Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Caroline Dinenage Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd January 2019 Public Bill Committees

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Minister for Care (Caroline Dinenage)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Mr Pritchard. Clause 2 relates to the authorisation of steps necessary for life-sustaining treatment or vital acts. This clause is incredibly important. It allows care givers, in limited situations, to deprive someone of their liberty for a short period of time prior to an authorisation being made or in an emergency. This can be done only to provide a person with life-sustaining treatment or to prevent serious deterioration in their condition.

The clause replaces the urgent authorisations that exist under the current deprivation of liberty safeguards system. Urgent authorisations last for up to 14 days in a situation where the need to deprive someone of liberty is urgent. However, providers are left without legal cover when the authorisation runs out and, due to the backlog, the council has not completed the necessary assessments.

We of course want to ensure that there is adequate oversight and that the measure will not be misused to push through unjust deprivations of liberty. Records will need to be kept and provided after the event. The regulators—which, in England, we expect to be the Care Quality Commission and, in Wales, to be Healthcare Inspectorate Wales and Care Inspectorate Wales—can use this to monitor whether adequate care is being given. With that in mind, I recommend that clause 2 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Powers of the court to determine questions

[Barbara Keeley]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 3, page 3, line 14, leave out

“whether Schedule AA1 applies to the arrangements”

and insert

“any issue in relation to the application of Schedule AA1”.

This amendment seeks to clarify that all relevant issues pertaining to Schedule AA1 can be addressed by the Court of Protection, for example whether an IMCA should be appointed or an AMCP involved.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship in this part of the Committee, Mr Pritchard. Amendment 18 may appear to be minor, but it could have significant consequences for the proposed system of liberty protection safeguards. The Bill removes the section of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that deals with court appeals for deprivation of liberty, and clause 3 proposes a new section in its place.

The Government have made few substantive changes to the power of the Court of Protection. We believe that this is a missed opportunity. The Law Commission said in its report:

“significant reforms should be made to the Court of Protection to ensure that it works for the people who apply to it.”

The fact that the Government have refused to consider this as part of the Bill is another sign, I am sorry to say, that this Bill is being rushed through. Rather than considering this issue in the round, they are simply seeking to reproduce the current deficient system. The people who are subject to the Mental Capacity Act deserve better, so when the Minister replies, can she reassure us that the Law Commission’s comments are being taken on board and that a full review of the Court of Protection will be forthcoming?

At the moment, the Bill gives the Court of Protection a limited set of powers. It can determine whether the liberty protection safeguards apply to the case; it can determine the length of authorisation; it can rule on the arrangements the authorisation relates to; and it can determine whether the authorisation conditions are met. So that hon. Members are clear on that final point, let me remind them what the authorisation conditions are. Paragraph 12 of schedule 1 reads:

“The authorisation conditions are that—

(a) the cared-for person lacks the capacity to consent to the arrangements,

(b) the cared-for person has a mental disorder, and

(c) the arrangements are necessary to prevent harm to the cared-for person and proportionate in relation to the likelihood and seriousness”

of that harm. When the court is asked to rule on whether a liberty protection safeguard should have been granted, those are the only things that it can determine.

The court cannot determine whether a cared-for person should have been given access to an independent mental capacity advocate—we had a very full debate this morning about the role of advocates. It cannot determine whether the case should have been reviewed by an approved mental capacity professional. It cannot determine whether any of the assessors had a conflict of interest that should have precluded them from carrying out an assessment. It cannot determine whether the consultation has been properly carried out. It cannot determine whether the person was given the information that they should have been given. In short, it cannot determine whether any of the safeguards that we have discussed in this Committee were properly applied.

In some cases, the process will be every bit as important as the outcome, and I remind hon. Members of a case I mentioned previously. Ethel, an 85-year-old woman living in a care home, wanted to leave the care home and return to her own home. She was subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguard. With the help of an advocate, she appealed her case to the Court of Protection. Although the court ultimately ruled that Ethel should remain in the care home, the advocate found during the appeal process that the conditions placed on her authorisation had not been read and were not being applied until the Court of Protection made sure those conditions were attached to the authorisation. If the process is carried out improperly, it may be that less restrictive options for the person’s care are not considered. It may be that a strong objection from a close family member, which could have altered the decisions made, is not expressed.

