Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

Powers and duties of IIAA members

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 3, page 3, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) The Chief Appeals Officer must, for each financial year, publish—

(a) the number of applications for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against decisions of the IIAA, and the number of such applications granted;

(b) the number and proportion of decisions of the IIAA set aside by the Upper Tribunal; and

(c) the number of decisions reviewed under section 6, and the outcome of those reviews.”

This probing amendment would require the IIAA to publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including data on onward appeals, decisions set aside by the Upper Tribunal and internal reviews.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Blake Stephenson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart; I hope you are ready for a lot of Divisions over the next few weeks. While clause 2 decides who the adjudicators will be, clause 3 decides how the quality of their decisions will be protected. That matters because poor-quality decisions will result in appeals, and appeals mean delays, fewer removals and increased costs for the taxpayer to bear.

Clause 3 sets out who is responsible for what: adjudicators decide on the cases; the chief executive must ensure that the adjudicators are adequately trained, as the Minister explained earlier; the chief appeals officer allocates cases, organises a system of legal support and oversees quality development and assurance; and the professional standards officer sets standards and publishes a code of conduct.

Dr Casey warned that adjudicators without legal training would be more likely to make “errors of law” and that the backlog, rather than genuinely decreasing, could simply relocate to the upper tribunal. The solution to that potential consequence must lie in this clause. What exactly is the “system of legal support” for adjudicators in subsection (3)(b)?

A question occurred to me over the adjournment, following the earlier debate about magistrates: will adjudicators sit with legal advisers, as lay magistrates do? That may or may not be helpful, but I would be interested in the Minister’s response. If so, at what cost?

The Law Society points out that the chief appeals officer is responsible for quality but has no power to intervene in any decision. What powers will the chief appeals officer have to act on poor performance?

Amendment 88 is a probing amendment. It would require the chief appeals officer to publish the number of applications for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal, how many are granted each year, the number and proportion of appeals authority decisions that the upper tribunal sets aside, and the number of decisions that the appeals authority reviews under clause 6, with their outcomes.

In her oral evidence session before the recess, Dr Sumption told this Committee that one of the key measures of success should be how many decisions are overturned. This amendment would ensure that Parliament is told every year whether that relocation of the backlog to the upper tribunal, which Dr Casey described, is happening.

Will the Minister confirm whether the appeals authority will publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including the rate at which they are set aside? If the Minister can give assurances on that, we will not press this amendment. Finally, what training standards will apply under clause 3(2), and will they be published? Will the code of conduct be published before the first case is heard?

The Opposition support clause 3, which ensures that the quality of the decision making is the best answer to the criticism that the appeals authority would generate more appeals than it resolved, but only if it is real, resourced and reported to Parliament.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Stockton West for tabling amendment 88. I will turn to that after giving a brief overview of the clause as it stands.

Clause 3 sets out the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members’ powers and duties. It makes the adjudicators responsible for the authority’s primary function: to make decisions on immigration and asylum appeals and certain bail applications. This will be the sole responsibility of executive adjudicators. Senior adjudicators will also have a responsibility to perform this function, but they may also have further responsibilities that are delegated to them by the chief appeals officer, as the clause permits. No other member or employee can determine the outcome of an appeal or application, reinforcing the autonomy of the adjudicator as the decision maker.

The clause also makes clear what the chief executive, chief appeals officer and professional standards officer are responsible for. Those members are responsible for putting adequate training and support in place for adjudicators, developing a quality assurance mechanism and setting the standards required of IIAA adjudicators. Those roles together will enable the IIAA to operate effectively and independently. Parliament will be kept abreast of important matters concerning the IIAA members or the administration of justice through written representations of the chief executive. Those representations must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. This will also act as an important mechanism for the independence of the authority, which can communicate to Parliament through the Secretary of State on matters of concern.

Amendment 88 tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition would require the chief appeals officer to publish annual data on internal reviews and onward appeals against IIAA decisions. The Government support transparency and agree that the quality of the authority’s decisions must be properly monitored. However, we are confident that the Bill already establishes a comprehensive framework for quality assurance and accountability. Clause 3 requires the chief appeals officer to oversee the quality of adjudicators’ decisions, organise legal support and develop a quality assurance mechanism. The professional standards officer is also responsible for setting and maintaining the standards required of adjudicators, as well as publishing a code of conduct.

The authority will be required to produce an annual report; that is not for me to determine, but I fully expect it to cover the kinds of areas that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire set out in his amendment. The annual report will be laid before Parliament. Its operation will also be subject to independent external scrutiny by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration. Although I agree that it is important to scrutinise the specified figures that the hon. Member flags in his amendment, we do not feel that they on their own would provide a reliable measure of decision quality. It is therefore unnecessary to prescribe those particular measures in primary legislation. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but will quickly refer to a couple of points that he raised.

We discussed earlier the standards of adjudicators that the hon. Member mentioned, but it is important to reiterate that adjudicators should have the required training to give them the necessary decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases and bail applications. It will be the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure that adjudicators have adequate training and support. The chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising a system of legal support for them. The Bill provides strong safeguards and quality assurance mechanisms to ensure high standards and to ensure adjudicators are entirely independent of the Executive.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire flagged adequate training and support, and it is important go into a bit more detail on that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the authority’s adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain independence from the Executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing that quality. The chief appeals officer will also be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive if they desire. The important point is that the authority is independent. It is really important that we remember that. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development is required for the authority’s adjudicators. They will be making decisions against appeals to which the Home Office will be a party, so it is important that we allow the authority to set those standards itself.

I will move on to how things will be monitored. As I mentioned, we have built a few steps of quality assurance into the system from the outset through training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onward appeal rights. As I said, the chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising that system of legal support, the professional standards officer will be responsible for setting professional standards, and the detailed operation of those arrangements will be developed through the authority’s quality assurance framework and procedural arrangements as they are established.

I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we agree with the principle behind the amendment. We do not think the specific figures he outlined are the best way to reliably measure decision-making quality, but we share the determination to ensure that there are opportunities to scrutinise it throughout the process.

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Siân Berry]

The Bill currently states that the IIAA procedure rules board must

“have regard to the desirability of”

ensuring that justice is done and that it is accessible, fair and independent. The amendment would simply strengthen that duty and ensure that it must act “with a view to” securing those things rather than merely considering them “desirable”. Importantly, the amendment would make the IIAA’s duties equivalent to the duties of the Tribunal Procedure Committee, so it would prevent the watering down that the clause represents.

Watering down and undermining fairness is a golden thread that runs through the Bill. We saw it originally with the watering down of the duty to be independent and fair, which was made an aim rather than a requirement, and we see it again in the IIAA’s powers over its procedure rules, which will govern the processes by which the IIAA hears and decides appeals.

Currently, the Tribunal Procedure Committee, which makes rules for the tribunals, has an obligation in section 22(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to make procedure rules

“with a view to securing…that…justice is done”.

By contrast, clause 4(5) of the Bill says that the IIAA will have an obligation only to

“have regard to the desirability”

that justice is done. That is clearly an attempt at watering down and weakening obligations of fairness—from “duty” to “aim”, from “duty” to “desirable”. The amendment would ensure that the IIAA has equivalent obligations to ensure fairness as the Tribunal Procedure Committee currently does—no more, but certainly no less. In such high-stakes appeals as asylum, that is the least of what claimants, Ministers and the public should expect.

I will briefly quote the Bar Council’s written evidence, because it brings home that there are real people behind this. It says that on account of errors by the IIAA,

“a British citizen may wrongly be deprived of British citizenship, a refugee be returned to a place where they risk persecution or torture, a British family with a foreign member may be broken up, or an EU citizen be denied Withdrawal Agreement rights.”

Those are all serious consequences. We must strengthen this clause. It is not sufficient for this to be left to chance, to the courts or to later guidance on the IIAA produced by Ministers. It is so basic to fairness that it should be on the face of the Bill.

Amendment 68 fixes an omission from the Bill by the Government. It proposes preventing an IIAA adjudicator from reviewing their own decision. Under clause 6, the IIAA currently has the power to review its own decisions. In principle, there is nothing objectionable in this. The mechanism could provide a cheaper, quicker way to overturn inaccurate decisions than an appeal to the upper tribunal and provides a way for mistakes to be corrected quickly and without fuss. However, there is no provision in the Bill to say that an individual IIAA adjudicator cannot review their own decision when it is challenged.

I should note that the first-tier tribunal currently has the power to review its own decisions but adjudicators will not have the independence, experience and legal expertise of tribunal judges—at least if the Government have their way. It would be against fairness for such a non-judicial adjudicator to be in effect a judge in their own case. The adjudicator reviewing their own decision would also have an uncomfortable conflict of interest: either validate their own professional competence or vindicate the rule of law. No adjudicator should be put in that position and no asylum appellant should have their appeal dealt with in this unfair and potentially biased way.

Any internal review of an IIAA asylum decision should be heard by a different adjudicator who is as independent as possible from the original adjudicator. Amendment 68 is the best way to secure the psychological and emotional distance needed to conduct a fair review. It is perhaps indicative of the lack of serious thought that has gone into the Government’s proposals that the Bill does not contain a safeguard so basic and so clearly needed. The amendment would prevent an adjudicator from reviewing their own decision in any circumstances, thus increasing the chances of a fair and independent review. I hope it will be supported by us all today.

Government amendment 29 provides for information to be given on legal representation. That is an improvement on the original Bill, but a lot more should be done to prevent an appellant from being disadvantaged because they cannot obtain legal representation.

I welcome new clause 2, which inserts some concrete steps to provide some assistance in some cases, and the Government’s recognition of the significant issues when it comes to the availability of legal advice for people in different parts of the asylum system, which I have seen with my own eyes. It would be helpful, though, to know more about the Government’s thinking and their plans for providing this advice. How much additional funding and resource will the Home Office provide to deliver it? Will the Government commit to consulting with relevant groups and organisations that support people seeking asylum on how this advice can best be provided and routed to those most in need?

[Blake Stephenson]

The procedure rules will determine how fast the appeals authority works in practice, time limits, hearings, evidence and late claims. As Professor Ekins warned in oral evidence, they are also the part of this scheme most exposed to legal challenge. The group that we are considering includes clause 4, schedule 3 and clause 5, which cover the rules and the board that makes them, together with amendments 63 and 68 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, a set of Government amendments to schedule 3 and Government new clause 2 on advice and representation, so there is a lot in there.

Clause 4 provides for the appeals authority procedure rules, made by the procedure rules board after consultation, with regard to the objectives in clause 1. They are to be made by statutory instruments subject to the negative procedure. Schedule 3 sets out what they may contain, including time limits, restrictions on fresh applications, decisions without a hearing and the treatment of late evidence. Clause 5 sets up the board that will write the appeals authority’s procedure rules, including the chief executive, the chief appeals officer, the professional standards officer and standing members appointed by the chair.

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Government amendment 36 sets out that the IIAA may undertake a review of a decision under clause 6 only to determine whether that decision contains an error of law. Without that express limitation, the clause could be engaged by broader vexatious or trivial applications to prolong the time it takes for an appeal to be finalised. The amendment therefore establishes clearly on the face of the Bill that a review under the clause is concerned with errors of law. The amendment does not prevent factual mistakes or procedural irregularities from being corrected. The IIAA procedure rules may provide separate mechanisms for dealing with such matters, including under paragraph 17 of schedule 3. The Government amendment preserves an effective internal safeguard while ensuring that the clause 6 review power remains focused, efficient and consistent. The Government amendment and clauses 6 and 7 together will ensure the correct balance and safeguards of internal review and external appeal.

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause allows the IIAA to review its own decisions once, to correct errors, amend reasons or remake the decision. An internal review of that kind is consistent with the Opposition’s own plan for a short internal appeal. Clause 7 provides the only route from the IIAA to a court—appeal to the upper tribunal on a point of law, with permission—and also applies to the post-Cart ouster in section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, with refusals of permission. Government amendment 36 limits the IIAA’s power of review to errors of law. Errors of fact will instead be corrected under the procedure rules. We do not oppose that. A review that can reopen the facts is a rehearing by another name.

That changes the argument about clause 1(8), however. The narrower the IIAA’s own remedies, the harder it is to say that there is an adequate alternative to judicial review. How will errors of fact be corrected, and how quickly? Do the Government still regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy? What time limit will apply and will a pending review delay removal or an onward appeal? I think that the Minister touched on that in her remarks, but I will be grateful if she could unpack that somewhat. How many reviews do the Government expect, and what effect will those have on the upper tribunal? Do the Government regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy that justifies excluding judicial review?

The Government’s own impact assessment—admittedly the one published earlier, not the one published yesterday, because I have not seen that—expects a “sustained increase in demand” on the upper tribunal. What additional capacity—judges, sitting days and so on—has been funded, and how many onward appeals does the impact assessment assume? What proportion of IIAA decisions do the Government expect to be set aside?

Clause 6(3) is significant; it applies the partial ouster that the previous Conservative Government enacted in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which was drafted precisely with narrow exceptions and is accepted by the courts. Professor Ekins, in his oral evidence a few weeks ago, told us that the model could be applied here to IIAA decisions. If that is right for the upper tribunal, why is it not right for clause 1(8)?

I have two final questions. First, will time periods such as those in clause 8 apply to upper tribunal appeals? Secondly, where an error of law is found, will the upper tribunal remake decisions itself or send them back? We support Government amendment 36 and clauses 6 and 7. A credible internal review and speed at the second stage, as well as the first, are part of a system that is fast, final and defensible in court.

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for the constructive way they have approached the clauses and amendments. As I mentioned, the clauses are important to ensure that decisions can be reviewed either by the authority itself or by the upper tribunal where there are errors in law. The Government amendment in this group seeks to clarify this position and support it on the face of the Bill.

I will turn to a few of the questions raised. On the point of law and the question posed about whether a review power is necessary if there is already a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, the review power enables IIAA to correct errors directly without requiring parties to pursue what can be a longer and more resource-intensive appeals process. This can lead to quicker resolution of cases and reduce unnecessary onward appeals. On the supposition that this is just an additional layer of appeal: it is not. The clause provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions, as I said. It does not remove or replace the onward right of appeal to the tribunal. The review mechanism and the onward appeal route operate as part of the wider appeals process established by the Bill.

On the question whether an appeal is limited to a point of law, this measure reflects the existing onward appeal route from the first-tier tribunal. The IIAA will determine the merits of the case. The upper tribunal’s role is to consider whether the law was applied correctly rather than, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire mentioned, to provide a full rehearing. I think reference was made to why permission is required as well. Permission provides an appropriate filter so that we can ensure that appeals only within an arguable point of law proceed. We are keen to avoid unnecessary resource expenditure and delay in the finality of decisions. Permission may be sought from either the independent immigration appeals authority or the upper tribunal. Any further questions, particularly around costs, will continue to develop during the process and development of the policy, and I will continue to keep Members updated.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

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[Blake Stephenson]

I am going to start using the words “appeals authority”, because “IIAA” is doing my head in.

Clause 8 lets the Home Secretary set time periods for the appeals authority decisions, with extensions where compliance is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Opposition supports statutory deadlines; 67-week waits for an appeal are, frankly, indefensible.

Amendment 89, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, is a probing amendment. It would require the first regulation setting time periods to be made within six months of the appeals authority being established, and require the appeals authority’s annual report to say how often a deadline was extended. A power to set deadlines is, of course, not a deadline. What periods do the Government intend, and when will the first regulations be made? Extensions “in the interests of justice” could become routine. How often do the Government expect them, and will extension rates be published? There is also a puzzle in here: schedule 1 repeals the 24-week statutory timeframes in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 before they have even come into force, and I would like to know from the Minister why that is the case. Why are out-of-country appeals, including deportation appeals after certification, excluded? What happens if the appeals authority simply misses a deadline? Is there any consequence beyond a line in an annual report?

Amendment 83 would broaden the list of those the Home Secretary must consult before setting time periods to include people with protection status, those with lived experience of the asylum system and legal practitioners, as we have just heard from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Consultations of course have their place, but this list would turn every set of regulations into a lengthy exercise and delay the very deadlines we need, so we intend to oppose that amendment.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I should probably have directed my intervention to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. The point she was making is that decisions done too speedily are against the interests of justice and fairness. The argument the shadow Minister is making—a far more powerful one from my point of view—is that delays make the system unfair. Of course, that is the system we currently have, which is why I support the position that he has taken in support of the Government.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank my hon. Friend for those very kind words about how powerful my arguments are. I am sure the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion will respond to that when she has the opportunity.

[Siân Berry]

My arguments were not that it should be longer, but that it should be the right amount of time to achieve fairness and justice. I am sure that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East would not disagree that the right amount of time is essential, and that shorter is not necessarily better.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention.

The Opposition will support clause 8 and oppose amendment 83. We want deadlines that are set, met and reported on. If the Minister can tell us when the first regulations will be made and that extension rates will be published, we will not press amendment 89 to a vote.

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[Anna Turley]

The clause allows the Secretary of State to request expedition of an appeal, bail application or procedural step within these proceedings where there is a public interest in securing a quicker resolution. This is an exceptional power for exceptional cases. It ensures that matters of particular importance can be brought to the attention of the IIAA for consideration of expedited treatment.

Let me be clear: this is a power to request expedition, not direct it. The IIAA decides whether a case should be accelerated and may refuse a request where expedition would not be reasonably practicable or would not be in the interests of justice. Nothing in the clause permits Ministers to influence the outcome of proceedings or diminishes the authority’s independence. Cases will continue to be determined impartially and on their merits. The clause is a balanced safeguard. It supports the timely resolution of cases, engaging public interest while preserving fairness and independence. The principle is simple: the Secretary of State may ask, but the authority decides.

