Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

The future of European security will be enhanced by military capability, interoperability and co-operation; it will not be enhanced by an unnecessary duplication of military headquarters. What more can we do to convince our European colleagues that that is not a sensible proposal, particularly at a time when defence budgets are falling across the continent?

[Dr Fox]

The Government oppose, and I have always very strongly opposed, any concept of an EU military headquarters—and we will continue to do so, whether any proposal is made up-front or attempted with permanent structured co-operation through the Lisbon treaty. NATO is the cornerstone of defence in Europe, and it shall continue to be so, because it brings the United States into the defence of Europe. Such a concept would be a diversion, as the right hon. Gentleman says, and a dilution of scarce resources; it would not produce one bullet, one battle tank or one aircraft; it would be pretentious; and it would be bureaucratic—none of which commends it to me.

Baha Mousa Inquiry

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Thursday 8th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I am very grateful to the shadow Secretary of State for his response and for the way in which he phrased it. He is quite right that the report in no way reflects on the general behaviour of our armed forces; indeed, the whole reason why we are discussing this case is that it was a shocking deviation from the normal standards of behaviour that we have seen from our armed forces. He is correct that a number of individuals are still serving. We are looking at the evidence in detail—it is obviously a very large report—and as I have said, the chain of command is looking at how those individuals still in the armed forces might be treated, although I expect a number of suspensions today.

The right hon. Gentleman raised a number of issues about the harsh approach to questioning and why we should adopt it. First, I should say to the House that the so-called harsh approach involves a short burst of shouting—defined as a short, sharp shock—to bring a captured person back to the realisation of their situation. It is not a violent technique, but it has produced information that has led to both civilian and military lives being saved. To deprive our armed forces of techniques that can make them safer and protect the population both here and abroad would be wrong.

The right hon. Gentleman asked whether we needed a change to the law in respect of the five techniques that were outlawed by the Heath Government back in 1972. My understanding is that we do not—they are absolutely banned, as is currently made clear in training—but I will look to see whether doing that would reinforce the position and whether our legal experts believe it to be necessary.

As for the right hon. Gentleman’s point about exemptions from prosecution based on evidence, let me be clear that there was an exemption from prosecution based on an individual’s own evidence, not an exemption from prosecution based on the evidence of others that came out in the inquiry. Both military and civilian prosecuting authorities will be looking closely at the evidence to see whether it is possible to bring more of those involved to justice.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for the content of his statement and for the tone in which he delivered it. I agree completely with what he said, including his reticence about the banning of non-physical harsh methodology. This incident was a dreadful stain on our very fine armed forces, and I welcome his comments about the continued efforts to pursue those who still evade responsibility for their appalling behaviour.

There are two areas that I want to ask the Secretary of State about. As with the Aitken report, this incident has again exposed the problems with corporate memory, which has come up in other areas, such as the loss of the Hercules and the coroner’s inquiry into that. What ongoing work, as I know that some work has been done, is the right hon. Gentleman doing to try to improve—no organisation can be perfect—this issue of corporate memory in the Ministry of Defence? What are he and his Ministers doing to continue to show an interest in detention facilities? No matter what rules and regulations are in force, if the top of the chain of command and Ministers themselves are not constantly vigilant in overseeing from the top the methods being used, the facilities provided and how they are being run, there will be lapses. Are the right hon. Gentleman and his Ministers continuing to be vigilant in respect of our facilities and how they are being used in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

[Dr Fox]

The answer to the final question is emphatically yes. The Minister for the Armed Forces and I have recently inspected detention facilities in Afghanistan. We also have a rigorous system of reporting in place where every allegation is reported, recorded and investigated, which is a huge difference from what happened back in 2003. If I may say so, the Ministry of Defence strategic detention policy that the right hon. Gentleman published when he was Secretary of State is one of the ways in which we are codifying policy to ensure that corporate memory is not lost. The procedures for improvements in training, the very clear delineation of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable and the writing down of these training materials are the means by which, I hope, these dreadful and almost unbelievable lapses in corporate memory will not be allowed to happen again.

Defence Transformation

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 18th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I would like to say that I am rat-proof, but that would probably be tempting fate. We have set out a path that we will clearly follow, from the defence reform set out by Lord Levene, through the basing review, which we have set out today, and through the reserves review and the extra investment that goes with that. It is correct that some of that will have to proceed quickly, but it is also correct that some of it can occur only if other steps are met. For example, the assumptions we make about Future Force 2020 and the size of the regular reserve ratio will depend on two things: that we ensure that the training and equipping of the reserves goes to the plan I have set out, and that we withdraw from Afghanistan in the time scale the Prime Minister has set out.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

Will the Secretary of State not even acknowledge—these words have not crossed his lips—that his announcement today effectively brings the cuts in the regular Army to in excess of 17,000? That comes on top of the cuts he has announced to the RAF and the Navy, and on top of the cuts he has announced to the Royal Marines, because no Minister has been prepared to acknowledge that not only has 19 Light Brigade been disbanded, but so too has 3 Commando Brigade. The Secretary of State is telling the House that we cannot afford—[Interruption.] Well, if Ministers are going to tell us that 3 Commando Brigade still exists, I want the Secretary of State to stand up and say that, because it does not—and if the Minister for the Armed Forces does not even know that, he should not be in his job. Members on both sides of the House worry that it is not the strength that we cannot afford, but it is the weakness that we potentially cannot afford, and we have not had any debate about this massive demise in our military capability. The strategic defence and security review did not provide such a debate, but we surely need it now.

[Dr Fox]

It defies belief that senior former Ministers of the previous Government can still come to this House and demand that we spend money that is not there. The right hon. Gentleman complains about cuts, but I have to point out to him that we have had to introduce cuts right across public spending because the previous Government left us with a £158 billion annual deficit, and what he calls the equipment programme was no more than a wish list at the MOD; there was no money in the pipeline for it. The programmes I have announced today—the 14 Chinooks, for example—I have been able to announce because there is real money there; they were never able to make such announcements because of their incompetent management of both the Department and the economy.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 4th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

It will depend on the situation on the ground and how benign the environment is. At the moment we do not envisage the need for another UN resolution, and we believe that the orderly handover to the UN and a new Libyan authority should be possible without one. Of course, that is constantly kept under review by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

Although it is understandable that the Secretary of State might be a little reticent, it is worrying that he says it is too early for planning. The situation in Libya could go on for some time yet, but equally the forces of the uprising could be in Tripoli at any time. Is he seriously suggesting that we still have to wait to plan for the conflict’s aftermath? I do not think it is going to be like what happened in Tunisia—it will be a lot more difficult than that, and somebody will have to provide some support.

