Defence Aerospace Industrial Strategy

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 16th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Ruth Smeeth]

I had the privilege of sitting in Red 1 last year, so I absolutely agree. The Red Arrows are our showcase for the RAF, and for us not to be investing at the time of the 100th anniversary of the RAF seems to me somewhat short-sighted.

I am not in favour of having a new aircraft just for the sake of it, but this is our most impressive and important defence engagement tool, and one of the priorities of the RAF. The Red Arrows can show off the best of our new technologies on a global stage, and we should encourage them to do so. However, I acknowledge that this would be a sticking plaster, and the long-term security of these and other sites can be guaranteed only by the development of a clear, genuine industrial strategy for the future of UK defence aerospace.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I recall that when I was a young major—I am still young, as I am sure the hon. Lady would agree—we were talking in 1984 about the requirement for a defence aerospace industrial strategy. We sometimes change the name, but we keep talking about the same thing. The truth of the matter, however, is that every time there is a defence review, the defence aerospace industrial strategy goes into the bin. I am afraid that that is the reality of the situation. We all want such a strategy, but it keeps getting scrapped, like so many of our aircraft.

[Ruth Smeeth]

This is the perfect chance for the Government to ensure that there is a real opportunity to have an industrial strategy. They must put their money where their mouth is and move forward with such a strategy.

My second point relates to the retention and development of our domestic skills base. Our defence aerospace industry operates at the absolute cutting edge of modern technology. This is a highly skilled, highly qualified workforce, and their talents are a national resource that need to be nurtured as well as retained. Such expertise enabled us to play a major role in developing the F-35 alongside our US partners—a project that was secured by our unique knowledge through the design of the Harrier jump jet.

When deals stall and future projects are uncertain, those jobs are put at risk, and if they go, those skills go with them. Once the capability to develop and produce complex systems in any field has been lost, it can be incredibly difficult and time-consuming to rebuild. One has only to look at the experience of the Astute programme to see the danger. Delays in our procurement of a new submarine programme led to significant redundancies of very specific skills which meant that, embarrassingly, when we eventually decided to upgrade our submarine capability, we had to go cap in hand to an American firm to help us rediscover and upskill the skills that we had lost after the completion of the Trident programme in Barrow.