Government amendment 37 seeks to ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently with the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendments make equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relate to a person being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Clause 9 applies where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under that expedited process are treated consistently with the cases subject to the late claims process.

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause lets the Home Secretary ask the authority to expedite a case where it is in the public interest. The authority must agree unless it is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Home Office has said that the power will be used for cases such as high harm foreign offenders and human rights claims that are clearly without merit. The Opposition support that.

On amendment 90, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, the principal question is: why leave it to discretion? The public have a direct interest in foreign criminals being deported and being deported quickly, so why leave it to the Home Secretary’s case-by-case discretion? Amendment 90 would require the authority to expedite any appeal by a person who is liable to deportation and has been convicted of an offence either here or abroad, exactly as if the Home Secretary had asked. Will the Government accept that incredibly sensible amendment, which I think the British public would support? I have a couple of basic questions. What criteria will the Home Secretary use, and will they be published? How many requests do the Government expect each year?

Government amendment 37 requires anyone deciding bail to consider whether the authority is expediting the person’s appeal at the Home Secretary’s request. We support that—someone whose appeal is being fast-tracked should not be released while it is heard—but it has a cost. How many additional people do the Government expect to remain in detention as a result, and is there the capacity? How do the Government intend to implement that?

On legal robustness, the House of Commons Library notes that lawyers are already asking how an appellant could challenge a decision to expedite, given clause 1(8)—we come back to clause 1(8) and the robustness, or otherwise, of that clause. That question will be answered in the courts if it is not answered here, so how do the Government expect expedition decisions to be challenged, and do they expect them to be judicially reviewed? When will the process regulations be made, and how long will the authority have to respond to a request?

We support the clause and the Government amendment. We will oppose any attempt to remove the power. Our amendment 90 would ensure that the appeals that matter most to public safety are always at the front of the queue, and I will seek to press that to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution to this debate and for tabling amendment 90. To reiterate, the Government amendment ensures that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendment makes equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9.

Let us move to amendment 90. The clause is deliberately designed to deal with cases where the Secretary of State considers that expedition would be in the public interest. It allows those cases to be identified individually and an expedition request to be made to the IIAA. Amendment 90 would instead apply expedition automatically to a broad category of appeals, which is not the purpose of the clause. Where there is a case for setting time periods for a wider group of proceedings, clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism.

That said, I think it is also important that we are not specifying a particular group in the Bill. Otherwise, potentially, we may need to amend legislation for every category of appeals that the Home Secretary wishes to expedite. It is really important that we maintain flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to public opinion and to public safety in terms of the category of appeals that she would wish to be expedited.

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[Blake Stephenson]

rose—

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, then to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk.

[Blake Stephenson]

You never know, Chair, we may be asking the same question. I asked the Minister whether she would provide some criteria—I am expanding my question, in fact—to give the public some certainty as to the decisions that the Home Secretary might make. Does the Minister expect some criteria to be published?

[Anna Turley]

It is important that we maintain flexibility, as I said. The Bill provides distinct mechanisms for very broad categories of cases and for exceptional individual cases. We should retain that flexibility, so I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on limiting the approach of the Home Secretary in the Bill. Particularly, this is also about case-specific assessment. We want to allow the Home Secretary the opportunity to look at case-specific assessments, rather than being too defined.

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[Anna Turley]

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority has a statutory objective to handle its cases quickly and efficiently. It cannot do that if it cannot enforce the requirements set out in its procedure rules. It is anticipated that the requirements on parties to proceedings will be set out clearly under the authority’s procedure rules.

Clause 10 provides the authority with a lever to set tangible consequences for non-compliance by enabling it to charge a party to proceedings, among others, who has acted “improperly, unreasonably or negligently,” and whose actions have caused the authority’s resources to be wasted. That is intended to disincentivise tactical delay. The charge will be payable to the authority, rather than an order to pay costs to another party. It will be for the authority to determine what meets the threshold for a charge according to the circumstances of the case, and the detailed operation of the power should be set out in the authority’s procedure rules. Any moneys the authority receives under the power will be paid into the consolidated fund.

Government new clause 1 will enable a party or the authority to seek enforcement, as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. That will simplify the process of recovering funds and will bring the authority in line with existing provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 10 allows the authority to charge a party or representative who acts “improperly, unreasonably or negligently” and wastes its resources, and the Opposition support it. Last-minute applications and poorly prepared cases waste time the system does not have.

I have a couple of questions. The Bar Council objects that non-lawyer adjudicators could charge or fine barristers, with a chilling effect. We do not accept that representatives should be immune from the consequences of abusing the process, but the power must be clear. What level of charge is envisaged, and will there be a cap? How often are wasted costs orders made in the tribunal now? Will a person who is charged have a right to review or appeal?

Of course, fairness cuts both ways. The Home Office is a party. The Library records that 36% of asylum appeals disposed of last year were withdrawn, and the Refugee Council attributes that to poor initial decisions, a point that was made earlier in the debate. Will the Home Office be liable to charges when it withdraws a decision shortly before a hearing, and will guidance define what counts as acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently?

Government new clause 1 makes sums payable under a decision by the authority, including charges under clause 10, recoverable as if they were county court orders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and enforceable in the sheriff court in Scotland. We support that. A charge that cannot be collected is no deterrent at all. Will charges against the Home Office be enforceable in the same way? What sums do the Government expect to be recovered each year?

We support clause 10 and Government new clause 1. A clear, fairly applied and enforceable power will discourage abuse of the process, which we think is important.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Government new clause 1 ensures there is a mechanism for the enforcement of cost orders between parties to proceedings in the authority, in addition to charges made by the authority under its powers in clause 10. The clause allows the authority to charge a participant in proceedings where it considers that they have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and that that has resulted in the authority’s resources being wasted. Schedule 3 provides for the authority to make rules in relation to cost orders, whereby the authority may order costs to be paid between parties as a result of any party acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question about whether the Home Office is accountable, yes, we will be.

The new clause enables a party or the authority to seek enforcement as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. When enforcement of a sum is pursued following the authority’s decision, that decision is to be treated as a registrable judgment in the relevant jurisdiction—in this case England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. This simplifies the process of pursuing sums payable under the authority’s decision. It is broadly in line with equivalent provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which enable tribunal costs to be enforced.

The hon. Gentleman made a few points about fairness and the ability to recoup the money. It is anticipated that the authority will take into account the circumstances of the case and the person’s ability to pay when deciding whether to impose a charge. Where there are genuine reasons for delay, for example, it is unlikely that those actions will meet the threshold for a charge. The value of the charge will, rightly, be set through the authority under its procedure rules. It will need to strike a balance between being proportionate and fair, and deterring tactical delay of the process. There will be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the charging power through the procedure rules, which will be subject to the negative procedure. We heard earlier a challenge to the use of the negative procedure, but the current tribunal rules are decided through that procedure, so there is no difference in the process.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned enforcement. The new clause provides that a sum payable under an order of the authority is enforceable as if it were payable under an order of the relevant court. That means the person to whom the money is owed as a result of a decision of the authority can rely on the court processes for the enforcement of that sum.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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Claim notices

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 11, page 8, line 36, at end insert—

“(7A) Where the recipient of a claim notice provides any reasons or grounds after the claim notice deadline, those reasons or grounds may not be relied on in any appeal before the IIAA or the Upper Tribunal unless the IIAA is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances occurring after the claim notice deadline.”

This amendment would require people served with a claim notice to raise all their grounds by the deadline, so that grounds raised later could not be relied on in an appeal unless they arise from a material change of circumstances.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 38.

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 39 to 42.

Clause 12 stand part.

Government new clause 3—Late claims process: credibility.

Government new clause 4—Late information etc: proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 11 tackles one of the most damaging features of the current system: claims raised at the last minute to prevent removal. It allows the Home Office to serve a claim notice on anyone liable to removal or deportation, requiring them to set out every reason they should be allowed to stay, including any modern slavery information, by a deadline. Clause 12 gives teeth to clause 11. Where someone ignores a claim notice and raises new grounds only once they are detained or given removal directions, their appeals will be fast-tracked and the late claim will count against them when bail is considered.

The Opposition support that approach, but there is a problem. The Minister told the Committee during the oral evidence sessions:

“More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 5, Q3.]

That is exactly the gaming of the system that the public will no longer tolerate. Our plan would require applicants to submit their claim in one go, with later claims disregarded unless there has been a material change in their home country. Clause 11 moves in that direction but stops short: a late claim goes into the late claims process and damages credibility, but it can still be heard and can still succeed. How long will people have to respond? Where will that be set? Who will be served? Beyond clauses 12 and 36, what are the consequences of failing to comply? Can late grounds still succeed on appeal?

Amendment 91 would close the gap: reasons or grounds raised after the claim notice deadline could not be relied on in an appeal before the appeal authority or the upper tribunal unless the appeal authority is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances after the deadline. That is the principle of our plan: claims must be made in one go, and later claims disregarded unless something has genuinely changed. Will the Government accept that approach and therefore our amendment?

Clause 11(10) repeals a large part of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including provisions on late evidence in section 26 and accelerated detained appeals in section 27. Why repeal them rather than bring them into force? What will replace them? The Immigration Law Practitioners Association points out that the priority removal notice regime gave recipients a period to access legal advice and clause 11 does not. We do not support the ILPA’s proposed legal advice precondition, but the Government should explain their answer to that point, because if they do not, it will be litigated.

Government amendment 38 goes further, repealing section 19(2) of the 2022 Act on credibility statements, which is replaced by new clauses 3 and 4. We do not oppose that approach. The risk is legal. Justice and the Bar Council remind us that, in the Detention Action case, the Court of Appeal quashed the detained fast-track rules because they were systematically unfair, and that the Court took comfort from specialist judges hearing those cases, which will not be true of the appeal authority. A fast track that is quashed delivers nothing.

What timetable will apply? Justice reports that the Home Office intends decisions “within a week”. What legal advice do the Government have that this process will survive legal challenge? How many cases are expected and what will happen to other appeals pushed back in the queue? What effect will the new bail conditions have on detention numbers and capacity? Will these cases, which often feature detention and are often complex, be decided by senior adjudicators?

Government amendments 39 and 42 mean that a person who gives modern-day slavery information late, after detention or after removal directions, will not go into the late claims process. I understand the reasoning, which responds to concerns from anti-trafficking organisations, but the Minister told the Committee that more than a third of failed charter returns involved a modern slavery referral raised after return arrangements were made. Does this change not reopen exactly that gap?

New clause 3 requires adjudicators in late claims cases to treat late information and late evidence as damaging credibility unless there are good reasons, and new clause 4 does the same for the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. We support them, but everything turns on “good reasons”. If that phrase is read generously, the rule will be swallowed up by the exception. Will the Government look to define it in the Bill or in guidance?

The written evidence adds two points to ILPA’s concern about legal advice. First, ILPA notes that nothing in clause 11 exempts under-18s from the credibility consequences of missing a claim notice deadline. Will children be exempt or protected by guidance? Secondly, Women for Refugee Women says that the Home Office’s guidance on gender-based claims

“recognises that late disclosure is common among survivors of trauma.”

The organisation After Exploitation and a coalition led by Hibiscus call a requirement to disclose everything at the outset “highly unrealistic”. How will the claim notice regime be applied consistently with the Home Office’s own guidance? Will trauma-related late disclosure count as a good reason? We want grounds raised early, but a regime that the Home Office’s own guidance contradicts will not survive its first test case.

Justice adds a point on Detention Action that the Minister should look to answer. When the Court of Appeal considered the fast-track rules, it took into account that independent specialist tribunal judges were hearing the cases. That will not be the case with the appeal authority. Has the Government’s legal advice taken that into account?

We support clauses 11 and 12 and the Government’s amendments, and we oppose attempts to weaken them. One notice, one deadline and one claim: that is the principle, and the Bill should apply it fully. I will seek to press amendment 91 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

As the hon. Gentleman set out, we have an issue in our system in this country with late claims that are made in detention just prior to planned removal, which inevitably require release or lead to bail, as there is no mechanism for dealing with the appeals in an expedited way. That leads to a significant degree of gaming the system and compromises removals performance.

On the late claims process, a single fast appeal process, which we are setting out here, will apply to late claims—those made after the expiry of the new claim notice. Individuals must submit all relevant information up front. Failure to do so, unless justified, will damage their credibility and result in expedited handling, which will be relevant to maintaining their detention until removal. Late disclosure of modern slavery information may similarly damage credibility unless justified.

Receiving information at the earliest opportunity helps to ensure that cases are considered on the fullest possible picture, enabling timely and better-informed decision making. Clause 11 seeks to deliver that through a new claim notice, which may be issued to individuals to inform them of the need to submit any immigration claim or modern slavery information they have to the Home Office at the earliest opportunity. Where modern slavery issues are raised, that will help support early identification of needs.

Clause 11 works in conjunction with clause 12 to ensure that individuals are informed that failing to submit an immigration claim following receipt of the notice, only to make a claim from immigration detention or after being served notice of departure details, will leave them subject to an expedited late claims process and may have negative implications for their credibility. For modern slavery purposes, the notice will advise recipients that failure to provide modern slavery information only to do so after the claim notice deadline will be taken into consideration, under clause 36, as damaging the credibility of their account by decision makers assessing whether they are a victim of trafficking, unless there are “good reasons” for the delay. Clause 11 is intended to encourage early disclosure of immigration or modern slavery information and remove any perceived advantage of delayed disclosure.

Clause 12 sets out that anyone who receives a claim notice, as set out in clause 11, but makes a claim or provides information only after the deadline given in the notice when they are either in immigration detention or have received notice of their departure details from the UK will enter the expedited late claims process. It also states that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the authority will hear any appeal against such a late claim as a priority above all other claim types. The provision supports earlier disclosure of claims and enables more efficient and expedited determination of late claims. The swift timescales associated with the late claims process will support the maintenance in immigration detention, and subsequent removal from the UK, of these individuals.

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Inspections

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 13, page 10, line 33, at end insert—

“(d) the proportion of decisions of the IIAA set aside on appeal to the Upper Tribunal;

(e) the number of persons removed from the United Kingdom following the dismissal of an appeal by the IIAA.”

This probing amendment would require the Chief Inspector’s reports on the IIAA to cover the outcomes of its work – decisions set aside on appeal and removals after dismissed appeals – as well as process.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 28—IIAA: publication of data—

“(1) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the publication of data relating to the work of the IIAA.

(2) The data required by this section must be updated and published at least every three months.

(3) The data to be published under this section must include—

(a) the number of appeals submitted to the IIAA;

(b) the number of decisions made by the IIAA;

(c) the outcomes of decisions made by the IIAA;

(d) the proportion of people submitting appeals to the IIAA who had legal representation;

(e) the number of appeals waiting to be processed by the IIAA;

(f) the length of time taken for a decision to be made on an appeal by the IIAA;

(g) the number of appeals that were withdrawn before being heard by the IIAA;

(h) the number of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6; and

(i) the outcomes of reviews of decisions made by the IIAA under section 6.

(4) The data published must, where possible, be broken down by—

(a) the type of appeal;

(b) the nationality of the person submitting the appeal;

(c) the gender of the person submitting the appeal; and

(d) the age of the person submitting the appeal.”

This new clause would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter (as is the case for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal), of data relating to the work of the IIAA.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 13 brings the authority within the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, with an annual report and the chief executive’s response laid before Parliament. The Opposition support accountability to Parliament, as we have discussed on several occasions today.

Amendment 92 is another probing amendment. The inspection regime in clause 13 focuses on process: premises, technology and training. Parliament will also want to know whether the authority is working. Dr Sumption told us that the data needed to judge those reforms—what happens to refused cases and how many decisions are overturned—largely does not exist.

Amendment 92 would require the chief inspector’s report to cover two outcomes: the proportion of the authority’s decisions set aside by the upper tribunal, and the number of people removed after the appeals authority dismisses their appeal. Will inspection reports cover those outcomes? What additional resources will the chief inspector receive? Is one report a year enough in the first years? When would material be omitted from published reports?

New clause 28, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require quarterly publication of data of the authority’s work on appeals, outcomes, representation, the backlog, timings, withdrawals and reviews. It overlaps with our amendment 88 on decision quality. Transparency around whether the new body is working is in everyone’s interest. I hope the Government will say whether they intend to publish data of that kind.

We support clause 13. Scrutiny should measure results, not just process. If the Minister can give assurances on the outcome data, we will not press amendment 92.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the shadow Minister that amendment 92 and new clause 28 are quite compatible. They both ask for more data from the Government and the IIAA about its work and what is going on. That is essential.

My new clause 28 would require the Home Secretary to arrange for the publication, at least every quarter—that timing is the same as for the existing Immigration and Asylum Tribunal—of data relating to the work of the appeals authority. It sets out properly detailed requirements for quarterly data publication. It includes requirements for information on decisions, appeals and outcomes, including where the appeals authority has reviewed decisions ahead of appeals and where appellants withdraw; information about who has had legal representation; and information about backlogs, timelines and delays on decisions.

The new clause also ensures that we can see that data broken down by nationality, gender and age, and what kind of appeal grounds are being made. Given the concern about the discriminatory and human rights impact of the Bill on people claiming asylum and our obligations under international agreements, all that information is essential.

We cannot have a publication scheme only set out by the appeals authority itself or by Ministers. It is important that Parliament should put such essential reporting information into the Bill; otherwise, we will simply not know the consequences of those changes or their consequences will become a matter of contention and further politicise the lives of those seeking asylum here. I have a related new clause that asks for a report in a similar fashion on current decision making, and the comparison between the two is vital.