[Dr Fox]

A great deal of planning, looking at a range of scenarios, is being undertaken by the National Security Council and across Whitehall Departments, and a range of important discussions are being held with our allies, not least at the large gathering of military leaders in London last week. We could well see the collapse of the Libyan regime over a short period, but it could take some considerable time yet. I am afraid that I think it is unlikely that the opposition forces will enter Tripoli in the near future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

I had a chance to visit Leuchars recently to thank those who carry out those duties on our behalf. My right hon. and learned Friend raises an important point. Those in the Scottish National party in the Scottish Government who pretend that they can enjoy both the security of the Crown forces and the luxury of talking about leaving NATO leave a lot to be desired intellectually.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

What is the status of the Chinook helicopter order?

Defence Reform

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

Whether or not the Treasury is delighted by the proposals that I have put forward, it has certainly given its agreement. Therefore, the spirit in which it has done so is not really my concern.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Secretary of State and Lord Levene, and I welcome the broad thrust of what is proposed. The Green Paper that we produced in the winter of 2009-10 flagged up the need for a joint command of the type that will now be introduced, and it is the right thing to do. How real and how deep will that jointery be? It is no good if it is not real and people’s allegiances belong entirely and exclusively to the single services.

The other thing that is needed is transparency. How can we have the kind of reforms that will be necessary in order to put the Ministry of Defence where it needs to be if we do not have transparency? The Secretary of State effectively abolished 3 Commando Brigade without ever admitting having done so. How can we introduce real transparency?

[Dr Fox]

One of the reasons why I was keen that we should have the Joint Forces Command with its own four-star at the top was that I believe that people who are involved in defence at any level—in logistics, in ISTAR, in defence intelligence or in defence medical—should have a chance to rise to the top of the tree, if they have the talents to do so. I want to create a fourth pillar precisely to create a more meritocratic structure. That will be much more transparent than what we had before, because we will not be able to have the stovepiping that gives primary allegiance to single services rather than defence as a whole.

Nuclear Deterrent

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Wednesday 18th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I have always thought that our independence of mind was why we were sent to the House of Commons in the first place, but perhaps I was mistaken. Because of the nature of the content of the report, most of it will remain unpublished, but I will consider whether its conclusions might be published without in any way prejudicing the security of the project itself. As I have just outlined, the Government are committed to the replacement of the Trident system, and the spend will go ahead through the rest of this Parliament.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

On costs, does the Secretary of State accept that since the election two things, effectively, have gone on? Savings have been made as a result of the joint missile compartment and the reduction in the number of warheads, but those savings have been completely wiped out by the political decision demanded by the Liberal Democrats to extend the procurement period beyond the next election. I would have thought that those political decisions have led to costs approaching £2.5 billion, if one takes into account the necessity to build an additional Astute class submarine just to keep Barrow going. One might think that in the circumstances faced by the Secretary of State this might not have been his priority, what with all the other cuts he was making and the additional maintenance round that will now be needed for the existing fleet. How much more additional cost will there be as a result of the separate review? In a Department in which we are bearing down on manpower and reducing the skills available, we are now applying the skill base to an ongoing, second round assessment and review.

[Dr Fox]

The costs of the alternatives review are met from existing departmental budgets and no additional costs will be associated with it. As I have said, when we take into account the different developments, including the fact that we have taken costs out of the missile compartment, as the right hon. Gentleman correctly says, and have reassessed the infrastructure required, we believe that there has been no additional net cost to the programme on the 2006 prices.

Armed Forces Covenant

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

My right hon. Friend raises an important point, which we have grappled with in our approach to the covenant. The reason why equipment is not in the military covenant today is that the covenant for the welfare of our personnel involves a pact not just between the Government and the armed forces but between the whole nation and the armed forces. That includes local government, communities, charities and private individuals. The provision of the right equipment for our armed forces is a duty of the Government, and it should primarily be seen as the duty of the Government rather than of the wider national community. It is the Government who should properly be held to account for that.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State’s congratulations to the Royal British Legion are well deserved, because it was its campaign more than anything else that forced this most welcome retreat by the Government. He will know that what wound the Royal British Legion up more than anything else was the attempt to water down the involvement of the reference group in the monitoring system set up under the Command Paper on service personnel. He appears to be saying that that is now to be restored, and that that role will be fully implemented in the proposed reporting mechanism. Can he confirm that there is to be no watering down of the involvement of the reference group—the stakeholders and the service personnel charities, including the Royal British Legion itself—in the ongoing reporting on the covenant?

[Dr Fox]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for asking for clarification on that point, and I can give him this assurance, which, as he knows, I have given the House on a number of occasions. I have wanted to see a maximising of transparency on this, and I have therefore decided that the external reference group will be able to see the Secretary of State’s report in advance and comment on it, and that we will publish those comments and any other representations at the same time as we publish the report of the covenant to Parliament.

Armed Forces (Redundancies)

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Wednesday 2nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

The review of reserves continues, looking at the financial and capability implications and the wider footprint. It is not directly affected by the results, but on implementation, we would of course have to take into account the shape of the armed forces resulting from the SDSR decisions.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State is trying to tell us that all the decisions spring from his strategic defence review—but is that true? He did not tell us about the cuts to the Tornado when he cut the Harrier. When the Prime Minister told us that he would protect the infantry, he did not tell us that he would cut the Royal Marines. The Secretary of State, many other Members and I know that decisions are still being made on further cuts in the Ministry of Defence. He criticised us for not having a strategic defence review, but it is becoming increasingly apparent that we still have not had one. He must open up the decision and take some proper, publicly accountable strategic decisions about the shape of our armed forces.

[Dr Fox]

If I may correct one minor inaccuracy, I said that we had decided to cut 17,000 jobs in the armed forces. In fact, the work that the armed forces carried out means that the figure is considerably smaller. Instead of 7,000, it is 5,000 for the Army; instead of 5,000, it is 3,300 for the Navy.