These concerns are widely shared. The Law Society has supported this amendment, as has a wide range of stakeholders, including Mind and Learning Disability England. It is my hope that the Government did not intend to exclude all the vital areas that I have just discussed, but I simply cannot understand why we would not want to give the Court of Protection the widest possible remit in this case. The court is intended to be the final safeguard against deprivation of liberty being used incorrectly or inappropriately, and if we restrict the issues that it can rule on, we blunt its effectiveness. The Opposition do not want to hear, a year or two down the line, of cases in which the responsible body has clearly not followed the correct process but the courts find themselves unable to do anything about it. Our amendment is designed to avoid such a situation ever arising, and I hope the Government will accept it.

[Caroline Dinenage]

I understand that hon. Members want the Court of Protection to consider matters such as whether an IMCA is appointed or an AMCP is involved. That would mean that the court was considering procedural matters regarding the liberty protection safeguards process. The hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South has asked me about the review of the role of the Court of Protection; she will be aware that the Ministry of Justice is currently reviewing courts in the round, and that review will of course include the regionalisation of the Court of Protection. However, the Bill is clear that the pre-authorisation review must be completed by an approved mental capacity professional in cases in which an objection has been raised. That provides a clear route for arrangements to be considered if that is something the person wishes to happen.

Government amendment 9 is clear that, in independent hospital cases, an approved mental capacity professional must complete that review—that is a duty—and if an independent hospital as a responsible body fails to do that, it would be in clear breach of its responsibilities and could be subject to legal challenge.

With regard to IMCA appointments, the Bill introduces an effective presumption that an IMCA will be appointed by the responsible body if there is not an appropriate person in place, which ensures access to representation. With that in mind, I hope that I have provided reassurances that the system will be robust regarding IMCA appointments and access to AMCPs. I therefore hope that hon. Members are willing to withdraw the amendment.

[Barbara Keeley]

As I said, the amendment seeks to clarify the role of the Court of Protection. It broadens the narrow set of responsibilities in the Bill, giving the court the explicit right to rule on any matter relating to the new liberty protection safeguards. It ensures that the process, as well as the outcome, of authorisations is covered by the court.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Caroline Dinenage]

Clause 3 sets out that the Court of Protection can hear challenges in relation to liberty protection safeguard authorisations. The court already considers challenges under the current system, and the Law Commission recommended that it continue to do so under liberty protection safeguards, pending the outcome of a Government review.

In designing the new system, we put safeguards in place to ensure that arrangements would be considered fairly and independently. We know that most people want to avoid courts and tribunals if possible, so it is important that they can access protections without needing to go to the Court of Protection. However, it is also important to us that people who want to challenge their authorisations in court are able to do so, which is why the right to non-means-tested legal aid will be maintained under the liberty protection safeguards system. Cost will not be a barrier to a person’s ability to access the court.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Consequential provision etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 14 and 15.

That Schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.

[Caroline Dinenage]

With your leave, Mr Pritchard, I will speak about amendments 14 and 15 before moving on to the clause stand part debate.

The amendments amend section 36 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to ensure that regulations about the functions of independent mental capacity advocates can make provision for advocates appointed under the LPS to support the new role of appropriate person. Amendment 14 also amends sections 38 and 39 of the 2005 Act.

Broadly, the provisions require an IMCA to be appointed when an NHS body or local authority proposes to accommodate a person in a hospital, care home or long-stay residential accommodation and there is no one else to consult about what would be in that person’s best interest. The amendments continue the position under DoLS, so that the duties to appoint an IMCA in sections 38 and 39 will not apply if one has already been appointed under the LPS in relation to the same accommodation. That is to avoid a person having two IMCAs carrying out similar roles. Amendments 14 and 15 also make consequential amendments that reflect the change from the deprivation of liberty safeguards to the liberty protection safeguards.

Clause 4 gives the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers a regulation-making power to make provision that is consequential to the Bill, including changes to existing legislation. The power will be used to make any necessary consequential changes as a result of the LPS coming into force—for example, to update references to schedule A1, which contains the existing deprivation of liberty safeguards, to references to schedule AA1, where the liberty protection safeguards will be set out.

