Bob Seely
Main Page: Bob Seely (Conservative - Isle of Wight)Department Debates - View all Bob Seely's debates with the Department for International Trade
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. Friend has made a very good point. The Commonwealth makes up a third of the members of the WTO, and I am determined that we will work with Commonwealth partners not only to reduce tariffs, but to promote the rules-based international system that will benefit all those nations.
As I heard during a recent visit to Stoke-on-Trent, ceramics producers currently face a 28% tariff to export their fantastic crockery to the United States. We export nearly £8 billion worth of cars to the US every year, but, again, we face tariffs. British beef and lamb have been banned from entering the US for more than 20 years. More free trade with our partners, reducing those tariffs and barriers, will play an integral part in our agenda to level up the country.
May I follow up the point that my right hon. Friend has just made, very eloquently? CANZUK—consisting of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and ourselves—has the potential to play a considerable role. What are the Government’s plans to strengthen our CANZUK relationship in respect of trade and free movement, as well as other issues of mutual interest?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. When we entered the EU, those close relationships with allies such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia fundamentally became less close. We have a huge opportunity, as we leave the EU, to build better relationships. We have already named Australia and New Zealand as two of our priority trading partners, and we want to work with Canada, particularly on accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, so that we can build up those strong relationships.
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. She will know about America’s imposition of section 232 to impose tariffs, with the excuse being that its steel industry was necessary for national security. However, I accept that the Government say they want to negotiate a zero-tariff, zero-quota free trade agreement with the EU. We need to do that, and we certainly need to do it for the steel industry, which my hon. Friend represents.
Perhaps those who have the audacity to ask for a plan ought to be prepared to provide suggestions, so in that spirit, let me be clear that the Opposition will champion the United Kingdom as a leader on the world stage that uses its position to tackle injustice and the imminent climate catastrophe. That means that we want to invest in future technologies and next generation industries, foster innovation and grow jobs in the economy, and to do so in a way that helps our trade partners to do the same. We do not see trade as a zero-sum game of winners and losers. We see open and fair trade as a way of increasing global wealth, along with global justice and equality.
At a time of global turmoil and escalating trade wars, it is imperative to have a strategy that ensures that the UK is not helpless against a triple assault: the dumping of subsidised products into our markets, which undercuts our producers; punitive protectionist tariffs imposed upon our exports by our would-be partners; and potential disruption to our trade with the EU, which is still by far our largest trading partner. To that end, our relationship with the European Union must be the priority. We need a free trade agreement that not only protects our existing trade with zero tariffs and zero quotas, but ensures minimum future disruption in both goods and services. We cannot and must not allow a situation to arise whereby our businesses face tariffs on their goods to the EU, alongside onerous and complex administrative burdens, border inspections or delays to the supply chain.
Will the Minister address whether the Government intend to remain part of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation regime? If not, what is their assessment of the impact that that might have on UK industries and of how it might affect third countries with which we have concluded roll-over agreements and that have already included cumulation regimes in their own subsequent treaties? Producers must not be doubly impacted by a surge of cheaper imports from overseas, particularly where they are manufactured to standards lower than our own or in markets that are distorted by unfair or illegal practices.
The Secretary of State knows that she is introducing what has been called the
“weakest trade remedies regime in the world”,
and industry confidence was knocked still further by interim most favoured nation tariff measures that propose to abolish tariffs on up to 87% of imports. The EU and US are introducing safeguard measures that could see tariffs on our exports and increased diversion of dumped goods on to our market, wiping out foundation industries and the thousands of jobs that they account for in steel, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newport East (Jessica Morden) said, in ceramics, which the Secretary of State talked about, and in major producers such as the automotive sector. I ask the Minister of State, Department for International Trade, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Conor Burns), to set out in his reply to the debate out how the Government will protect our manufacturers, producers and farmers from a flurry of such imports under future trade agreements.
The hon. Gentleman tempts me, and I have a great deal of sympathy with his position. I believe that the decision that the Government have reached on Huawei is already a risk too far, so I share that view with him. Of course, he is right to point out that the Chinese Government’s subsidy to Huawei is just as damaging in that sector as subsidies for steel or aluminium.