Of course, the budgetary pressures continue. As any Labour politician knows, the previous Government left Ministry of Defence finances in an absolute shambles. The problem will not be tackled overnight.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 31st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

That is an ongoing and progressing relationship. I point my hon. Friend to one particularly successful project—the police training taking place in Helmand. Those involved in that project throughout the country would recognise that what the British armed forces are doing is very possibly and very probably the leading project of that kind. If we can not only continue with what we are doing but export it as best practice to others, we will be making a doubly important contribution.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

Gains that are clearly being made by our armed forces at an operational level will be undermined if we do not get things right at the strategic level. The growing of the Afghan national security forces and the attacks being made on the Taliban leadership will not be enough on their own: what is being done to pump some life into the reconciliation process? Surely we need to get that strand of work up and running and get the Americans committed to it before the 2014-15 deadline.

[Dr Fox]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct. It has always been the case that there could not be a political settlement without a military settlement and vice versa. We now have quite large military gains on the ground, as he says, but he is quite correct that those gains cannot be maintained unless we get an acceleration in the pace of the political programme. There are gains being made at national and local level but they are neither widespread nor deep enough. We need to ensure that throughout this year we push the Government of Afghanistan to understand that we need to make progress now, while we have a reasonable following wind, because this is the crucial time to be able to get the gain on the ground that will make what we are trying to achieve sustainable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

As I mentioned earlier, the House will be aware that there is one great threat to global non-proliferation: the ambitions of Iran. There is no more important policy for long-term security and for the maintenance of the non-proliferation treaty than ensuring that Iran, although it may have access to civil nuclear capabilities, does not become a nuclear weapons state. I do not think that I could have ended on a clearer note.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

Why, when the Prime Minister said there would be no cuts in infantry capability while we were on a combat mission in Afghanistan, is the strength of the Royal Marines being cut?

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 10th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

The Government are certainly considering better cross-departmental working on these issues. To be fair to the previous Government, they did begin some of this work to see how there could be better co-ordination across Whitehall. We have a number of pieces of work under way, not least from my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), looking at how we can better co-ordinate what is happening in health and social services, for example, with what the Ministry of Defence intends to do. The hon. Gentleman is proposing the same end as that which we seek, but the means by which we achieve it may be open to some debate between us.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State will be aware that the Royal British Legion has written to some, if not all, Members about its concerns about the process he is putting in place. When we undertook the service personnel Command Paper, we were anxious not only to improve the relationship between the armed forces and different Government Departments, but to put in place a mechanism that made sure that that did not fall into disrepair and that the situation was independently updated. The RBL is worried that the mechanism the Secretary of State is proposing effectively takes over from that, and does away with the independent reporting mechanism brought in by the Command Paper for the reference group to report on an annual and a five-yearly basis on the need for improvements to what we might call the covenant. Will the Secretary of State respond to that, because it is of concern to the British Legion as well as to me?

[Dr Fox]

I believe the concerns set out in the letter from the British Legion that all Members will have received are unfounded. We intend to build on that independence in respect of the external reference group, and I will be happy to discuss exactly how that will feed into the new process with the British Legion throughout the passage of the legislation. We all want the same thing: we all want there to be proper scrutiny of what Government, across the whole of government, do in terms of our service personnel. I hope we can maintain that independent element, and we can discuss with the British Legion how that feeds into the report that will ultimately come to this House. I am very open-minded about how we do that, but I do want to maintain this element of independent reporting so that when the House receives the report from the Secretary of State it is able to access as much information as possible not just from the Government, but externally sourced as well. I think that any belief that seems to have come from the legion on that is misplaced. The Government intend to be as open as possible during the entire process, and will certainly be happy to discuss the matter during subsequent stages of the Bill, and to discuss with the bodies involved how we can best make this happen.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 13th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I am well aware of my hon. Friend’s long-standing interest in Afghanistan and his long-standing difference of opinion with the mainstream. It is not just the UK that believes that the mission is essential. A coalition of some 48 countries in Afghanistan believes, and understands correctly, that we need both to degrade the threat in Afghanistan and to increase the capability of the Afghan Government to provide security if we are to see regional, and indeed global, stability.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

The progress being made by the Afghan security forces is good news, but when I asked the Prime Minister why he decided to announce a deadline so far out from 2015, he replied that one reason was to get away from the pressure for constant, short-term deadlines. He then went to Afghanistan and announced that our troops may well start coming home by 2011. Why is he doing that? What is the purpose of those constant public announcements on the end of the combat mission and the beginning of troops returning home? No one in the House denies that they want to see the troops come home quickly, but everybody is somewhat worried about those public pronouncements.

[Dr Fox]

There was indeed no announcement of any short-term milestone on the way to 2015. In answer to the question of whether British troops might be able to come home in 2011 and reduce their number, the Prime Minister said that that was dependent on conditions on the ground, which is entirely consistent with the Government’s position in the run-up to 2015.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

Quite the reverse. In opposition, we spent considerable time discussing with the French what we would want to do in terms of greater co-operation were we to win the general election. What we saw this week were the fruits of considerable labour on both sides for a considerable time.

It is rational and reasonable simply to want greater co-operation with our biggest military ally in continental Europe. What has been amazing in the last few days is the level of agreement, which seems to have occurred across the political spectrum, that this is not a drastic threat to UK sovereignty, but a common-sense use of both our nations’ resources.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

As the Defence Secretary for the last year of the Labour Government, I remind the right hon. Gentleman that in that year we took £900 million out of the defence budget, rather than increase the deficit by £3 billion, and that that was met with howls from the then Opposition. Without wanting to fall out with the then Chief of the Defence Staff, I have to say that I cannot remember his ever having said anything to me about defence cuts that I was not prepared to make. I say that on the record.

[Dr Fox]

The right hon. Gentleman has made his point very clearly. Obviously, I am unable to say what discussions might have taken place. However, the point is that, as the National Audit Office said, there was an added overspend of £3.3 billion in the final year alone in the projects budgets. That is very clear.

As the Prime Minister has said, the SDSR was about taking the right decisions to protect national security in the years ahead, not simply a cost-saving exercise to get to grips with the biggest budget deficit in post-war history. However, let us be absolutely clear that those are not two separate things. Proper strategic thought encompasses ends, ways and means, matching ambition and policy to commitments and resources. A strategy that does not take account of fiscal or budgetary measures is no strategy at all; it is simply wishful thinking.

As Lord Ashdown recently put it, we cannot defend a country on flights of fancy. Furthermore, history has clearly shown how fundamental a strong economy is for effective national security and defence over the long term. We were left an economically toxic legacy by the previous Government. They doubled the national debt and left us with the biggest budget deficit in the G20. We are spending £120 million every single day just to pay off the interest on Labour’s debt. The interest we will pay next year on the debt is some £46 billion, significantly more than the entire annual defence budget, and we will get nothing for that money. Without regaining economic strength, we will be unable to sustain in the long term the capabilities required, including military capabilities, to keep our citizens safe and maintain our influence on the world stage.

