was asked to review just six of those. Even if she were to have abolished all six, it clearly does nothing to reduce the busy and confusing landscape. My hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon made that point well.
A busy and confusing regulatory landscape should not be a justification for getting rid of an essential investigatory body and disincentivising the investigation process and whistleblowing and disclosures, by tying it up with the regulator, which itself may be at fault. Streamlining and dealing with a busy and confusing landscape are objectively good reasons to do something, but not this. That is the central point.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon referred to, the question was put to Dr Dash, the author of the recommendations, when she gave evidence: what happens if there is a problem with the Care Quality Commission once HSSIB has become part of it? I think we rightly expected a fairly clear answer on that. The answer was a rhetorical response:
“‘What happens if the problem is this organisation or that one?’”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 8, Q9.]
That was the response from Dr Dash. But we are not talking about whether there is a problem with this organisation or that one; we are talking about the CQC, the organisation that HSSIB will become.
If there is a problem with another organisation, HSSIB can investigate it; if there is a problem with the CQC now, HSSIB can investigate it; but when HSSIB becomes the CQC, there will plainly be a problem with investigating the CQC. When that question was put to the author of the report on whom the Government are relying, no answer was provided. The reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon was a rhetorical question.
I urge the Minister to reflect. There is a major issue here that has not been addressed. Until she, or those on whom she relies, can articulate the answer, I urge her to delay these proposals.
Karin Smyth
I thank my hon. Friend for that. He and others on both sides of the House with clinical experience, including the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, have shared live examples that can shock the layperson. It is important that those practices are changed clinically, and it is up to Government to make sure that the overarching legislative framework enables that.
Karin Smyth
I want to make some points first. I will pick up any outstanding points I do not cover.
The abolition of HSSIB and the transfer of its functions to CQC is being done to strengthen the link between patient safety investigations and the action being taken on the frontline to simplify the patient safety landscape. We want to align the recommendations with action.
Hon. Members quoted evidence that Dr Dash gave to the Committee. Let me remind the Committee of something else she told us, about how HSSIB’s functions can be better aligned as part of the CQC. She said:
“by bringing HSSIB into the CQC, you can align the work of the two.
For example, if the CQC is going round the country and spotting a particular problem with the way in which anaesthesia is being given or with managing patients post-surgery, the CQC could then say to HSSIB—that team of people with specific expertise—‘Can you go in and take a look at this? Can you do a detailed focus review of this particular area of care that we are spotting through our visits and which seem to be a particular challenge?’ It is that bit about enabling the CQC to identify a problem and then asking HSSIB to review it in detail, and HSSIB bringing its expertise in investigations into the CQC to enable the CQC to go deeper and then come back to the NHS”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 7, Q8.]
to enable best action. These organisations can learn better from each other.
Transferring investigation powers to the Care Quality Commission is an opportunity to strengthen the CQC. We have to move away from a defensive culture to a culture of shared learning if we are to improve patient care. The CQC can learn and improve from HSSIB best practice and take a more holistic approach to patient safety. Those executing the regulatory and investigatory functions can learn from each other and exchange skills, which would strengthen the links between learning, oversight and improvement, leading to real and sustained change across the system, driven by the CQC.
Karin Smyth
I am going to persist on some of these arguments. I think I have addressed all the points made by the Opposition. It is the job of effective leadership to manage those interests and responsibilities, and that is what we expect of the CQC’s leadership.
I will now turn to the amendments on this topic, which I thank the hon. Members for Sleaford and North Hykeham and for North Shropshire for tabling. Amendment 55 would make provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers in certain circumstances. I recognise the importance of ensuring that investigatory powers are not exercised in relation to sensitive Crown or Government premises where there is a national security interest. I want to be clear: the Bill already provides for that.
The Bill already amends section 96 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 so that it applies to the new CQC investigatory function. Section 96 makes provision for the application of CQC legislation to the Crown, which means that the mechanism that the amendment is seeking to introduce is already in place within the existing legislative framework. Additionally, the Bill already provides for a power which enables the Secretary of State to disapply these investigatory powers in relation to Crown premises when it is in the interest of national security. The amendment would therefore duplicate an existing provision and would add unnecessary complexity to the legislation without delivering any additional benefit.
Amendment 56 would allow the Care Quality Commission to recover charges that are higher than the actual costs it incurs when providing assistance to anyone other than an NHS body or the Secretary of State. I understand the intention behind the amendment—to give the commission greater financial flexibility—but the Government do not think that it is necessary. The charging framework in the Bill is based on the clear principle of cost recovery. Removing subsection (9) of proposed new section 51R of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 would mean that the commission could charge more than it actually costs to provide a service, shifting away from recovering costs and towards allowing the commission to make a surplus through its charging powers.
Dr Johnson
My understanding is that, in the past, HSSIB has provided services to not only British health services but overseas health services, which were, in some cases, charged for that service, as it is a world-leading organisation. Why would the Minister not want that to continue?
Karin Smyth
I am happy to get back to the hon. Lady on that specific point, if that is the case. The charging framework is about recovering costs, not making a surplus, which is what the amendment would result in. If that is not the case, I will make sure that she receives a proper correction.
The Government do not think that there is a good case for the amendment, because, as I have said, the aim of the provision is to provide for fair and transparent cost recovery, not to raise extra income beyond cost. I am not sure whether the hon. Lady is suggesting that it might be good for the commission to create additional funding, but if that is not clear, I am happy to get back to her on it. The provision makes the recovery of costs more predictable and consistent for those who have to pay them. That is usual for public bodies.
New clause 42 relates to funding provisions for the CQC’s new investigation function. The Department already provides grant in aid to the CQC to provide adequate funding for investigations and special reviews; similarly, HSSIB’s budget is provided through grant in aid and is set each year. When the CQC takes on HSSIB’s functions, the funding streams will remain distinct, and the CQC will have to assure the Department that the amount allocated to the new investigation function is being used for that purpose.
Funding decisions for the investigation function will continue to be captured in wider departmental budget-planning processes and considered centrally. That provides assurance that business and strategic priorities for the investigation functions can be met. Robust financial oversight will require the CQC to demonstrate that grant in aid is used appropriately, and solely to support the investigation function, without the need to prescribe funding arrangements in legislation.
As there is already an operational mechanism for the Secretary of State to provide adequate funding and resources for investigations, the new clause is not needed. It would also be inappropriate to prescribe the form or level of funding in legislation. The new clause would reduce the Department’s ability to manage funding through the established spending review and estimates process; introduce unnecessary rigidity as the merged function evolves; and risk creating binding funding expectations that may not align with future fiscal constraints. A non-legislative approach ensures flexibility, scale and adaptive function while maintaining robust oversight.
I agree with the intention behind amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, which is, as I understand it, to ensure that the Health Services Safety Investigations Body functions that are transferred to the CQC retain a high level of operational independence and continue to command the confidence—the Committee heard that word a lot this morning; I completely agree on its importance—of patients and their families, healthcare professionals and the wider public. Similarly, I understand that the objective of the amendment is to maximise the perception—again, that is a word I am coming back to; I tried to address the issue earlier—of independence in the CQC.
The Government have protected safe spaces in legislation, and we agree that operational independence of the investigation function is required, but our plans support and enable that. For that reason, we cannot support the amendment, which would impose a highly prescriptive governance structure on the CQC by requiring the creation of a separate statutory committee and setting out in primary legislation detailed requirements for its purpose, membership appointments and operational arrangements. While the Government fully agree that effective safety investigations must be conducted independently and objectively, we do not consider it necessary to put such detailed organisational arrangements in the Bill.