Future trade agreements could undermine rights and standards, could change the nature of work and the protections offered to workers, such as leave arrangements and parental leave, could reverse environmental protections, and could compromise data privacy and our capacity to regulate in the public interest. Trade agreements could also see our public services being locked into greater privatisation and different pricing models. I say “could” because I am trying to be generous, since Government Members have sought to assure us that no such thing will happen on their watch, but that takes us to the heart of things: if that is so, why are they refusing to allow any degree of scrutiny or engagement in the process?
The trade Bill was supposed to be one of the flagship Bills underpinning global Britain. The Government boasted that it would set out the framework under which future trade agreements would be concluded, but it has been delayed. It has been kicked into the long grass. In fact, it actually came out of its eighth and supposedly final Committee debate two years ago tomorrow. In Committee, we made every effort to legislate for proper democratic oversight of trade agreements. How unreasonable we were! We asked for consultation with industry, a published mandate agreed by Parliament, transparency of agreed texts, scrutiny, debate and positive ratification, but we were blocked.
In the other place, their lordships valiantly reinstated the democratic safeguards and, despite all the Government’s attempts at obfuscation and frustration, their lordships actually managed to introduce significant amendments to the Bill. No wonder it has now languished down the other end of the building for almost a year. In the meantime, the Government have signed a raft of trade agreements—not the 40 originally promised for a minute after midnight on 29 March last year—many of which try to mirror the existing terms of the third-party agreements with the EU. Those trade agreements have been subject to little public scrutiny, with the Government taking advantage of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 process to ratify treaties without giving Parliament the opportunity to debate them.
New Members may be unaware of the vagaries of CRAGA, under which an international treaty is automatically ratified after it has been published and laid before Parliament for 21 sitting days, so long as neither House has resolved against it. How do we resolve against it? The Government have to make time or provide an Opposition day for such a vote, but they have no compulsion to do either. That means Parliament can be presented with a fait accompli—so much for the return of sovereignty. International treaties are possibly the most binding law we pass in this place. They commit our successors in international law and cannot simply be repealed by a future Parliament in the way primary legislation normally can.
Let us examine what is happening under CRAGA. One such agreement currently pending ratification, having been laid before Parliament on 20 December 2019, is the UK-Morocco association agreement, which purports to cover Western Sahara. Western Sahara is categorised as a non self-governing territory under chapter 11 of the UN charter, and it has been under military occupation by Morocco since 1975 after Spain surrendered the colony. The Sahrawi people have been denied the referendum that would allow them to exercise their right to self-determination.
The European Court of Justice has twice ruled, in 2016 and 2018, that Western Sahara is a “separate and distinct” territory from Morocco under international law, and that no agreement with Morocco can be applied to the territory of Western Sahara without the consent of the Sahrawi people. The group internationally recognised as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people has rejected every proposal that the EU’s trade agreement with Morocco should apply to them. In fact, a coalition of 93 Sahrawi civil society groups has confirmed that the people of Western Sahara reject the inclusion of their territory in any agreement concluded by Morocco.
Our own High Court ruled just last year that the territory of Western Sahara is separate from Morocco under international law and that the UK Government are acting unlawfully by failing to distinguish between the territory of Morocco and the occupied territory of Western Sahara.
The proposed UK-Morocco association agreement is thus contrary to international law and our own law, and it should not be ratified by Parliament until all references to Western Sahara are removed. This is what happens when there is no process of prior consultation, mandate-setting, scrutiny, transparency or debate as part of the ratification process.
Other recent treaties that replicate economic partnership agreements concluded between the EU and countries in central and southern Africa, for example, force market liberalisation measures without allowing for any modernisation or incubation capacity for industry in those partner nations. That effectively locks in economic dependency and prevents the broadening of their economic and industrial base, which is essential to achieving their development goals.
The impact on chicken farming in Ghana, Cameroon and Senegal has been well documented. Dumped chicken products from the EU, farmed with subsidy support under the common agricultural policy, have decimated local chicken production, raising genuine food security questions for these least developed countries.
Is this the global Britain that Conservative Members aspire to be: compounding economic hardship, legitimising oppression and actively supporting regimes that flagrantly abuse human rights and international humanitarian law? I do not think so, but it is what will happen unless the Government openly and frankly outline a detailed strategy for global Britain, and unless Parliament is allowed to fulfil its constitutional role of holding the Government to account.
