Ukraine

Bob Seely Excerpts

Monday 11th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

There are two parts to mine clearance in-country. First, there is the tactical mine clearance of lanes through which to launch the Ukrainian offensive. The tactic to which the Ukrainians have resorted to preserve combat power has been to clear the minefields very slowly, deliberately and methodically with dismounted infantry, in a way that those of us who served in Afghanistan or Iraq will remember as a tactic for improvised explosive devices there. It is quite something that that has been the tactic for clearing a minefield, but it has preserved combat power and therefore has been necessary. The other part is that there will obviously need to be a demining effort for the country at large after the war, and that is a concern for all of Ukraine’s donors and friends—[Interruption.] Mr Deputy Speaker, it seems odd to talk about the progress of the war and the atrocities when others are so busy in their conversation, but I am sure they mean nothing by it.

Despite the large numbers of Russian forces committed, they are not succeeding. Ukraine has had notable successes, destroying several Russian command and control centres and ammunition storage sites. It is difficult from the comfort of our position as observers to imagine the ferocity of the fighting and the sacrifice of the Ukrainians. Russia is suffering heavily on the battlefield and has taken some 200,000 casualties, of whom we believe 60,000 have been killed. In addition, more than 10,000 armoured vehicles have been destroyed.

However, the value of today’s debate is not simply to reflect on the tactical situation on the ground in south-east Ukraine, but to zoom out and assess the strategic scorecard.

[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend makes a valuable point about demining, but demining could be put in place now, and it is important now, because even areas that are retaken still have significant numbers of seeded mines. There is not only traditional mine clearance, of the kind that he will be familiar with from Afghanistan, but the use of artificial intelligence and software to predict how mines move and spread. That work can be done now—we do not have to wait till the end of the war.

[James Heappey]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend’s observation. The reality is that, as the frontline moves, it is in Ukraine’s interest to bring the agricultural land back into productive use as quickly as possible, and we have seen some extraordinarily innovative efforts to do that, from the most low-tech to the most high-tech. The challenge is that neither the UK nor any other supporter of Ukraine would want to put a combat engineering capability into the country, for fear of any miscalculation that that would cause. That effort necessarily sits with the non-governmental organisations, but there are a number working with the Ukrainian Government, some of which are based here in the UK.

I suggested that the House zoom out a bit to look at the strategic scorecard. As a result of Putin’s war, the Russian people are needlessly suffering, the Russian economy is faltering and we are seeing Ukrainian strikes deep into the interior of Russia. An aborted coup and its aftermath laid bare the nature of Putin’s regime and the strength of feeling of so many Russians against his so-called special military operation. It has become a standard line in these updates, but on day 564 of Putin’s three-day operation he still has not achieved any of his strategic objectives. Russia’s economy is failing, the rouble continues to fall and sanctions are biting.

As we have seen before, Russia will resort to terrorising Ukraine’s population whenever its battlefield objectives cannot be met. Just last Wednesday, a Russian strike hit a crowded market in the Ukrainian city of Kostiantynivka, killing at least 17 people and wounding a further 32. Over the weekend we have seen sham elections run in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Crimea, but, as the Foreign Secretary tweeted, the problem for Putin is that

“You can’t hold elections in someone else’s country.”

Putin continues to use food as a weapon to hold the world to ransom. Russia is using its Black sea fleet to attack Ukrainian ports with impunity in order to prevent the export of grain and exacerbate global food insecurity. I have travelled extensively across Africa and the rest of what is sometimes lazily referred to as the global south. Whatever Putin might think he achieves through the security conference he hosts in Moscow and St Petersburg, I am yet to meet anyone who is not clear that it is his attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure that threaten food security across the developing world. He is using food as a weapon. We encourage a return to the Black sea grain initiative, but we are clear-eyed about Putin’s actions and his likely intent.

It is self-evident that Russia’s behaviour on sovereign Ukrainian territory means that he is interested neither in finding a path to peace nor in stability in the world beyond. Make no mistake, the fastest route to peace in Ukraine and to security and stability for the rest of us is through Putin withdrawing his forces and ending this illegal and unjustified war.