The Bill already provides a clear legislative framework for the transfer of those functions and enables the CQC to discharge them appropriately, within its broader statutory responsibilities. Furthermore, the CQC already operates within a robust statutory framework and is capable of establishing governance arrangements that support the effective delivery of its functions, including appropriate safeguards to protect investigative independence and the handling of safe-space material.
The amendment would reduce organisational flexibility by mandating a specific committee structure, and would constrain the CQC’s ability to adapt its governance arrangements over time in response to operational experience, changes in circumstances or future improvements in best practice. Under the amendment, governance arrangements would be fixed in statute, rather than having the capability to evolve as the organisation learns and develops.
Those additional administrative and governance requirements would increase bureaucracy and complexity, which the Government are looking to reduce. I re-emphasise that, in addition, a statutory committee would weaken the important links between learning and the action that the transfer of this organisation is intended to support. One of the key benefits of bringing these functions into the CQC is the opportunity to strengthen strategic oversight and ensure that learning from investigations can more readily inform improvement activity across the system.
Dr Johnson
The Minister seems to be saying that her reasoning for moving HSSIB into the CQC is to ensure that actions take place in response to the recommendations. But if HSSIB outwith the CQC makes recommendations that are delivered by the provider organisations, commissioned by the ICBs and overseen by Ministers, and then the CQC checks that as part of the regulation, why does HSSIB need to be within the CQC for that to happen?
Karin Smyth
We are probably not going to agree on this point. I have made the point several times—and we made it in the Dash review—about bringing these organisations together. As I said again in my opening comments, it is about the opportunity to get this right and share that learning and experience. It is not about the cost but about aligning the recommendations and the actions that follow through from them. That learning, and the opportunity to push that through, is something we should grasp.
Coming back to amendment 5, creating a separate statutory committee risks introducing additional layers of separation that could slow the flow of intelligence and impede timely action in response to emerging patient safety concerns. We believe the integration of investigatory functions can be secured through clear statutory functions and appropriate safeguards, rather than through organisational structures set out in primary legislation that are too rigid. Establishing detailed governance requirements in statute may also make future improvements more difficult to implement without legislative change.
I understand and respect the concerns that underpin the amendment, but the Government believe that the Bill already provides the necessary framework for the safe and effective delivery of health services’ safety investigations following their transfer to the CQC. We will of course work closely with both the CQC and HSSIB on their transition arrangements through a transition board, whether on the issues of ensuring operation independence of the investigation function and the ways in which that learning is shared, or, further to the Opposition spokesperson’s point, how we make sure that learning is shared and creates an impact, and where that is felt most clearly. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments, and I commend clauses 59, 60 and 61 to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dr Johnson
The Minister has reassured us that, although it has not been lifted and shifted from the original, the amendment is a duplication of another clause. Therefore, we believe the Committee—
Karin Smyth
Clause 62 underscores the importance that we place on special reviews and investigations, and it will maintain the Care Quality Commission’s ability to conduct them by ensuring that the CQC’s investigatory role remains properly aligned with its original statutory purpose. The CQC is the independent regulator of health and care providers, and in the case of commissioners, it has the powers to undertake a special review or investigation when requested to by the Secretary of State.
On 30 January 2024, the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), commissioned a section 48 review into mental health services in Nottinghamshire following the tragic events of June 2023. As we know, that revealed serious and systemic failings and led to strengthened oversight and a clear improvement plan. With NHS England being abolished and its functions being transferred to the Department and across the wider system, this clause will remove NHSE from the scope of section 48 and allow Ministers to set out, through regulations, the future scope of section 48.
NHS England’s commissioning functions will mostly transfer to the integrated care boards but, as we discussed previously, NHSE’s most specialised commissioning functions will transfer to the Secretary of State. In future, regulations will set out the specific commissioning functions that the Secretary of State will be responsible for and that the CQC may review or investigate. The scope of the special reviews and investigations will continue to apply only to commissioning functions under the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, which is the CQC’s existing remit.
This approach will ensure that the CQC’s investigatory powers will not be automatically extended to departmental functions, which would fundamentally change the relationship between an arm’s length body and a Government Department and would not align with the original intention of section 48 reviews. For that reason, the Bill will provide for scrutiny through secondary legislation. That will set out a transparent and accountable way to specify which commissioning functions are in scope, enabling parliamentary scrutiny and CQC oversight where it is genuinely relevant to patient safety and care quality.
This approach will also provide important flexibility: as commissioning arrangements change, the right function can be brought into scope without unnecessary delays. Taken together, this clause will protect the CQC’s independence, maintain accountability and provide a sensible framework for scrutiny where it adds real value for patient safety and care quality. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Johnson
I have just a couple of questions. Clause 62 will update the CQC’s power to conduct special reviews of NHS commissioning to cover ICBs and the Secretary of State’s commissioning functions, and the requirement for ministerial approval before the CQC can investigate will be retained. How will that apply when HSSIB is moved into the CQC? Is it the Minister’s intention that HSSIB will need the Secretary of State’s approval to complete investigations?
Karin Smyth
My understanding is that the clause will not change that particular power, but I will get back to the hon. Lady if I am wrong.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 63
Time limit for bringing proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Karin Smyth
The 10-year health plan reaffirms the Government’s commitment to families affected by bereavement or serious harm, ensuring that lessons are learned from their experience and that more cases are fully reviewed and acted on. Families seek closure following serious harm to or the death of a loved one by wanting to understand what went wrong and what could be done to stop other families experiencing similar trauma, and by wanting to hold someone to account. Families often turn to the Care Quality Commission for help.
Clause 63 will extend the CQC’s power to bring proceedings against a health and social care provider for a serious breach of regulations from the existing limitation of three years from the date of the offence to five years. Let me be clear: extending the three-year limitation from the time of the offence will not alter the first requirement that the CQC should act within 12 months of sufficient evidence of a serious breach of regulations becoming available. That 12-month window for action once the regulator is aware of the offence will remain unchanged. Extending the limitation period to five years from the date of the offence will mean that fewer events that should be considered by the regulator will effectively time out and go beyond the reach of the regulator’s action.
The CQC is not the only body with an interest in investigating serious breaches of regulations that result in unnatural death; there are other investigatory bodies, such as the police, with equal interest and powers to investigate deaths for the purpose of pursuing criminal prosecution. The coronial process serves a different purpose. A coroner’s role is to establish facts surrounding an unnatural death rather than to find fault. In a complex case, a police investigation or a coroner’s inquest—sometimes both—can take time to conclude. Those independent processes are a useful source of information for the CQC to form a full picture of a breach of regulation.
A culture of learning from investigations, inquiries, errors and poor care should be the norm in the NHS. It is therefore expected that a service provider may also commission its own internal investigation to learn from an unnatural death. Furthermore, there are cases where the CQC is approached late with information after an offence may have been committed. For example, the CQC may only receive information about an offence two and half years after it was committed, leaving little time in the remaining six-month period to investigate. Extending the period to five years would help mitigate such circumstances, and that is why we are extending the statutory limitation period. This will ensure that the CQC has the ability in far more cases to address the serious regulatory failings that it should and must address, without risking falling foul of a time limitation. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Johnson
As the Minister said, clause 63 amends section 90(2) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 to extend the limit on proceedings relating to the registration of offences under part 1 from three to five years. The impact assessment talks a little about the time it takes to investigate these cases, but as the Minister said, the time to investigate is 12 months from the CQC being given enough evidence to consider whether the case is prosecutable. Why has she chosen not to change that too? Does she think people will have enough time to investigate? She is looking puzzled.