I very much respect what my hon. Friend says. I am just nervous about this, “Oh, we’re terribly unimportant nowadays” argument. We are not a superpower and have not been since the 1950s. China is the new superpower and the United States of America, our closest ally, is a current superpower. But there are a series of great powers underneath that level, including France, Germany and Japan, and rising ones such as Brazil and Indonesia. Arguably, because of our varied and integrated assets—our language and culture, and the military in which my hon. Friend served—we are still a great power, and perhaps the most leading one.
I am not going to argue with my hon. Friend about the semantics, because I agree with him. There is a level below the superpower of which we are most definitely a member.
I firmly believe that our participation in the United Nations really helps us to have influence in the world; and if we get it right, we get it very right. We were a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, which then—75 years ago—was an organisation that reflected the power politics of that time. Now there are 193 members and the United Nations is honestly the world Parliament, albeit a flawed one just as we are flawed here. It is the best we’ve got.
The most important United Nations organ is the Security Council, which consists of five permanent members. As everyone probably knows, they are the United States, Russia, China, France and ourselves. We were all allies in the second world war, and incidentally we are all nuclear-capable. Any one of the permanent members of the Security Council can veto a resolution to prevent its adoption, regardless of the fact that it may have majority support among the 15 members because the Security Council includes 10 non-permanent members, with five being elected each year to serve for a two-year period.
Critics quite rightly say, “Things have moved on. You’re looking at something that was relevant in 1945 and things have a hugely changed since then.” They are right. In a way, the United Nations is stuck in the past. The way it is set up is. Many people say—and my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) just implied this—that states such as Japan, Germany, India and Brazil, and perhaps the European Union in the round, should be permanent members. Others say that France and the United Kingdom should not. Actually, they have a point—we must accept that—but may I just examine it and tease it out a bit? In terms of GDP contribution to the world, the United States is at 24%, China is at about 16%, Japan is at 5%, and then Germany and India at 4%. The UK and France are next, at 3%, followed by Italy, Brazil and Canada, at 2%. Interestingly, Russia is at less than 2%. Thus we hear the odd phrase that Russia’s economy is smaller than Italy’s—that is where it comes from. Using such measures, and assuming that the Security Council continues to have only five permanent members, they will be the United States, China, Japan, Germany and India. The UK and France would be out, and so too would Russia.
But in truth there is no real mechanism for change in the United Nations, and I do not think there is much appetite for it either. Trying to change that sort of organisation would be incredibly difficult. For instance, it would require the agreement of all five current permanent members—in other words, they would be volunteering for redundancy. I do not see that happening, and I am not sure whether the world would want it to happen. So, for the foreseeable future, the United Kingdom will remain a permanent member of the Security Council. That is really good news for us, as global Britain—great news. It provides us with a platform, and we do not have to pay too much for it because we use our reputation. Our reputation in the world is huge, regardless of fact that we have lesser and lesser defence forces. I have had direct contact with that myself, as I once rang the Security Council from the field, and when I said I was British, that got me through pretty quickly. We have a very good reputation in the Security Council, and the General Assembly as well.
Let me comment particularly on British involvement in UN peacekeeping, which, of course, the Security Council authorises. No United Nations operation can take place without being sanctioned by the Security Council, and we, as a permanent member, have a veto on that. I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West back in his seat. I am sure he missed my slight dig at the Royal Green Jackets, so I want to get it in again now he is back—but he can read it later. For peacekeeping, there are three practical ways in which we contribute in the Security Council: first, by helping to provide the mandate, then by funding the forces, and then by contributing forces. Overall, the United Kingdom contributes nearly 7% of the UN’s budget for peacekeeping. That is more than we have to, but we still do pretty well because it is considerably more than our world GDP percentage.
I am glad to see that the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), is now in his place, because I am about to give him a bit of a hand, as he is a good friend. It was a good idea for him to attend and perfect that he has just arrived. From hints put out by the Government over the last weeks, I gather that they intend to put more effort into UN peacemaking and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. That is really good news—I am totally up for that. In fact, as part of our defence review, I am up for the idea of earmarking part of our armed forces to be sent to the United Nations when there is a requirement and we agree it. I like the idea of a battle group that is UN-designated.