Finally, clause 4 will introduce schedule 2, which will make minor and consequential amendments that update other legislation to reflect the change from deprivation of liberty safeguards to liberty protection safeguards. I commend the clause and the schedule to the Committee.

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On amendment 54, much of the detail debated during the Committee will be addressed in the code of practice. We have raised our concerns over and over again. Does the Minister agree that legislators, healthcare staff, assessors and advocates—the list goes on—should be fully informed and aware of the code of practice prior to the revisions in the Bill being implemented to give them a fighting chance to prepare? I am concerned that any code of practice will not be subject to the scrutiny that both Houses provide for other pieces of legislation, particularly as this Government do not have a good track record of welcoming scrutiny from other Members or from outsiders. Perhaps the absence of an oral evidence session demonstrates that. There is concern that the code of practice will contain significant flaws and gaps. This morning, the Minister was not even prepared to talk about it in general terms, and said that we would have to wait for the detail and the views of experts and further consultation. I accept that, but we could still have some sort of comment on the general terms of the code.

[Caroline Dinenage]

The hon. Gentleman might be slightly misquoting me. I have spoken in general terms about the code of practice, and have indeed circulated a draft of what will be included in it among hon. Members, as well as what we have committed to including in it as part of the discussions in the House of Lords and during this Committee.

[Alex Cunningham]

It is never my intention to misrepresent anyone. All I am concerned about is that we should have clear detail as soon as possible in order for us to understand what will happen. It is not just for us to understand—it is also for people outside in the world who have to deal with this on a day-to-day basis. The Minister just answered the question I would have posed at the end, so I will not bother asking it.

[Caroline Dinenage]

I thank hon. Members for initiating this discussion. Amendment 52 would delay the introduction of liberty protection safeguards until the Department has fully responded to the report of the independent review into the Mental Health Act.

The hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South said that I was stubborn. I am sure that a number of people, not least my husband, would agree with that sentiment. I think she would agree that I have committed to looking again. A number of issues have been raised during the Bill’s passage through Committee, not least ensuring that people get information as early as possible—I agree with her on that—and how we can maximise protection for those being cared for in an independent hospital. I am sure she would agree that I would be being equally stubborn if I were to take the amendments on board without giving them careful and due consideration, and without checking the legal ramifications and making sure that we are offering all the protections that we need to. I am sure that the hon. Lady, other Opposition Members and stakeholders will forgive me for making sure that we consider everything thoroughly and properly.

On amendment 52, I welcome Sir Simon Wessely’s landmark report and I am sure that it will very much set the direction for improving the way the Mental Health Act works for thousands of vulnerable people. The Government have already committed to bringing forth mental health legislation when parliamentary time allows, taking that very important report into account. We have already accepted two important recommendations, which will give service users more choice and control, but it will take time for us to consider the rest of the recommendations, of which there are 152. We will respond to the remaining recommendations in due course, but Sir Simon said that the Government would need to consider the “practical implications” of the interface recommendations, and that it would be “problematic” to introduce those recommendations in this Bill.

Hon. Members will be aware that the reforms in the Bill are desperately needed—I cannot repeat often enough that we cannot wait any longer to improve the situation of the backlog of more than 125,000 people who have been deprived of their liberty without authorisation. As much as there are concerns among stakeholders—I have met a number of stakeholders and we will continue to consult them, to take their views on board and to make sure that we work with them at every step of the way when it comes to the code of practice—they also share our concern that 125,000 people have been deprived of their liberty without authorisation, that their loved ones have been deprived of peace of mind and that their care providers have been deprived of legal protection.

[Barbara Keeley]

I have two points to make to the Minister. I remind hon. Members that we have heard examples of authorities—they include mine, that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North and some London boroughs—where there is no backlog and where the local authorities have dedicated enough resource to the situation. Despite the number of DoLS applications increasing since the Cheshire West case, they are dealing with it. Let us not talk in Committee as if it is the same everywhere; it is not. Some local authorities are coping perfectly well with the backlog, and there is no pressure in those local authorities to change to a worse system that will cause a problem.

