Strategic Defence and Security Review

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I accept what my hon. Friend says and I listened with great admiration to his earlier comments. There is a lot of work to be done, as the Secretary of State has made plain, and I hope that my hon. Friend will play as valuable a part in it as he played before the election.

My greatest concern about defence is that the British, and perhaps the European, public believe that defence is a job done and that the end of the cold war meant the end of the need to spend serious amounts of money on defending our interests. They think we can rely on the Americans to protect us, but they are wrong: the Americans will protect us only for as long as it is in their interests to do so. Until our constituents demand that we spend more on defence, no Chancellor of the Exchequer will wish to do so, but that will not happen until the public are properly engaged in talking about defence or until they understand its importance and purpose. If one conducts a defence review behind closed doors, while everyone is away on holiday and at a pace that would startle Michael Schumacher, no such understanding will arise. Let us hope that the next one comes across better.

Given all my criticisms of the process, the result was far better than I expected. First, the Secretary of State for Defence did an absolutely valiant job of fighting his corner and I doubt that he alienated the Prime Minister or the Chancellor in the process—he was doing his job. Secondly, given that the Secretary of State started with a defence posture and budget that were both utterly incoherent and unsustainable there was a surprisingly strategic feel to the outcome, the thrust of which seems to be that we shall be gambling our security in the short term in exchange for its enhancement in the longer term. That is preferable to the reverse, provided that we always have at the front of our minds the need not to fail in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, despite the tightness of the settlement, there was a recognition of the changing and unpredictable nature of the threats we face. There was extra money for cyber-security and a recognition by the Secretary of State personally regarding the threat from electromagnetic pulses. I expect also that there will be extra money for space security. Those are some of the new threats.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I think that is superb. The real problem that having smaller armed forces will bring is an absolute requirement to get our intelligence tip-top. We have been utterly surprised so many times in history. We have to make our intelligence much better, so that we reduce the chance of being surprised again. For example, why do we have so many intelligence agencies? I would bet my bottom dollar that we will be surprised again, but we have to reduce the risks as much as we can. That is as much a part of the review as anything else; indeed, it is probably one of the most important factors.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I agree. My hon. Friend talks about the number of intelligence agencies we have, but he might like to look at the United States, which has such a plethora of intelligence agencies that it gives one a headache simply to look at a wiring diagram. Nevertheless, he is quite right: some of the threats we face are unpredictable. We are useless at predicting where threats will come from, or where we may need to be deployed, and for that reason we have to be adaptable.

My overall view of the review is that it is 80% common sense, pragmatic and broadly agreed upon, and 20% controversial, risky and able to generate headlines in the media. The success in pulling together the 80% that is agreed upon should not be overshadowed by discussion and argument over the 20% that is not, but that is what sells newspapers.

Let me give one example in relation to the French-UK treaties that were signed this week. I am in no doubt that they are a good thing, and that we are moving in the right direction. I have a reservation relating to the aircraft carriers, but I repeat that the treaties are a good thing. Actually, I believe that we should go further and give reality to the treaties, so that the warm words that they contain might be translated into tangible progress in training, doctrine, equipment-sharing, acquisition and research with our good friends and allies, the French. My reservation about the aircraft carriers, however, has been wrongly depicted as some great showdown between myself and the Secretary of State. I shall explain my reservation.

When the SDSR was announced last month, the Prime Minister said of the aircraft carriers:

“We will build both carriers, but hold one in extended readiness.”—[Official Report, 19 October 2010; Vol. 516, c. 801.]

And we all know that “extended readiness” in Ministry of Defence-speak means exactly the reverse. But, in the press conference after the signing of the treaties this week, my right hon. Friend referred to our “carrier”. As I understand it, we have not yet decided to sell one of the two carriers, and I hope that we do not. To talk of our “carrier” might be to build an expectation that we shall definitely mothball and almost certainly sell the other one. It is pre-empting a discussion that needs to take place much later, when we can see the economic circumstances of this country and, more importantly, the threats against us.

Two carriers would be a good idea, and no carriers would be a fairly good idea, but one carrier? Surely not. Every time it went into refit would we not prove to the Treasury that we were able to struggle on without it? Furthermore, are we really yet close enough to the French position that we can utterly rely on being allowed to use theirs? The answer is no, not yet. Our deployment to Iraq took place in the last decade. I do not say that we never will be close enough to the French, because I hope and expect that at some stage in the reasonably near future we shall, but it will come about only after a decent length of time operating alongside them, and after the treaties have been given detail, teeth and funding, none of which has yet happened.

How about another idea? How about deciding between the two of our countries that the French will contribute to the cost of the second carrier and, in return, have the right to use it when their carrier is in refit? That would mean that the two countries had three operational carriers between them, which should surely be acceptable. Having said all that, let me repeat that the French treaties are, in the words of “1066 and All That”, a “Good Thing”.