I accept that the United Nations is not perfect, but it is well worth having, and honestly, it is all we have got. Every recognised state in the world—all 193 of them—is a member, and each has a seat in the General Assembly, as do we. Of course, the UK may not like some of the resolutions and debates in the General Assembly, but there is no doubt that it is the best forum—indeed, the only one—for gauging world opinion. Condemnation within the forum of the world is never welcomed by any country.
I have concentrated on one part of global Britain, but that is because I wanted to, because I believe that the United Nations is so important. The United Nations is a crucial part of keeping and improving our international influence. We are doing well now—we are not doing badly—but if we put more effort into it, we could get much more back. Our permanent seat on the Security Council is incredibly valuable, because that is where legally binding international mandates are designed, and through our own arguments, with our good Foreign Office officials and our good Ministers, such as the hon. Member for—where is it?
The hon. Member makes a good point. As a former consul and diplomat, it is hard for me to argue against additional resources for the Foreign Office. I would say that the figures she mentions I think relate to a reduction in the numbers of British diplomats deployed overseas, but during that time there has also been a considerable growth in the numbers of locally employed members of high commissions and embassies. There is a balance there, and local knowledge is incredibly useful as well. She is right, however, and I did say earlier that I hope the Budget will see a boost for all Departments that can deliver global Britain.
It is not just as the United Kingdom that we have an overall aggregate global role. If we look at every constituency in the country, there are huge links between our businesses, or indeed our hospitals, and overseas organisations. In my constituency of Gloucester alone, we export to China alone valves for the oil and gas sector, the cylinders that go into every Dyson vacuum cleaner, marine engines and the landing gear for every Airbus—and we export tea to China. That story of engagement is replicated across the towns and cities of the entire United Kingdom.
I want to make a point about pay and conditions. We produced a “Global Britain” study last year, and one of the things that surprised me is that ambassadors do not always have line management of all staff in embassies, so if people are from DFID or the MOD, it is more difficult for them to fall under a cohesive and integrated approach to management. People were also on different salaries for doing the same job, very often to the detriment of the Foreign Office. It would be very good if, in the foreign and defence review, these things were ironed out, because it would be an encouragement to folks in the Foreign Office and actually valuable for them.
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. All I would say at this point is that the most important thing for us overseas is to have one HMG—one presence of Her Majesty’s Government’s representatives—and the boss should always be the ambassador or the high commissioner, regardless of which home Departments individuals in that embassy or high commission originally came from.
That is part of the projection of our values, and our role in and our contribution to the world, which we do need to look at as we move forward: very much part of Europe, but no longer a member of the European Union; very much part of the international rules-based order, which we played such a large part in establishing; and an outward-looking, independent nation—working in partnership with many others and many organisations, but making our own decisions in the best interests of the United Kingdom and in line with our values. Contrary to what one or two Opposition Members said earlier, those actually are valuable and are precious to the world. Those of us who have been a Prime Minister’s trade envoy will have experienced that across the world.
That means working closely with our neighbours, especially on security issues and European borders, and constraining Russian expansionism. That is our traditional role in maintaining the balance of power on our continent. It also means taking different views where we need to, and the same will be true of our relationship with today’s superpowers, the United States and China. We will be making decisions, whether on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 5G telecoms, or free trade agreements, that are right for the United Kingdom.
For the past few years, the Labour party has appeared to be against business, international trade, defence and security, and against so many countries who are close allies. It has never spoken up for the global opportunities, and largely sees only corruption and villains. Unlike that, we believe in the huge opportunities and benefits to this nation from manufacturing as well as services, and from apprentices in both. We believe in creativity, and in opportunities to export our education, satellites and pharmaceuticals. That, I believe, is the opportunity that lies ahead.
We will need some changes to help bring that alive, so perhaps I can make a few recommendations to which the Minister can respond. We need a Foreign Secretary who has overall responsibility for £12 billion of development, as well as for diplomacy. We need the Departments for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and for International Trade to work more closely together, and with MPs, to hold “Global Britain” exporting seminars in every constituency across the land. We must focus on attracting key foreign technology investors and capital, and I welcome the Government’s decision on visas for scientists. We must continue to lead in aerospace and digital businesses, and I welcome the commitment to working with our Five Eyes partners on telecoms alternative technologies.