Secondly, I asked the Minister about the cost of dealing with the backlog, and I hope she will touch on that. She has raised the backlog again and again as a reason for rushing the Bill through. It is not a reason for rushing through a new piece of legislation that is this important. I hope that she will come on to say exactly how the backlog is to be dealt with and what resources will be available to deal with it, because that is an important issue. If the backlog is the reason for doing things this way, how is the backlog going to be dealt with?

[Caroline Dinenage]

Yes, of course I will go on to talk about the transition between the two systems and the backlog. I also say gently to the hon. Lady that she and others may be in the fortunate position where their local authorities have got to the stage where they do not have a backlog—in many cases, that is due to a political decision to prioritise it—but I think all those local authorities would recognise that there is duplication and cost in the system that they could do without. They have had to take very tough decisions to prioritise this issue over other things that they could be spending their money on, when money is tight. I do not think the attitude of, “I’m alright, Jack, there’s no backlog in my constituency,” is a very good one, when 125,000 other people are waiting.

[Alex Cunningham]

I do not have a particular problem with what the Minister is saying—local authorities do want to see reduced costs and to ensure that responsibilities are carried out—but she used the expression I used last week. It was a “political decision” by local authorities such as Stockton to take money from other services and invest them in this matter. Surely local authorities should not have to face that choice. The Government should properly fund our whole social care service, never mind the issues around the Bill.

[Caroline Dinenage]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman—the whole of the health and social care system needs funding, and that is where the additional money for the NHS comes in. The Government have given councils access to more than £10 billion over this three-year period. The fact that they are still struggling shows the scale of the problem. We do not want to waste money on duplication when that money could be valuably spent elsewhere. The desire to streamline the system to avoid unnecessary duplication, which drives costs but does not offer any further protection, is what this is all about.

[Alex Cunningham]

It is has been estimated that the Minister will save about £200 million as a direct result of the changes in the Bill. What will that money be used for?

[Caroline Dinenage]

We have to be careful not to conflate our language. There is no intention to save money on the process. We know that if DoLS were implemented correctly all across the country, as they are in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, the cost would be £2 billion. However, we are not looking to save money here; we are looking to ensure that it is spent more wisely—not on duplication, but in a way that offers people the protections that they need. This is not a cost-saving exercise; it is about ensuring that money is spent wisely and effectively to offer that protection.

Amendment 53 would delay the introduction of liberty protection safeguards until the Department has published an updated impact assessment and implementation strategy. I thank hon. Members for reminding us of those items, which are important for the successful implementation of the Bill. We are in the process of preparing the updated impact assessment to reflect the amendments made in the Lords. We are keen to make the Bill as successful as possible and to listen to the concerns of those in the other place. We will shortly publish the impact of the amendments made there, and the Government have also made changes to the Bill in this House that will require us to update the impact assessment further.

The noble lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy—I am not sure whether I am allowed to name him—has committed to publishing a training strategy before the Act comes into force. With regard to training, we will work closely with the sector, local authorities and NHS organisations on implementation as part of our strategy, and we welcome Members’ contributions. I completely agree with hon. Members that adequate training for health and social care staff is vital. Ahead of the implementation, we will consider the most appropriate way to ensure that everybody is appropriately equipped.

We have considered training costs as part of the updated impact assessment that we will publish shortly. We know that there will be an impact on transitional costs. We will support the sector and we will deliver training through a workforce development model delivered by and in partnership with Skills for Care, as we do for other things.

With regard to the implementation, ahead of day one we will work with local, national and Welsh DoLS networks in partnership with the Local Government Association and the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services to clear the existing backlog of applications. Those who remain in the backlog on day one will have their applications handled under LPS—a streamlined system that minimises duplication. Existing assessments can be used, if appropriate. For example, there may be no need to commission a doctor to do a new mental health assessment. That efficiency will allow local authorities and other responsible bodies to tackle the backlog effectively.

Cared-for persons who have an existing DoLS authorisation on day one will remain under that authorisation until it expires, after which a new application will need to be made under the new system. Those in settings that newly fall under LPS, such as those in the community, who may have an authorisation from the Court of Protection, will remain under that authorisation until it ends. A new application will then need to be made under LPS. We will work closely with responsible bodies and care providers to ensure that the transition period is as smooth as possible, and that vulnerable people are protected.