I asked the Minister for some baseline data on the current situation during the oral evidence sessions. The reason I asked is that until March 2023 we had quite a lot of details, including around nationality, in the Home Office’s own quarterly statistics release. However, for over three years now, the appeal statistics have not been included, and we do not see the information about nationality broken down. The letter we received from the Minister on 6 October gave some information about the breakdown of different human rights grounds, which was useful, but unless comprehensive information is provided about the current situation and the changes that will take place when we introduce the appeals authority, we will not really see the impact of the Bill. This is absolutely essential.

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[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.

As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.

More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.

[Blake Stephenson]

Given the insufficient assurance on the outcome data, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Anna Turley]

Clause 14 addresses the dual-running process between the authority and the first-tier tribunal. It gives a power to the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor to, among other things, transfer property, rights, liabilities or staff used by the first-tier tribunal from the Secretary of State to the authority. This provision allows for operational flexibility and makes for a smoother transition in case it is later decided that assets or property should transfer to the authority.

Clause 15 provides an essential safeguard during implementation of the authority. Its principal purpose is to protect continuity. Before part 1 is fully in force, clause 15 provides for specified descriptions of cases that would be decided by the authority to be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This could prove necessary in case of a significant disruption affecting the authority’s operation—for example, to manage unpredictable spikes in demand in the implementation period when the authority is not yet fully formed.

The clause may also be used to correct the rare occurrence in which a case needs to be moved to another body. This ensures that cases are heard by the appropriate forum without avoidable procedural complexity. This is not a power to influence individual decisions, avoid judicial scrutiny or alter appeal rights. Appeals will continue to be determined independently and in accordance with the law. Clause 15 simply provides the resilience and flexibility needed to keep cases moving and correct exceptional allocation discrepancies.

Clause 16 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision that is consequential on part 1 of the Bill, which establishes the authority. The clause ensures that the wider statute book can operate properly when functions transfer from the first-tier tribunal to the IIAA. It provides that the authority is generally to be treated as a tribunal where legislation applies to tribunals. However, not every provision applying to tribunals will necessarily be suitable for the authority. The clause therefore enables regulations to modify how individual provisions apply, or to disapply them where appropriate. The clause may be used to amend, repeal or revoke provision made by primary legislation that has been passed before the Bill receives Royal Assent, or passed later in the same parliamentary Session.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to the new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the usual rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

[Blake Stephenson]

This group brings together the machinery clauses of part 1: transfer schemes in clause 14, the transition in clause 15, and the consequential power in clause 16. I will speak to amendment 93 tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and to Government amendment 43.

Clause 14 is technical in nature. It allows transfer schemes to move property, rights and liabilities to the appeals authority. The Opposition support that, but it is also where the costs of the reorganisation begin to show. The impact assessment—again, the previous impact assessment, not the one that was issued yesterday—warns of significant judicial liabilities in winding down the tribunal, because full-time judges hold lifetime appointments and there are the additional costs of running two systems. What is the estimated cost of winding down the tribunal? How many staff will transfer? Why does the Lord Chancellor, as well as the Home Secretary, need this power? What will the parallel running costs be?

We want the new body up to speed as quickly as possible. Will existing first-tier immigration judges be able to transfer or apply as senior adjudicators, for example, should they wish to? How many of them do the Government expect to apply and employ? The Law Society points out that the impact assessment says the implementation plans are “not yet fully developed”, which I think the Minister reflected earlier. Will a full costing of the transfer be published before any scheme is made?

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[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response, his questions and his challenges. Amendment 93 proposes that the authority should be able to transfer cases back to the first-tier tribunal only for a maximum of three years after clause 1 comes into force. If the amendment were to be accepted, it would reduce the flexibility within the overall appeals system to reduce the appeals backlog while simultaneously determining new appeals. I am afraid we are not able to set an arbitrary target of that kind, although I am sure that, given that we are bringing this Bill forward, the hon. Gentleman will understand our sense of urgency behind this transition. He need be in no doubt about the urgency with which we want to make this transition.

The length of time that the FTT IAC—even more acronyms—and the authority will need to run concurrently to ensure optimal efficiency in the overall appeals system will depend on a number of operational matters when the authority is established as a new statutory body corporate. Therefore, legislating for an arbitrary cut-off point of three years is unhelpful, and may result in appeals taking longer than necessary to be determined. We need to be flexible and responsive, which the current drafting of the Bill allows us to do.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire challenged me as to why that cannot be done by the Secretary of State. It is not appropriate for the Home Secretary to lead on that; the Lord Chancellor doing so is obviously more appropriate.

Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the normal rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

More importantly, the power is tightly constrained and can be exercised only in connection with regulations made under clause 15, which provides that regulations can be made to transfer cases from the authority back to the first-tier tribunal, and clause 52, which provides for commencement regulations. The power is intended to be used only where urgent rule changes that cannot be taken forward in the usual process are required.

Given that the power to make rules is otherwise exercised by the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals before exercising it. The power is appropriately constrained and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, as defined, must be approved by both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Other regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative procedure.

In response to the question of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire about which cases will transfer, clause 52 makes provision for the commencement regulations, including setting out which cases will transition and when. On his questions about cost and implementation, as I have said, detailed plans for the authority, including the costs, are being developed, and work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine the authority costs and establish comparable, current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. There are not yet agreed or publishable figures for either comparison, as programme costs, affordability and benefits will be developed through the business case.

The hon. Gentleman also asked when the authority will start to make decisions, and when it will take all new appeals. The authority will be introduced through a phased transition, with the FTT IAC continuing to hear existing appeals in parallel while the new authority begins taking specified cohorts of new cases. We know that the current system is taking too long to deliver decisions, so the Bill creates a more scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness.

[Blake Stephenson]

The Minister did not respond to my question about the projection that by the time the appeals authority gets up and running, approximately 200,000 people could be waiting for an appeal. Does that projection resonate with the Minister? Is that situation a possibility?

[Anna Turley]

Could the hon. Gentleman say where he got that figure from?

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[Blake Stephenson]

The figure is taken from the evidence the Committee received from Refugee and Migrant Justice.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. I do not recognise that figure, but of course, the Government want to make sure that we are fully aware of the figures. As was detailed at the start of the Committee’s consideration, the Government know that there are a huge number of appeals in the backlog. As the authority is developed and starts to come into force, the transition will be made. I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman any projections, as I would not want to mislead the Committee with any numbers or predictions we could make at this stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Power to specify cases to be heard by First-tier Tribunal instead of IIAA

Amendment made: 43, in clause 15, page 13, line 2, at end insert—

“(4) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedural Rules in connection with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.

(5) Before making rules under subsection (4), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals.

(6) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (4) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under clause 15 transferring cases back to the First-Tier Tribunal from the IIAA. (See also amendment 46.)

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

I commend clause 17 and amendments 96, 130 and 131 to the Committee.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart.

I thank the Minister for her opening remarks, and indeed for pre-empting and answering some of the questions that I have in my speech. It is almost as if she might have had a spy in my team, looking at the questions that I might ask. For these debates on the ECHR, we perhaps had a dry run yesterday in the first Opposition day debate.

Let me start by saying that the Opposition oppose clause 17—perhaps not a surprise to Members, as we said so in our reasoned amendment on Second Reading—and we will vote against its standing part of the Bill. Our amendments are tabled to test the Government’s reasoning. Some of our points have already been answered by the Minister, but I will go through them for the record. If the Committee decides to keep the clause, we submit that our amendments would limit the damage that it will cause.

Clause 17 is the first clause of part 2 of the Bill, which the Government believe is the answer on article 8 of the ECHR. That makes this the right place to ask the question on which the whole debate on part 2 will turn: does the Bill change what a court must do when someone says that article 8 prevents their removal, or does it simply change what the court should have regard to? I will deal first with clause 17 itself and then with what it tells us about the Bill as a whole.

The clause creates a new statutory category of “sponsor human rights claim”. This would enable someone already situated in the UK to submit an application directly to the Secretary of State, at a location designated by the Secretary of State. Such a claim would assert that refusing a member of their family entry to the UK would breach article 8. Subsection (1)(d) then brings those sponsor claims within the scope of the human rights appeals framework set out in part 5 of the 2002 Act. As the explanatory notes confirm, the effect is that the UK-based sponsor becomes the claimant, with the right to appeal.

As the Minister went through, subsections (3) to (7) then carve out sponsor claims from the provisions that apply to other human rights claims in the 2002 Act. They cannot be declared inadmissible under section 80A of the 2002 Act; they cannot be certified as clearly unfounded under section 94; they sit outside the statutory timeframe in section 86B—I suspect that the civil servants might be looking those up now for the Minister—and there are bespoke rules on pending and abandoned appeals.

The Government are presenting these changes as a tightening of the rules: overseas family members may not claim, because the sponsor must. However, our reasoned amendment on Second Reading set out our concern that the Bill would allow sponsor human rights claims and so enable people outside the UK to enter on human rights grounds. There is nothing in the evidence, nor in what the Minister said in her opening remarks, to convince me that that concern was misplaced, so I have a few points to go through, if I may.

[Melanie Onn]

Is the shadow Minister’s principal concern that the clause will result in an increase in overseas human rights claims?

[Blake Stephenson]

Yes, and fundamentally I think the clause is tinkering around the edges with the application of the ECHR. We have been here before; I will come on to this later in my speech. Successive Governments have tried to do this, but my fundamental concern is that the clause will not work.

Let me turn first to the drafting. The explanatory notes say that overseas article 8 applications must be made by the sponsor, but the clause defines a claim as made

“at a place designated by the Secretary of State”.

As the House of Commons Library points out, it deals with the appeal stage; it does not say how claims are lodged in the first place. Minister, where in the Bill is the provision that stops an overseas family member applying? Which places will be designated and by what regulations, rules or guidance?

Who holds the right of appeal today? In written evidence submitted to the Committee, the Bar Council stated:

“Until now, an application for entry clearance to come to the UK had to be made by the person overseas and any appeal against refusal had to be brought by them.”

Clause 17 would now give the UK-based sponsor an appeal of their own. Does the Minister accept that clause 17 introduces a right of appeal that currently does not exist today? If so, how is clause 17 in any way, as she says, tightening the rules?

Secondly, I want to discuss the exemptions. Clause 17 leaves inadmissibility and certification in place for other human rights claims. Why should a sponsor claim be exempt from both? On amendments 95 and 96, I note that the Government have adopted our amendment 96, for which I am grateful. I am sure that they did so for their own good reasons, not just to copy and paste an Opposition amendment. Those amendments were tabled to remove those exemptions. They were probing amendments, but let us assume that amendment 96 probed sufficiently for it to be taken on board by the Government. If the Minister cannot explain to the Committee for what reason a sponsor claim would be treated more favourably than any other human rights claim, the exemptions should go. Perhaps she could address that point on amendment 95 in more detail.

There is a point of drafting to consider in whether the clause actually works at all. Clause 52(5) ties the commencement of clause 17(3) to section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and clause 17(5) to section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 when it comes fully into force. The Minister may not have the answers to a complicated drafting question, but perhaps during the course of today’s debate, her civil servants might provide an answer. I note that section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act is not yet in force, and that schedule 1 to this Bill would repeal it. Would the Minister explain how clause 17(5) is meant to commence? If there is an error in drafting, will it be corrected?

I will move on to the interaction with family reunion. Three witnesses in our oral evidence sessions—Vicky Tennant of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jon Featonby of the Refugee Council and Angela Afzal of the International Rescue Committee—took views very different from the Opposition on the Bill, but their evidence is relevant as we scrutinise the clause. Ms Tennant told us that the Bill’s presumption of cohabitation

“is a difficult threshold to make”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 9, Q7.]

in the refugee context, particularly given the suspension of the refugee family reunion route. Mr Featonby estimated that probably 20,000 people have been unable to apply since that route was suspended just over a year ago. Ms Afzal warned that families could be encouraged to resort to smugglers to reunite.

The written evidence goes a bit further. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association tells us that the human rights claim

“may be the only realistic remaining path”

for refugee families while the dedicated route is suspended. The Bar Council told us that it will be the “only practical gateway”. The British Red Cross highlights that 12,888 family reunion visas were granted in the year to June 2026, and that the core protection status of cause 21 is expected to carry “no family reunion rights” at all.

Although I draw different conclusions, the dedicated route has been suspended, and the clause creates a statutory sponsor claim with a right to appeal and without safe country filters. The people with expertise in this field who gave evidence expect that it will become the main entry route, so are the Government not simply closing one back door and opening another? What assessment has the Home Office made of those numbers?

[David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)]

It is obviously not on the face of the Bill, but does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the Government’s intention to introduce safe and legal routes would ultimately solve the problem that he is describing, as raised by the witnesses?

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[Blake Stephenson]

I recognise the Government’s intentions. Of course, we are here to talk about the implications of the Bill, but I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s broader point.

The Bar Council also points out that the details of how the sponsor claims will work will be set out in immigration rules, which have not yet been made, although the Minister has referred to them. Will the Government publish the draft rules and the new refugee family reunion rules before Report so that Members of this House can know exactly what they are voting for?

The Library records that roughly 500 people abroad were granted article 8 visas in 2025. How many out-of-country applications and appeals are there each year, and how many do the Government expect there will be under clause 17?

Amendment 97 would at least confine the new right of appeal to the family, which is what the Government say article 8 is about. An appeal against a refused sponsor claim would stand only where the family member was part of the claimant’s core cohabiting family under proposed new section 117AA—that would be a spouse, civil partner, partner, minor child, or the parent of a child sponsor. If the Government truly believe in their own definition in clause 18, why will they not accept that the sponsor’s right of appeal should be limited to that definition?

Amendment 112, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, would require the Home Secretary to carry out safeguarding checks before deciding a sponsor claim. Such checks would include whether the sponsor has convictions, protective orders or findings for domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage, or a history of immigration decisions in which those matters were material. It would also require a consideration of the weight of any risk to the family member, the children or others. If the Government are to create a statutory route in which the sponsor drives the claim, the least they should do is check who the sponsor is.

I thank the Minister for supporting the amendment in principle. She described some of the existing safeguarding measures, which will be strengthened, but I would be grateful if she unpacked that somewhat more to demonstrate the Government’s clear commitment to ensuring that the spirit of the amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, will be implemented in a way that works in practice, if it is not on the face of the Bill. I ask that for a particular reason. The Minister knows that I have been asking the Home Office quite a lot of written parliamentary questions in recent months, particularly about legal immigration and visa controls. Given the responses that I have been getting, I seriously question whether the systems that the Home Office has in place to monitor, track and oversee the compliance of visa sponsors are fit for purpose. It would be prudent for the Minister to provide comfort to this Committee that there will be better controls for sponsors who use this route.

Professor Singer—who, it is worth noting, is opposed to the Bill—told us that the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in IA and others

“was a very restrictive interpretation of article 8…I do not see the courts taking a particularly liberal approach to article 8.” ––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 61, Q99.]

If that is right, what is the mischief that clause 17 addresses? Is it meant to reverse the Court of Appeal in IA, to codify it, or to do something else? I know that the Minister referred to that particular Court of Appeal case, but I would be grateful if those specific questions could be answered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Goldsborough]

I know that the Opposition place a lot of emphasis on the Lord Wolfson report on leaving the ECHR entirely, but that report states that doing so would terminate part 3 of the UK-EU trade co-operation agreement that was secured by the hon. Gentleman’s party, meaning that we would leave Eurojust, Europol and fast-track expedition frameworks. All that puts us at risk of not being able to manage the immigration system in the fair and transparent way that our constituents want. Does he not agree?

[Blake Stephenson]

Funnily enough, I do not agree with the hon. Member—shock horror. Lord Wolfson produced an extremely extensive piece of legal advice, running to some 180 pages, which the hon. Member has, I am sure, read from front to back. There are absolutely no legal impediments to us leaving the ECHR, and to do so would resolve the issues before us in the Bill. Some of the matters that he has raised are political rather than legal, in the sense that they can be negotiated politically. The important thing is that we are fair to the British people and that we have an immigration system that they can have confidence in, and we can deliver that only by departing from the ECHR. I do not want to go down rabbit warrens on all the reasons why it is a fantastic policy, but no doubt the hon. Member will ask further questions as we proceed.

The one time Parliament tried to disapply the convention in this area—hon. Members will love to hear the word “Rwanda”, I am sure—was in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The provision never took effect and was repealed by the Labour Government in 2025. Government and Parliament must be willing to take steps that require the courts to decide convention cases differently. That is the direction in which the evidence we heard points this Bill Committee.

If the Government will not change the framework and merely ask the courts to “have regard”, part 2 will at best deliver what the Government’s own impact assessment predicts: refusals that do not become removals. Why have the Government not considered giving the courts a direction that they cannot set aside—an exclusive code, for example, or disapplication of the Human Rights Act in this context? If they have considered that but have not moved forward with it, can the Minister explain why it was rejected?

The unfortunate reality for the Bill is that the Government are falling into the same trap as previous Governments: legislation that is well meaning—even well drafted—and designed to circumvent the constraints of the ECHR. The courts will inevitably default to the same positions that they always have, allowing people who have no right to be in this country to stay for longer in the meantime. If, or more likely when, this Bill fails to genuinely empower the Government to deal with the extensive grounds for resisting removal that the various articles of the convention create, will the Minister and other Labour Members finally join us in accepting that the issue here is not how carefully the legislation is drafted but the ECHR itself, and that we cannot have a meaningful conversation about restoring control over our immigration system without taking steps to leave the ECHR?

[Ben Goldsborough]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Blake Stephenson]

I am going to close, because I think I have spoken enough and time is pressing on.