Above all—you would expect me to say this, Madam Deputy Speaker—we must look more closely at what we can do with Asia, and at opportunities for closer engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the possibility of acceding to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the opportunities for working more closely with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, our Commonwealth partners, on defence, training and preparations. We must help nations with their cyber and finance requirements, and create huge numbers of jobs in those nations through our own expertise. One British insurer alone has 275,000 agents working in Indonesia. Those are franchises and independent, small Indonesian businesses. Those are the opportunities for us. We can take them forward and be a great power for good. We can make global Britain a real strategy.
It is a pleasure, as ever, to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), and I will be following up on some of his points. [Interruption.] Is he right honourable?
It is a matter of time. I thank my hon. Friend.
There has been much talk about global Britain, and last year I and others published “Global Britain: A Twenty-First Century Vision”, which I circulated to many MPs this week. Unfortunately, I came third in a tight field of three in the race to be Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, but I hope that was a comment on me, rather than on my work, which I hope is still useful.
That study contained 20 ideas, one or two of which have been mentioned by other hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), who spoke about the importance of the United Nations. The United Kingdom has arguably been the world’s greatest nation at developing alliances throughout our history. Indeed, we would not have done so well in the last two world wars if those alliances had not been in place. Whether NATO, our close relationship with Europe now that we are not part of the European Union, or CANZUK, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Paul Bristow) eloquently referred, there is a wealth of alliances that we could be building. The victor in the Foreign Affairs Committee race, my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), spoke about partnerships with middle-ranging powers, or with great powers such as Korea and Japan, which are important.
On soft influence, when my hon. Friend and I, and other hon. Members, go abroad, perhaps in uniform, we are very well received in large parts of the world. One very important instrument for our soft influence is using our military academies to educate people, particularly from the middle east, but anywhere—for example, Kazakhstan.
Absolutely. In my very brief time at Sandhurst, I saw people who were there from foreign powers. That is a very important form of soft influence, along with our universities and higher colleges. In Shrivenham, there are many international students, especially in the higher courses. I thank my hon. Friend for making that point.
I want to add one thing to the debate about the necessity for strategy. Despite having a wealth of think-tanks that study strategy, I am not sure we have done it well enough in the past few decades. We have been too tied to the United States for its concept of strategic hard power, much of which we might agree with, and too tied to the European Union for our definition of soft power, through trade and so on. A global Britain would give us the chance to develop our own idea of how to combine hard and soft power when it comes to trade negotiations, the export of values, about which my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester spoke, and many other elements.
Many Members have spoken about the rules-based order, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) and the hon. Member for Putney (Fleur Anderson). There are now considerable threats to the rules-based order, not only from the rise of Russian authoritarianism but potentially from the rise of China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist party. I may well differ with my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester on some of these matters. I think he see many opportunities and some threats. I see many opportunities, but also many threats. We have to understand much better not only how we ourselves can project an integrated power, but how others are projecting an integrated power to us.
Is not one key element in this discussion, which does not get much political oversight, how China operates in different universities and the academic sector, not just here in the United Kingdom but throughout the western world? Could that not do with a bit more—oversight is maybe the wrong word—political and Government attention?
I very much agree, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point. The Foreign Affairs Committee covered China’s role in universities in this country, but we need an understanding of how we use integrated strategy and how people use that strategy against us. For example, I suggested in the “Global Britain” study that we should think about rolling the Department for International Development and the Department for International Trade, as agencies, into the Foreign Office. People who prioritise DFID think that that cannot possibly be done, but we can still have the 0.7% and a significant aim for aid, while having those Departments as agencies within the Foreign Office to have greater integration between the different elements of power that one has at one’s disposal. That is just a suggestion. I am not saying that one should do it, but I think we need to think freely about the options we have. One would not want to copy Russian power, because it is very often used unethically and immorally, but its notion of integration is very important.
I want to say a few words about Huawei. I know I have, with my role as a Parliamentary Private Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, bent the rules slightly. I am very grateful to the Whips for their generosity in allowing me to talk about this issue in the past week or so. It falls under the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, but I have been talking to them extensively to make sure they are not too disappointed in my actions.
