Bob Seely
Main Page: Bob Seely (Conservative - Isle of Wight)Department Debates - View all Bob Seely's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the situation in Ukraine.
Putin’s unprovoked, illegal war has now entered its third month. Russian forces failed in their initial war aims—they failed to take Kyiv and they have suffered heavy losses—but Ukraine now faces a renewed offensive in the east and south, and we are seeing appalling atrocities in Mariupol, Odesa and beyond. We must double down in our response.
So far, Putin’s planning has been riddled with misconceptions and miscalculations. He was wrong about Ukraine’s strength and determination. We must prove him wrong again in his expectations of our stamina and commitment. Our aim remains clear: Putin must lose in Ukraine and we will do everything that we can to ensure that.
We know that Putin’s ambitions do not stop at Ukraine. I am in constant contact with allies and partners to urge more action. I made the case to NATO and G7 Foreign Ministers earlier this month and in every exchange I have had with my counterparts around the world. Since those meetings, we have seen action in three areas.
First, we are stepping up our lethal aid. The UK has led this effort. We have supplied 6,000 anti-tank weapons and 120 armoured fighting vehicles, as well as ammunition and other weapons. We are helping other countries to deliver equipment by providing logistics support. We are also backfilling third countries’ stocks—for example, by offering to deploy British Challenger 2 tanks to Poland.
We are training Ukrainian troops to use the new equipment, and our allies are stepping up too. For too long there was a false distinction between defensive and offensive weapons. It became an excuse for some to drag their feet. That time has now passed. NATO allies are clear that we are delivering heavy weapons to Ukraine. That is what the Ukrainians need to halt the latest Russian initiative and regain control of their territory.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for the work that she and many other senior Ministers are doing. Does she recognise that one of the key conversations now is about the move to NATO-calibre 155 mm artillery, so that we can match the 152 mm that is being used in the east and the south against cities such as Kharkiv, Odesa and Mykolaiv?
On that point, targeted missiles of the kind we have seen launched at tanks at short range are an answer, but the argument in favour of moving to NATO calibre 155 is that, all things considered—of course shells come in different specifications—it offers slightly longer range. By using longer range, the Ukrainians can stay out of Russian 152 range and target them with their 155s, potentially forcing a change in Russian tactics. There is benefit in moving to NATO calibre as well as in directed missiles.
I do not dispute that at all, but we must remember that Russian artillery has Ukrainian cities to aim at, whereas Ukrainian artillery would only be aiming, presumably, at Russian artillery. That may be the best answer there can be, but I would have thought that some of the more modern, smarter systems such as suicide drones might be a more effective response.
That leads to my final point. When people say, “What does victory look like?”, it is not so much a question of victory over Putin as of showing Putin that, unless he desists from this, he will end up much worse off than if he gives up. What has happened so far is that his troops have paid a price that has not shown commensurate gains—his aircraft similarly, his tanks similarly and his ships similarly—so all he has left is this method of artillery. We want the Russians to think that every time they fire an artillery round, their artillery piece is going to be destroyed. We have a very capable Defence Minister doing the wind-up—I am delighted to see him nodding—and that is my one point that I wish to see addressed, because if we can show Goliath that all his weapons are useless and that we can supply the slingshots, perhaps Goliath will decide that it is better to stay away from the battlefield.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for East Surrey (Claire Coutinho). Much of what she said was, of course, right. There were parts of it with which I did not agree, and we may return to those later, but what she said about the generosity of the public was entirely correct. That is reflected from Surrey to the south side of Glasgow, as Members would expect and, indeed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss)—who is sitting beside me—knows.
Let me start with where I think the Government have got it right. I think they have got it especially right in terms of military support. We hear from President Zelensky that “weapons, weapons, weapons” are what will help him and his people to win this war, and Ukraine winning the war is actually what matters. It is fair to say that the Government have been leading on that front, and the hon. Member for East Surrey can indeed take some pride in the fact that that is recognised by the President and the Government of Ukraine. The official Opposition—together with me, as my party’s defence spokesperson, my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Alyn Smith) as our foreign affairs spokesperson, and indeed the First Minister of Scotland—have been on the same page, along with our leader here at Westminster, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford). Weapons, weapons, weapons are what will help Ukraine to defeat Russia on its territory.
There is a growing mood in Ukraine, a wish not just to push back against the aggression that we have seen from the current wave of the conflict. I have noticed a couple of references to the war having started in February this year, but of course it did not; it started in 2014.
The hon. Gentleman is making a good case about when the war started, but there is another good case for suggesting—given the hybrid, integrated approach to warfare that Russia has in its doctrine—that it started in about 2004 or 2005, after the orange revolution, although the violent and paramilitary aspects became more visible after 2014.
My fellow member of the Foreign Affairs Committee is most learned in these affairs, and I completely agree with everything that he has just said. What we will see, not just in Ukraine but around the western world, is an intensification of those other elements of the Russian warfare doctrine, such as cyber disinformation and the use of private military contractors.