Clause 17 creates a new statutory claim for sponsors, and new rights of appeal, which will become the main route for refugee families. It exempts those claims from the safe country filter. Its detail is left to rules that we have not seen, and it commences by reference to provisions that are not yet in force or that the Bill would repeal. Amendment 84, which would have left out the clause, has not been selected, so the Committee will instead decide the matter by voting on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. For the reasons I have mentioned in this speech, which has gone on far too long, the Opposition will vote against it.

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I am speaking a little earlier than I had expected—I misunderstood the shadow Minister. I thought he was just getting started, but it turns out that he considers his speech on the long side. Just for the record, I do not.

I am going to address the wider issue of whether the Bill, the clause and this set of amendments really do address the issue that the Minister, and indeed the entire Government, want them to. Their intention, as I understand it—I do not think this is controversial, at least given what the Government say they want to do—is to reduce the number of claims, to ensure that claims are genuine and to create efficiencies in the system. Of course, we all have those aims. I think that the Government have made a genuine attempt with the Bill, but as far as I can see, it will fail substantially.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

Family life

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 18, page 15, line 14, leave out from “must” to end of line 15 and insert

“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”

This amendment would require courts and tribunals to decide whether Article 8 is engaged in accordance with new section 117AA, rather than only to have regard to it.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 99, in clause 18, page 15, line 21, leave out “normally”.

This amendment, with Amendments 101 and 102, would remove the word “normally” from new section 117AA so that family life for the purposes of Article 8 is limited to the core cohabiting family and the other relationships specified, without an open-ended qualification.

Amendment 100, in clause 18, page 15, line 25, at end insert

“(but only where A and the partner have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years)”.

This amendment would require a partner who is not a spouse or civil partner to have lived with the person in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years to count as part of the core cohabiting family.

Government amendment 44.

Amendment 101, in clause 18, page 15, line 30, leave out “normally”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.

Government amendment 45.

Amendment 102, in clause 18, page 15, line 33, leave out “normally”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.

Amendment 103, in clause 18, page 16, line 17, leave out subsection (6).

This amendment would remove the provision allowing the factors excluded by new section 117AA(5) to be considered at the public interest stage, to test whether subsection (6) undoes the effect of subsection (5).

Clause stand part.

[Blake Stephenson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.

Clause 18 is at the heart of part 2 of the Bill, and is where the Government set out for the first time in statute, as we heard earlier, what counts as family life for the purposes of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Other than the fact that the Conservatives would withdraw from the ECHR to implement our borders plan, allow me to say at the outset that the Opposition do support the broad direction of travel of the clause. The public are entitled to expect that the right to respect for family life protects genuine, close family relationships and does not stretch to cover extended relationships and loosely evidenced dependency, which is the very problem that the Government’s explanatory notes identify. In my opinion, the question for the Committee is not whether the clause points the right way; it is whether it will make any difference at all in the courtroom. On the evidence the Committee has heard and read so far, I fear the answer is unfortunately that it will make very little difference.

Clause 18 does three things. First, subsection (3) inserts a two-stage sequence into section 117A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. A court or tribunal must first decide whether article 8 is engaged at all, having regard in particular to proposed new section 117AA, and only then turn to the public interest question. Secondly, clause 18(4) inserts proposed new section 117AA into the 2002 Act. A person’s family life is normally limited to their core cohabiting family: a spouse, civil partner or partner and minor children or parents, to the extent that they live together. A parent who does not live with a child does not normally have family life with that child unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, and an adult does not normally have family life with another adult unless they live together as partners or there is an additional element of dependency beyond normal emotional ties.

Thirdly, clause 18(5) lists four things that, on their own, do not amount to that additional dependency: financial dependence; illness, unless it meets a three-part test of constant care; emotional resilience; and concern for a relative living in a country affected by war or instability. Subsection (6) then provides that nothing in subsection (5) stops the court considering those same factors when it comes to the public interest question.

Why is the direction right? There is a real problem here. Mr Smith, the former director general of Border Force, told the Committee that article 8 is

“often used as a lever quite late in the process”,––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 44, Q67.]

as we all know from the cases we hear about on the news.

The Minister gave the Committee an example from Home Office casework of a man who falsely claimed paternity of eight children and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. Families, of course, take many forms, and nobody on this side of the Committee wishes to deny that. However, the law should be clear that the core of family life is the family that lives together, and that anything beyond it must be proved. We support the principle of the clause, but we have been here before—I refer to the debate on clauses in group 14 and the many good speeches made—with the immigration rules in 2012 and the Immigration Act 2014. I want to test whether this clause will succeed where those attempts did not.

First, on the language, proposed new section 117AA to the 2002 Act does not say that family life is limited to the core cohabiting family; it says that it is “normally” limited to it. The same word appears in subsections (3) and (4). Professor Ekins told us that this word is where the litigation will end up turning. Justice, which opposes this part of the Bill, makes the same point from the other side: its written evidence accepts that the use of “normally”, together with the need only to “have regard” to those considerations,

“preserves the possibility of finding family life beyond these prescribed circumstances.”

I ask the Minister: in what circumstances do the Government expect a court to find family life outside the core cohabiting family, and will that be set out anywhere? If the Government cannot say, why is the word “normally” there at all? Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would remove it.

Secondly, let us look at the duty itself. Proposed new subsection (1B) to section 117A says that the court

“must (in particular) have regard to”

section 117AA. It does not say that the court must apply it—that matters. In Rhuppiah, a case mentioned in the previous sitting, the Supreme Court held that the “have regard” formula in the 2014 Act

“cannot put decision-makers in a strait-jacket”.

As was mentioned earlier, Chris Rowe of Swansea University, writing for the UK Constitutional Law Association, described the device as “insufficiently potent” to force a result incompatible with the convention. Clause 18 uses exactly the same device. What in proposed new subsections (1A) to (1C) to section 117A differs in kind from the formula that the Supreme Court has already held cannot bind? Amendment 98 would replace “have regard to” with a requirement that the court determine the question in accordance with proposed new section 117AA.

Proposed new section 117AA(5) tells the court that financial dependence, illness, emotional reliance and concern for a relative in a war zone do not, on their own, create family life. Subsection (6) tells the court that it may consider every one of those factors when it weighs the public interest. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association adds that the Bill is silent on whether those factors may be combined when the court decides whether there is an additional element of dependency, and that the Strasbourg court, in Kumari and Martinez Alvarado, allows exactly that. If the court reads a combination test into paragraph (4)(b) to keep the clause compatible, the list in subsection (5) will do very little work. What is subsection (6) for, if not to give back at the second stage what subsection (5) takes away at the first? Amendment 103 would leave it out, to test exactly that.

The central question is whether clause 18 changes the law. The Government’s human rights memorandum says that proposed new section 117AA codifies the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life. The House of Commons Library notes that the Strasbourg court has itself said, in Kumari v. the Netherlands, that family life is

“normally limited to the core family”,

and it records Professor Singer’s view on the clause’s effect, that

“it is unclear how this would differ significantly from current practice”.

However, the Law Society tells this Committee that the new emphasis on cohabitation is

“a significant move away from the current position in UK law and a substantial narrowing of Article 8 protections.”

Justice says the clause

“falls short of codifying the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life, despite the Government’s assertion to the contrary in its ECHR memorandum”,

in particular for

“young adults who are still living with their parents”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Blake Stephenson]

I was just about to close, but I will gladly give way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Goldsborough]

As the hon. Member very kindly name-checked my speech yesterday, I need to thank him first of all. He says there is no issue of “Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels” when leaving the ECHR, but there is an issue concerning our colleagues and friends on the island of Ireland. What would be the result of leaving the ECHR when it comes to the Good Friday agreement? There is no question about it: Lord Wolfson may say that there may or may not be an issue with that, but the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission has noted that there would be an issue, and we have the history as well. Anything that comes back with this idea that, “Well, Australia and New Zealand don’t operate within these systems,” does not take into account the history of the island of Ireland.

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was correct to say that I was far too generous in taking it; I should have just closed my speech.

The hon. Member for South Norfolk clearly recognises that the Opposition commissioned Lord Wolfson to conduct a very serious legal analysis of the benefits or otherwise of leaving the ECHR, which he has done. I go back to the comment I made earlier about how there are no legal barriers to us departing the ECHR. There is no risk to the Union and there is no risk to the Good Friday agreement in a legal sense. It will, of course, result in a political discussion, and that will be had at the appropriate time, but the political questions that will arise are not insurmountable.

I will now close. The Opposition support the aim of clause 18 and will not oppose it standing part of the Bill. We support Government amendments 44 and 45, but a definition that is qualified by “normally” applied through a duty only to “have regard to”, with the excluded factors let back in by clause 18(6), is a definition that the courts can step around. I will seek to press amendments 98 and 99 to a Division.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair today, Mr Twigg.

I take completely the opposite position from the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire in almost every respect. I am going to speak against clause 18 and its inclusion in the Bill, and I am going to oppose the Government amendments that would put further tests on parent-child relationships and parental involvement for refugees. I will also be opposing the Conservative amendments, which would put even tighter constraints on family life.

I am here to defend our article 8 protections—I say “our”, because I believe it is really important that we set laws for refugees and asylum seekers that we would happily be subject to ourselves. That is absolutely at the core of the universal nature of human rights and the international agreements we have made to respect human rights around the world in the way that we would want them to be respected should we be in the horrible position of needing to claim asylum.

Article 8 protects the right to family life specifically for us under the European convention on human rights. Although it is not absolute, it requires any state interference in these rights to be lawful, necessary and proportionate. I do not agree with the Government when they say in their human rights memorandum that they are taking

“proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aims.”

To me, paragraph 26 in the memorandum clearly admits that there is interference in our rights with this legislation. The Government are using the argument that they are taking “proportionate means” of “achieving the legitimate aims”, but the legitimate aims they lay out are:

“maintaining effective immigration control, economic wellbeing and the prevention of disorder or crime.”

I honestly do not see how clause 18, on family life and people making claims for reuniting their families and maintaining this essential human right protected under article 8, comes into those “proportionate means”. It is about reducing the ability of families to reunite. The impact assessment clearly says that many thousands of people who would be able to come here under current laws will be denied their claims. This is a reduction in human rights and it seriously needs looking at. I am neither equipped nor planning to add further arguments relating to Northern Ireland and the Windsor framework, but further conversations are needed about what is currently in the Bill, never mind what would happen if we withdrew from the ECHR.

Everybody on the Committee wants a fair, robust and effective immigration system—one that works and upholds the rule of law and on in which people have confidence. Article 8 is not an abstract concept within all this; it is the law that decides whether a parent can stay in the country where their children live or whether a British child grows up with both parents. We do not want to see families separated or children separated from the parents who care for them, yet that is precisely the risk posed by clause 18, according to the Government’s own impact assessment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I disagree wholly with that. During the speeches made by Opposition Members earlier in the debate, I kept thinking about the people who, due to natural disasters or wars, are left without core family, and have to find another family member who will take them in and take that place. There is an inherent danger in putting in place these limits, and in the amendments tabled by Conservative Members that would add rigid definitions. Given the stories about the different ways in which people have experienced refugee status over the years, which all hon. Members will have heard about in casework and read about in memoirs and novels, the need for this change does not ring true. We should keep the system as it is now, where the reality of every single case needs to be looked at.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady described our amendments as “rigid definitions”, but is it not right that we as legislators make sure that our definitions have certainty? We want to have a system that the British public have confidence in, and that is not the case at the moment—in good faith, the Government are trying to deal with that. Do we not need rigid definitions and certainty to achieve that?

[Siân Berry]

I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Member. We need to look at individual cases individually, as no two families are the same. We could imagine many circumstances for which we would want exceptions to this rule. The Government have rightly left caveats in the Bill, but the Opposition are arguing against them. Putting in rigid criteria on top of what is already in the Bill is absolutely the wrong way to go about addressing the issue. The best way to deal with any problems we might see is to do so in the initial decision making.

Clause 18 says that financial or emotional dependence, illness, or living in a conflict zone alone is not enough to establish family life, yet families routinely support each other financially, emotionally and practically. Ministers say that those factors can still be weighed at the public interest stage, but once family life is ruled out, that stage is never reached. What will that mean in practice? As I have hinted at, the Government’s impact assessment says that their article 8 reforms will mean 14,000 more refusals every year. Even after appeals, around 11,700 people more will be refused each year. Under the law as it stands, those people would succeed. That shows that clause 18 does not simply clarify existing principles, but is intended to change outcomes at a substantial scale. The clause does diminish human rights for refugees in this country, as is admitted in the Government’s human rights memorandum.

The way the clause is doing that is very troubling for two main reasons. First, it suggests that family relationships deserve protection only when they fit a model chosen by the state, but article 8 has never worked that way. The European Court has always looked at the substance of an individual relationship, not its form. Indeed, the very cases the Government cite require an individualised assessment of all the circumstances. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we have been here before. The examples we are hearing from the Home Secretary and the Minister come as part of what is now a mini-tradition of Home Secretaries using exaggerated anecdotes to add to toxic rhetoric about migrants.

[Blake Stephenson]

This might be an opportune moment to intervene and allow the hon. Lady to get to the right place in her notes. She mentioned that we have been here before; that was a central part of my speech. In order to break this cycle, would she not agree that the right thing to do is to depart from the ECHR?

[Siân Berry]

I thank the hon. Member for trying, but he is talking to a person who cannot read the universal declaration of human rights without welling up, and I will never give up making arguments of this sort.

Previous legislation on these matters, to which the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire referred, followed on directly from the infamous 2011 party conference speech of the then Home Secretary—now Baroness May of Maidenhead. She repeated false claims from newspapers that judges had permitted a man to escape deportation because he had a pet cat—something she says she did not make up. In reality, neither of the judges’ decisions in the case was based on the man having a pet, and the second and final decision was not based on any human rights consideration at all. It was straightforwardly based on a failure by the Home Office to apply its own policy.

Amnesty International gave us more information in its written evidence:

“This—together with the readiness of many political commentators to cherry pick often minor or irrelevant facts that are mentioned in tribunal or court judgments and present these as if the main or sole reason for a decision that may have little or nothing to do with them—continues to underpin criticism of Article 8 in immigration-related decision-making. That criticism is plainly misinformed, often careless and, in some cases, on its face, clearly ill-intended—including out of dogmatic hostility to the ECHR and other political motivations.”

On Second Reading of the Bill, the current Home Secretary summarised an unnamed case. She said:

“In 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him. She was not his wife or life partner—instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before.”—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 675.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

It is pretty clear that I think the Bill is a result of the Government responding to toxic rhetoric coming from other parties, and that it is an attempt to be seen to be doing something.

[Blake Stephenson]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will finish my point. In an evidence session, we challenged the National Crime Agency on the roots of the organised crime that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes mentions, which is doing huge harm. I will not argue that the small boats system is the best way to bring people to this country. Small boat numbers started to grow the moment safe routes were closed. We need safe routes, and that is the approach the Government could take to reduce small boat crossings. The law that protects our rights does not need to be undermined. I would absolutely argue that.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Lady refers to other parties and their toxic rhetoric. Perhaps she could give some examples. If she wishes to call out those parties, will she do so by giving clear examples rather than by making throwaway comments? That would really help the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

I am happy to clarify that I am talking primarily about Reform UK. That party is not represented on this Committee and can answer for itself in other ways, but it has, until recently, been taking votes from the Government on the right. I am happy to come back in future sittings with further examples of anecdotes being used instead of evidence. I chose to highlight two examples of Home Secretaries doing that, because the Minister is here to represent a Home Secretary.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. My amendment would introduce a public interest test for survivors of violence against women and girls, domestic abuse and sexual violence into the considerations. I will also speak to the matter of leaving out the clause. I will start with the clause and what it does.

The clause will fundamentally alter the balance that has long existed between article 8 rights and the public interest by restricting the courts’ ability to assess the individual circumstances of each case. Our courts and tribunals carefully balance the right to private and family life against the public interest in an effective immigration system. Our judiciary performs that task every day, helping to deliver justice, uphold the rule of law and guard against abuse. Yet the clause assumes that the balance is being struck wrongly, without the Government having demonstrated that. The main evidence is only a 2022 internal sample of Home Office decisions.

The existing statutory framework already strongly favours the public interest, in particular in deportation cases. While preserving the ability to consider individual circumstances, the clause will replace that with a more prescriptive framework. Here are my views on the main changes in the clause: first, it will require courts to predict whether a person will remain financially independent. That is an inherently speculative exercise, because it fails to consider the uncertainties of ordinary life, including illness, disabilities, caring responsibilities or economic downturns. The effect is likely to discriminate most heavily against disabled people, as well as those with long-term health conditions and caring responsibilities.

Secondly, the clause will discount genuine family life, because of immigration status. Family life formed while a person was here with no leave to remain would be given no weight at all, and family life formed while people’s status was precarious would be given little weight. Precarious migration status covers everyone with anything short of indefinite leave to remain or citizenship—care workers, skilled workers, international students, refugees and partners on the family route.

Under the earned settlement proposals, the qualifying period to become eligible for settlement would be extended to a baseline of 10 years, and in some cases 15 or even 20 years for refugees. Many people will therefore remain on in a precarious position for years, during which the relationships they form and the children they raise would count for little or nothing under the clause. The reality is that family relationships do not cease to exist or be formed just because an immigration status is uncertain.

Strasbourg accepts that precarious status can reduce the weight that is given to family life, but it has not said that it counts for nothing. In an important case, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation—even when the applicant had remained without leave for years—because of the impact on her children. With a “No weight” rule, as in clause 19(4), there will be no space to assess such cases and to retain flexibility. It will weaken protection for children.

Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, when courts assess a child’s best interests they do not look at one factor in isolation—they examine the full picture: a child’s age, health, education, friendships, cultural identity, family circumstances, personal development and connection to the UK—and the children are not defined by a checklist; yet clause 19 would introduce a closed checklist, under which it would be unreasonable

“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”

they would receive no education abroad, face “very significant obstacles” to integrating in the new country, or suffer

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”.