Amendment 54 would require the code of practice to be approved and published before the introduction of liberty protection safeguards. That statutory guidance is essential. It will outline the details of how the system should operate and will be a valuable tool for practitioners. The Government are required by section 43 of the Mental Capacity Act to consult when preparing the code of practice.

We are already in the first stages of developing the code. We will work with the sector to co-produce it. I am happy to commit to publishing the code of practice before the scheme comes into force. I also commit to laying the code in draft before Parliament, giving both Houses the opportunity to resolve not to approve it, as section 43 of the Mental Capacity Act also requires.

I hope that I have been able to provide reassurance and that the hon. Member is able to withdraw the amendment.

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Division 27

Ayes: 7

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Labour: 7

Noes: 8

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Conservative: 8

[Caroline Dinenage]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 5, page 4, line 25, leave out subsection (9).

This amendment removes the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 5 stand part.

[Caroline Dinenage]

Parliamentary procedure requires a privilege amendment to be included in a Bill that starts in the House of Lords and has financial implications. It is then removed in the House of Commons as a standard procedure.

Clause 5 sets out the territorial extent of the Bill, which is England and Wales. This clause sets out that clause 4, except subsection 6, and clause 5 come into effect immediately on the Bill being passed. The rest of the Bill comes into force on a day nominated by the Secretary of State. Different days may be appointed for different purposes or different areas of the Bill. Clause 5 also gives the Secretary of State a power to make transitional arrangements by regulations. I recommend the clause to the Committee.

[Barbara Keeley]

Government amendment 1 is, of course, entirely uncontroversial. We cannot implement a new system until the Government are authorised to pay for it. I have a question for the Minister, following our conversation about the financial impact of the Bill: in the light of the changes that have been made to the Bill in the past few months, will she give us an estimate of how much expenditure we are being asked to agree?

We will not oppose the amendment, but I feel that members of the Committee should have an idea of what they are agreeing. We definitely need to have the updated impact assessment as soon as possible and certainly before Report stage. It is not acceptable to have an impact assessment that is six months out of date. We want to know how much the new system will cost before the Bill concludes its passage through the House. Only if that happens will we be confident of the amount of expenditure agreed to.

On clause 5 more generally, I am disappointed that the Minister has opposed all our amendments. In particular, I remain concerned about the code of practice, when it is finally produced. I counsel her against trying to rush it through the House, with little opportunity for Members to provide feedback. We have tried valiantly on this Bill Committee to bring up issues of great importance in the Bill, and they need to be listened to.

The Government have said that the new system will not come into force until the code of practice has been published, so there is no real reason not to agree to have the code of practice approved by each House before the Bill is enacted.

I hope the Minister will reflect carefully on what has been said in our debate on the Bill. As is evidenced by the letter from all those organisations in The Times today, the Bill contains significant flaws. It would not be unreasonable for some of our concerns to be addressed before the Government even try to bring in the new system. With that, we will not oppose clause 5 stand part, but we hope the Minister will use the powers in the clause to ensure that the Government get the system right before they roll it out.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Clause 5, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Meaning of deprivation of liberty

“(1) After section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 insert—

‘4ZA Meaning of deprivation of liberty

(1) In this Act, references to deprivation of a person’s liberty have the same meaning as in Article 5(1) of the Human Rights Convention and, accordingly, a person is not deprived of liberty in any of the circumstances described in subsections (2) to (4).

(2) A person is not deprived of liberty in a particular place if the person is free to leave that place permanently.

(3) A person is not deprived of liberty in a particular place if—

(a) the person is not subject to continuous supervision, and

(b) the person is free to leave the place temporarily (even if subject to supervision while outside that place).

(4) A person is not deprived of liberty if—

(a) the arrangements alleged to give rise to the deprivation of liberty are put in place in order to give medical treatment for a physical illness or injury, and

(b) the same (or materially the same) arrangements would be put in place for any person receiving that treatment.

(5) A person is free to leave a particular place for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) even if the person is unable to leave that place provided that if the person expressed a wish to leave the person would be enabled to do so.’

(2) In section 64(5) of that Act (interpretation) for the words from ‘same’ to the end substitute ‘meaning given by section 4ZA.’”—(Caroline Dinenage.)