If we learned anything from the cold war, it is that a strong economy equals strong defence. The economic legacy of the previous Government is a national security liability. We were left with a situation in which the country’s finances were wrecked while the world is a more dangerous place than at any time in recent memory.

Every Department must make its own contribution to deficit reduction and the MOD is no exception, but because of the priority we place on security, the defence budget is making a more modest contribution to deficit reduction relative to almost all other Government Departments.

The SDSR meets twin priorities of protecting front-line capability for Afghanistan and beginning the process of transforming our armed forces to meet the challenges of the future, setting the path to a coherent and affordable defence capability in 2020 and beyond.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

There is no doubt that we need to deal with armed forces accommodation. We will want to do so as quickly as possible and in a way that produces the best and quickest improvement, at the best deal for the taxpayer. We will learn all the lessons from the previous Government, and even from times before them.

The three further reviews that I mentioned are the six-month study of the future role and structure of reserve forces; a review of force generation and sustainability by the service chiefs and the defence reform unit; and the remodelling of the MOD itself, which is overseen by Lord Levene’s defence reform unit. Let me be very clear: I entirely agree with Lord Levene’s view about the staff in the MOD, who are among the most able people I have worked with. I am sure that former Ministers would concur. However, I wish to be equally clear that the Department must be restructured to serve the interests of the new national security posture, and smaller armed forces will require a smaller system of civilian support.

I am acutely aware that behind the bare numbers of the reductions that we plan are loyal people, with livelihoods and families, who face an uncertain future through no fault of their own. We will do everything we can to manage the process sensitively and with care and support, but manage it we must if we are to meet our vision of the future force structure. The Government are determined to reinvigorate and respect an enduring military covenant. We cannot shield the armed forces from the consequences of the economic circumstances that we face, but we will make progress wherever we can. I look forward to receiving soon the report of the independent armed forces covenant taskforce that we set up earlier this year.

The second period, from 2015 to 2020, will be about regrowing capability and achieving our overall vision. That will include the reintroduction of a carrier strike capability, with the joint strike fighter carrier variant aircraft manned by a joint Royal Navy and RAF force, and an escort fleet including the Type 45 destroyer and, soon after 2020, the Type 26 global combat ship, which used to be called the future surface combatant—the names keep changing. We will also reconfigure the RAF fast jet fleet around the JSF and the Typhoon, and consolidate the multi-role brigade structure in the Army.

One of my goals as part of the SDSR was to reduce the number of types of equipment used to provide the same capability. Achieving that by 2020 will mean less duplication and less expense overall, when we take into account the complex training and support requirements of each piece of kit. That will include reducing the number of types of equipment in the air transport and helicopter fleets, and of destroyers and frigates.

Nevertheless, my very strong belief, which the Prime Minister shares, is that the structure that we have agreed for 2020 will require year-on-year real-terms growth in the defence budget beyond 2015. It would be nice to do more sooner, but as the great hero of the Labour party, Tony Benn, once said, albeit in different circumstances,

“the jam we thought was for tomorrow, we’ve already eaten.”

How well he understood his own party.

There is a hard road ahead, but at the end of the process Britain will have the capabilities that it needs to keep our people safe and live up to its responsibilities to our allies and friends, and our national interests will be more secure.

I turn to some specific issues. The carrier strike capability that we plan will give the UK the ability to project military power over land as well as sea, from anywhere in the world, without reliance on land bases in other countries. Britain will require the strategic choice and flexibility in force projection that carrier strike offers. I also believe that that capability should be as interoperable as possible with the allies with whom we are most likely to work in future. The inherited design of the carriers would not have achieved that.

The House and the country must understand that any decisions regarding the carriers must be taken in the context of their extended service life of 50 years. The final captain of a Queen Elizabeth carrier has not even been born yet. When they go out of service, I will be 109 years old and the shadow Defence Secretary a sprightly 103. We are taking decisions now on what will be best for us as a country in the middle of the century. That is why we have taken three decisions. First, we have decided to take a capability gap in carrier strike, because we assess that the risk of not having access to basing and overflight for our fast jet force in the next decade is low. However, the same cannot be said looking further ahead.

Secondly, we have decided to install catapult and arrester gear, which will allow greater interoperability, particularly with US and French carriers and jets, and maximise the through-life utility of our carrier strike capability. Thirdly, we have decided to acquire the carrier variant of the joint strike fighter. Adding the “cats and traps” will allow us to use the carrier variant of the JSF, which has a bigger payload and a longer range than the STOVL variant planned by the previous Government. Overall, the carrier variant will be significantly cheaper, reducing the through-life cost compared with the STOVL version.

Contrary to popular belief, there will not be a new Queen Elizabeth class carrier in service without the planes to go on it, apart from in the period required by law for us to have the carrier properly crewed up and ready to accept the planes. The idea I have come across in some parts of the media—that we can get brand-new carriers and the brand-new planes to fly off them almost on the same day—simply defies the complexity of the operation involved.

When the carrier enters service towards the end of the decade, the JSF will be ready to embark on it. Yes, there will be a delay to the programme as a consequence of the decisions I have mentioned, but unlike the previous Government’s delay to the carrier programme in 2008, which added £1.6 billion to the overall cost—more than the whole Foreign and Commonwealth Office budget next year—and gave us nothing in return, our delay will give us a carrier that is best configured for the next 50 years.

[Mr Ainsworth]

I am seriously concerned about the decision that the Government have taken. They have not only scrapped the Harrier, but retreated from STOVL, going back to what is basically today’s and yesterday’s technology of “cats and traps”. They have left themselves potentially reliant on two aircraft that do fundamentally the same thing, giving up the ability to use short-take-off and vertical-landing aircraft. This is about more than the capability of the carrier. We are giving up—not temporarily, but permanently—the capability that the Harrier has given us. We will have two fleets of aircraft that fundamentally do the same thing.