Of course, it is easy to mock the SDSR: “If only it had not been necessary to scrap the Ark Royal! If only we could have kept on the Harriers! Perhaps we could get by with some inflatable Harriers”—all that sort of jolly joking. However, the consequence of having to find money is that the alternative is to salami-slice all that is left and destroy the fundamental effectiveness of our armed forces in the process.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has had the courage to take some very difficult decisions. My guess is that in the decision between the Tornadoes and the Harriers, the fact that the Tornadoes have an air-to-ground strike capability was what saved them; we might well need that capability sooner than the Typhoon can provide it, and there must be questions about why that has been delayed for so long. Why did we need to scrap one or the other, the Harrier or Tornado? The cost of the logistics of keeping another type in the air is huge—billions of pounds; a billion here and a billion there, and soon we are talking about real money.

The noble Lord West described the decision to scrap the Harrier as “bonkers”. That would be easier to accept if, when he was in a position to do something about the bonkers economics of the Ministry of Defence, he had tried to do something to put it right. Instead, he drove forward the carrier decision, which he must have known was unaffordable.

How did all this come about? First, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) set out so convincingly and with such great knowledge in his speech, there is the awful system of perverse incentives inside the Ministry of Defence. I congratulate the noble Lord Hutton on commissioning the Bernard Gray report. Those perverse incentives did not begin under a Labour Government; they have been around for decades, and I must bear some part of the blame for them myself.

Secondly, there is the disgraceful command from No. 10 that before the election there was to be no more money, but also no bad news about base closures or programme cancellations. The former Secretary of State for Defence did his valiant best to try to take some real, hard decisions, but he was thwarted at every step of the way by the Prime Minister of the time and some of his Ministers. In the private words of one of his Ministers at the time, the problems were to be chucked over the fence, into the responsibility of the next Government. I have been Chief Whip, and I am not often shocked. But I was certainly shocked when that remark was reported to me.

I still have considerable concerns about the strategic and defence review. I am very concerned about the gap in vital capability if the Nimrod aircraft go. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex, I am very concerned about the overall size of the fleet, which will be tiny in future; the unquantifiable influence exerted by the Royal Navy when a smart ship sails into a foreign port will be rarer and rarer. For the next 10 years, the strategic defence and security review will rely heavily on our enemies giving us advance warning of an impending attack. The enemy have a vote in all this; let us hope that they are polite enough to do that.

There will be other concerns. Service families watching this debate will fear redundancies, uncertainties and upheaval, having given themselves and made such sacrifice for their country. The same will apply to civil servants, who have also given outstanding service, and to the defence industry, which has done so much to support our defence efforts. All this will have substantial effects on whole communities—for example, in Scotland. We must do our best to mitigate those effects.

Whatever the concerns, one thing is absolutely clear. We have now had the defence review and we must now make it work. In my view, there is only a limited amount to be achieved by blaming the Labour party for the ghastly mess that it left us or the coalition for the hasty and secretive review that it has brought in to put it right. We now have a plan and we must scrutinise it, but we must leave defence on a stronger footing at the end of the process than it is on now. We must make it work for the good of the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson (Lagan Valley) (DUP)]

I welcome the opportunity to participate in today’s debate. Following the precedent set by the hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames), I pay tribute to those who have paid the supreme sacrifice in our armed forces and who laid down their lives so that today we can have this debate and enjoy the relative degree of freedom that we do. In particular, I am thinking of the soldiers who served in Northern Ireland over a number of decades, and those who lost their lives protecting the community there.

We had a debate yesterday in the House on the Saville inquiry, and there was much criticism of the actions of the Army in Londonderry in 1972—but that must not become the mark of the Army’s contribution to Northern Ireland and to the relative degree of peace that we enjoy today. The Army did many valiant things in Northern Ireland, and many people are alive today because of its contribution. I would also say that the Army has learned much from its experience in Northern Ireland. I hope that, whether in Afghanistan or in the other parts of the globe, it can put that experience to good use.

It is a matter of concern that recently the head of MI5 warned that the threat from dissident terrorist groups in Northern Ireland is on the increase. We are discussing today a strategic review not only of defence but of security, and I want to highlight the continuing threat, because not only is it posed in the cities, towns and villages of Northern Ireland but it has the capacity to extend to other parts of the United Kingdom.

Yesterday in the Belfast Telegraph there was an interesting interview with some of the so-called leadership of a new dissident group that described itself as Oglaigh na hEireann, which is Irish for the army of Ireland. It is the latest version of the Irish Republican Army, and it draws together disaffected elements from the Provisional IRA, the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA. Significantly, among the new recruits are bomb makers who have developed a capacity to explode bombs in a way that is very dangerous. It concerns me that although, of course, our focus at times is on our role in Afghanistan and on the threat from al-Qaeda and other militant groups, there remains here at home in the United Kingdom a potent threat from such groups. It is estimated that the new group has about 600 members, some of them new but many of them with experience of involvement in terrorism over a number of years.