Each is a very high bar. Remarkably, the Government’s impact assessment describes those factors as a “non-exhaustive” list, but subsection (7) uses the phrase “if and (only if)”. It is very clearly a closed list. The Bill therefore goes even further than the Government say they intend, in terms of its effect on children.

I am also concerned that the clause applies to British children too. As drafted, it could result in a British child with a migrant parent either being separated from their parent or having to leave the UK to preserve the family unit. That results in two-tier British citizenship. The Government’s own impact assessment lists family separation among the consequences of these reforms, and says—with little humanity—that the new test will allow decision makers

“to consider whether parents can maintain their relationship with a child from outside the UK”

or whether a British child can

“successfully adapt to life abroad”.

The existing framework is not perfect, but it already places substantial weight on the public interest and has safeguards allowing courts to consider the facts of each case. Clause 19 risks upsetting that balance. At its heart, the issue here is a simple one: do we trust our courts to weigh the facts before them, or do we seek to predetermine the outcome through statutory presumptions? I believe that the existing approach better serves both justice and the rule of law, and for that reason clause 19 should not stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 61 would reduce the harm of this clause, if it remains, by inserting a new public interest consideration into section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, requiring a court or tribunal to take into consideration the effects of violence against women and girls when deciding whether an interference with a person’s article 8 rights is justified. In my view, without the amendment the Bill will remove or weaken application grounds or causes of appeal relied on by many women living in abusive or exploitative conditions, making them even more vulnerable. That may leave victim-survivors at risk of being refused leave to stay, removed or deported for factors that are a direct consequence of the abuse to which they have been subjected.

To bring that point home, I will provide some examples from organisations that are currently supporting such women. My first example shows how the stricter public interest considerations risk undermining evidence for financial dependency and contact with the criminal justice system being usual results of an experience of violence against women and girls. Julianne was living in another country when she began her relationship with a British man. While visiting him in the UK, she became pregnant with his child and he encouraged her to stay, promising to support her and secure her immigration status. Trusting those assurances, Julianne stayed and became an overstayer. Once her status became insecure, her partner’s behaviour changed dramatically. He subjected her to domestic abuse, isolated her from friends and family overseas, and exploited the fact that she had no support network in the UK. The abuse escalated after the birth of their child.

Julianne eventually fled with her child after a violent assault. She sought medical treatment, reported the abuse to the police and received emergency support from the local authority. Traumatised and destitute, Julianne was left to navigate a complex immigration system alone, as she had been unable to secure legally aided advice and could not afford to pay for a solicitor. She lives with the constant fear of removal. I have changed Julianne’s name.

Julianne had a pathway to regularisation as the parent of a British child; however, if clause 19 becomes law the barriers to regularising her immigration status would be raised significantly, potentially preventing her from qualifying to remain in the UK as the parent of a British child. Re-emphasising the weight of financial independence without reliance on state support and public services will create pressure on victim-survivors like Julianne to stay in abusive and exploitative situations instead of leaving and claiming support, as she did.

Women who have been subject to economic and immigration abuse will be penalised due to their lack of financial independence. The public interest considerations would weigh heavily against Julianne because she accessed support from the local authority while protecting herself and her children from domestic abuse, and because no weight would be given to her family life, as it was established when she overstayed. Without amendment 61, there would be no discretion to consider the role her abuser played in causing her to overstay.

In respect of the redefinition of family, I have a further example of where limiting family life to core cohabiting family and replacing a judicial assessment with a checklist will ignore nuances and external factors forcing a family not to cohabit, such as coercive and controlling behaviour. More broadly, women who are convicted of criminal offences would also be put at increased risk of deportation, as a high evidential standard is needed to prove a disproportionate impact on them or a family member.

That includes women who are coerced or pressured into criminal activity—those driven to engaging with the criminal justice system due to unmet needs, such as being unable to afford food or having unaddressed mental health problems, and those who retaliated against the person abusing or exploiting them, or who had a counter-allegation made against them falsely. All those women are vulnerable and deserving of protection and support, not the further punishment of possible deportation.

My second case study is Blanca. Blanca came to the UK with a visa to work, and while here, she married a British man and had a baby. He had a good job, so they agreed she would stop working, and they then had two more children together. Over time, he became more controlling. Although the children’s benefits were registered in her name, he controlled the payments and did not give her access to the money.

As Blanca did not have her own income, he gave her money for the family’s food, but he would demand that she provide receipts and the exact change. If she bought anything he considered unnecessary, he would be angry and make her return it. That included sanitary products, which Blanca found humiliating and confusing. He also became verbally and later physically abusive towards Blanca, and she became more and more scared of him.

One day, when she was in the supermarket, her period started. She did not know what to do, and she was scared of her husband seeing that she had bought something he thought was unnecessary. She stole a box of sanitary pads, but on her way out of the shop, she was stopped by security who reported her to the police. She was charged and later convicted of theft.

If part 2 of the Bill were fully implemented, Blanca’s conviction would put her at high risk of deportation. No consideration would be given to the abuse that she experienced, which pushed her to commit the crime, nor would it be given to her vulnerability and trauma. In addition, as she did not have lawful status for much of the time she was in the UK, her private and family life may be deemed to hold no weight—or, at best, little weight—if it were held to have been established when she arrived with precarious status.

The Committee can see that clause 19 has all these knock-on effects into further parts of the Bill, and that this additional public interest consideration is necessary. I hope the Committee will discuss and support amendment 61, if clause 19 is to remain in the Bill. I am happy for this to be a probing amendment, if the Government will consider these risks and make their own similar changes to the Bill later.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. As we discussed in the last sitting, clause 18 asks who counts as family, but clause 19 asks what weight that family should carry against the public interest. The clause goes to the heart of public concern, as it considers people who build a life here, while they have no right to be here, only to rely on that recently constructed life as a reason to stay in the UK indefinitely.

I will speak to amendments 104 to 106, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and I, as well as amendment 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, and clause 19. The Opposition support the broad direction of travel in which the Government are going with the clause; however, to our reading, much of it is unfortunately drafted in a way that means it will be all too easy for the courts to set aside. Furthermore, the evidence behind the clause has not yet been published. I will take the Committee through both aspects.

First, clause 19 amends section 117B of the 2002 Act, which deals with the public interest considerations that apply in every article 8 case. Subsection (2) replaces the requirement to be financially independent with a three-part, forward-looking test, which is that a person must be, and is

“likely to remain, financially independent…able to house themselves…without reliance on state support”

and is not

“reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term”.

Subsection (3) adds a new public interest in people who have not been convicted of an offence anywhere, have co-operated with the immigration authorities and

“are otherwise of good character.”

Subsection (4) changes “little weight” to “no weight” being given to a

“private or family life established by a person”

who is here without leave, or with leave obtained by deception, or who is in “serious breach” of its conditions. Subsection (5) extends “little weight” for precarious status to family life as well as private life. Subsections (6) and (7) tighten the rule on parents with qualifying children. There must now be

“a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect”

on a child who stays, and it is unreasonable

“to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if)”

one of three conditions is met.

On the evidence base, the Home Office told the Committee that 71% of those newly granted article 8 leave

“had entered illegally or overstayed”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 73, Q130.]

and that grants made in 2025 cost the taxpayer an incredible £4.9 billion. If those figures are correct, the case for this clause is overwhelming and undeniable; however, the Committee has not seen the evidence behind them. If the Government want the House to legislate on the strength of the 71% and the £4.9 billion cost figures, it is our view that they should publish the sample, definitions and method before Report.

On financial independence, subsection (2) is, in our view, right in principle. The Library records that the Home Office’s aim is

“increased refusals or unsuccessful appeals in cases where applicants impose avoidable burdens on public resources”.

I certainly think the public will agree, but the test is a prediction about the future, and the Bill says nothing about how it is to be made. In its evidence, the Law Society told us:

“No detail has been provided on how the elements of this test are to be determined”.

Over what period will future reliance be assessed? What evidence will be required, and will guidance be published before commencement?

There is a further difficulty, which is whether this subsection will be able to survive the courts. Again, according to the Law Society,

“the Government’s human rights memorandum at paragraph 27”

acknowledges that the new criteria are

“likely to result in discriminatory outcomes for…older or disabled people”.

The Bar Council makes the same point. A test that the Government themselves expect to operate unequally is one that will in all likelihood be litigated under the Equality Act 2010 and perhaps article 14—and one that the courts may well soften as a result. I ask the Minister: what mitigation does the Government propose to avoid that?

On good character and amendment 104, subsection (3) sets out a new public interest in people who have not offended, have co-operated with the authorities and are “of good character”. Again, we support the direction of travel, but “good character” is not defined in the Bill or the explanatory notes, which seems an extraordinary gap, though I recognise that it is quite difficult to define it in the Bill. This is another example of the Government potentially setting themselves up for failure in the Bill. The Bar Council says that it hands the Home Office

“a general evaluative test that is highly subjective in scope”.

The Law Society and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association made similar points in their evidence. An undefined test is an invitation to future litigation.

There is a ready answer, though, to which I shall point the Committee: the good character guidance used in naturalisation decisions, which is detailed and demanding, with periods that taper according to the length of sentence. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government will apply that guidance here? Amendment 104 would add that to the Bill. What will count as a failure to co-operate with immigration processes—absconding, the destruction of documents, ignoring a claim notice under clause 11, et cetera? It would be helpful to understand what the Government’s understanding is.

On amendments 105 and 106, the explanatory notes accept that courts can depart from the weightings under section 117A(2) of the 2002 Act. The Law Society says that the change

“appears to be an attempt to bar a full proportionality assessment”,

and sets up a conflict with the duty on the Home Secretary and the courts to

“act compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.”

--- Later in debate ---

[David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)]

rose—

[Blake Stephenson]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Gentleman.

[Blake Stephenson]

I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but we absolutely cannot bind the courts’ hands in this situation. The reality is that they have to be flexible. We can set a very clear steer—that is on the record, in the Bill and in legislation—but it is important that we allow the courts flexibility, because their role is to establish the facts, case by case.

[Anna Turley]

As my hon. Friend rightly flags, “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s private or family life established in the time that they were in the UK without permission. That is a clear definition for the court. Applying the “no weight” rule to all breaches of leave could mean minor or technical breaches leave cases open to challenges of disproportionality.

Amendment 106 is in a similar vein. Although we agree that non-compliance must have consequences, it is appropriate that we distinguish between serious breaches and less significant or technical non-compliance, because we always have to have proportionality. Removing “serious” would considerably widen the provision and could require the same approach to be taken to conduct of very different gravity. The Government’s reforms already substantially strengthen the public interest side of the article 8 balancing exercise. The inclusion of “serious” helps to ensure that the reforms are focused on the cases of greatest concern.

[Blake Stephenson]

In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s attempts to define this, but it is important to say that we are keen not to include specific definitions in the Bill, as we are worried that they could result in disproportionate outcomes. Our approach is to be robust, targeted and, crucially, legally sustainable. We do not want to allow ourselves to be open to challenge.

--- Later in debate ---

Cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) Where a person has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years—

(a) the first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply, and

(b) the third set of exceptional circumstances applies only where there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in subsections (4) and (5).”

This amendment would restore the current rule that a foreign national sentenced to four years or more cannot resist deportation by relying on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” exceptions and must show very compelling circumstances over and above them.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—

(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or

(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”

This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.

Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert

“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”

This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).

Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”.

This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.

Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”.

This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.

Clause stand part.

New clause 45—Deportation of foreign offenders—

“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 32, for subsections (1) to (3) substitute—

‘(1) In this section

“foreign criminal” means a person—

(a) who is not a British or Irish citizen, and

(b) who is—

(i) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, or

(ii) charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.’

(3) In section 33, omit subsections (1)(b), (2), (3) and (6A).

(4) In section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, omit all instances of the word ‘knowingly’.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign national who is convicted of an offence or who is charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.

New clause 66—Automatic deportation: forced-marriage offences—

“(1) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1)(c), for ‘Condition 1 or 2’ substitute ‘Condition 1, 2 or 3’.

(3) After subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) Condition 3 is that the person has been convicted of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offence of forced marriage: England and Wales).’”

This new clause would amend section 32 of the UK Borders Act to create a separate basis for automatic deportation where a person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, concerning forced marriage.

New clause 67—Particularly serious crime: National Security Act 2023 offences—

“(1) Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) After (5ZB) insert—

‘(6) A person is presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if—

(a) the person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence listed in the National Security Act 2023; and

(b) the person is not, by virtue of the conviction, a person falling within subsection (2).’”

This new clause would make any conviction of an offence under the National Security Act 2023 an automatic deportation offence, as is currently the case with offences under Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

[Blake Stephenson]

On Thursday 15 October, the Government were kind enough to accept Opposition amendment 96 to clause 17; I hope the Minister will look at these amendments with the same open mind, because of all the clauses in part 2, this is the one that the public care the most deeply about. People expect that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes in this country will be deported, and they do not understand why family life—often family life formed while the offender was here—so frequently stands in the way. It is frankly unacceptable.

Our reasoned amendment on Second Reading made the point that this Bill

“does not ensure all foreign criminals and illegal immigrants will be deported”.—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 679.].

Clause 20 is where that concern is tested. My case is that, although the clause contains real improvements, which we support, it also makes the position easier for the most serious offenders. Either way, it leaves the final word where it is today: with the judge’s assessment of proportionality.

The clause does four things. First, it extends the deportation rules in section 117C of the 2002 Act from foreign criminals to everyone liable to deportation, including those deported because it is conducive to the public good. Secondly, it replaces the current structure of a single rule, that deportation is required unless its effect on the person or their family would be disproportionate. Thirdly, it replaces the sentence length threshold of 12 months and four years with a sliding scale: the more serious the offending and its impact on society, the greater the public interest in deportation. Fourthly, it provides that deportation will be disproportionate if, and only if, one of three sets of exceptional circumstances applies: long residence and integration, an unduly harsh effect on a partner or child, or other very compelling circumstances, and the interference cannot be justified by the public interest.

I turn first to what the clause gets right, because I want to be fair to the Government in this Committee. Extending the rules to all deportation cases is a genuine tightening, and for that reason the Opposition support it. There is a reasonable legal argument that the new structure restores the balance test that the courts took away. Dr Chris Rowe of Swansea University argues that after the Supreme Court’s decision in KO (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the unduly harsh exception came to operate as an unqualified right, which we heard about in earlier Committee sittings. If the effect on the family was harsh enough, the strength of the public interest did not matter. He argued that clause 20(3) would be effective in restoring a balance against the public interest. If that is correct, it is a real improvement for so-called medium offenders.

Once again, however, I cannot help but notice what kind of improvement this is. On Dr Rowe’s own analysis, clause 20 brings domestic law back to what the Strasbourg case law requires, but does not go beyond it, and for the most serious offenders, the clause appears to move in the wrong direction. Under the current law, someone sentenced to four years or more cannot rely on the long residence or unduly harsh exceptions on their own; they must show very compelling circumstances over and above them. Clause 20 removes the sentence thresholds altogether. Justice, which, I should say, supports the change for very different reasons, describes the effect precisely in its evidence, stating that the Bill

“flattens out the application of the exceptions, so that all three apply, regardless of the length of a person’s sentence.”

The House of Commons Library briefing says that it is “not clear” how the new rules are stricter for people sentenced to more than four years.. Does the Minister accept that under clause 20, the most serious offenders gain access to exceptions one and two? If so, why? What reasons could the Government have for loosening the rules for the worst-offending foreign criminals? Presumably, the Government are trying to achieve the opposite.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for supporting the general thrust of what we are trying to achieve with the amendments, and I accept his point. By having a narrow list, we may constrain future opportunities and changes, and we need to be flexible. However, it is important that the Committee expresses its view that these crimes are abhorrent. Although it is a narrow list, this place can of course legislate further in the future, as life changes. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his general support and I understand his point, but given the gravity of these crimes, it is important that this Committee is very clear that they are totally unacceptable.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

I think there is broad agreement on the principle behind the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, but is he seriously suggesting that, for every additional crime that we decide needs to be added to his inexhaustible list, we must come back to the House and somebody has to sign off on it?

[Blake Stephenson]

We are here to legislate, so I do not think it is unreasonable for us to be defining what is right and wrong. Perhaps we can leave it to the Minister to respond.

The unfortunate reality is that, with this Bill, the Government are falling into the very same trap that the previous Government fell into. The legislation may be designed to work around the constraints imposed by the ECHR, but it will ultimately run up against the very same problems. The courts will default to the positions that they have consistently taken, enabling individuals with no right to remain in this country to delay or prevent their removal. Indeed, when the Bill fails to enable the Government to address the extensive range of grounds for resisting removal that flow from the ECHR, will the Minister finally accept that—as we have long argued—the real problem lies outside the drafting of the legislation, however robust it might be, and however robust the Government intend it to be today?

As I have already noted, the Minister described discussions about leaving the ECHR last week as unnecessary and counterproductive. If she genuinely believes that deterrence must sit at the heart of the response to these challenges, I struggle to see how removing the ability of foreign criminals to rely on the convention to delay or prevent their removal could reasonably be considered as either unnecessary or counterproductive.

The Opposition will not oppose clause 20. Extending these rules to all deportation cases and restoring the balance against the public interest are steps in the right direction that we support. However, the clause removes the clear lines that protected the public from the most serious offenders, and it gives these criminals access to exceptions that cannot be used today. We will seek to press amendments 107 and 108 to a vote, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s answers to the various questions I have asked.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak very briefly on clause 20, specifically subsection (4). At present, it will expand the scope of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that it automatically applies to everyone whose deportation the Home Secretary has decided is conducive to the public good, regardless of the objective seriousness of their offence, under the Immigration Act 1971 and its use of the word “deems”, which I think is very important.