[Dr Fox]

First, “cats and traps” are not yesterday’s technology. In fact, considerable expense is going into ensuring that there are more modern, more effective “cat and trap” systems. The United States is spending a great deal of research and development money on that at present. Secondly, if we are to have genuine interoperability, it makes sense to have carriers that the American navy or the French can land on and, in the case of the French, use when their carrier is in refit and they require ongoing training. It is perfectly rational to buy the plane with the longer range and bigger payload, which is in fact cheaper. In the past, it was decided, for whatever reasons, to build 65,000-tonne carriers without a “cat and trap” system, and that decision was augmented by the STOVL decision. That would have been the most expensive variant, with the shortest range and the smallest payload. We are bringing those greater capabilities into better alignment with the carrier itself.

The right hon. Member for Coventry North East mentioned the Harrier. We had to face up to the difficult choices that the previous Government put off. Regrettably, we have decided to retire HMS Ark Royal three years early and to retire the Harrier force—both in 2011. Of course, that is not unprecedented. The UK’s carrier strike capability was gapped during the late 1970s, as we transitioned from Buccaneer to Harrier itself. While Harrier was operating in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009, our ability to generate carrier strike was at best severely curtailed.

Over the next five years, life-saving combat air support to operations in Afghanistan has to be the overriding priority. In Afghanistan, the Joint Force Harrier did wonderful work, and I pay tribute to the Harrier aircraft, the crews that have serviced them and the pilots who have flown them since they entered service. During its deployment to Afghanistan, the Joint Force Harrier flew in excess of 22,000 hours on more than 8,500 sorties, more than 2,000 of which were close air support missions. It is my understanding that every Harrier pilot from every Harrier squadron took part at some point during the Harrier’s deployment to Afghanistan.

Tough and unsentimental choices had to be made, however, and the military advice was that Tornado was the more capable aircraft to retain, due to its wider capabilities and force size, for not only Afghanistan but other significant contingent capabilities. Operations in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009 took their toll on the Harrier force. By the time the aircraft was withdrawn from theatre, the force’s ability to recuperate and regenerate a fully operational carrier strike capability—notwithstanding the strenuous efforts to do so by Joint Force Harrier—had understandably been affected.

The decision taken by the previous Government in 2009 drastically to salami-slice the number of Harriers meant that, even if we had wanted to, we could not sustain our current fast-jet requirement in Afghanistan using Harriers alone. The decision in 2009 reduced the number of Harriers from 18 force elements at readiness to 10, but the military advice is that we require 40 force elements at readiness of Harriers to maintain our fast-jet contribution in Afghanistan on an enduring basis and without breaching harmony guidelines.

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[Dr Fox]

If, as the previous Government said in their own study, the current Trident replacement was the most efficient and cost-effective way of defending Britain against a unique existential threat, and if the reason for having the deterrent in 2006, as set out in the previous Government’s White Paper, was that we could not predict the threats in the next 50 years, what has changed since the election?

[Mr Ainsworth]

The answer is a treaty that the right hon. Gentleman has just signed with France; technological capability going forward; another five years; and a need to analyse the cost-benefit as against the other defence benefit that will be lost. It is all very well for the Foreign Secretary to say there will be no strategic shrinkage, but the Government have embarked on a fairly substantial degeneration of the military capability in this country that underpins our strategic position in the world. It may well be that Trident remains the most effective option and that a continuous at-sea deterrent is still essential, but with another five years we will have to examine that. Other people will examine it and if we do not, we will be seen to be putting our heads in the sand and not prepared to undertake a proper analysis of the choices that we face.

I have one further point to make, and it relates to force generation. The Secretary of State will know that his personnel costs are rising every bit as much as his equipment costs. The equipment costs catch the headlines, and people talk about them and the press get excited about them, but the personnel costs are rising every bit as fast. The Commandant General of the Royal Marines addressed a meeting in the House of Commons just a week or so ago, when he was able to say that the Royal Marines could generate deployable capability more cheaply than the infantry. If he can stand on his feet while he says that, something needs to be examined in the way the Army force- generates. The Royal Marines’ training is much longer and is therefore a lot more expensive. In addition, the Royal Marines’ capability is arguably considerably higher, so if it is cheaper as well, something is wrong and this needs to be examined.

One important job that the Secretary of State needs to do, and one that I started to get into, is to deal with how the Army force-generates, although he will be hugely resisted if he does so. If he is going to keep that minimum ongoing deployable capability force of 6,000—or whatever he said is the figure he is trying to maintain—he is going to need a 90,000-strong Army, so that corner needs considerable examination. I urge him to do this job, because it is necessary if we are going to get value for money and motivate the very fine people who make up our armed forces.

Defence Treaties (France)

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

But it is surely in the interests of the United Kingdom to welcome a trend that we have been calling for for a very long time. When we can draw the French into greater co-operation with NATO, where they are clearly in a much more transatlantic orbit, and are able to supplement and augment what the United Kingdom can do without interfering in our sovereign capability, we should welcome it. It is not a question, as my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Sir Peter Tapsell) suggests, of the joint ownership of fleets; it is about our willingness to operate them together when it is in our mutual interest to do so.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I hugely welcome the signing of these two treaties, but, despite the presentational attempts, I am a little amused at a Conservative-led Government announcing what is a huge integration of European capability. This is not a zero-sum game, and we should not present it as one, but will the Secretary of State explain the balance between investment and cost in respect of the facilities in which there will be investment at Aldermaston and in France? Notwithstanding any desire to work together, we ought to be pretty hard-headed in our relationships with France. They most certainly will be on their side.

[Dr Fox]

The contracts are currently under discussion, and it is a matter of commercial sensitivity exactly what the numbers are. We do, however, believe that it would save very substantial millions for the United Kingdom to go ahead with the facility in France.

On the question of this being an integrationist measure—far from it, because we are able to understand the difference between geographical Europe and political Europe. What we want to see is a partnership with another sovereign nation on the European continent, not supranational control from the European Union.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 13th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

May I say to the Secretary of State that the leaders of industry, as well as the trade unions, are enormously worried that adequate evaluation of the industrial ramifications is not taking place ahead of the main decisions of the SDSR? He cannot do this in sequence without taking huge risks. Will he ensure that the industrial consequences of the review are fully evaluated—or is the timetable being dictated by the Treasury?

[Dr Fox]

The biggest risk that we face in our security is that we have a muddled and incoherent defence programme left over from the previous Government. Before the Labour party lectures the coalition Government about the financial implications that we face, it might want to remember that with a defence budget of some £35 billion a year, it has left behind an overspend in the equipment programme of £38 billion by 2020, with which we are going to have to deal.

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[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

In May, the Secretary of State said that

“there is no lack of clarity in the Government’s policy: we believe in a continuous, at-sea, minimum, credible, nuclear deterrent, based on the Trident missile system. I hope that that is explicit enough”.—[Official Report, 26 May 2010; Vol. 510, c. 272.]