Huawei is probably the major strategic goal of China in the UK and Europe over the next five to 10 years. By that, what I mean is that China’s strategic goal, with its Made in China 2025 and Digital Belt and Road initiatives, is to become dominant in the cyber space. That presents potential opportunities, but also very significant threats. I am concerned that in the past 15 years, Huawei, which is an arm of the Chinese state—let us be under no illusion about that—has built up a potentially dominant position in many countries. That presents significant problems and threats to us, and I would just like to rehearse some of the arguments. I do so in part because this will come back and be a focus of discussion here, certainly for the next month or six weeks as the Government seek to put through secondary, and potentially primary, legislation.
First, there is a claim that Huawei is a private firm. In no meaningful sense is that correct, as we would understand it. The company is 99% owned by a Chinese trade union, and Chinese trade unions are part of the one-party state. To follow up on what the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald) said, I think we need a better understanding of non-democratic systems. We tend to assume that the rest of the world is a little bit like us in different ways. I lived in a one-party state, the Soviet Union, before its collapse, and I am glad I did. One-party states are functionally different. For us, the rule of law is given the highest rank. In one-party states, the rule of the party is given the highest rank, and the rule of law is ranked somewhat lower. So party comes before law in such countries, in a way that it simply does not in democratic states. That goes to the heart of the question of being a non-trusted vendor and a high-risk vendor. I will develop that argument in a minute, if I may, although I will be conscious and respectful of Members’ time.
Huawei is not a private firm; it is 99% owned by a trade union, and trade unions are part of the Chinese state. Considering that previous Secretaries of State have described Huawei as a private company, is the UK Government’s position that they believe Huawei to be a private firm, or do they accept that it is part and parcel of the Chinese state? I will probably write a letter to the various Secretaries of State to follow that up, because I think it is important.
My second point is about the idea that we can limit Huawei to the periphery of the network. That is key to Government plans, and I think it is highly questionable. The Government say that there is a way of managing the risk through network design, but many other countries say that that cannot be done. Mike Burgess, the director general of Australia’s version of GCHQ, said that
“the distinction between core and edge collapses in 5G networks. That means that a potential threat anywhere in the network will be a threat to the whole network”.
I will quote some other experts whom I have talked to. One told me:
“Basic cybersecurity principles tell you that one vulnerability or weakness in the system threatens the entirety of the system.”
I would like to know whether the Government think we can build out threat in our network design.
As regards the core versus edge arguments, many experts argue that proposed solutions based on segmentation between functions are
“yesterday’s perspective on tomorrow’s problem.”
Such experts argue that it is not possible to segment 5G as we could with 3G and 4G, because some of the core functions will be pushed to the edge. As the architecture moves on, those core functions will be stretched across the network via virtualisation and intensification of active features of radio access network equipment. Another expert said:
“Many…core functions have to move close to the edge in order for 5G to offer the benefits it does”—
that is, latency and speed.
I was reading an article in The Strategist, a magazine put together by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The article was written by one of the magazine’s cyber experts who formerly worked at Australia’s version of GCHQ, and who said:
“I was part of the team in the Australian Signals Directorate that tried to design a suite of cybersecurity controls that would give the government confidence that hostile intelligence services could not leverage their national vendors”—
Huawei—
“to gain access to our 5G networks. We developed pages of cybersecurity mitigation measures to see if it was possible to prevent a sophisticated state actor from accessing our networks through a vendor. But we failed.”
I cannot believe that I am agreeing with the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone), but his assessment is right. What the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) has just described is the Government willingly bringing us a digital Dunkirk.
Let me be fair to this Government. They have not been in power for long and we have had 15 years of Huawei effectively coming into our country by subterfuge. I think there is a role for foreign lobbying, but it is doing damage and we need a foreign lobbying Act, which I hope to work on. To be fair to this and the previous Government, their telecoms review at least tries to bring order to something that has been driven by a price-dumping strategy. I will come on to that later. I want to make progress so that I do not talk for any more than another five minutes.
My hon. Friend poses a bigger-picture question about the role of democracy in today’s world and the threat from authoritarian regimes. Does he agree with me—I should declare an interest as chairman of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy—that we need to create a democracy fund that spends more money and uses our influence more effectively in encouraging and helping nations that, like us, have difficulties in making sure that democracy is working as well as it possibly can?
That is an excellent idea, because we are a values leader in this world. I do not at all negate the role of soft power; I just think we need to get the integration of hard and soft power right.