I hope the Minister can answer three questions on the clause. First, do the proportionality qualification and the exceptions in the clause offer any protection for those whose criminality is as a result of exploitation or abuse, particularly those who face immigration-related domestic abuse and have been convicted of crimes related to that? On that theme, the new clauses tabled by the official Opposition would clarify the word “serious” so that some offences would be considered serious automatically. I see the point they are trying to make, but if we made that automatic, it would not be possible for those who are exploited and drawn into criminality to face a proportionate, human-rights-based public interest test. I do not support those new clauses, nor do I support amendments 108 to 111.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Ninth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Melanie Onn]

I will not, because I am on my final sentence.

Rather than having a negative perception of those asylum seekers, this could help the public to understand that they are making a contribution—that they are willing to make a contribution. Then we will see a settlement that is deemed to be acceptable and that hopefully contributes to a much more cohesive society.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Barker. I will try to be as efficient as I can, given the time.

As we have heard, clause 23 gives a new power to the Home Secretary that requires people to pay towards the cost of any asylum support they have received, once they are able to do so. In contrast to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion—Members will not be surprised to hear this—this does not make me uncomfortable. I reject the notion that it is a refugee tax; I think that is just scaremongering Green campaign nonsense. [Interruption.] I said I was going to be efficient, so I will not take an intervention. Our constituents pay considerable amounts of taxation, and we are spending incredible sums on the asylum support system. It is entirely reasonable, and fair to the British taxpayer, that people who have received support should contribute to that cost.

This group contains three amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about how much people should pay, three Government amendments about waivers and insolvency, and amendment 141, which I tabled, about what happens when people do not pay; Members will not be surprised to hear that we will be opposing the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Together, they give the Minister an opportunity to tell the Committee something that the Bill does not: what the scheme will actually charge and how it will operate.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. I remind hon. Members again not to use “you”.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Member has proved my point: if you turn up to scrutiny meetings and make your point, sometimes the Government listen. They did so by taking on one of my earlier amendments. Turning up and contributing is helpful.

[David Smith]

I am delighted to hear the Opposition spokesman say that this is not a refugee tax. Does he agree, as we approach other issues in the Bill and elsewhere, that redistributions of funding and contributions in other areas are not always a tax?

[Blake Stephenson]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. This is not a refugee tax.

On 18 March 2025, Labour Members voted down that new clause 37. The then Minister told that Committee that it was not sufficiently developed to be put into primary legislation. Interestingly, we heard the same criticism from witnesses about clause 23 of this Bill, and even the Government’s own impact assessment rates the impact of these measures as “uncertain”. I ask the Minister what amount and what income threshold the Government intend to set. The Home Office has spoken of £10,000; will that be a flat rate per adult, and over what period? How will the threshold be set so that the charge does not deter people from taking work or declaring their earnings—a risk that the Government’s own impact assessment identified?

Amendment 76 would prevent any payment that would leave a person or household with below 60% of median household income. Clause 23(5) already provides that no one will be required to pay if it would make them “destitute”. Amendment 76 would go far beyond destitution: with a 60% median test, very few people who had been supported by taxpayers would ever pay anything; it would turn into a repayment scheme in name only.

Amendment 81 would cut the amount owed by 20% for every 30 days beyond six months that the Home Office took to decide a claim. I understand the point being made—delays cost money and are not the claimant’s fault—but it is the taxpayer who has paid for those months, and the answer to delays is making faster decisions, not giving a discount. What is the current average time to an initial decision, and what is the Government’s target?

Amendment 79 would cap repayments at the cost of the support received. I would be surprised if the Government intend anything else. Will the Minister confirm that nobody will be asked to repay more than the support they receive, which is the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion? If so, the amendment is unnecessary.

Government amendment 124 will enable repayments to be reduced, waived or refunded, including by giving the Secretary of State discretion. Amendments 125 and 126 deal with insolvency. The supplementary memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee says that the powers will be subject to the negative procedure because they can only benefit individuals. The Opposition will not oppose the measures, but the use of a discretion to waive, exercised on a case by case basis and never reported, is how schemes like this quietly stop working. What criteria will govern waivers? Will the number and value of waivers be published each year? Will a person be able to clear the debt by making themselves bankrupt?

The Committee is entitled to know whether the scheme will ever recover meaningful sums. Migration Observatory expects that unless the threshold is set significantly below the minimum wage, the number of people earning enough to reach it will be relatively small. That is set against the enormous cost to the British taxpayer. Around 97,500 asylum seekers receive taxpayer-funded support, costing the taxpayer roughly £4 billion in 2024-25. Simple division of that figure suggests that the costs are close to £40,000 a year per person supported. A £10,000 contribution, if it were ever collected, would recover only a small proportion of the initial cost.

During the Committee’s oral evidence session, when my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West asked the Minister what measurable difference the Bill will make, she said:

“I do not want to put a specific figure on it.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 72, Q127.]

Can she do so now? How many people do the Government expect to pay? How much will be recovered each year, and over what period? How much will it cost to build and run the system? Given that the Government do not have a good history of running systems, can she assure us that the scheme will raise more money than it costs?

Amendment 141, tabled in my name, would ensure that where an individual has been required to repay asylum support costs, any unpaid amount can be considered when deciding applications to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, including for settlement. That would give the scheme more weight by providing that the debt will influence settlement decisions until it is paid off. If amendment 141 is not made, the consequence of not paying will depend on earned settlement rules that have not been laid before Parliament. Will the Government support the amendment?

The Opposition oppose amendments 81, 76 and 79, but not Government amendments 124 to 126. As I mentioned, the principle of clause 23 was originally in a Conservative proposition, so of course we support it, but our concern is that a repayment scheme with discretionary waivers and no consequences for non-payment will be ineffective. We look for assurance from the Minister on that. I will be pressing amendment 141 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their important contributions to this debate on asylum costs and the mechanism the Government are creating to recover some of them. As we heard from my hon. Friends, fairness is at the heart of this debate. We are discussing the concept that individuals who have benefited from the sanctuary and generosity of this country and its taxpayers should contribute towards the support that they received. That is not about punishing anyone; it is about those who have received support having a stake in the success of this country and contributing to the cost of that support, and thereby to the sustainability of giving it to others, once they are financially able.

The right to receive support must come with responsibilities. Each year, the taxpayer funds £4 billion of asylum costs. While it is right that we support those fleeing war and persecution, it is also right that those who have received that support make a fair and proportionate contribution when they can. The measures will ensure that they put back into the system that supported them and contribute towards the provision of that support to others, as well as ensuring that others who are paying for that support consent to doing so.

We have heard examples of our constituents contributing to many different forms of collective support, including through national insurance, and through tax to fund access to healthcare. Contribution is an important principle of the social contract in this country. For that reason, the Bill introduces a new power, under which asylum seekers will pay back a portion of the cost of their support when they are financially able to do so. It will be possible to recover those costs through tax receipts, benefit payments and/or as a debt to the Home Office. That mirrors the way in which the Department for Work and Pensions deducts from universal credit where people have child support payments due, owe money for hardship payments, or have unpaid bills or tax.

Amendments 81, 76 and 79, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seek to prescribe in the Bill how and when asylum support contributions should be calculated and reduced. The Government cannot accept the amendments because they would be too complex to enable effective delivery of the policy and would move us away from the policy intent of a fair and proportionate contribution towards the costs of support once a person is financially able to pay.

Clause 23 establishes an important principle that, where someone has received asylum support at public expense and later has the means to contribute, it is fair that they do so. Of course, any contribution must remain affordable and not push a person into destitution. Clause 23(5) already requires regulations to include provisions to ensure that nobody pays where it would leave them destitute. Further details of this important safeguard will be set out in the regulations that we have committed to sharing during the passage of the Bill.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Tenth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)]

Amendment 50 addresses the fact that, according to the clause, children will become indebted on their 18th birthday—we have heard an indicative amount of £10,000, but it might be more. Clearly, no child has contributed fiscally when they reach maturity to the benefits they have received from the state—be that benefits or education—but the clause is othering child refugees and seems wrong in principle and wrong in practice. I ask the Minister: does it apply to all child refugees who reach maturity while receiving asylum support? Does it apply to victims of trafficking, for example? This seems wholly wrong. As I say, if we want refugees to integrate, othering them in this way does no good whatsoever and simply fuels the frankly toxic debate in this country that refugees are somehow not part of our community. We need them to become part of our community. Othering them in this way does no good.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. This group is about who should be exempt from the duty to repay asylum support and when a debt should be cancelled. Five of the grouped amendments—four in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and one tabled by the Liberal Democrats in the name of the hon. Member for Wimbledon—would widen the exemptions or write off the debt. The Opposition take the opposite view, unsurprisingly. The exemptions in clause 23 are already too wide, which is why I tabled amendments 139 and 142.

Clause 23(6)(b) exempts anyone who

“started to receive asylum support before the day on which this section comes fully into force”.

That is not an exemption for support received before the law changes; it is an exemption for all the support that a person will ever receive before or after commencement. The Government tell us that about 97,500 people are receiving support and, as the Bill is drafted, every single one of them will be exempt for life. Between now and the commencement date, which the Government have not yet given us—with appeals taking over a year, the first charges under this clause may be many years away—how many people will be exempt under subsection (6)(b)? Why not exempt only the support received before commencement, so that people already in the system contribute to the support they receive once the law has changed? When do the Government intend to bring clause 23 fully into force and levy the first charges?

Clause 23(6)(c) will allow the Secretary of State to exempt “any other description” of a person by regulations. The explanatory notes tell us that victims of modern slavery will be exempt. Under clause 50, those regulations will be subject only to the negative procedure. The Government’s reasoning is that exemptions do not disadvantage the people affected. They may not disadvantage the people exempted, but they certainly affect the taxpayer. A series of negative instruments could hollow out the scheme without a debate in the House. Which further categories do the Government intend to exempt, and why do Ministers not think that Parliament should be able to approve those?

Amendment 139 would remove subsection (6)(b), which is the exemption for everyone who started to receive support before clause 23 is fully in force. As I said, that will exempt around 97,500 people for life for the support that they receive, as well as anyone who enters support before a commencement date that nobody has given us. The Opposition’s intention is simple: people already in the system should contribute for the support they receive once the scheme is in force.

Amendment 142 would make regulations creating further exemptions under subsection (6)(c) subject to the affirmative procedure. The Government say that the negative procedure is enough because exemptions do not disadvantage the people exempted. That may be the case, but it certainly is not the case for the taxpayer, who is burdened with the cost. A series of negative instruments could hollow out the scheme, as I mentioned earlier.

Amendments 77 and 50 would exempt anyone who was under 21 or 18, respectively, at any time while they were supported, rather than those who were children throughout. That would mean that someone who arrived at 17 and was supported for years as an adult would pay nothing. We will oppose both those amendments.

Amendment 82 would exempt anyone granted leave after a successful appeal. Mr Featonby of the Refugee Council made the point for us. He said that

“the majority of people who will ever be in a position to even start to pay back that money are people who are going to go on to get protection.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 32, Q53.]

Exempting those who win on appeal would remove a large share of the people who could pay, and would reward the cases that took the longest.

Amendment 78 would add exemptions for people over retirement age, recognised victims of trafficking, survivors of sexual or gender-based violence and domestic abuse, and victims of torture, rape or serious violence. Those are sensitive cases, and the Government have said that victims of modern slavery will be exempt. The right way to decide those exemptions is in regulations that the House has seen and approved, not by negative instruments that can hollow out the scheme, as I mentioned earlier. Which categories will the Government exempt, and will draft exemption regulations be provided before Report?

Amendment 80, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require the Home Secretary to cancel a person’s liability upon death or permanent incapacity, when they reach 65, or 10 years after their support ended. There is a fair question underneath that. Student loans, which are the basis for the model that we proposed, are written off after a set period, but a 10-year write-off that starts when support ends would allow anyone to wait out the debt and simply not pay. The amendment is far too wide, and we will oppose it. Do the Government intend to have any write-off period at all, and if so what?

Finally, the Opposition will oppose amendments 77, 50, 78, 82 and 80. The clause already exempts everyone now in the system for life and allows further exemptions by negative instrument. Amendment 139 would close the first gap and amendment 142 would close the second. I will press amendment 139 to a Division.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. I will speak briefly about two of the exemptions to requiring someone to make a payment for their asylum support. They have been referred to already; they are in clause 23(6)(a) and (b).

Subsection (6)(a) states a person is exempt for the purposes of this section if they

“were under 18 at all times at which they received asylum support”.

I accept that if someone was a child throughout the entire period they received asylum support, they would be fully exempt, but I think I disagree with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion on an interpretation point. That is the problem with the Bill; it is badly drafted and unclear in places. If someone under the age of 18 was receiving asylum support, then turned 18 and sought it afterwards, they would not be exempt—of course not, because they also received asylum support as an adult—but one would assume that they would not be charged for the portion of time that they had received asylum support while under 18. The Minister needs to clarify that point, but giving clarity in Committee is not sufficient when it is unclear in the legislation. She would do better to clarify it in the legislation.

The second exemption I want to briefly refer to, as the shadow Minister has, is subsection (6)(b). It gives an exemption to someone who

“started to receive asylum support before the day on which this section comes fully into force”.

As a counterpoint to what I just said, I do not understand why, if someone received asylum support for a year—let us say; typically it is a lot longer—and day one was before this section came into force, but day two and 364 of the 365 days were after it came into force, they would be exempt from making contributions for their asylum support. They would receive the vast majority of that support after the legislation comes into force, so I would have thought it a fairly obvious pro rata exercise to say that they do not pay for the portion of time they spent receiving support before the law was in place— I take the point that we do not have retrospective law in this country—but they do thereafter.

It makes me wonder whether my understanding of the child-becoming-an-adult element is wrong. The Government need to be clear about whether a pro rata approach is being taken when a child becomes an adult. If so, why is that not being applied when someone starts receiving support before the Bill comes into play and continues to receive support after? I hope the Minister can give us some clarity.

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Division 48

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 3

---

Conservative: 3

Noes: 10

---

Labour: 8
Green Party: 1
Liberal Democrat: 1

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 23, page 22, line 13, at end insert—

“(7) This section may not be brought fully into force until the Secretary of State has published and laid before Parliament—

(a) a draft of the regulations which the Secretary of State proposes to make under subsection (4), and

(b) an estimate, for each of the first five years after this section comes fully into force, of—

(i) the number of persons expected to be required to make payments under subsection (3),

(ii) the sums expected to be recovered, and

(iii) the cost of administering the requirement to make payments and of collecting those payments.”

This amendment would require the Government to publish its draft regulations for the asylum support repayment scheme, together with an estimate of how many people will pay, how much will be recovered and what the scheme will cost to run, before the scheme is brought into force.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 23 stand part.

Clause 24 stand part.

New clause 62—Asylum support payments: annual report—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, for each financial year beginning after section 23 comes fully into force, prepare and lay before Parliament a report on the exercise of the power in section 23(3).

(2) A report under subsection (1) must set out, for the financial year to which it relates—

(a) the number of persons required to make payments under section 23(3);

(b) the total sums required to be paid;

(c) the total sums recovered, including sums collected by HMRC under regulations made by virtue of section 24(4);

(d) the total sums written off or treated as irrecoverable;

(e) the number of persons exempt by virtue of section 23(6), by description of exemption; and

(f) the cost of administering the requirement to make payments and of collecting those payments.

(3) A report under this section must be laid before Parliament within six months of the end of the financial year to which it relates.”

This new clause would require the Government to report to Parliament each year on how many people have been charged for asylum support, how much has been charged, recovered and written off, how many people are exempt, and what the scheme costs to run.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 23 gives the Home Secretary a new power to require people who have received asylum support to pay towards its cost once they are able to do so. Clause 24 is the machinery that sits behind it. The Opposition supports both clauses, so my questions are not about whether clause 23 is right in principle; they are about whether, as drafted, it will recover anything at all—and when.

Amendment 140 would mean that clause 23 could not be brought fully into force until the Government have published and laid the draft regulations and a five-year estimate of how many people will pay, how much will be recovered and what the scheme will cost to run. That is not an obstacle to the scheme—it is the minimum that Parliament needs in order to judge whether it will work effectively. Will the Minister commit to publishing the draft regulations and those estimates before the clause commences? If she does, I will not press the amendment to a vote.

Clause 23(1) applies the scheme to anyone who has received asylum support and is not exempt. Subsection (2) defines asylum support. Subsection (3) is the core power: the Secretary of State “may” require payments. Subsection (4) leaves everything else to regulations. Subsection (5) provides that no one can be required to pay if it would make them destitute. Subsection (6) exempts people who were children throughout, anyone who started receiving support before the clause comes fully into force, and anyone else the Secretary of State specifies in regulations.

Clause 24 is the machinery that sits behind clause 23. It sets out how the charge can reflect support given to dependants, allows His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to collect it, allows information to be shared with the Home Office for that purpose, and makes unpaid sums recoverable as a debt. Clause 23 is the principle, which we support; clause 24 is where we assess whether any money will actually be collected.

We agree with the principle, but the Government have not provided the detail that we expect. There is no amount detailed in the Bill. There is no threshold. There is no repayment period. There is no collection model. All of that is left to regulations that we are yet to see. If our new clause 37 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 was not developed enough for primary legislation in March 2025, I invite the Minister to explain what makes clause 23 in this Bill developed enough now.

The explanatory notes state that the power applies to those

“who have had their case concluded”;

but that condition is not in the clause. Can payments be required while a claim or appeal is outstanding from people with savings, for example, and how does that relate to the separate contributions mechanisms announced in November?