This New Clause provides the meaning of “deprivation of liberty” for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Caroline Dinenage]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause provides statutory clarification in relation to the meaning of deprivation of liberty for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act. The Mental Capacity Act defines a deprivation of liberty by reference to article 5 of the European convention on human rights. The proposed new clause adopts the same fundamental approach, by anchoring the meaning of deprivation of liberty to article 5.

As Committee members will be aware, the 2014 Supreme Court Cheshire West case changed what was commonly thought of as a deprivation of liberty, resulting in an eighteenfold increase in people entering the DoLS system, and applications are still growing year on year. That resulted in a significant rise in resource use for local authorities and the care sector, resulting in a backlog of over 125,000 people waiting for their applications to be authorised, as I have mentioned on numerous occasions during our debates.

The Law Commission was against a definition of a deprivation of liberty, but noble peers, stakeholders and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have all called for a definition to be included in the Bill, to bring proportionality to this situation and ensure that liberty protection safeguards are appropriately applied. The new clause does that by bringing clarity to prescribing circumstances, or exceptions, that are not a deprivation of liberty. If a person meets the conditions in one of its subsections, they are not being deprived of their liberty and so do not fall under the liberty protection safeguards. These subsections are drawn from case law.

The Department has decided not to include a full definition of a deprivation of liberty because primary legislation needs to be extremely clear and precise, and case law is constantly evolving. That makes it difficult to draft a definition that will remain sufficiently precise, given that the definition may change as case law develops. For that reason, we must be extremely wary of the unintended consequences of including a full definition in relation to such a complex matter. By taking this exclusionary approach, we will enable the definition to remain valid as new cases come forward, as there should be sufficient flexibility within the clause for case law to develop in parallel.

An important point to make Committee members aware of is that the clause would be accompanied by detailed statutory guidance and case studies within the code of practice. Here we would set out scenarios as workable examples of the subsections, to assist practitioners as they determine whether someone is being deprived of their liberty. I would like to assure colleagues that these supporting materials will give the detail and depth required for those in the sector, and local authorities, to identify a deprivation of liberty. We are working with stakeholders already to gather these scenarios in a wide range of settings, including care homes, private domestic settings and supported living. The clause would apply to 16 and 17-year-olds, as the rest of the Bill does, but we recognise that the circumstances of this vulnerable group of people can be different, and that will also be reflected in the guidance.

The inclusion of a clause in relation to consent has been carefully considered, but one has not been included. That is for several reasons. First, to give valid consent, an individual would need capacity, as set out by the Mental Capacity Act. If they have capacity and are consenting to the arrangements, then that automatically cannot be a deprivation of liberty. Secondly, there is not enough in case law to support the validity of de facto consent—that is, consent given by someone without capacity—and I am concerned that it would not be compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. Above all, we must protect the rights of cared-for people.

The new clause will clarify issues post Cheshire West, it will determine when the LPS should and should not apply, and it will support those planning care in considering the least restrictive options to enable greater freedom for those in their care.

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[Caroline Dinenage]

Is the hon. Lady suggesting that there should not be a definition?

[Barbara Keeley]

No, I welcomed the fact that the Government were trying to put in a definition, but this definition is not fit for purpose. The problem is that, as with everything else in the Bill, it was rushed. At the meeting I had with stakeholders not very many weeks ago, almost everyone in the room had fears about it. Many of them had not even seen it. The process has been wrong.

I made it clear to the Minister what I think the Government should do. They should withdraw new clause 1 and not put it to a vote. They should put the definition out to consultation, and not introduce it again until those involved with the definition are happy with it. Then we can be clear. Pitting a Government decision against decisions of the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights is not wise; it is a knotty problem. I am not a lawyer myself, but I have listened enough to people who are experts in this area to know that it is a problem.

Perhaps I can encapsulate the problem in one final question to the Minister. On the front of the Bill the Secretary of State certifies that he feels it is compatible with the European convention on human rights. Given some of the points that I have just raised about the definition, is the Minister confident that the Bill would still be compatible if we agreed to the new clause?