The UK has been at the forefront of efforts to support Ukraine’s offensive. As the House will know well, we provided £2.3 billion in military support to Ukraine last year, and by being the first to send tanks and Storm Shadow missiles, we galvanised a coalition of like-minded nations to follow suit and come to the defence of the broader international rules-based system. At the NATO summit in Vilnius in July, the Prime Minister announced a new tranche of support for Ukraine, including thousands of additional rounds for Challenger 2 tanks, more than 70 combat and logistic vehicles, and a £50 million support package for equipment repair, as well as the establishment of a new military rehabilitation centre. We are also seeing increased contributions to the international fund for Ukraine. So far, £782 million has been pledged, and 10 contracts worth £182 million have been placed, to assist Ukraine in critical areas such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare and air defence. The first deliveries arrived in Ukraine this summer.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Heappey]

I note the hon. Gentleman’s comment and pay tribute to the work of the group in his constituency. On a Government-to-Government basis, it is important that we are led by the Government of Ukraine and what they ask us for. They are clear in their communication with us about their priorities, and those are what we resource. However, I will of course ensure that his point is noted. In the meantime, I encourage the groups in his constituency to continue doing what they can in support.

We have now trained more than 23,000 Ukrainian personnel under Operation Interflex, with contributions and knowledge from international partners, as demonstrated by the growing coalition of countries now joining us in training Ukrainians here on UK soil. Nearly 1,000 Ukrainian marines are returning home after being trained by the Royal Marine and Army commandos during a six-month UK programme. That training saw the commandos training Ukraine forces in small boat amphibious operations and in conducting beach raids. We have also commenced basic flying training for up to 20 Ukrainian pilots to support the recent decision by Denmark and the Netherlands to donate F-16 jets. That, in addition to the ongoing work from the Royal Navy to train the Ukrainian minesweeping crews, makes the UK the only country on earth that is training soldiers, sailors, aviators and marines—something about which we should be very proud.

[Bob Seely]

My right hon. Friend is making a great speech, and I apologise for interrupting again and thank him for taking the intervention. Apologies if I have missed it, but when it comes to training people, is any thought being given to a Sandhurst package or starting to get junior officers through? One thing that the Royal United Services Institute has identified—it is not necessary to go through a year-long course to do it, but it may help—is the lack of junior officers, and of people with J3 ops experience and of putting together basic plans. That is one point that has been identified, and I was wondering whether my right hon. Friend could answer it.

[James Heappey]

My hon. Friend thinks deeply about the problem, and his observations are absolutely correct. It would be inelegant to reflect on the private conversations that we have with Ukrainian Ministers and defence chiefs, but I think Ukraine is going through exactly the same as any other country that has been fighting a war: it is very hard to strike the balance between keeping its most combat-experienced and battle-hardened on the frontline, in command of tactical situations, and bringing those people rearwards and making them part of the planning or training effort. That can have an exponential impact, but it is a very big opportunity cost to accept.

The UK remains one of the largest bilateral humanitarian donors to Ukraine. At the Ukraine recovery conference in London in June, co-chaired by the UK and Ukraine, we added a further £127 million of humanitarian support to the £220 million we have already provided. This week, we have proscribed the Wagner Group as a terrorism organisation, a further measure of the UK’s commitment to compete with Russian influence wherever in the world it manifests itself. Through our sanctions, we are frustrating Russia’s attempts to prosecute its war and hindering its efforts to resupply. The UK alone has sanctioned over 1,600 individuals and entities since the start of the invasion, including 29 banks with global assets worth £1 trillion, 129 oligarchs with a combined net worth of over £145 billion, and over £20 billion-worth of UK-Russia trade. In June, we introduced legislation to reinforce our approach by enabling sanctions to remain in place until Russia pays for the damage it has caused in Ukraine.

Russia’s failures on the battlefield demonstrate that its much-vaunted and much-feared capabilities are anything but. Russia has been proven to be an unreliable partner, unable or unwilling to satisfy export orders due to outdated and inferior-quality materials, alongside inadequate logistics and equipment care. Moscow is having to prioritise its own forces over its international order book. Potential Russian export customers see clearly the opportunity to diversify their defence supply and seek out the reliable and effective equipment that Britain and others in the west manufacture.

What is true for defence exports is increasingly true for all other exports, too. That matters, because Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine is increasingly costly to him, not just in blood and treasure on the battlefield, but in influence in the international arena. More and more countries in Russia’s near abroad are looking for other friends because they see that Russia cannot be trusted, while countries that have been in the Russian sphere for decades, and depended on it for their defence and security, now realise the need to diversify. That is not just in NATO, where Finland and Sweden have gone through huge strategic shifts: others around the world are doing likewise. The cost to Russia of Putin’s folly will last for decades.

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[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Apologies for my absence earlier, Madam Deputy Speaker, and thank you for your understanding.