The Home Office says that the measure will ensure that refused asylum seekers

“take responsibility for the financial impact of their presence in this country”,

but a refused claimant who remains here unlawfully is not going to be paying through pay-as-you-earn. How much do the Government realistically expect to recover from refused claimants who stay? Why does the definition in clause 23(2) leave out section 98 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999—initial accommodation, including hotels—so that time spent there appears to be free of charge?

Subsection (4) allows regulations to provide for HMRC to collect amounts due. We believe that this is the correct model. It is how student loans are recovered—automatically, through the pay packet, once earnings pass a certain threshold. It is the model the Opposition proposed. However, subsection (4) is only an enabling power; it says that regulations “may” provide for HMRC collection. Under clause 50, those regulations will be subject only to the negative procedure, and the Government describe collection as a more technical and administrative matter. Has HMRC agreed to collect the charge? Will collection be through PAYE by default, as it is for student loans, and from what date will it happen?

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

New clause 5 will mean that a person’s exemption from deportation under section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 can be disapplied where they have engaged in conduct such as terrorism, war crimes or serious organised crime. Section 7 provides protection from deportation for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who were ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom before 1 January 1973. It is an important safeguard for many people with long-standing ties to the UK.

The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 prevents us from deporting them. That cannot be right. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime, sexual grooming or war crimes, should not be able to avoid deportation purely on the basis that they have been in this country since before 1973.

Our new clause will end the disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. Decisions to disapply the exemption will be taken personally by the Home Secretary. Safeguards put in place by the new clause ensure that the legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will be used to ensure that only those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

As we saw with the case I mentioned, changing the law is only half the problem. Arranging the deportation of such individuals can take time, as successive Governments have found previously. Introducing this important new clause will ensure that we have the power to deport this individual, and that will be taken forward in the usual way. Given the danger that this individual poses, Government amendment 47 would amend the commencement clauses in the Bill to ensure that the new clause comes into effect upon Royal Assent.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

New clause 5 closes an anomaly that dates back to 1973, under which Commonwealth and Irish citizens living in the country when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force are protected from deportation by section 7, however serious their conduct. The new clause would let the Home Secretary decide that such a person is liable to deportation where they have been or could have been deprived of citizenship on conduct grounds. We support it and amendment 47, which brings it into force on Royal Assent.

The Conservative plan is to deport all foreign criminals. Not some of them—all of them. Any measure that removes a barrier to deportation is a step in that direction. New clause 5 is indeed a step in the right direction, but it is such a small step that it is challenging to see that it will make a noticeable impact. It is a personal discretion, not a duty, for the Home Secretary. Every person it covers will still be able to resist removal under article 8 and article 3, through the Human Rights Act 1998. Compare that with the much more robust new clause 45, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), which would mean automatic deportation for every foreign national convicted of an offence. That is what our borders plan means by deporting all foreign criminals.

For the purposes of the debate, I have three questions for the Minister. How many people do the Government estimate are protected by section 7 and could be made liable to deportation under new clause 5? What is the Government’s legal assessment of the clause’s reliance on conduct before commencement? How will the power apply to Irish citizens, given the common travel area, and have the Irish Government been consulted on the measure?

We will support Government new clause 5, but if the Government accept the principle that dangerous people should not be protected from deportation by legal technicalities, I hope they will support our new clauses in that regard too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 sets out exceptions to the automatic deportation of foreign criminals. This technical amendment provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

At the time the UK Borders Act was enacted, there was not a detailed domestic legal framework in place for the identification and protection of victims of modern slavery. Since then, the Government have introduced specific domestic modern slavery legislation, including the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The ongoing work on this Bill has highlighted the outdated reference to the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and this provides an opportune moment to update the legislation so that it refers to the relevant domestic modern slavery framework.

New clause 32 replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under ECAT with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

Since the introduction of the 2007 Act, the UK has introduced specific modern slavery legislation and these provisions will now provide the legal framework for identifying and protecting victims of modern slavery in the UK. The new clause aligns the deportation framework with existing domestic legislation on modern slavery provisions and provides greater legal clarity.

The new clause does not expand or alter the protections. It simply clarifies and clears up any ambiguity in the law. It simply places the exception to automatic deportation on a clearer domestic statutory footing, while ensuring the Secretary of State retains flexibility to grant temporary permission to stay in exceptional circumstances where appropriate.

[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 32 rewrites the exception to automatic deportation for foreign criminals who are victims of trafficking. At present, section 33(6A) of the UK Borders Act 2007 disapplies automatic deportation where removal would breach our obligations under the Council of Europe trafficking convention. The new clause would replace that with a test based on leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including where the Home Secretary merely intends to grant such leave, even where she is under no duty to do so.

A criminal conviction should trigger automatic deportation, and those deported as foreign criminals should not be able to make protection claims to stop that deportation. New clause 32 keeps a route by which a foreign criminal can avoid automatic deportation and it widens the discretion to use it.

I am sure nobody in this Committee wants genuine victims of trafficking to be left unsupported, but in clause 38, the Government accept that people who pose a threat to public order should be disqualified from protection. Why, then, keep the exception to automatic deportation for people who have been convicted of crimes here? Why widen the range of cases where there is no duty to grant leave at all?

How many foreign criminals relied on the trafficking exemption in each of the past three years? In what circumstances would the Home Secretary intend to grant leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 where there is no duty to do so? How many foreign criminals do the Government expect to benefit? Unless the Minister can show that this exception will be rare and tightly controlled, it is a back door through which foreign criminals will continue to avoid removal.

[Anna Turley]

Temporary permission to stay is granted only in limited circumstances for specific purposes and for time-limited periods. Confirmed victims who are considered a risk to public order who have made a modern slavery claim in bad faith will not usually be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. In rare cases, the Secretary of State may decide that temporary permission to stay is to be granted to an individual who has been convicted of a crime, for example, where their presence is necessary to support a law enforcement investigation or criminal proceedings. The new clause ensures that the Secretary of State retains this discretion as is befitting with clauses we considered earlier. Any grant of temporary permission to stay is subject to the individual continuing to meet the relevant requirements and lasts only for as long as it is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is granted.

I will undertake to write to the Committee on the specific numbers that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for. I thank Members for their interest in the new clause. It replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act. The technical new clause provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 32 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 33

Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner

“(1) Part 5 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (immigration advisers and immigration service providers) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 92F (enforcement of penalty notices) (inserted by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—

(a) in subsection (1), after ‘notice’ insert ‘(“a penalty”)’;

(b) for subsections (2) to (4) substitute—

‘(2) In England and Wales, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(3) In Scotland, the penalty may be enforced in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.

(4) In Northern Ireland, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(5) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a penalty, the penalty—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.’

(3) In Schedule 5 (the Immigration Services Commissioner), in paragraph 9C (enforcement of orders to refund fees or pay compensation) (inserted by paragraph 14(5) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—

(a) for sub-paragraph (3) substitute—

‘(3) Any amount to be refunded or paid under the order (“the amount owing”)—

(a) in England and Wales, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court;

(b) in Scotland, may be enforced by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland;

(c) in Northern Ireland, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court.’;

(b) in sub-paragraph (4), for ‘make an application under sub-paragraph (3)’ substitute ‘take steps to recover or enforce an amount owing’;

(c) for sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) substitute—

‘(5) Where action is taken under this paragraph for the recovery of an amount to be refunded or paid under an order of the Commissioner, the order—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.

(6) For the purposes of this paragraph, an appeal is pending during the period—

(a) starting when the appeal is brought, and

(b) ending when the appeal is finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.’”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would insert a new clause, to go in after clause 49, amending the provision inserted into the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 about the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner for penalties, refunds and compensation, so as to make it work effectively in Northern Ireland.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Government new clause 33 seeks to amend the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to ensure that the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner under that Act for penalties, refunds and compensation work effectively in Northern Ireland. Provisions regarding enforcement of unpaid monetary penalties, refunds of fees or payments of compensation in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were part of the Immigration Services Commissioner measures in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. Upon making preparations to commence the measures, however, it became apparent that the current provisions are not compatible with the system in place in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the Government are taking steps to rectify the situation so that the enforcement regime can operate as intended.

The Government new clause ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers providing poor or illegal immigration services or advice can be recovered in Northern Ireland as they can in England, Wales and Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Procedures for recovery of debts differ in Scotland from those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, statutory penalties need not be treated as an existing court judgment. In keeping with other types of statutory penalty in Scotland, the proposed drafting allows for these penalties to be treated as an extract registered decree arbitral, bearing a warrant for execution for purposes of enforcement. That means that no application is needed to the court to enforce a debt or penalty, as it is treated as having been registered with the court and authority given the execution.

Amendments in later groups will make provision for the commencement of the new clause to take place in conjunction with the measures it relates to within the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.

[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 33 makes the Immigration Services Commissioner’s penalties, refund orders and compensation orders enforceable as court orders across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland. These are technical improvements and we support them.

Rogue immigration advisers do real damage. They take money from vulnerable people, and, too often, they coach claims designed not to establish the truth but to delay removal, including the late claim lodged the night before a flight, and the fresh claim built on a story that has changed. We would end immigration legal aid and limit judicial review to cases where the Home Office has acted outside its powers, which would remove much of the market that these advisers exploit.

In the meantime, the regulator should have teeth. How many penalties has the commissioner imposed in the last three years, how much has actually been recovered and how many prosecutions for giving unregulated immigration advice have there been? As I said, we support this move, but I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause makes a straightforward technical amendment to the UK Borders Act 2007. It adds the Bill, once enacted, to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. References to “the Immigration Acts” appear throughout the statute book and are used in connection with a wide range of immigration powers, enforcement provisions and other immigration functions. It is therefore important that, once enacted, the Bill is included within that established statutory definition.

The effect of the new clause is to ensure that references elsewhere in the legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the revisions contained in the Bill in the same way as they apply to other immigration legislation. The new clause is a technical provision that ensures the legislation fits coherently within the wider immigration statute book and that existing references to “the Immigration Acts” operate as intended.

[Blake Stephenson]

Mr Twigg, you and the Committee members will be pleased to hear that this will be the shortest speech of the day. The new clause adds the Bill, once enacted, to the list of “the Immigration Acts”. It is a technical provision, and we do not oppose it.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their overwhelming interest in and enthusiasm for this new clause. As discussed, this is a straightforward amendment that adds the Bill to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. It will simply mean that references elsewhere in legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the provisions contained in the Bill in the same way that they apply to other immigration legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 34 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Kohler]

I apologise. The right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) said that they realised they could no longer

“rely on sending people back to the place where they first claimed asylum”.

In spite of the Home Secretary’s statements to the contrary in the recent Home Affairs Committee evidence session, the Prime Minister was quoted in The Times as saying

“the small boats crisis has arisen in the last 10 years because we lost that returns agreement”.

There seems to be a belated admission—in No. 10, at least, if not in the Home Office—that Brexit has exacerbated the problem of illegal immigration to this country.

We cannot continue to be on the outside looking in. The security needs of our border demand closer alignment with Europe.

The Home Secretary has signalled her desire to negotiate access to the Eurodac database, and we are asking the Government to go further in working with our European neighbours by joining the migration and asylum pact. Our new clause would mandate negotiations to join the pact, so that we can share the benefits of European collaboration on immigration. Although Border Force has had some success in reducing dangerous crossings, there will always be a market for criminal gangs to exploit unless we join the EU’s comprehensive framework. Does the Minister acknowledge the potential for the migration and asylum pact to deliver more effective border security, or was the Prime Minister wrong to draw attention to the negative impacts of Brexit?

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart.

New clause 6 would require the Government to start negotiations to join the EU pact on migration and asylum within three months. Committee Members should not be surprised to hear that the official Opposition oppose this new clause. The hon. Member for Wimbledon spoke at length about the returns agreement, but it is not simply a returns agreement. At its heart is a so-called solidarity mechanism, under which member states either accept asylum seekers relocated from other states or pay contributions instead. Joining it would mean the United Kingdom accepting people we did not choose, under rules we did not write, ultimately subject to the European Court of Justice. That is the opposite of taking back control.

The Conservative borders plan takes a completely different approach. We would ban asylum claims by people who enter the country illegally and remove them within a week. We would seek returns agreements with countries of origin, backed by visa sanctions on those that refuse to take their nationals back, and we would support our allies in Europe to stop illegal entry with intelligence, policing and maritime resources. That is co-operation, and it does not require us to hand control of our asylum system to Brussels.

The Liberal Democrats have shown clearly during this Committee that they are not capable of being serious about controlling immigration. They will say that the pact will let us return people to the EU, but the price is relocation quotas and EU jurisdiction, and the evidence from the pact so far is that returns between member states remain very limited indeed. I hope the Minister will confirm today that the Government have absolutely no intention of seeking to join the pact or its solidarity mechanism.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I thank hon. Members for tabling the new clause and for their thoughtful contributions to the debate.

I agree with the hon. Member for Wimbledon that deeper international co-operation is important. That is why the Home Secretary is in regular contact with her counterparts across Europe, including in France, Germany and Belgium, and we are continuing to establish a more comprehensive relationship with Europe as a whole. However, I remind him that irregular migration is not an issue limited to EU nation states. That is why we as a Government are looking even wider and being even more ambitious: not only tackling the issue when it emerges within European territories, but working upstream to prevent the vile trade of organised immigration crime in the first place.

For example, in August 2025 we signed an agreement with Iraq to bolster efforts to deter small boat arrivals. In October 2025, we signed an agreement with Vietnam to crack down on illegal migration and increase returns. In August this year, we signed a migration partnership with Egypt, which will continue to bear down on illegal migration and cut the time needed to return Egyptian nationals with no right to be in the UK by 90%. Those are just some examples of the importance of that broader co-operation and partnership. My hon. Friend the Minister for Migration and Citizenship also attended this year’s Berlin process meeting of Interior Ministers in Montenegro in September. It was a fantastic opportunity to strengthen international police co-operation and develop a joint response to cross-border security challenges not only with our EU counterparts but with representatives from the western Balkans.

I agree that international co-operation is an essential strand of our overarching strategy to tackle illegal migration, and one that I am keen to highlight is bearing fruit. As hon. Members will know—I will say it again, just for the record—small boat arrivals have decreased by more than 40% compared with this point last year. I am not claiming that the job is done—far from it—but we are taking a holistic approach to this issue, of which the Bill is one part. However, the Government will not support the new clause.

I want to pick up on a couple of the points the hon. Member for Wimbledon raised about the impact on returns and about Eurodac. We continue to work with our European partners on the shared challenge, including on returns, but joining the pact would not guarantee increased returns, and our focus is on practical co-operation that delivers real returns outcomes.

Eurodac is a matter for the EU, not a unilateral UK decision. Eurodac is one example of a pact measure where our participation is not legally possible without EU agreement, and the Eurodac legislation makes that clear. Access to asylum data could, of course, help identify individuals who have previously claimed protection in an EU member state before travelling to the UK, but it is for the EU to decide whether it wishes to extend access to third countries. In the meantime, we are strengthening practical co-operation with European partners, including through intelligence sharing and our observer status in the European Migration Network, which delivered on a key PM commitment from the UK-EU summit, and I will come on to say a bit more about the work we are doing on that.

Going back to the new clause, participation is not a straightforward proposition. The pact is not a single agreement that third countries can simply choose to join. It is complex collection of EU legislative measures, many of which are designed specifically for EU member states and Schengen countries. There is no established model for third-country participation, so any form of UK participation would require agreement from the EU and significant EU and operational change before extensive negotiations could commence. The pact is still being implemented across the EU and has been in application only since June this year. Member states are working to implement it, with the EU rightly focused on making it work for its own member states. That is a significant challenge, particularly for frontline countries that are facing the greatest migration pressures.

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[Mr Kohler]

I will start with one: since Brexit, the Government have spent more than £1 billion on the agreement with France. We do not yet know the costs of intelligence sharing with Belgium, so I cannot give an answer on that. However, those deals fail to recognise that people who seek asylum are desperate. Sadly, making the French coast a more difficult place from which to embark pushes asylum seekers towards longer, more dangerous routes. Small boat departures from Belgium used to be rare, but that has changed since the start of 2026. There were 32 attempts to launch small boats from Belgium between January and April of this year, of which five were prevented. In comparison, there were just two launch attempts in the whole of 2025. We believe that agreeing a deal with the entire bloc would be more effective in preventing dangerous small boat crossings, by implementing a deterrent that encompasses all of Europe.

I take the Minister’s point, however. We do need some evidence, which is why the Liberal Democrats suggest a cost-benefit analysis. New clause 7 calls on the Home Secretary to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of bilateral arrangements, to compare their costs with the estimated costs of joining the pact. Does the Minister acknowledge the benefits that that information could yield? Hon. Members have shown that they are interested in the answer, so let us give them the answer. I would like to hear what the Minister thinks.

[Blake Stephenson]

I was surprised to hear the hon. Member for Wimbledon be so supportive of rejoining the EU—I think we have all learned something this morning. We have also learned that the Liberal Democrats feel that that would be a silver bullet to fix all these issues. Yet still the hon. Member comes forward to ask for a cost-benefit analysis to prove it. His statutory duty to benchmark every bilateral agreement against the EU pact is designed to build a case for joining the pact, not to improve returns, and for that reason, the Conservatives oppose it.

[Anna Turley]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wimbledon for his new clause. I understand the case that he is trying to make. He is trying to build his evidence base to persuade us to join the EU pact, but, despite his earlier efforts, I am afraid we will not support his new clause.

We agree that migration co-operation should deliver clear operational benefits, represent value for money and be subject to appropriate scrutiny. Indeed, that is already the case. Relevant spending and significant proposals are assessed under the established appraisal, assurance and accounting officer requirements. Ministers rightly expect officials to demonstrate that policies are deliverable, affordable and capable of achieving their intended objectives. I remind colleagues that we have already published an impact assessment for the Bill. I appreciate that there are details still to be refined, but colleagues will find in the impact assessment information that I hope will support their understanding of the Bill.