Karin Smyth
Apologies—I missed the exact question as to what needed to be changed. Could the hon. Lady repeat that?
Dr Johnson
The Minister talked about changing the time period in which proceedings can be effected from three to five years, but once the CQC is aware that an investigation could be brought and there is evidence that needs to be looked at, it will still get only 12 months. That has not been changed. I wonder what the rationale is for that. I am not criticising it; I am just asking the question.
The other issue is that clause 63 is prospective, so if an offence were committed immediately after the Act was passed, for the first three years things would effectively be as they are now; the change from three years to five would be relevant only after three years. Clause 71(2) on commencement provides that clause 63 will not come into force until two months after the Act is passed. I just wonder in practical terms why, given that it will take three years to come into effect in any case, it will not come into force on the day the Act receives Royal Assent.
The impact assessment talks about the CQC prosecuting two or three additional cases a year, and a cost of £4.3 million over 10 years with fines of £2.7 million over 10 years. Will the regulator keep the fines, or will they go back into the Treasury? Can the Minister guarantee that the additional funds that are estimated to be required for the additional cases under this new regulation will be provided so that the CQC can do the investigations that she is giving it the opportunity to do?
Karin Smyth
Put simply, the answer to the hon. Lady’s questions is that we are not seeking to change other aspects. The CQC wants to get to points as soon as possible, so the 12-month period has not been changed. The function of clause 63 is merely to recognise the issues around the three years and to change that to five years. We are not seeking to alter anything else in that regard. On her point about the commencement date, that is merely recognising what is considered to be parliamentary convention.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
Abolition of Healthwatch England
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dr Johnson
Clause 64 abolishes Healthwatch England, which I believe is a mistake, and introduces schedule 9 to facilitate that. The impact assessment talks about the roles of local healthwatch and Healthwatch England, with local healthwatch obtaining views, making reports and recommendations, promoting and supporting public institutions, signposting to advice, and giving views to Healthwatch England nationally; and Healthwatch England then providing leadership, guidance and support to local healthwatch, escalation to the CQC, which we have heard a lot about already, and advice to the Secretary of State or NHS England.
Members may be familiar with the term “nothing about us without us”—the idea that policies should not be decided and services should not be shaped without the participation of those who will use those services or be affected by the decisions that are made. As a medical practitioner, I believe that is an important principle. Patients must have a voice, because it is they who have the lived experience of their conditions and know their needs better than any civil servant in Whitehall. They know what is working and what needs to change.
Let us look at the history of patient voice. In the two decades after the NHS’s inception, the provision of care was really quite paternalistic. Patients did not really have any role in shaping the services that they received. That changed in 1974 with the establishment of community health councils, made up of volunteers. They carried out research, conducted visits to inspect standards and represented communities when changes were proposed. They also helped the public with information about local services, including how to make complaints—very similar processes.
The Labour Government abolished community health councils in 2003, although a cursory trip to Hansard reveals that the Government repeatedly stated before the publication of the NHS plan that at that point they envisaged no immediate changes to community health councils, but they did go on to do that. That is reminiscent of what we are discussing today, because abolishing Healthwatch was not in the Labour party manifesto.
In 2003, the community health councils became patient and public involvement forums, and five years later they became local involvement networks. The names and structures have changed, but the principle of patients having an independent voice remained. Healthwatch is the latest iteration. To be precise, Healthwatch England was established initially as a committee of the Care Quality Commission in 2013. It operates a hub-and-spoke model with more than 150 local healthwatches spread across local authority areas.
Healthwatches play a vital role in exposing problems in the health service. Indeed, even the King’s Speech contained a reference to Healthwatch England. According to Healthwatch England’s May 2025 report,
“nearly one in four…adults have noticed inaccuracies or missing details in their medical records”,
such as inaccurate personal details and inaccurate records of medicines, diagnoses, treatments and conditions.
I note that the Minister herself has relied on Healthwatch when bringing problems facing her constituents to the House. She said:
“In a recent Adjournment debate about Bristol and the south-west, I raised the issue of a pregnant constituent who was unable to access care at that critical time. This is the No. 1 issue raised by Healthwatch. Patients are struggling.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2022; Vol. 708, c. 484WH.]
So Healthwatch is valuable.
I invite Members to look at the impact that Healthwatch had in 2023-24. More than 925,000 people used their local healthwatch to get advice and information about their health and care. More than 329,000 people shared their experiences to help improve services. Healthwatch England helped to secure changes to Royal Mail so that NHS letters are delivered to patients on time. It also led new NHS guidance so that patients commencing cancer treatment have priority access to NHS dentists. A piece of Healthwatch research indicated that millions of eligible adults may be missing out on social care.
Recently, my local branch, Healthwatch Lincolnshire, produced a report on the challenges facing carers nationally. Healthwatch has influenced the future of attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder care, encouraged the uptake of cervical cancer screening and so much more. That is why the public and health experts are alarmed by the Government’s plans.
As for HSSIB, the success of Healthwatch is due to its independence, but the Government want to do away with that. Their policy paper commits to replacing Healthwatch with a new patient experience directorate, which will sit inside the Minister’s Department. Instead of having organisations embedded in communities sitting on local health and wellbeing boards, the public will need to interface with the Minister’s Department. How can she guarantee the independence, and the perception of independence, of the new directorate? How can she be sure the public will trust it?
I remind Members of what Councillor Dr Wendy Taylor of the Local Government Association said:
“The current proposals to disband Healthwatch and allow health and social care services to gather and respond to feedback, rather than being challenged by an independent voice, risks organisations being seen to mark their own homework.”
When Healthwatch conducts surveys, it often solicits information that proves problematic for the Government of the day. How can the public have confidence that the new directorate’s process will do the same? What will stop the Secretary of State deciding what questions get asked and what data gets published? From my reading of the Bill, the answer is nothing.
The Government have made it clear that, alongside the new directorate, ICBs will take over several patient voice functions. I appreciate that this strays slightly into the subject of the next group of provisions, Ms Lewell, but it is difficult to separate Healthwatch from local healthwatches. The Patients Association has warned:
“Splitting local Healthwatch between ICBs and local authorities risks creating a patchwork of accountability with no single body responsible for ensuring patients are heard”.
If responsibility to deliver those functions is shared between different parts of the health system, who becomes accountable if it is not funded? Who is accountable if people fall through the cracks? If accountability is divided, it often means that accountability is somewhat diminished.
Members also need to ask whether it is financially feasible for ICBs to deliver patient voice. In its evidence, the Health Foundation wrote:
“Moving the NHS functions of local HealthWatch organisations into newly enlarged ICB footprints could also result in the loss of a more nuanced local understanding of the public’s priorities and needs, with particular implications for seldom heard or more vulnerable communities.”
We know that ICBs are under financial pressure because of decisions by the Labour Government; they have had to slash operating costs by 50%, and many are pencilling in cuts to frontline services. Against that backdrop, how can they afford to deliver patient voice functions? Ms Lewell, your guess is as good as mine.
We have not heard about any additional funding from the Government for the purpose of patient voice. Healthwatch England was provided £3.3 million in 2025-26, and local healthwatch £14.1 million. How much of that money will be redirected to the patient experience directorate and the ICBs?