Will the Secretary of State repeat that?

[Dr Fox]

Well, I am not sure that I need to repeat it —put simply, I agree with it.

UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I shall come to a number of issues about the wider political element, but as the hon. Gentleman has raised it, I will say that the prime reason for being in Afghanistan is our national security: to ensure that the territory is not used again as a base for training and attacks by terrorists, the likes of which we saw on 9/11. It is to ensure that we degrade the threat, so that the Afghan security forces are able to deal with it themselves, without having to refer to the international community.

The second audience listening today is our armed forces and the wider defence community. They need to know that they have our support, not just for who they are, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) said, but for what they are doing and for the sacrifices that they are making. They need to know also that the ISAF coalition is providing all that they need to succeed in their mission. Our armed forces know that there is no such thing as a risk-free war, a casualty-free war or a fatality-free war. They accept that. They are professional people and volunteers every one. That is what makes them truly special. They want our support, not our sympathy. They want to be victors not victims.

In July, the Government agreed to a request from ISAF to deploy temporarily about 300 additional troops from the theatre reserve battalion in order to supplement the UK force of more than 9,500 troops and ensure that the progress being made in Operation Moshtarak was consolidated and exploited. The TRB will enable the redeployment of US forces in Sangin and of UK forces to central Helmand.

On 2 August, two additional RAF Tornado GR4s arrived in Kandahar, again in response to a request from the commander of ISAF for an increase in air support. Those aircraft joined the eight Tornados that have already been provided in order to support the multinational pool, not just our forces, and they have boosted the available flying hours by 25%, or an extra 130 flying hours per month. We announced extra funding for base protection and close-combat equipment and more counter-IED funding. All that will enable UK forces to consolidate the hold in central Helmand as the force there thickens, and to partner the Afghan security forces more effectively. It demonstrates our commitment to the coalition and to the ISAF strategy for Afghanistan.

The third audience who will be listening today are our allies and partners. They should be assured of Britain’s commitment to the shared strategy, and of our determination to play our part in protecting not only our national security but that of our international partners. There are now more international forces in Afghanistan than ever, and that is allowing real progress on governance and development. However, just as a more secure Afghanistan will not come about without military means, it will not come about by military means alone, as my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Bob Russell) said.

At the Kabul conference in July, the international community supported the Afghan Government’s vision of progress on security, governance, economic growth, the rule of law, human rights, countering corruption and reconciliation. There is a very long way to go on many of those fronts, and the Afghan Government themselves must understand that they need to make progress on many of them in order to take advantage of the improved security situation that the international coalition is bringing.

That political track, which runs alongside training the Afghan army and the military surge, is vital. In order to progress it, an Afghan high peace council will oversee a process towards a political settlement for all the Afghan people, underpinned by the $150 million peace and reintegration trust fund.

On 18 September, just a couple of weeks away, Afghanistan will hold its first parliamentary elections since the 1960s to be run entirely by Afghans themselves. The elections will not be perfect, and none of us should expect them to be, but they represent progress. Progress is being made on security and governance. It is hard and it is slow and it is very variable, but it is real, and as Afghan sovereignty grows, so the nature of ISAF’s operations and the role of our forces will evolve.

What is clear to me, what was clear to the previous Government and what must be clear to our allies in ISAF is that, as responsibility for security is transferred to the Afghans, any draw-down in force levels must be done coherently by the alliance. It must be done by an international coalition, not by individual nations. The issue is about phasing out, not walking out.

We also need to strengthen the training mission even further. Some countries might have political or constitutional problems with sending combat troops. We are not happy about that, and we never have been, but we understand it. However, there is absolutely no reason why any NATO country cannot do more to help train the Afghan national security force; it is a measure of our commitment and resolve as an alliance.

The fourth audience listening to our debate today will be our opponents and enemies: insurgent groups, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the violent extremists who support them. Some have claimed that, by talking of our determination to succeed within the time scale set out in the counter-insurgency strategy, we give succour to our opponents. That is not the case, and let me explain why.

Over the past few years the strategic position of the insurgency has begun to crumble. Pakistan is taking the threat seriously, and the safe haven that used to exist in that country is gradually being squeezed by the Pakistani security forces. Pakistan, too, is making substantial and significant sacrifices, among its civilian population and its military, as they hunt down al-Qaeda and violent extremists in their own country. We would do well to recognise that sacrifice.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

rose—

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[Dr Fox]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. I do not agree with her detailed analysis, but it is important to recognise that Afghanistan must be regarded in a regional context. All the nations involved in Afghanistan must bring to bear as positive an influence as possible on the regional questions that will help to determine a better dynamic than perhaps has been brought in the past. That will involve a large number of regional players, but in this case it is quite wrong to point the finger at India, as the hon. Lady has.

I apologise for not giving way to the shadow Secretary of State.

[Mr Ainsworth]

The Secretary of State knows that I agree with many things that he is saying, but I have one concern—well, more than one, but this is a particular concern—about one issue that he raises. He just said that he does not accept that, by talking about our determination to achieve certain conditions, we give succour to our enemies. But that is not what has been said. What has been said, in terms, by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister is that, irrespective of conditions, combat will end in 2015.

General Petraeus has tried to say that all those decisions must be conditions-based, and I went to a meeting the other day with the Secretary of State’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, at which he tried to say that we should think of those things in the way that General Petraeus has portrayed them. But that is not what the Defence Secretary’s own Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister have said. They have been absolutely clear—and that is what concerns our armed forces, as the Secretary of State’s hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) said. Will the Secretary of State clarify the position? Is it as black and white as the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister have said it is?

[Dr Fox]

The Prime Minister made it very clear that, although we might have an extended role in Afghanistan, in training and further involvement in improving the quality of the Afghan national forces, the United Kingdom does not see that it should have a combat role beyond 2015. That is not entirely new. General McChrystal, before General Petraeus, made it very clear that it was part of the counter-insurgency strategy to ensure that the Afghan national security forces were able to maintain their own security by 2014; that was always part of our wider aim. Of course there will be continuing capability elements inside the Afghan national security forces which need to be dealt with, and we will have to be there in a mentoring and a training role for some considerable time. On top of that, the wider elements of reconstruction and governance in Afghanistan will require the non-governmental organisations and the wider international community to be there for a long time.