Like others here, I spent roughly a week in Ukraine last week, with two and a half days in Kharkiv, Kramatorsk and Konstiantynivka—which was also sadly bombed—followed by two days in Kyiv, along with the co-chair of the APPG, the hon. Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel), to understand the changes on the battlefield, to see what was happening in Ukrainian society and also to understand the Ukrainian way of fighting and how it is evolving, some of the Russian changes and whether there needs to be some tweaking to the support we provide—the training and other things that we can do.

I want to look first at the Ukrainian style of fighting. It is always a pleasure to listen to my right hon. Friend the Minister for Armed Forces and he will probably be interested in this because, as a former serviceman, he was used to the intense tactical battles in Helmand and Sangin, and we are seeing something similar in Ukraine. If a Ukrainian way of war is evolving, it is being formed around creative problem solving and around strongly empowering junior officers because they need to make decisions. There is a real mission command culture, which is radically different from Russia with its intense hierarchy that effectively slows operations down massively.

There is a volunteer culture and an openness about using external support—perhaps unlike the British Army at times, dare I say it—which makes up for the Ukrainian army’s size. The most obvious example of that external support and the volunteer experience is in the use of drones, which is well documented, with commercial drones now being engineered for military work as well. Other examples include patriotic businessmen raising regiments—I have had the pleasure of meeting a few—and the original use of commercial comms kit. When I was in an ops room near Kramatorsk, they were using gaming software to communicate with the frontline, their mortar positions and their drone positions. They had basically taken the commercial gaming software used by the shared gaming sites around the world and were using it in battle. There is very much an emphasis on what works.

There is also a focus, as I am sure the Armed Forces Minister will appreciate, on the tactical battle rather than on large-scale manoeuvres, which cannot be carried out because Ukraine does not have air superiority and its forces are faced with kilometres of mines in front of them. Perhaps most importantly, commanders are having to fight in a very economical style because there is not much kit. Long-range missiles are used sparingly. Even standard 155 shells are fired back at the rate of maybe one for every five or sometimes one for every eight. Russia is still using between 10,000 and 40,000 shells a day, and we really underestimate the scale of resource needed.

This is also about having to conduct assaults while minimising casualties, and it was remarkable how many of the military vehicles we drove past were medical vehicles. It was quite upsetting at times. Having to assault while minimising casualties means that the Ukrainian forces are not assaulting with a traditional 3:1 ratio. They are having to assault effectively while being mindful that the Russians can lose four people for every one the Ukrainians lose. If Putin were given the option of sacrificing another 500,000 Russian lives for 150,000 Ukrainian lives, he would take that, because that would effectively shatter Ukraine’s volunteer army. So there has to be an economical use of force.

The Russians are changing and learning. They are doing it slowly, but we should not delude ourselves that they are not doing it. I would that anyone who wants to know what is going on on a daily basis and to understand the tactics of the war reads the report by Jack Watling from RUSI and the one from the Institute for the Study of War. Jack has said:

“It is also important to recognise that Russian forces are fighting more competently and with reasonable tenacity in the defence”.

That is the critical point. The hon. Member for Leeds North West and I had a conversation with soldiers who they were saying that the Russians were fighting well enough. They were not dismissive of their enemy, because the Russians are dying in place. If they are retreating, it is a controlled retreat. They have a depth of defence that they did not have last September. This is a big argument against tactical or strategic pauses, or indeed negotiations, because every time the Ukrainians stop, the Russians will dig more lines. I see no evidence that a collapse like the one that happened last September in Kharkiv is going to happen again. I wish it would, but there is no evidence.

I spent about 24 hours with a unit called Tsunami, a volunteer unit out of Odesa with additional soldiers from the Luhansk area, which is right over in the east of the country. They are a lovely bunch of people and I am incredibly grateful to them for hosting us. I was in their ops room, 20 km or so from the front. It was a very professional ops room with lots of screens and drone screens, and we were watching a tactical battle as it was taking place in Bakhmut. They were using gaming software, as I said, to connect drone operators with small teams on the ground. In some places in these villages and streets where people are dying in large numbers, as has been happening over the last few months, the soldiers are 50 metres apart. Normally at a British shooting range, we start at 100 metres and go up to maybe 400 metres. On the Ukrainian training grounds, a mile or so out from the frontline, they are practising trench clearance and doing range shooting at 50 metres, because 50 metres is probably what they are going to be up against in and around Bakhmut and other areas of the frontline because those frontlines are so close together.