I tabled a written question about the benefits to the public purse of abolishing Healthwatch. The Minister’s response was as follows:
“The potential savings from abolishing Healthwatch England and Local Healthwatch are dependent future policy decisions regarding the approach taken to collecting user experiences post-abolition.”
She set out an intention for “future policy decisions”, but there was, and still is, an absence of a plan. That is something we have heard again and again in relation to health, in Committee and throughout the two years that this Government have been in power: the absence of a plan for how things will be achieved. They have lofty aims, and understandable and sometimes really good goals, but no understanding of how they are going to get there.
It is not just the Opposition who are concerned; I will give some examples of Government Members who are, too. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington (Paulette Hamilton) said:
“One of my biggest concerns about the Bill is the reduction in independent patient representation, including the abolition of Healthwatch structures.”—[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 921.]
The hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) said:
“Replacing Healthwatch will mean that, ultimately, patients will not have confidence in the commissioners.”—[Official Report, 9 June 2026; Vol. 787, c. 136.]
The hon. Member for Blaydon and Consett said:
“I understand that the Government’s real intention, through the Bill, is to strengthen the patient voice and the ability to raise issues, but there is real concern that an organisation inside the Department of Health and Social Care will not provide that independence. Will the Minister commit to looking again at how that independence can be built in and…with the ability to pull the levers”?—[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 944.]
We have also heard concerns from the Health and Social Care Committee.
But the Member that the Minister may be most interested in is the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham). He wrote to the former Secretary of State last year saying:
“People speak to Healthwatch because they are outside the system—they are impartial, trusted, and provide a safe space for concerns to be shared.”
Does the Minister agree? If so, why does she want to remove the independence of patient voice? The right hon. Member for Makerfield also said:
“The independence of resident and patient voice is a necessity. Without it, we risk losing the trust of the public, the richness of lived experience, and the ability to challenge and improve the system from within, particularly during this time of significant system reform”.
My plea to the Minister is this: think again about the importance of the independence of patient voice. People will give their views when they think they can do so independently and safely—a principle that was echoed in the debate this morning. Removing the independence does not seem necessary, and I do not understand why the Minister thinks that it will improve patient care and thereby patient safety. It is clear that Members not only on the Opposition Benches, but right across the Government Benches—in fact, potentially the new Prime Minister from next week or the week after—may think the same. I encourage the Minister to reconsider this step.
Dave Robertson
I will make some progress. There are concerns that if we roll some responsibilities into ICBs or councils, the Department needs to make sure that the issue does not get pushed to the side and that the funding does genuinely remain for patient voice. I am reassured that there will be a patient experience directorate within the Department. That will bring decision making and the patient voice into the Department while also keeping an eye on what is happening with those ICBs and ensuring that they have standards to hit.
The Department needs to ensure that it is sharing good practice and keeping oversight of local authority commissioning of social care. The CQC is starting to do that, and there are some positive indicators. There is obviously more work to do, and we need to stay on top of it because, as I said earlier, there are risks whenever there are changes to healthcare. I am reassured that bringing the patient voice into the room with decision makers is the right way to enact change.
Karin Smyth
Clause 65 and schedule 10 will abolish the current local healthwatch arrangements and place responsibility for gathering the views of local people firmly with the bodies with the clearest levers to act: integrated care boards and local authorities.
At present, many organisations are gathering views, running engagement exercises and raising issues, often with the best of intentions, but the result can be duplication, variable coverage and uncertainty about who is accountable for responding. We can end up with lots of feedback but too little clarity on the action that follows. By placing those duties on integrated care boards and local authorities, we are ensuring that insight from patients, service users and communities feeds directly into where commissioning and service planning decisions are made for both health and care. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield said, the people are in the room. It makes it easier to connect lived experience to priorities, quality improvement and the tackling of inequalities, rather than leaving intelligence at arm’s length from decision makers.
This is about strengthening impact, not silencing criticism. Integrated care boards and local authorities will have a statutory duty to demonstrate how they have engaged with all people in their area, including seldom heard groups, and will be expected to have clear routes for people to raise concerns. We expect transparency about what people have told the system, what the system has done in response and how learning is shared across partners.
As I said in my evidence, many constituents in my Bristol South constituency are said to be hard to reach. They are not hard to reach, in my view. We know exactly where they live, who they are, how old they are and what sex they are. We know largely what diseases they have. We know their level of income. We know their levels of education and attainment, and how they impact their health outcomes. They are not hard to reach; the system is not set up to listen to them. That is what we are determined to change.
Dr Penny Dash’s review of patient safety described a cluttered landscape, with overlaps in how user experience and advocacy are organised. It described the burden that that can place on the frontline, producing multiple, poorly co-ordinated asks with limited impact. Bringing the patient and community voice closer to the organisations responsible for improvement—it is actually their job as commissioners—will help to make feedback more actionable, reduce confusion and support better services. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Johnson
As I understand it, the objectives of the Bill are to replace the local healthwatch with a less independent, internalised gatherer of patient experience feedback. The objectives appear to be featuring feedback more centrally in strategic decision making, getting people into the room and simplifying the patient landscape.
There are things that I do not understand about that. If the problem is that those who commission or deliver the services are not listening adequately to the people who gather the patient experience information, why not invite the independent individual who has gathered that information into the room? Why ask someone in the room to gather the information and risk the independence? Why not compel more listening?
The Minister talked about who is accountable for action. My understanding is that it is the healthwatches’ job to gather the patient experience and present it to Healthwatch England and the decision makers. It is not their job, as I understand it, to make decisions on how care is delivered or to deliver that care differently. Does the Minister intend that to change?
The Minister also talked about strengthening the impact of Healthwatch, but I do not understand how this change will do that. We have heard how its independence allows Healthwatch to go on telly, talk to Members of Parliament, Select Committees, radio stations and others, and publicise its findings. If it is within the Department, will it be able to do so as freely? I suggest that it will not.
The other thing that I do not really understand—perhaps the Minister can help us with this—is the organisation. At the moment, it is done in local authority areas. It will now become the job of the local authority and the ICB to commission feedback, but we have already heard how the 50% cuts to ICB budgets have led to ICBs merging into larger conglomerates. Those do not necessarily overlap with the strategic mayoral authorities in the way the Minister eventually wants. What geography does the Minister want the feedback to be gathered over? How does she see that working? Will it require further restructuring? The hon. Member for Lichfield talked about the importance of localism and how different areas of his constituency have different health needs. How does the Minister think that that will work under her new plans?
The Minister said that one benefit of the new process is reaching vulnerable individuals, but what is to stop Healthwatch doing that? Ultimately, if we have Healthwatch doing things now that are independent and respected across the House—I am sure your local healthwatch is also excellent, Ms Lewell; Lincolnshire’s certainly is—why not strengthen that voice? Why not say to those who are providing that service, “We’re going to give you more resources,” or “We’re going to ask you to deliver it in a slightly different way,” or “We’re going to ask you to focus on particular populations,” or even, “We’re going to invite you into the room with the ICBs so that they can hear you and listen carefully”?
Why not compel those making the decisions and delivering the services to listen to Healthwatch, rather than replacing it? It was not Healthwatch’s job to listen to them, but to gather the information and present it, and that is what it has done. Can the Minister explain how removing its independence is going to help? I simply do not understand it.
Helen Morgan
I am very grateful to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. My hon. Friend the Member for Winchester has made some general points about Healthwatch and the importance of an independent patient voice; I will not reiterate them, because he made them very well, but I want to speak specifically about local healthwatches and the benefits that they bring.