We are talking about one of the most difficult countries in the world in which to operate and in which to bring these things forward. However, it is quite clear that we cannot have an indefinite combat role, and that is what the Prime Minister has made clear.

Afghanistan

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

Mr Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity to update the House on our operations in Afghanistan. As the Prime Minister has said, we intend to make regular updates to the House.

As this is a complex subject, I have made maps available to assist hon. Members. I am grateful to you for your support, Mr Speaker. These are now available in the Vote Office, and the Whips on both sides of the House are distributing them. In addition, I will obviously be happy to arrange further briefings at the Ministry of Defence, should Members find them useful.

The Prime Minister reminded us today of the ongoing sacrifices made by our armed forces in Afghanistan. In the face of such losses, we should be in no doubt about the importance of the mission—particularly today, the fifth anniversary of the London bombings in 2005. It is vital to our national security that we have a stable Afghanistan that is able to maintain its own security and prevent al-Qaeda from returning.

As I made clear in Washington last week, we are a committed member of the international coalition of 46 countries in Afghanistan. We have a clear political strategy, and a clear military counter-insurgency plan to support it. The focus now is on delivering, and we can be confident that General Petraeus will build on the considerable success of General McChrystal.

We face many challenges. Progress has been slower in some areas than others, particularly on the political side. We can expect success in counter-insurgency to be gradual, cumulative and hard won, but there has, nevertheless, been considerable progress. Through a UK lens, it would be easy to assume that all of Afghanistan is like Helmand. In fact, many parts of the country are largely secure, with low levels of violence. In Kabul, the Afghans themselves have assumed responsibility for security, and have proved themselves capable of dealing with the localised threats that have emerged.

We are also making good progress on building up the Afghan security forces, so that this pattern can be repeated elsewhere. The Afghan army has been growing steadily over the years—and by 20% in recent months—to about 130,000 troops now. We are playing our part, and the Government have recently approved the expenditure of up to £189 million on new surveillance, communications and logistics equipment for our bases, as part of Britain’s ongoing commitment to support the effective partnering of the Afghan security forces.

In southern Afghanistan, the story of this year has been one of the Afghans themselves increasingly coming to the fore in the fight against the insurgency. In Kandahar, and under the direct oversight of President Karzai, Afghan security forces are leading operations as part of a rising tide of security in order to set the conditions for improved Afghan governance. In Helmand, Afghan and international security assistance force units have together succeeded in expanding the authority of the Afghan Government to 11 out of the 14 districts, by driving insurgent fighters out of the population centres of Babaji and Nad-e-Ali, while consolidating previous gains in Lashkar Gah, Now Zad, Nawa and Gereshk. The situation in Marjah remains challenging, but counter-insurgencies are about progressively winning the confidence of the local people, and the US Marines are well placed to succeed.

Elsewhere in central Helmand, where our presence is more established, we have seen considerable success. In Nad-e-Ali, British troops have been operating alongside the Afghans to secure the district centre and allow unfettered access to local roads Improved security is allowing effective governance to flourish and trade to grow. In May, for example, around 3,000 Nad-e-Ali residents elected a more representative district community council. ISAF now intends to reinforce this success. For that reason, I have accepted an ISAF request for a temporary deployment of elements of our theatre reserve battalion, the 2nd Battalion the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment. The theatre reserve battalion is a standing force based in Cyprus, which I have instructed should be used only for time-limited deployments to fulfil specific tasks. This deployment will meet those criteria. The additional forces will be used to give commanders additional flexibility to reinforce progress in central Helmand this summer.

In a counter-insurgency campaign, the people are the prize. It is hugely important that we strike the right balance between the numbers of the civilian population and the size of the security forces available to protect them. The Prime Minister and I regularly argued in opposition that British troops in Helmand were too thinly spread and that we had insufficient force densities for effective counter-insurgency. That is why we welcome the arrival of more than 18,000 US Marines, whose presence is allowing us to deliver a better and more realistic distribution of tasks within the international coalition.

As the House is aware, ISAF has already transferred security responsibility for Musa Qala and Kajaki to US forces, who are building on our achievements there. Lieutenant General Rodriguez, ISAF’s operational commander, will today announce the next phase of this process—I understand that he will do so within the next hour. ISAF intends to restructure its forces in the Farah and Nimroz provinces so that it can consolidate a US marine brigade in northern Helmand, which will assume responsibility for security in Sangin later this year. This will simplify current command arrangements and enable UK troops to be redeployed to reinforce progress in the key districts of central Helmand. The theatre reserve battalion will then withdraw. The result will be a coherent and equitable division of the main populated areas of Helmand between three brigade-sized forces, with the US in the north and south, and the UK-led Task Force Helmand, alongside our Danish and Estonian allies, in the central population belt.

We have been closely consulted by ISAF, and fully support this plan. In Sangin, UK forces have made huge progress in the face of great adversity. The district centre has been transformed. Helmand, as a whole, is a safer place as a result of our endeavours and sacrifices there. I am sure that the whole House will join me in paying tribute to those who have lost their lives in Sangin, and those who continue to serve there.

The operations in Afghanistan, though geographically distant, are of vital importance to our national security. On the ground, we continue to make progress. There will be hard days ahead, but the further changes that I have announced will mean more manpower and greater focus for the key terrain of central Helmand. We have the right strategy, and we are determined to succeed. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I thank the Defence Secretary for his statement, for early sight of it and for the indications that he gave me yesterday about the broad outline of what he was going to say today. That is good news for our ability to continue to support, from all parts of the House, our forces’ operations in Helmand province.

I welcome what the Defence Secretary said about his commitment to regular updates to the House, and his offer of briefings in the Ministry of Defence, but will he consider continuing the direct military briefings that started last year for Members here at the House of Commons? They were appreciated by Members on both sides, and I know that the all-party Army group has written to him and asked him to continue them. If he could, that would be appreciated. I know that it is onerous in terms of his time, but I ask him to consider doing so.

I totally agree about the purpose of the mission. Our forces are in Afghanistan to protect our national security and to keep us safe. The right hon. Gentleman says that we have a clear counter-insurgency plan and the military tactics to support that plan, but he knows that there is some concern and confusion over whether there are deadlines. Will the Government do their level best to clear up that confusion, so that people know the exact commitments? Is our combat mission in Afghanistan to continue on a conditions-based footing until the Afghan forces can take over, as was the situation, or is there a very clear deadline from the new Government stating that our combat mission will end on a particular date, irrespective of the conditions in Afghanistan? It is enormously important to clear up that point.