The command guys in the Tsunami unit had a lot of communication with the teams on the ground to walk their mortars into position. Their drones and the base were communicating using gaming software—there were lots of screens—to strike the Russian position with 120 mm mortars, reducing it to rubble. They were watching for the splash every couple of minutes, adjusting their aim until, unfortunately—well, fortunately, but sadly—they killed the Russian invaders. I take no pleasure in saying it, but huge numbers of Russians are dying, which is a tragedy for them on so many levels. The Russians fought until they were killed. The Ukrainians also took three prisoners that day, one of whom was carrying propaganda cards explaining why they were fighting. An argument is being put for why they are there.

During the 24 hours I was there with that one unit, there was one Ukrainian dead and seven injured. We sat down with the commanders and asked, “How much land have you taken, and what are your casualty rates?” We worked out that a man is dying every 80 metres or so. They are fighting and taking back their country, but every 80 metres, and certainly every 100 metres, on this section of the front a man is giving up his life for that small piece of ground, and that is not including the injured.

One of the improvements in Russian arms is the Lancet drone, which is now made in Russia. Some of us went to see the head of the National Security Council on Saturday afternoon, and it was explained to us that there are 490 bits of kit in that drone, 60 of which are still coming from the United States and the west. Sanctions leakage is still doing damage to the Ukrainian war effort, and it is killing people.

These guys are rotating out every 24 hours, and we went to see them in the house they had rotated out to. When the people we met the day before went back to the frontline, their soft-top vehicle was struck by a Lancet. One of them was killed, one lost his testicles and two others were injured. A price is being paid. There is no war weariness in Ukraine, but nor is there the early rush of adrenalin they had when the initial positions collapsed last September. There is a grim realism that this will potentially be a long war, and that tens of thousands more people will die. Even if we accept a quarter of a million Russian casualties, we have to accept that if Ukrainian casualties go above 50,000 it will have a phenomenal effect on that society.

On the military convoy train that we took back from Kramatorsk, I sat opposite a lovely guy called Volodymyr, who was going back to comfort his wife because his brother-in-law had been killed on the southern front the week before. We know that drones are critical, and the Russians are improving their drones.

I will finish with a few points about how we can maximise our positive influence. The Government are doing a phenomenal amount, on which I congratulate them. I have some mates who are involved in the training, and I was chatting with them the other day. They love training these Ukrainian soldiers, so this is not a complaint but a suggestion for how we can train them a little better. Ministers will know from their experience in Afghanistan that the OPTAGs—the operational training and advisory groups—went out into the theatre and continually tweaked our training. Every time there was a change in the Taliban’s tactics, it would come back very quickly to the training programmes that people attended. I wonder whether we can speed up our learning from the battlefield in the drills we are putting these guys through. I worry that five weeks is not enough, and I know the Armed Forces Minister would say that is what the Ukrainians want and that that is how much time they are giving us, but I wonder whether a week or two extra, with a few more significant exercises built into the programme, could help to keep more of these fantastic guys and girls alive.

Looking at that OPTAG experience, is there more we could do to get drones involved in the training exercises? This is effectively a tactical war of 120 mm mortars and drones, and sometimes big, fat, horrible artillery shells. The problem is that we do not have enough drones in the British Army, and we do not have the commercial drones that could help. If the Armed Forces Minister is minded to do so, I wonder whether we could see how we can speed up our learning from the Ukrainian frontline, in the same way that we did with OPTAG. There is also a question about whether we can further vary some of the special purpose courses we are doing for the special purpose units—I will not say where it is—at one of the bases that is hosting the Ukrainians.

There are a few little tweaks, but the head of the National Security Council also made a wider point to me about the desire for a strategic relationship with the UK. Having listened to the Armed Forces Minister, it is very difficult to argue that we do not have a fantastic strategic relationship, and I am mindful of the fantastic work this Government have done. Indeed, I pay tribute to Boris Johnson. I know he is not popular with some Members, including on the Opposition Front Bench, but he is phenomenally popular in Ukraine, where people still see him as the man who helped to make the difference. Whether the Opposition like it or not, the Ukrainians love us partly because they are very grateful for what Boris did. They want that depth of strategic relationship, and I wonder whether there is more we can do across the board. We have done huge amounts—lots of short-term stuff and some medium-term stuff—but they complain that not enough Ministers come out. They say that Tel Aviv gets bombed more often than Lviv. People can easily get insurance to go to Tel Aviv, but they cannot get insurance to go to Lviv. Is there more we can do on the insurance market? I know we are doing good stuff on the grain convoys, but we are not quite there yet.

The Ukrainians are talking about wanting a greater strategic relationship. They love this country, and they see us as their closest political and military ally, although they know they are getting more kit from the US. I just wonder whether we can formalise that depth of relationship for the benefit of both our nations, not only in the short term but in the medium and long term too.