I find it quite difficult to hear in this room, so I hope the hon. Member for Lichfield will correct me if I have misunderstood the gist of his speech, but I was frankly astonished by the suggestion that if local managers had heard about the problems at Mid Staffs or at Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS trust, the concerns raised in those extremely serious scandals would have been addressed. The reality is that the management of both providers knew exactly about the concerns in those trusts, and they did not address them. That is why we have Healthwatch.
The hon. Member for Lichfield may be aware that my parents live in Stone, which was in the Mid Staffordshire constituency at the time. My mum was a clerk to Staffordshire county council, and I recollect very strongly that the health scrutiny committee at that council questioned the trust about its appalling mortality rate and was constantly reassured that there was nothing to see here. It absolutely failed to mark its own homework. The suggestion that my constituents Kayleigh and Colin Griffiths, who fought for the Ockenden report on Shrewsbury and Telford, did not first try the local services is, I think, missing the point.
With the Ockenden report on Nottinghamshire a couple of weeks ago, we also saw that the hospital trust commissioned several reports into its own maternity services, which found that it was failing. Instead of acting on them, it brushed them under the carpet and commissioned another. The suggestion that providers are capable in the current culture of dealing with those issues does not, I am afraid, hold true in the way it should across every trust.
Dr Johnson
Is there not a third issue: that the local authority and the ICB will no longer have congruent areas and will therefore look at different populations?
Helen Morgan
The hon. Lady raises a good point. I do not want to revisit an earlier part of the debate, but it is certainly relevant that where there is not a local authority representative on the ICB and there is not a mayor in place, and the ICB’s area is not coterminous with the local authority boundary, that adds another element to the issue of the separation out of Healthwatch. Does the Minister agree that the independent and locally rooted Healthwatch cannot be replaced by processes that sit within the NHS system? Will she please reconsider the change? There is concern on all sides of the House, given the value that Healthwatch brings to the service.
Karin Smyth
I will begin with Government new clauses 91 to 95. Many hon. Members will know that the current regulatory framework for medicines and medical devices is seen as overly complicated and difficult to navigate. It is also slow and burdensome to amend, limiting our ability to ensure that it keeps pace with developments. Maintaining the safeguards to public health is central to every decision we make. However, the regulatory framework currently slows down innovation and delays patient access to healthcare products. From a market growth perspective, it also places barriers to the UK market, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises.
These new clauses will deliver a more streamlined regime for making and updating secondary legislation. The ability to make faster and more responsive updates to secondary legislation will enable the Department and the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency to address the current barriers that I have highlighted in the regulation more quickly.
New clauses 91 and 92 provide for changes with regard to powers to make “ambulatory references”, which are references in legislation to external documents such as technical standards and lists, which can be updated from time to time. These changes will ensure that the legislation continues to capture updated versions of those documents without the need for further regulations. International and domestic standards are crucial in the highly technical areas targeted by the change. It is important that the regulatory regime remains aligned with the technical, scientific and international framework that is designed to evolve over time.
Currently, there are limited powers for medical devices regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that change over time, and there are no such powers at all for medicines. Without the ability to make ambulatory references to those documents, legislation is needed each time the standards are updated. That is disproportionate and risks unintentional regulatory divergence that creates uncertainty for industry.
The new clauses introduce a power for human medicines regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that are updated over time. For medical devices, the provisions also extend the current ambulatory reference power to make reference to lists of countries subject to mutual recognition agreements, lists of devices or categories of device that are eligible for an international reliance pathway, and lists of British technical standards. Amendment 80 sets out that the extent of new clause 92 will cover England, Scotland and Wales.
The provisions of new clause 93 enable a more flexible approach to consultations on regulatory changes related to medicines and medical devices, rather than the current one-size-fits-all requirement. Under the amended powers, the MHRA and the Department will still retain a legal duty to consult relevant stakeholders, and significant regulatory changes will continue to be subject to public consultation. The measure is designed to enable consultations that are proportionate to the scale of the change in hand. That will ensure that regulations can be updated more efficiently and in line with the needs of the health service.
New clause 94 will enable certain technical updates to medicines and medical devices regulations to be made using the negative rather than the affirmative procedure. Specifically, it relates to changes that routinely arise as clinical practice evolves—for example, updating detailed lists of medicines or making limited adjustments to the professional groups who may prescribe, supply, sell or administer particular medicines. At present, even minor or time-sensitive changes of this sort can require a debate under the affirmative procedure, which is not always the best use of parliamentary time.
New clause 95 is the final measure in the regulatory framework package for the MHRA. It is designed to streamline the process for routine fee updates made using powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 by allowing the use of the negative parliamentary procedure for routine fee uplifts. That will bring the powers in line with those relating to fees in the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021, where uplifts to existing fees can be made with the negative procedure. That will also reduce delays in making and communicating such adjustments, while maintaining appropriate safeguards, including the requirement to set out the cost basis for any new uplifts with any legislation—whether it is made under the negative or affirmative procedure. The draft affirmative procedure will be retained for any substantive changes, such as the introduction of a new chargeable function.
Finally, there are a number of consequential provisions related to those I have just discussed. Government amendments 80 to 82 primarily relate to the commencement period in which they come into force.
In conclusion, the amendments will enable a faster and more responsible reform of the existing legislative framework, while preserving proportionate safeguards and necessary scrutiny. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
Dr Johnson
New clause 91 would amend the Medicines and Medical Devices Act to enable regulations
“to refer to both international agreements and standards and standards developed in the United Kingdom”
and enable the Secretary of State
“to dispense with requirements placed on devices which meet regulatory requirements applicable outside the United Kingdom.”
New clause 92 would amend the definition of “mutual recognition agreement” so that
“agreements are defined by a list published by the Secretary of State, rather than a Schedule to the regulations.”
New clause 93
“amends the duty to consult in relation to regulations about human medicines and medical devices.”
That means that instead of a public consultation, it
“gives the option of consulting such persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate”.
I would be grateful if the Minister clarified whether that could be nobody, or whether it has to at least be somebody.
New clause 94
“changes the parliamentary procedure for certain regulations from the draft affirmative procedure to the negative procedure.”
That relates to regulations about medicines and medical devices. I want to ask about scrutiny, because we have had a number of statutory instruments over the last few years that, under the new regulations, would now be put under the negative procedure. When we have looked at them, there have been questions and potential changes.
Why does the Minister want a lower level of scrutiny? In general, scrutiny is a good thing. I understand that this could smooth out procedure and make it a bit quicker in some cases, but we had an example where a Minister brought forward fee increases. I then raised the issue of national insurance and that Minister was not aware of whether it was paid at that time. The civil service pay estimate was significantly lower than expected and lower than what was given. Therefore, six months later we were back in Committee with a different Minister asking for more money. There is a scrutiny issue with new clause 94. That also relates to the fees and terms in new clause 95, which was one of the examples I gave.
Karin Smyth
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. The purpose of the new clauses is to support our life sciences and medicine sector, in order to make that more streamlined. She will be aware of the proposals about the negative and affirmative procedure. If there were particular issues of scrutiny, normal parliamentary rules and processes would apply if Members wanted to raise any particular issue.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 92
Medical Devices Regulations 2002: mutual recognition agreements
“(1) The Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/618) are amended as follows.
(2) For regulation 1A (Schedules) substitute—
‘1A Schedule
Schedule 2A has effect.’