I will crack on. I would like to know from the Government what our network architecture is likely to look like. How can we think about how edge and core functions will work in our 5G in five or 10 years’ time? Moreover, if we were red-teaming this, we would need to ask how non-trusted, high-risk vendors could manipulate future network design. If there is a realistic chance of them being able to do so, that would be potentially damaging.
We have been told that a non-spy agreement with China is feasible. It is not. Huawei has offered one. Article 7 of China’s national intelligence law states:
“All organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with the law”.
That is pretty cut and dried. How will this Government guarantee the security of networks when non-British passport holders have access to them, given the nature of the Chinese state and Chinese law? This is not about being anti-Chinese; it is about questioning the role of the Chinese Communist party and the one-party state.
I question the claim that the security services are happy, and not only because Sir Richard Dearlove wrote the foreword to our report on Huawei a few months ago. I think there are ways of phrasing things to get the answers one wants from the security services. Much as I respect the National Cyber Security Centre, I am concerned about some of the advice it is giving, only because I hear very impressive people in different positions saying different things and I do not believe it is possible to give certainty for five and 10 years ahead. By building a 5G network now, we are effectively committing to allowing the Chinese state to introduce 6G and 7G in 10, 20 or 30 years’ time.
We are told that this enables market provision. It does not. Huawei came to power by, in effect, stealing the intellectual property of Nortel, a Canadian company, leading to its collapse. Considerable allegations have been made. In future weeks we might hear more—who knows?—about the nature of the deals that Huawei strikes with western telcos and about accusations of price dumping and other things. More generally, Huawei is funded by the China Development Bank, to the tune of $10 billion in loans and a further $100 billion in credit lines, which means that it can simply undercut any commercial fair price offered by a western telco. That puts permanent pressure on Samsung, Fujitsu, Nokia and Ericsson.
About 10 years ago, Huawei had 5% of the market. Now, China collectively has about 40% of the market. On the current trajectory, in 10 or 20 years’ time there will be no market apart from that dominated by ZTE and Huawei, and Nokia and Ericsson will go the same way as companies such as Nortel, about which we no longer hear. That is cause for concern. It is simply a myth that this enables market provision. Indeed, it limits it.
We are told that there are no alternatives, but yes, there are. There would be short-term delays and additional cost—there is no question about that—but this is a question of balance. I look forward to having a grown-up discussion when the Bill comes before the House.
I will not dwell on the human rights argument—I want to be respectful of people’s time—apart from saying that there have been allegations from ASPI and others that Huawei has worked on the oppressive surveillance kit in Xinjiang province.
Next, it is claimed that the quality of Huawei’s work is high. Well, the Huawei Cell says that the coding is sloppy. Indeed, Infinite State, a tech company based in the United States, found sloppiness in Huawei’s source code after analysing 1.5 million files, but also said that on multiple occasions Huawei coders had disguised unsafe functions, and that too concerns me.
In general, I question the reassurances that we have been given. What positive action can we take? If I were suggesting stuff to a Government whom I strongly support, what would I say? First, we need public debate. Australia had nearly a year of public debate about this, because it raises significant issues such as data privacy, human rights and our attitude to human rights abusers abroad, and whether the Magnitsky Act could apply to Huawei if it is used to supply oppressive equipment in other parts of the world.
There are significant practical, economic and moral implications that have simply not been discussed. We have been getting it wrong for about 15 years, and our answer is “We have got it wrong, so let us just brush it under the carpet.” Huawei is hiring the great and good for its board, and a former senior Government information officer is oiling Whitehall to make it safe for Huawei. All those points raise significant ethical, political and economic questions.
We could try separating Huawei in the same way that BAE Systems in the United States is an entirely different company from BAE Systems here. We have not done that. Why not? A public inquiry into how we have messed this up so badly might also be a good idea. My preferred option, however—and I would love the Government to consider it—is an international conference to agree trusted vendor status for the free states of the world, the liberal democracies, so that they could have trust in the future building of a critical national infrastructure. Machine-to-machine communication through 5G will revolutionise and become the core of our communication society.
Finally, we need a foreign lobbying Act. We know that Huawei’s lobbying operation in this country is very well funded and very extensive, but apart from that we know little about it. I think that, for the purpose of good government and, indeed, leaving the European Union—I keep reminding myself that we are doing that tomorrow, which is wonderful—we need more transparency, not less, and we need more accountability, not less. That is one of the reasons why I chose to vote to leave the European Union.