The right hon. Gentleman felt the need to say that, in opposition, he and the current Prime Minister repeatedly said that there were issues of force density, but I ask him to accept that it was not only he in opposition who felt the need to concentrate on and deal with force densities, because we in government had exactly the same priorities. Before force densities could be addressed, however, we needed to have someone to hand those districts on to, so, before the arrival of the American uplift, we could not hand on Musa Qala, Kajaki or Sangin to anyone other than the Taliban. Thankfully, the American uplift now gives us an opportunity to rebalance our forces in Afghanistan, and we have been doing that for some time. I understand that his announcement today is simply a continuation of an ongoing process. Does that effectively end the need for force rebalancing? In the British area of operations, do we now have the same ratio of forces to population as the Americans have on their side of the line?

The right hon. Gentleman said that Marjah is very challenging. Does he intend to deploy elements, as he said, of the theatre reserve battalion to the American—Marjah—area of operations? If so, for how long, and in what numbers? He says “elements”. Does that mean the whole theatre reserve battalion? Do we now, effectively, have no reserve for the rest of the deployment, or are some elements of the theatre reserve battalion still available to cover other contingencies that might arise?

We had already agreed in principle to hand command in Sangin over to the American brigade. I understand that the Secretary of State is now saying that it is not only in terms of command—the Americans themselves will take over in Sangin. When will that happen? Has he any idea what forces will be deployed, and in what numbers, into the Sangin area?

Does the Secretary of State accept that there will be mixed emotions, and pretty deep emotions, among many elements of our armed forces who have served in Helmand—not only those who have experienced injury, but those who have lost loved ones, which includes families back here, and everybody who has served in the most dangerous part of our theatre of operations? Our forces went out there on a daily basis to patrol, fully knowing the risks that they faced, and the whole House must pay tribute to the immense bravery, courage and resilience that they have shown over a period of time. They have achieved some considerable improvements in Sangin, but I think that the Defence Secretary will accept that we are still handing on a challenge. We have not got as far as we ideally would have hoped to get in Helmand before this hand-on.

[Dr Fox]

I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his support for the specific proposals that I have set out today and for his general support on the mission in Afghanistan. He was very generous with the briefings that he made available to the Opposition when he was in government, and we will continue the same courtesy. I also fully intend to continue the briefings for Members of Parliament begun under the previous Government; they are very valuable. In addition, as I said, if we are able to provide more detailed briefings in the Ministry of Defence, we are happy to do so. We should not, in any way, shape or form, be shy about providing any Member of this House with the information they require to make better sense of what is happening in this most important national security mission.

The shadow Secretary of State is entirely correct that it took until the American surge was fully under way for us to be better able to have sensible force densities. He asked me directly about comparisons between the British and Americans. Combat Team North has a population of 441,000, which is 37% of the population; Task Force Helmand has 388,000, or 32%; and Combat Team South has 370,000, or 31%. These are much better matches in terms of force density. He asks if this will effectively be it. Well, not necessarily, as there will be changes in the mission, but we will want to continue this pattern, or shape, in terms of force density. As he says, we have reached the end point, at least for now, of a process that began some time ago.

On the size of the theatre reserve, we will have some 300 personnel, and they will stay there until October. The size of the current UK force is about 1,000—I think that the exact number is 1,008. The exact number that the Americans put in will of course be for their commanders to determine in terms of the security situation that they find.

As regards 2015, I can only repeat what the Prime Minister has said—that British troops will not be there in a combat role, or in significant numbers, in five years’ time, but we can expect them to still be there in a training role. There will be a continued need for us to ensure that the quality of the Afghan national security forces is adequate. I echo the point that he made by saying that we are very fortunate in this country to have a volunteer Army—people who are willing to put their life and limb at risk on a voluntary basis for the security of this country, its people and its interests. We are deeply honoured and privileged to have such people in our armed forces.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Bob Ainsworth and Liam Fox

Monday 21st June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I would never be so presumptuous as to believe that I could read the complexities and high intellectual level of my hon. Friend’s mind, but let us just say that having spent four years in opposition together, I have a fair idea of what he is likely to raise and when. He is absolutely correct, and I reiterate that it would be wrong, and fly in the face of everything that we have learned from history, to believe that future wars will be predictable or like the ones in which we are currently engaged. We must maintain generic capability that is flexible, adaptable and able to deal with changing future threats of a sort that we cannot possibly predict with any certainty.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I am struggling to understand at the moment how the Secretary of State plans to deal with the issue of the deterrent. I know what the coalition agreement said and what the Liberal Democrats’ position is, and I have heard him say various things, but will the value-for-money study be part of the strategic defence review, has it started, and how and in what forum will his coalition partners be able to pursue their separate views on the shape of the deterrent?

[Dr Fox]

The value-for-money study on Trident has begun, as has the SDSR, and it will be concluded long before the SDSR. I hope that it will be concluded before the summer recess.

I want to be as open as I can about the backdrop to the SDSR. To take one aspect, the defence budget itself, the future programme is entirely unaffordable, especially if we try to do what we will need to do in future while simultaneously doing everything in the way that we do it today. The legacy that the new Government have inherited means that even if defence spending kept pace with inflation, we would face a deficit of many billions of pounds over the life of this Parliament and more over the next decade. To make things worse, there are additional systemic pressures on the defence budget that exacerbate the situation, including the trend of pay increases above inflation. The previous Government’s approach was too often characterised by delay-to-spend rather than invest-to-save. The decision to slow the rate of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers in 2009, for example, increased the overall costs by more than £600 million at a stroke.

The bottom line is this: no matter how hard we bear down on the costs of administration and drive up efficiency, we cannot expect to bridge the gap by those means alone. The problem is structural, so the response must be structural to put defence on a stable footing. The Ministry of Defence, as a Department of State, must itself face wide-ranging reform. We intend to reorganise the whole organisation into three pillars: first, strategy and policy; secondly, the armed forces; and thirdly, procurement and estates. We intend to create a more efficient and leaner centre, in which everyone knows what they are responsible for and to whom they are accountable, with clear deadlines and budgetary discipline. Major reform of our procurement practices will be accompanied by a number of industrial consultations that I will shortly outline to Parliament.

As much as structural reform is required, however, I am equally determined that the armed forces be reconfigured to meet the needs of the evolving security environment and satisfy the expectations of this country. Although the SDSR is necessarily financially aware, it is policy-based, and I wish to set that policy out to the House.