(3) In regulation 2 (interpretation), in paragraph (1)—
(a) in the definition of ‘mutual recognition agreement’, in paragraph (a), for ‘country listed in Schedule 2’ substitute ‘country specified in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time’;
(b) in the definition of ‘third country conformity assessment body’, for ‘established in a country which is listed in Schedule 2 and designated in accordance with a relevant’ substitute ‘designated in accordance with a’.
(4) Omit Schedule 2 (mutual recognition agreements).”—(Karin Smyth.)
This new clause would amend the definition of “mutual recognition agreement” in the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (as it has effect in England and Wales, and Scotland) so that agreements are defined by a list published by the Secretary of State, rather than a Schedule to the regulations.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 93
Consultation about medicines and medical devices regulations
‘(1) Section 45 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (consultation) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for “a provision of Part 1, 2, 3 or 4” substitute “Part 1 or 3”.
(3) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) Before making regulations under Part 2 or 4 the relevant authority must—
(a) carry out a public consultation, or
(b) consult such persons as it considers appropriate.”
(4) In subsection (3), at the beginning insert “Where a public consultation is carried out”.
(5) In subsection (4), in the words before paragraph (a), for “subsection (1)” substitute “subsection (1ZA)”.’—(Karin Smyth.)
This amends the duty to consult in relation to regulations about human medicines and medical devices. It gives the option of consulting such persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate instead of a public consultation.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 94
Medicines and medical devices regulations: parliamentary procedure
‘In section 47 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (regulations: procedure), for subsection (3) substitute—
“(3) Regulations under Part 1 are subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
(3A) Regulations under Part 2—
(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions—
(i) provision made in reliance on section 6(1)(a) (fees);
(ii) provision amending the meaning of ‘appropriate practitioner’ or ‘approved country health professional’ for the purposes of Part 12 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (see regulation 214 of those regulations);
(iii) provision amending any of the following provisions of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012—
• regulations 217C(3) or 217CA(3) (original pack dispensing for products containing relevant substances: definition of ‘relevant substance’),
• Schedule 13 (prescription only medicines for which community practitioner nurse prescribers are appropriate practitioners),
• Schedule 15 (requirements for specific products subject to general sale),
• Schedule 16 (patient group directions and vaccine group directions),
• Schedule 17 (exemption for sale, supply or administration by certain persons),
• Schedule 18 (substances that may not be sold or supplied by a pharmacist without a prescription in reliance on emergency provisions),
• Schedule 19 (medicinal products for parenteral administration in an emergency), or
• Schedule 21 (medicinal products at high dilutions);
(iv) provision amending regulation 250 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (restrictions on persons to be supplied with medicinal products: exceptions) for the purpose of changing the products to which any exception from time to time provided for by that regulation applies;
(v) provision that is consequential on provision of a description mentioned in any of sub-paragraphs (ii) to (iv);
(b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they—
(i) contain only provision that is made in reliance on section 7 (emergencies),
(ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health, and
(iii) are not within paragraph (a);
(c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within sub-paragraphs (a) or (b).
(3B) Regulations under Part 3—
(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision made in reliance on section 12(1)(a) (fees), and
(b) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a).
(3C) Regulations under Part 4—
(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions—
(i) provision made in reliance on—
• section 17(1)(a) (fees), or
• paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 (supplementary provision about civil sanctions);
(ii) provision amending or revoking regulation 1ZA of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (expiry of certain provisions) or consequential on such provision;
(b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they—
(i) contain only provision made in reliance on section 18 (emergencies), and
(ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health;
(c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a) or (b).”’—(Karin Smyth.)
This changes the parliamentary procedure for certain regulations from the draft affirmative procedure to the negative procedure. The changes all relate to regulations about medicines and medical devices (although the procedural provisions relating to certain other matters are restated in the amendment).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 95
Medical devices etc: parliamentary procedure for certain fees regulations
‘In Schedule 7 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (regulations), in paragraph 12—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1) for “relate to altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money” substitute “fall within sub-paragraph (1A)”.
(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
“(1A) Provision falls within this sub-paragraph if it relates to—
(a) altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money,
(b) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged in connection with the exercise of a function which a public authority has by virtue of provision made under section 8C in connection with the EU medical devices Regulations, or
(c) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged under the Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/50).
(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A)(b) ‘the EU medical devices Regulations’ means—
(a) Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, or
(b) Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 2010/227/EU,
as they have effect from time to time by virtue of Article 5(4) of the Windsor Framework.”’—(Karin Smyth.)
This allows regulations altering certain fees in relation to medical devices etc to be made subject to the negative resolution procedure. At the moment those regulations are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 1
National Maternity Commissioner
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, appoint a National Maternity Commissioner, situated within the Department of Health and Social Care.
(2) The functions of the National Maternity Commissioner are to—
(a) oversee NHS maternity services;
(b) act as an independent voice for women and families;
(c) ensure lessons are learned from identified failures and that the recommendations of maternity reviews are acted upon;
(d) promote consistency, safety and accountability across NHS maternity services; and
(e) advise the Secretary of State on matters relating to the safety, quality and provision of maternity services in England.
(3) The person appointed as Commissioner must—
(a) be a person with knowledge, expertise and experience relevant to the discharge of functions of the role;
(b) have first-hand experience of working in maternity services, so far as reasonably possible; and
(c) not be a sitting Member of Parliament.”—(Helen Morgan.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to appoint a maternity commissioner within the Department of Health and Social Care to oversee national maternity services. This person should be someone with experience and expertise of maternity services, and not a political appointment.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Helen Morgan
New clause 1, which I tabled, would require the Secretary of State to appoint a maternity commissioner within the Department of Health and Social Care to oversee national maternity services. This person should be someone with experience and expertise in maternity services, and not a political appointment.
It is important to start by saying that I tabled the new clause before we had the report from Donna Ockenden on the Nottingham review, and last week’s report from Baroness Amos on her national review, both of which recommended the appointment of a maternity commissioner. Obviously, since then, the Secretary of State has announced that he will appoint a maternity commissioner. None the less, I will state the arguments for having one, and if the Minister can give us some assurances today, I will not press the new clause to a vote.
Just to set the scene, which I think we all know too well, maternity services in England have suffered a series of high-profile scandals. The cost of political neglect has been paid by families in terms of trauma, injury and lost lives. We have known for a long time that maternity services in this country have been failing. Numerous recommendations have been made over that period, but they have not been effectively acted on in a consistent way, and Baroness Amos’s inquiry finally confirms that.
It is important to say that the vast majority of births take place safely, successfully and happily. However, where things go wrong, having a baby safely has become a postcode lottery. Women are being routinely silenced, and staff who raise the alarm on unsafe care or systemic discrimination have been put off or crushed by a culture of fear. We therefore need to make England the safest country in the world to have a baby.
The Liberal Democrats have been campaigning on that for a long time, and following the Ockenden and Amos reviews it genuinely feels that there is now the will and focus to deal with the problem once and for all. This issue has been going on for far too long. We thank the Secretary of State for hearing our campaign and Baroness Amos’s calls for a national maternity commissioner to oversee national standards and drive change. We also pay tribute to campaigners such as Louise Thompson and the former MP for Stafford, Theo Clarke; without their advocacy, and without so many women sharing their stories, we would not be moving forward.
It is important to say that one individual—one maternity commissioner—will not solve all the issues in maternity by themselves, but they can help drive change and address recurrent issues, whether those are cultural or about safe staffing. They can hold Ministers to account, help restore public confidence in NHS maternity service and ensure that accountability exists. But I want to be clear that the buck should always stop with the Secretary of State; they hold the power and the purse strings, and this role cannot be used by Ministers as a way to shirk that responsibility.