We should not underestimate that threat. I do not want to give the group a status that it does not deserve, but the reality is that the Police Service of Northern Ireland has been reduced from 14,000 officers at its peak during the troubles to the current level of just 7,000, who alone have to deal with that terrorist threat, supported by the security services but without the support of the Army.

[Bob Stewart]

I am worried by the right hon. Gentleman’s comment that there might be 600 people in a new terrorist organisation in Northern Ireland. That is a significantly large terrorist group, particularly if substantial numbers are active. That worries me a great deal. Is he absolutely certain that it is anything like as large as that? If it is, that is a big worry.

[Mr Donaldson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, and for the contribution that he made while serving in the Army in Northern Ireland. I know that he experienced some terrible events that occurred during his time there. The figures that I quote come from the security services and from the Police Service of Northern Ireland; they are not something that politicians have dreamed up for the purposes of scaremongering. I do not share these remarks with the House to scaremonger, but merely to say that, in the context of our strategic review, we must keep an eye on a growing internal threat in the United Kingdom that may have consequences for the capacity of the PSNI to cope with it alone without the support at least of specialist assistance from our armed forces. We still have that capacity based in Northern Ireland, and it may be more needed than was envisaged when Operation Banner drew to an end just a few short years ago.

At the end of Operation Banner—as the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), will recall—commitments were given at a political level that a significant garrison would be retained in Northern Ireland. It therefore concerns me that there is talk of 19 Light Brigade, who are headquartered in Thiepval barracks in Lisburn in my constituency, being transferred back to the mainland. Similarly, there is talk of 2 Rifles, who are part of 19 Light Brigade and based at Ballykinler in County Down, and who recently served with distinction and great loss in Afghanistan, being transferred back to the mainland, with Ballykinler no longer being used as part of the garrison establishment in Northern Ireland, although its ranges and specialist training facilities would still be available to the Army.

This causes concern to us in Northern Ireland, as we very much value the presence of the Army in our part of the United Kingdom. Although we still have 38 (Irish) Brigade headquartered at Thiepval barracks, the presence of 19 Light Brigade has been important; they have done some valuable work with the local community. I would be worried if there were a move to transfer the brigade headquarters away from Lisburn back to the mainland. When the Prime Minister made his statement to the House on the SDSR, I sought an assurance from him that the cuts in troop numbers would not result in a reduction in the size of our front-line infantry units, and he gave that assurance. At the moment, 1 Royal Irish and the Irish Guards are deployed in Afghanistan, currently on operational duty in Helmand.

We in Northern Ireland are very proud of our long and historical tradition. It may not go back 800 years, but it certainly goes back over many hundreds of years. There is a tradition of Northern Irish men and women serving in our armed forces. Someone mentioned the Duke of Wellington, who is only one of many I could mention. Montgomery, and others of Northern Irish extraction, have made major contributions to our armed forces. We want to ensure that that tradition will continue and be respected. If I may be so bold as to speak for absent Members from Scotland and Wales, the regional contribution of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to our armed forces at all levels is to be valued. That is true not just of the units that originate from those regions but of members of all units at every level of our armed forces. They are members of the British Army and proud of the British tradition as well as of their regional identity. I hope that those identities will be respected as the SDSR is taken forward.

I support the remarks of the hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) about the review of the reserves. I hope that the thrust of that review will be to strengthen the role of the reserve forces within our armed forces. He made some valuable comments in support of that move, which would bring the UK into line with other countries where the reserve forces play a greater role.

For the record, some 24,000 reservists have been mobilised on or in support of military operations since 2003, which is quite a remarkable contribution. To make the greatest contribution to our armed forces, the reserves need to be properly structured for future conflicts. That will make the best use of their skills, experience and capabilities, while at the same time moving us towards a more efficient structure. I understand that as we are having this debate, some 929 reservist personnel are on current operational duties. We wish each of them well. Their contribution is valued, and we want it to be strengthened because they have skills and specialisms that can provide valuable input into what our armed forces are doing.

The concept of conflict prevention, which is mentioned in the national security documents that have been published, is important in the context of the SDSR. If we are to have a smaller military capacity in future, we want to ensure, with our international partners, that the prospect of conflict developing is diminished as best it can be. In recent years, in the light of our experience in Northern Ireland, I have had the honour of working with people in many parts of the globe who are facing conflict. We have sought to use the benefit of our experience to help them avoid conflict or resolve it where it occurs. Just two weeks ago I spent some time in Cyprus talking to people from the north and south of the island about the situation there and the need for a political settlement. We have worked with people from the Iraqi Parliament, from Moldova, from Kosovo, from the Basque region in Spain and so on.

The UK has an important role to play in conflict prevention. Despite all that has happened in the past, it is still very much respected, and in many respects we can give a lead to the international community by working with others to prevent conflict where possible. I received an invitation recently to attend an event here in Parliament on the situation that is developing in Burundi, and I have discussed other countries where there are early warning signs of the risk of conflict.