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[Alex Norris]

I completely agree. To me it is a big, blinking red light that says that perhaps we need to pause and think again. Nothing typifies that more than new clause 1. It is helpful to have a definition in the Bill, and there is broad support for that. I also have some sympathy for its being exclusionary, rather than put in a positive manner, because we know, irrespective of what ends up in the Bill, that it will end up in court.

This is a hotly contested area of case law. It feels a bit like what it must be like to be an American legislator—we are almost waiting for what we do to be tested in court to see if it is okay. I have no doubt, with things as they are currently comprised, that we will be back. I do not know whether it will be a couple of months down the line or a couple of years, but if we carry on we will certainly be back.

The approach laid out by my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South is sensible and proportionate, and it might give us an opportunity to resolve the issue, by sending the new clause, which has appeared between stages, to the sector and asking, “How do you feel about this?” in order to get some engagement. That would give us more time for the lawyers to do their thing too. That seems quite sensible.

It would also give us a chance to take a breath on the whole Bill, and a little more time to see whether we can resolve some of the issues that we have discussed over the last two weeks. Many of the things we as an Opposition have put forward have had merit; perhaps our approach has not always been perfect, but to find better ways to try to address those things would be good for us all.

I will move on to my second concern. If new clause 1 becomes part of the Bill and the Bill becomes an Act, the smoke will come out of this place and send a clear signal: “We know that DoLS doesn’t work and hasn’t worked for a long time. Here is what is going to come next. Here is what we mean by ‘deprivation of liberty’ and here is what you can expect.” I maintain my anxiety that we will have only solved half of the problem, or one of two problems, because it is entirely possible for a big problem—in this case DoLS, the backlog and people’s experiences of that process—to be multifactorial.

No one has contested the fact that the DoLS system did not work and ought to be replaced, but there is a big, yawning and currently unanswered question of resources. I was concerned to hear the Minister say that they are the result of political decisions. I have been in that chair, as the local adult services lead on my council for three years, wrestling with DoLS. Is it a political decision? Yes, maybe it is, in the sense that we are basically trying to juggle whether to deal with assessing new people on their social care needs, assessing whether the needs of people currently in the social care system have gone up or down or, indeed, areas such as DoLS, all of which carry enormous risk to an individual, a local authority and a community as a whole.

In the sense that it is a political choice, it is like saying, “Your house is on fire; are you going to put out the lounge or the kitchen first?” You would just grab the bucket of water and chuck it at it, frankly. There is no political decision in that, or certainly not one of due prioritisation. Ultimately, if we are going to include this new clause in the Bill to set up the new system and legislation to set the new way, we must have absolute clarity that the finances are going to be met. Otherwise, the system will fail and we will, certainly with new clause 1, have elevated people’s expectations. At the moment people expect to be disappointed, because they know the system does not work. Now we are going to tell them that we have a new system that works, and then it will not. I suspect that is why all those eminent organisations have said that it is where it is.

On this point and on others, I feel that we on the Opposition Benches have made strong arguments about ways of improving the Bill, but it is not just us. It is not just partisan knockabout; it is not political. It is not a case where the Government say one thing so therefore the Opposition oppose. We should look at the organisations that are also saying, with flashing lights, “Please stop and have a think about this.” Otherwise, as I say, we will be back.

[Caroline Dinenage]

I think it would be helpful if I began by setting out how we got to where we are, for the sake of clarity, although I know that many hon. Members know this. The case of MIG and MEG and P widened the understanding of the scope of deprivation of liberty safeguards with the Supreme Court decision that:

“A gilded cage is still a cage”.

Even though the cared-for person was happy in their situation, it was still a deprivation of liberty and required a safeguard. The acid test set out by Baroness Hale in Cheshire West had two limbs: first, is the person subject to continuous supervision and control, and secondly, is the person free to leave? We can see that test running through this clause. We cannot directly challenge or go against Cheshire West, as it is the Supreme Court’s articulation of article 5, and our Bill must be compliant with the European convention on human rights. That is why deprivation of liberty continues to be defined by reference to article 5 of the ECHR.