I hope the Minister will clarify a few key points. First, can she reassure us that the commissioner will be independent and not a political appointee? It is essential that this individual feels confident to hold the Government to account and have those difficult conversations. That is far less likely if they are a political appointee.
Secondly, women have made it clear that for them to be reassured that this change will happen and happen meaningfully, they need a clear timetable for when the maternity commissioner will be in place and operating. Understandably, the Secretary of State has not been able to provide that yet, given the need for this Bill to pass through Parliament and for the statutory role to be on the books, and given the time it will take his maternity taskforce to define what it wants the role to look like and for the appropriate legislation to be written and put in place. However, we hope we can get a firm commitment to a timetable from the Minister today or, if not today, then on Report.
We think the commissioner should be involved in the establishment of the taskforce, because it is important that it does not develop a plan that they are required to implement, despite it being something they personally would not have approved. I therefore hope the commissioner will be in place very quickly, even if only on a temporary basis, so that they are working to get the taskforce plan into place.
We heard from the Secretary of State that the commissioner will co-chair the taskforce alongside him. That seems to be the right move, and I welcome it, but, as I said, it is important that they have some role in shaping its action plan, so that they can feel responsibility for it and be fully behind its implementation. Will the Minister commit to introducing a temporary maternity commissioner so that that can happen?
Finally, we have heard reports that the taskforce is not meeting very regularly. I hope the Minister can reassure me that it is now meeting much more regularly and getting that plan into place as quickly as possible, and that the Secretary of State is fully on board in driving forward the commissioner’s role as soon as possible.
New clause 13, which is also in my name, is about putting a duty on the Secretary of State to create a scheme to ensure that every maternity unit in the country achieves a good or outstanding rating from the CQC. I will not repeat some of the points I have just outlined about failing maternity services, but the first quarter of 2026 saw the worst ever recorded rate for maternity injuries. Four years ago, the Ockenden review into the Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS trust, which is in my area, found that over 200 babies had died unnecessarily in Shropshire. Yet, despite several immediate and essential actions being put in place, a subsequent CQC review found that the majority of maternity units in this country did not achieve a good rating for safety—they were inadequate in some way. That is just not acceptable.
Our package of measures includes the maternity commissioner, which the Government are obviously progressing with, and we are very pleased about that. However, we also need investment in the service to ensure that that maternity commissioner has the resources they need to make the changes required. We therefore call for one-to-one midwifery care for every woman in labour; a consultant on every labour ward 24 hours a day, seven days a week; a director of midwifery—a senior, experienced midwife—in every maternity service to ensure that more junior midwives on that ward are suitably supervised; the restoration of ringfenced service development funding; and a dedicated neonatal workforce plan.
New clause 13 also requires an annual report to be laid before the House on the “effectiveness of the scheme”. That would allow Parliament to track progress and hold the Government’s feet to the fire on it. Baroness Amos has also called for regular reporting to Parliament to maintain accountability, albeit through the maternity commissioner.
There seems to be consensus, here and across the NHS, on the need for meaningful and decisive action on maternity. There is a great deal of overlap between our plan and the recommendations Baroness Amos has made, and I hope the Minister will be able to take some of these points on board and incorporate them into the Bill.
Dr Johnson
As the hon. Lady said, new clause 1 seems somewhat redundant, because the Government appear to have decided to appoint a maternity commissioner.
New clause 13 asks for a report. Before I go any further, I should say that I am a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and have attended the delivery of many babies as a paediatrician at different levels of seniority. I should also say that I am a member of the British Medical Association, that I continue to work as an NHS consultant paediatrician and that I worked at Nottingham University hospitals NHS trust in late 2012 and 2013.
I have great sympathy with the reasoning behind what the hon. Member for North Shropshire is proposing. We have all been shocked by the many reports we have read, the circumstances we have heard about, the tragedies that have occurred over many years and the challenges that are faced by maternity care. I am not sure that writing more reports is going to help; I think we need more action rather than words.
The hon. Lady mentioned the taskforce. I was disappointed that it took the Government so many months to establish it, that it took so long for it to meet and that it has met only a few times. As we have talked about things such as Healthwatch and the HSSIB, the Minister has shown her enthusiasm to get on with things and ensure that the recommendations made in the varying reports are implemented. I would therefore be interested to understand how that will occur in maternity.
My understanding is that the Government are going to produce a plan on how to deliver the recommendations in the recent report, and that is going to be available by Christmas. However, that means that we will then be in a situation where the Government came into power in mid-2024 and then spent a year writing a plan—the 10-year “Fit for the Future” plan. Around the time that they published that, they decided that they needed an urgent maternity report; that was going to take a few months, but it ended up taking another year in of itself. Now we are going to take another six or seven months writing another plan on how to implement the plan we have written, based on the plan we wrote before, based on the plan we did not have at the general election.
I am interested to understand how the Government are going to convert the good intentions I am sure they have into action. In particular, their manifesto promised that thousands more additional midwives would be trained. I would be interested to know what progress they have made on that.
Karin Smyth
I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Shropshire for bringing this discussion before the Committee. I put on record our thanks for the work she has done in this area and for her engagement with me, and indeed with officials at the Department, to help us understand it more clearly, particularly in the light of the new clause.
Hon. Members across the Committee are committed, as are the Government, to ensuring that women, families and babies receive the care and support they need. We know that the vast majority of births are safe and that there are outstanding examples of care in the NHS. However, where things do go wrong, it can have a devastating impact on women and their families.
That is why the Government launched the national investigation into NHS maternity and neonatal care, chaired by the noble Lady Baroness Amos. Baroness Amos brought the findings from past reviews, local rapid reviews and new evidence from families and staff together into one clear national set of recommendations, which as we heard was published last week. The Government also launched the maternity and neonatal taskforce, chaired personally by the Secretary of State, which will translate Baroness Amos’s recommendations into action.
As we heard, Baroness Amos recommended the appointment of a statutory maternity and neonatal commissioner. We have accepted that recommendation, and I know there is support for it across the House. To be clear, the Secretary of State stated last week that we are committed to putting the role on a “statutory basis” as soon as possible.
I am afraid I cannot give the hon. Member for North Shropshire a more detailed timetable at the moment, because we are currently looking at options to legislate at pace, including potentially through this Bill, subject to discussions through the usual channels, while also—this is crucial—giving the taskforce the opportunity to shape the scope of the role. That was one of Baroness Amos’s urgent actions, and we accept it as a crucial first step in overseeing systemic improvements to care and outcomes and earning back the trust of women and families.
The maternity and neonatal commissioner will champion the voices of families and drive forward that necessary change. The Secretary of State will remain accountable to Parliament for maternity services. The role will be discussed urgently with the taskforce and will have a relentless focus on driving those improvements, which will include co-chairing the taskforce.
As the Committee knows, these are complex matters. The Government, having accepted the Baroness Amos’s recommendation, intend to legislate as soon as practicable. Our immediate priority is to work quickly through the taskforce to define the scope and responsibilities of the role. I know that the hon. Member for North Shropshire will not press the new clause, but I commit to keeping in touch with her and other hon. Members as this work progresses.