We are confident that the exceptions in subsections (2) to (4) represent existing case law. The clause defines deprivation of liberty in that way, and the subsections are consistent with and drawn from existing case law—for example, as I have detailed, subsections (2) and (3) are based on the Cheshire West acid test. It is unlikely that there will be a mismatch between our clause and the High Court’s view; it may be that the clause is subject to litigation in future, but we are confident that the Government’s approach of providing for situations that would not constitute a deprivation of liberty will give sufficient flexibility for the meaning of the clause to develop alongside case law as that evolves.

Much of the discussion has emphasised how incredibly complex a legal matter this is; the clause must be drafted incredibly carefully to ensure that it is legally compliant. We have worked with other Government Departments such as the Ministry of Justice to develop the clause. We listened to stakeholders and peers during the progress of the Bill through the House of Lords to understand their requirements for a definition and drafted the new clause in a way that would achieve what they wanted legally. Since drafting it, we have shared it with stakeholders to explore its impact. We are consulting a wide variety of organisations to gather case studies, which we will use in the statutory guidance.

[Steve McCabe (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)]

I wonder whether the Minister can explain how, if there was consultation with stakeholders, my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South has that impressive list of organisations with such grave reservations. That suggests the consultation was a bit inadequate.

[Caroline Dinenage]

The decision to put the definition in the Bill was made in the House of Lords. We had to work carefully on the definition. That information has been shared with stakeholders only in the past couple of weeks. The definition is where we have been working most latterly.

Stakeholders have agreed to work with us and to bring forward case studies that we can put in the statutory guidance that will make it very clear how the Bill will work in every instance and for all the different types of vulnerable people we have discussed. That is what we need to provide clarity. Those case studies will demonstrate how the exceptions will apply in different settings and scenarios, provide clarity, and aid practitioners in identifying when one of the exceptions applies. We are working with stakeholders to co-produce that guidance to ensure that it is clear, unambiguous and of real help to those who use it. It would not be appropriate to include that kind of detail in primary legislation. As I have tried to articulate, the new clause needs to be precise and to fit with evolving case law.

[Barbara Keeley]

I constantly get the feeling when I listen to the Minister that she is describing a happy situation that, unfortunately, the evidence suggests does not exist. The notion that she is co-producing the definition with stakeholders is not what stakeholders say. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North and I read out the list of organisations that object to the Bill and the severe comments they have made about it. If the Minister were in fact co-producing parts of the Bill and the definition with stakeholders, they would not be writing to The Times describing the Bill in that way.

[Caroline Dinenage]

We are talking about the definition. I am not saying we have co-produced it with stakeholders, but we have given a copy of it to stakeholders, asked for their feedback and asked them to supply case studies. Some have welcomed it and see it as absolutely necessary to provide the clarity we are looking for.

The Law Commission report shows that overly cautious application of DoLS is unnecessary, but we want an effective system with access to safeguards, as required by article 5 rights. The hon. Lady raised a number of case studies, including Stanev v. Bulgaria, in which Mr Stanev needed permission to leave. We will make it very clear in the code that a person is not free to leave if they require approval or permission. That is also clarified in subsection (5) of proposed new section 4ZA of the Mental Capacity Act.

We intend to set out in the statutory guidance, by reference to case studies, how that should be interpreted. For example, we understand that in care homes, cared-for people are often left unsupervised for many hours of the day yet may still be regarded as being deprived of their liberty. We do not intend to exclude those people without discretion. We will set out in the guidance the circumstances in which someone should be regarded as not being under constant supervision, such as how frequently they are checked and the monitoring that is present. We are also conscious that “continuous supervision” means different things in different settings, and I welcome the contribution of my hon. Friends towards that.

There is also a sliding scale of situations we expect to be excluded by subsection (3)(b) of proposed new section 4ZA. We will expand on that in the guidance in consultation with stakeholders. For example, the place must be one to which the person has a wish to go rather than one solely of staff’s choosing. It is worth pointing out that both limbs of subsection (3) must be met for a person to be excluded by it. For example, if a person is not continually supervised in a care home but is not free to leave temporarily, the subsection does not apply.

Although we aim to bring clarity, we recognise that every case is different. I hope I have articulated that this will be a person-centric system. We do not want a one-size-fits-all approach, which is the problem with the system that we have now. That approach is no longer fit for purpose for such a vastly different and vulnerable group of individuals. With that in mind, I ask that new clause 1 stand part.