Dr Johnson
We talked about clause 1—on the abolition of NHS England—at the beginning of the Bill. The Minister was keen at that time to take unelected individuals out of the picture and create accountability by returning things to democratic control through the abolition of NHS England and putting them back in the Secretary of State’s hands. However, this proposal essentially does the reverse with maternity care, taking it out of the hands of Ministers and the Secretary of State and putting it into the hands of a commissioner. Could the Minister explain that?
Karin Smyth
I am sorry, but I did not get the end of that sentence. However, I think the hon. Lady was saying that the Bill essentially abolishes NHS England. Again, as I have said repeatedly, nobody is opposing that. As is well known, the recommendations on the maternity commissioner have come through a separate process. Given the need for public assurance and to earn back the trust of women and families, as well as—I think the hon. Lady said this herself—the shocking revelations that have come through some of this work, Baroness Amos recommended a maternity and neonatal commissioner to drive through these changes and give confidence to the system. That is why we are going to accept her recommendation. Accountability for maternity services obviously remains with the Secretary of State, who will be co-chairing the taskforce. I hope that addresses the comments the hon. Lady made.
On new clause 13, we know that the vast majority of births are safe, but the devastating trauma experienced by many through failures in care must be brought to an end. The CQC has an important role in assessing whether patients are receiving safe, effective and high-quality care, and it is essential that it can do that objectively and independent of Government. It is therefore not appropriate to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure particular ratings.
Dr Chambers
I would not always object to that, because the whole point of the new clause is that such a contract would come to Parliament and then might well be approved if it turned out to be the best system and in our national interest. The thrust of all three new clauses is to ensure that we do not get exposed and make ourselves vulnerable, which could affect the functioning of the NHS and compromise people’s data. A future Government could set up their own AI system in the UK. How would data be used by that system? We are looking at future-proofing people’s privacy and future-proofing the ability of our country to deliver a service properly.
There is also an economic opportunity. We should always prioritise domestic suppliers where possible, and even cultivate them, and help them to innovate and develop, because spending potentially tens of millions of pounds with foreign companies will not do anything to grow our own economy. Given the world-beating talent in our country, we see no reason why the long-term effect of domestic options to foreign systems could not be developed with sufficient Government support. As such, where a contract is signed with a foreign supplier, new clause 4 would require the Secretary of State to take steps to support domestic alternatives. We recognise the complexities involved with NHS procurement, and our new clauses represent one vision built on the core principles of domestic resilience and digital sovereignty.
I have a few questions for the Minister, which I would appreciate some comments on. How do the Government intend to build trust in the single patient record to make sure that it is not undermined, rather like the federated data platform has been? Does the Minister agree that the poor reputation of Palantir and distrust has been an important element in the slow roll-out of the federated data platform? Has she considered undertaking a risk assessment with a national security focus of current NHS digital and tech contracts? Does she agree that, in an ever more turbulent world, building domestic capability in this area is central to the security of our country?
Does the Minister agree that the domestic life sciences and tech sector is more than capable of developing and scaling many of the systems that we rely on foreign companies for at the moment? The Government have very much positioned AI and technology as the NHS’s white knight. We agree that the potential is huge, but do the Government not think that the NHS needs a long-term digital strategy to support a joined-up development and roll-out of these systems and technology? An analogy to this is how the defence investment plan and future defence procurement can help prioritise and boost economic growth in the UK. We think this is another way that economic growth could be nurtured.
Dr Johnson
I rise to discuss new clauses 3 to 5 and 43, which I am sure that the Whips will not let me forget. I understand the sentiment behind the Liberal Democrat new clauses. The hon. Member for Winchester is keen to ensure that uses of NHS data are limited to uses for which people can consent, uses in relation to their care or specifically approved research. Having heard examples of this data being tracked or leaked by accident, the hon. Gentleman is keen to ensure that that does not happen. He is particularly concerned about the risk of that happening in another jurisdiction where we have less control of the system. I am not sure that the new clauses have been properly thought through, however.
New clause 3 says:
“Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must conduct and lay before Parliament a risk assessment of all contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside of the UK.”
That is “all contracts”. In subsection (2), it says that the Secretary of State must “pay particular regard” to contracts with technology companies, but not only to those. I am being a bit pedantic here, but has the hon. Member for Winchester considered the wording of “all contracts”? The NHS does not just provide drugs and medical technology; it provides bedding, blankets, pillows, bananas for people to eat at lunchtime, bedpans and loo roll. There is a whole range of things procured as supplies by the NHS that may or may not be procured from overseas. It would be cumbersome and completely unnecessary to include all of those.
Even with the tech companies themselves, there is a risk for small contracts for small pieces of tech to create a huge amount of bureaucracy. I am not sure that it would specifically improve data quality or data protection. It is reasonable that the Minister would consider risk assessments, and I hope that she would automatically consider them before contracts that are particularly sensitive or contain patient data, but I am not sure that the new clause works.
Moving on to new clauses 4 and 5, the hon. Member talked about Palantir. It may even have been his intention for these new clauses to target one specific American firm, but the actual impact would erect costly barriers to trade. The NHS contracts IT functions to firms based in other countries when the business case is strong. It uses Microsoft, an American company that offers software, cloud services and Outlook for emails; Oracle for standardising and automating financial processes; Sectra, a Swedish company, for transferring medical images and reports; and Dedalus, an Italian company, for migrating services to the cloud. To echo the point made by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, should the NHS prioritise a British company over an international company if the service has better functionality and a lower cost and is safe?
The hon. Member for Winchester spoke about the vibrant life sciences and tech sector in this country, but if we close off our markets to those from overseas, will others not do the same? Would he want those life sciences companies to be unable to export? There is a barrier to free trade here.
Dr Chambers
This is not about closing off markets or shutting off the potential to use foreign companies if they are most appropriate. It is about prioritising and investing in UK technology and our economy to solve some of our domestic problems while also providing security. Saying that we are closing off domestic markets is misunderstanding the thrust of the new clause.
Dr Johnson
I think it is about balance. I agree that we need to ensure that the data is kept safely. Using British technology where we can is a good thing, but we have to be reasonable about it. For example, there are alternatives to Microsoft Outlook, but how much more would that cost the NHS and how much would it affect patient care? There is a balance to be struck. I understand what the hon. Gentleman is trying to do in protecting our data. That is an extremely important issue, and I am sure the Minister will tell us about the work she is doing to ensure our data is kept safe.
New clause 43, in my name, is about private providers’ data. We often do freedom of information requests about, for example, surgical procedures, but one in 10 procedures are performed in private settings and are not subject to FOI, which means that less data is available to the public. Data from private independent providers is less transparent than that of standard NHS provision. This is a probing amendment to find out the Minister’s thoughts about how to ensure people can access transparent data on operations performed in local independent hospitals, particularly as the Government have signalled their intention towards more and more of those being provided.
Edward Argar
My questions will be very brief. I am conscious that, given that these are mostly Liberal Democrat new clauses, for once I will be asking the hon. Member for Winchester for a response, not the Minister.
New clause 4 would require that contracts be laid before Parliament. I would be grateful if the hon. Gentleman can tell the Committee how many such contracts he thinks would end up being laid before the House in any given year, based on historical data, and therefore how much parliamentary time that would take up. Does he envisage that being handled by an affirmative or negative statutory instrument? What will the process be?
I can see what the hon. Gentleman is trying to do, but I have a certain wariness, along the lines of that expressed by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket. Although it is important that we have appropriate protections and scrutiny, when we are procuring services and technology for the NHS we should be looking for the most effective and best tools that have those safeguards but can do the job that eminent surgeons and clinicians need them to do in order to do their work for patients.