I want to be clear that the value of migration co-operation is complex. Some agreements help to deter irregular migration, and some help to change behaviour and prevent dangerous journeys from happening in the first place. Those benefits can sometimes be difficult to measure directly, but they are no less important when considering the overall value of an agreement. Equally, the Government are not lacking in transparency. We regularly publish information on major migration partnerships—for example, we have published details of UK-France co-operation under the broader framework of the Sandhurst treaty and subsequent agreements, including funding commitments, operational activity and strategic objectives. UK-France co-operation is also subject to regular strategic review by the French Government and the UK Government.

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause goes considerably further, however. It would require the Government to publish an annual assessment comparing our existing bilateral migration agreements against a wholly hypothetical model of UK participation in the EU migration and asylum pact. We do not believe that that is a sensible or proportionate requirement. The pact is an internal EU framework comprising 10 separate legislative measures. The UK is not seeking to participate in it, and there is no established mechanism through which non-EU, non-Schengen countries such as the UK can do so.

That means that there is no settled understanding of what the legal route to participation might be, what obligations it might entail, what operational arrangements would be required, or indeed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes said, what costs might arise, yet the new clause would require the Government to produce an annual assessment based on assumptions and theories about all those issues, about which we would have no information. Any such exercise would be inherently speculative. It would require officials to assess a theoretical arrangement that does not exist, using assumptions that cannot be verified and for which there is no established evidence base.

The new clause also appears to rest on the assumption that participation in the pact would somehow replace the UK’s existing network of bilateral migration arrangements and partnerships. There is no reason to believe that that would be the case. EU member states, operating within the EU’s common asylum and migration framework, continue to maintain bilateral arrangements with third countries to support returns, migration management and broader co-operation. The need to engage directly with countries of origin and transit does not disappear because a country participates in the EU system.

At the same time, many of our migration partnerships are about far more than asylum processing or returns. They sit within broader bilateral relationships, helping us to tackle migration pressures at source, disrupt organised immigration crime, strengthen returns co-operation and support wider foreign policy objectives. Participation in the pact would not remove the need for many of the agreements that the new clause seeks to assess. In practice, the UK could find itself maintaining a significant proportion of its existing partnerships, while also incurring additional costs associated with participation in the pact itself.

The new clause also takes no account of the cost of pursuing that proposed participation. As I have already highlighted, negotiating any bespoke arrangement with the EU would require significant official resource, extensive discussions with EU institutions and member states, and potentially substantial legislative and operational change. At the same time, the pact is still being implemented across Europe. Its impacts, costs and benefits are still emerging, and it will take time before there is a clear and reliable evidence base from which lessons can be drawn.

Against that backdrop, requiring officials to construct and maintain an annual assessment of theoretical policy that the Government are not pursuing would not represent good value for money. As I said—and I hope the hon. Member for Wimbledon understands my values and intentions here—the Government are committed to deeper co-operation with European partners on tackling illegal migration. As the hon. Gentleman mentioned, the Prime Minister has set out that Europe is our neighbour and that stronger co-operation with our European partners is essential to tackling these shared challenges. That is why we will be using our engagement with the EU, including the forthcoming summit on 20 November, to pursue practical co-operation on border security, organised immigration crime and improved information and data-sharing, where that supports our national interest. However, none of that requires participation in the pact. We reject the suggestion that joining the pact is the only route, or the necessary route, to achieving these objectives. Our focus is on practical co-operation that delivers results, not a hypothetical arrangement whose terms, costs and obligations cannot be known. For those reasons—

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[Anna Turley]

I disagree with much of what the hon. Gentleman has said today, but he is right on that point. There is opportunity for broader co-operation on many of these fronts, which is why we will continue to explore co-operation. However, signing up to these restrictive pacts would limit that opportunity. I think we have the best of all worlds here: not only can we have direct negotiations with other countries, but we can scale up things such as the one in, one out deal when we think there is potential to do so with other countries. On that note—

[Blake Stephenson]

I caught the Minister just in time. She described the one in, one out scheme as a “pilot”. I do not recall it ever being described as a pilot when it was launched. Can she unpack what the expectations were, what was delivered and why the scheme has been cancelled?

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[Mr Kohler]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a cross-departmental taskforce whose stated aim is to prevent homelessness among asylum seekers and refugees. The Prime Minister has, to his great and huge credit, made ending homelessness a priority, but why, then, is the Minister pursuing the measures in this Bill that contradict such a noble aim? We have already seen that the refugee tax and core protection introduction risk exacerbating the precarity experienced by refugees with settled status.

In December 2024, the Government doubled the grace period refugees were given to move out of Home Office accommodation to 56 days. They did that, as they stated at the time, to provide refugees with more time to find alternative accommodation, reducing the risk of homelessness and putting pressure on overstretched council housing services. The Home Office has now reduced the grace period to 42 days, which would increase such pressures. The longer move-on period was shown to be effective. According to the Refugee Council, an estimated 1,000 refugee households in England avoided homelessness in 2025 thanks to the increased time they had to begin rebuilding their lives in the UK. I am concerned that a reduction in move-on time would lead to increased refugee homelessness, and I would be interested to hear whether the Minister has seen any data on refugee homelessness levels since that reduction in the grace period.

The issue of a shorter move-on period is compounded by systemic issues identified by the Refugee Council. Those include refugees receiving documentation in stages instead of all at once, delayed access to e-visas, local authority uncertainty on refugee entitlements and challenges of low digital literacy. Those challenges require a tailored approach, which is why our new clause would establish a taskforce to combat refugee homelessness. It would be responsible for co-ordinating the different services, moving people out of asylum support, ensuring that people who are granted refugee status get their essential documents promptly, identifying those at the greatest risk of homelessness and monitoring the impact of changes to the move-on period.

Asylum has become a politically charged issue, but we cannot lose sight of our obligations to those fleeing war and persecution. We must ensure that move-on initiatives deliver. The National Centre for Social Research found that constraints of systemic housing shortages and the concurrent roll-out of e-visas were holding us back. It made recommendations that included restoring the move-on period to 56 days, better data sharing and strengthening the support on offer. It would be within our taskforce’s remit to ensure that those recommendations are properly implemented. Having a body dedicated to protecting homeless asylum seekers is a way to ensure that we uphold our responsibilities and action those recommendations.

[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Member for Wimbledon has described the real pressures on councils across the country. When people are granted protection and leave asylum accommodation, many present as homeless, and local authorities across the country pick up the cost. However, in our view, a statutory taskforce will not solve that. The root of the pressure is the number of people arriving and the time that they spend in the system. Fewer arrivals and faster outcomes would do far more for councils than any taskforce.

We will not support the new clause, but let me ask the Minister a question, building on the one that the hon. Member for Wimbledon asked. What is the current move-on period after a grant of protection, and what assessment have the Government made of the cost of refugee homelessness to local authorities throughout England?

[Anna Turley]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wimbledon for raising this issue through his new clause, because it is a big priority for this Government, as he alluded to. I want to put it on record that I and the Government support the notion that no one should be sleeping rough. As the Prime Minister has set out, ending homelessness is his No. 1 priority.

As Members will be aware, in the immediacy, the Government have committed £442 million to ensure that everyone who is sleeping rough is off the streets by Christmas. That feeds into the wider £4.4 billion being invested in homelessness and rough sleeping services over the next three years. This combines immediate accommodation support with longer-term settled housing and intensive support for people who have experienced prolonged rough sleeping. The Christmas ambition is the first phase of that wider effort. It is a programme of practical delivery and, as I have laid out, it is not one that depends on establishing a separate statutory taskforce.

Looking beyond the Christmas delivery plan, the Government are already taking a cross-Government approach through the national plan to end homelessness in England and the interministerial group on homelessness and rough sleeping. That group brings together work on housing, health, employment and transitions out of public service with regular monitoring of delivery. A separate taskforce would duplicate existing co-ordination arrangements rather than address the practical barriers that people face.

We recognise that newly granted refugees can face particular challenges. Asylum move-on liaison officers, where present, explain next steps, signpost housing and benefit support, liaise with local services and escalate barriers. They provide practical help with navigating the transition. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked what the move-on period is: it is currently 42 days.

We regularly review the role of the liaison officer model to ensure that it meets the needs of users and to reduce homelessness among newly recognised refugees. This includes exploring earlier, targeted housing advice before an asylum decision, and working with accommodation providers to improve the quality and timeliness of information given to local authorities when asylum support ends.

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[Mr Kohler]

Our proposal to allow refugees to begin working after three months waiting for a decision would generate five times more revenue than the misguided debt levied on asylum seekers by earlier provisions in the Bill. It would have an instantaneous effect and generate a much more positive financial outcome than that immiserating proposal, both for the Home Office budget, which is under strain from the ballooning asylum bill, and for the Treasury’s tax receipts.

In 2022, the Labour party acknowledged that the current 12-month waiting period should be halved, yet the Government refuse to pursue this common-sense policy. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research has modelled the macroeconomic effects of lifting the ban. According to it, allowing those who have been waiting more than six months for a decision to work would save the Government £4.4 billion a year, increase tax revenue by £800 million and add £1 billion to GDP.

Time spent being prevented from working has a scarring effect on refugees’ future likelihood of being in work. These effects are well documented; the longer someone is out of a job, the harder it is for them to get one. A study of Swiss asylum seekers found that, for each year they are prevented from working, their future employment rate falls by 4 to 5 percentage points. Furthermore, preventing refugees from working only drives greater numbers of people towards the black economy. Instead of pursuing policies that improve prospects for asylum seekers, the current path serves only to increase state dependency and enrich criminality. We must remember that if this country works for refugees, refugees will work for this country.

The argument that giving asylum seekers employment rights will encourage further illegal immigration is well worn but ultimately unsubstantiated. Available evidence suggests that employment rights play little to no role in people’s destination of choice, whereas factors such as language and familial relations are far more influential. The Government’s position is disputed by their own Migration Advisory Committee.

Indeed, asylum seekers come here in spite of the fact that our working regulations are a complete outlier in comparison with other states. EU law requires access to work after six months at most, while Canada allows it immediately and the US after six months. Even Denmark, which is always held out as being quite hard-line on immigration issues and undocumented migrants, allows it after six months. A three-month limit would be in line with our allies and may incentivise the Home Office to improve the efficiency of its decision making.

Allowing refugees to work after three months would be worth £437 million per cohort, which is five times the cost that would be recovered with a £10,000 payment scheme. Importantly, the public support this measure. Lift the Ban research found that 71% of the public agreed that people seeking asylum should have the right to work. Ultimately, people who work while they wait for an asylum decision are more ready to support themselves when they get status. This is good for the taxpayer, good for the asylum seeker and good for the country.

[Blake Stephenson]

The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 10 would give asylum seekers the right to work after three months, and the Green party’s new clause 24 would give them an automatic, unrestricted right after six months that lasts through every appeal. We oppose both new clauses.

People who enter the UK illegally should not be able to claim asylum here at all. The new clauses go in the opposite direction. They would make the UK a more attractive destination for people deciding whether to pay a smuggler to cross the channel. Everybody wants to reduce pull factors so that we can reduce dangerous crossings, and I am afraid that the new clauses would introduce additional pull factors.

I will keep my remarks brief and just ask the Minister a question. How many asylum seekers currently have permission to work, and what assessment have the Government made of the effect that earlier work rights would have on the number of claims?

[Siân Berry]

The right to work does not impact only those seeking sanctuary; the impact also falls on their children and on communities. Giving people seeking sanctuary the right to work—or, rather, restoring their agency—is a matter of basic dignity and human rights. People who have fled war or persecution should have the opportunity to rebuild their lives in the UK with dignity and independence. That means that they need a safe place to live, access to support and a genuine right to work, as set out in new clause 24. It is important to stress that this debate is about restoring choice and agency to people seeking sanctuary, not imposing new requirements on those who are not ready or able to work.

As it stands, the law permits a person seeking asylum to request permission to work if they have been waiting more than 12 months for a Home Office decision on their asylum claim through no fault of their own. That may be 12 months after they initially claimed asylum or 12 months after they made further submissions, which are then considered as a fresh claim.

It has been more than two decades since those seeking asylum could apply to work after six months. People repeatedly raise the issue of enforced worklessness while claims are processed. My new clause 24 would simply restore the previous time limit and match the Home Office’s own targets for decision making. The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 10 would grant the right to work at three months, which is also perfectly reasonable. New clause 24 goes into more detail about how the proposal should be implemented. It states that the right should be automatic, without the need for an application, and that there should be no restrictions on the type of employment. It also states when the right should end, if a decision on the application is made one way or the other.

More often than not, vulnerable people are left waiting for months, and often years, for a decision. For that entire period, however qualified and willing they are, they are not permitted to work. That is profoundly felt by people who arrive with real skills, a keen willingness to contribute and a desire to rebuild their lives. Instead, the current rules require them to survive on a small weekly allowance. They are unable to contribute, build a life and often even volunteer in their communities without navigating endless bureaucratic red tape.

The most potent and poisonous rhetoric of the far right plays up the dependence that people are left in; it stokes conflict between people in the asylum system, who are denied the ability to earn, and others in society. Members can hear the voices I am referring to in their heads right now. There is absolutely no need to leave in place the restrictions that fuel that kind of rhetoric and racism, and that badly harm the acceptance and integration of refugees.

Work can bring not only integration and community strength but genuine benefits to people fleeing war, trauma or oppression. That is because people seeking sanctuary in the UK are five to six times more likely than the general population to have mental health needs. A review of the impact of asylum processes on mental health found that policies restricting work contributed to psychological distress and social exclusion. The mental health cost of robbing vulnerable groups of the ability to exercise their agency and provide for themselves and their loved ones is far too high.

Many people seeking asylum in the UK and elsewhere are living with trauma. That contributes to their poor mental health. They might also be recovering from illness or caring for family members. It is important that a humane and just system recognises the structural barriers to finding work that many of these people will face. We must recognise that some people will want to work immediately, while others may need time and support to rebuild their lives. Therefore, my new clause is set out as a right to work. If the Government make any moves in this direction, they must refrain from making it a mandate to work.

Despite the clear and mounting evidence in favour of the right to work, successive UK Governments have closed their minds to the idea and refused to implement it. The usual response, which has already been aired in this debate, is that permitting work sooner risks acting as a pull factor to further migration, but that does not hold water given the evidence. The UK maintains one of the strictest systems in Europe concerning the right to work for people seeking asylum. The international evidence is unequivocal and the difference in waiting times across comparable countries is enlightening.

In 2018, Ireland opted in to the recast EU reception conditions directive and allowed work after nine months. That was subsequently reduced to six months in 2021. Comparable countries in Europe have far more lenient policies on the right to work. In Germany, it is granted after three months, with the only restriction being on self-employment. There is a similar policy after 60 days in Greece. In Italy the period is two months, in Spain it is six months, in Belgium it is four months, and in Denmark it is six months—all with no restrictions. In Sweden someone can apply to work immediately in limited sectors, and in France there are restricted types of work that someone can do after six months. All this is evidence that an alternative can be imagined that is intensely practical, would not have the knock-on effects that other parties have suggested, and can work.

Alongside the moral arguments, there is a strong economic angle to be considered. The Lift the Ban coalition, which has already been quoted in this debate, estimates that lifting the ban could save the Treasury over £280 million per year, and recent research by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research found that lifting the ban after six months could save the Government a total of £4.4 billion per year, increase tax revenue by £880 million and add £1 billion to GDP.

Restricting access to legal work inevitably increases the risk of exploitation. When people are prevented from supporting themselves lawfully, they can be pushed towards unsafe and illegal forms of work. Granting people the right to work therefore extends itself to protecting vulnerable people from further exploitation and abuse, and extends the ability to maintain community cohesion and safety.

In my view, though, the greatest cost of the current policy is the human cost—years of wasted potential, lost independence and lives left on hold while awaiting a decision. The Government should heed the approach taken by much of mainland Europe already and accept these amendments.

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[Tom Gordon]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. New clause 11 would require the Secretary of State to make changes to the immigration rules to make provision for leave to enter or remain in the UK to be granted to the family members of refugees and of people granted humanitarian protection. The family reunion route was paused on 4 September 2025, with a stricter system promised from spring 2026 still not in place, as we discussed earlier in Committee. So I ask the Minister: if the Government announce a new settlement route, will there be a new family reunion route, too? We want to see the details of the resettlement scheme announced with this legislation. Obviously, the purpose of this amendment is to make sure we end up with the tens of thousands of people, predominantly women and children who used to use the family reunion visas, able to access it.

I meet many people in my constituency of Harrogate and Knaresborough, from victims of genocide such as the Yazidi people to people who came through the Afghan route. Quite often the distress and additional trauma that is caused by having been separated from their families compounds the issues that they are already trying to grapple with.

With the new rules set to come in under this Bill, there will be issues around refugees being able to hit the income thresholds so that their family members can come with them. That is the purpose of this new clause and I would welcome any news or updates from the Minister further to the questions already put during the course of this Bill Committee.

[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 11 would require the Government to restore refugee family reunion within six months, but I understand that it also widens definitions to include children up to the age of 25, which was not in the hon. Member’s opening remarks, so I hope I am not mistaken.

We oppose this measure. Family reunion, as proposed in new clause 11, would add a further reward to a successful illegal crossing. Every grant would bring the prospect of encouraging a wider family member, and it would create a well-known incentive for families to send one member ahead, sometimes a child, on the most dangerous journey of all. We all want to stop and limit dangerous journeys. Safe and legal routes should be for people from regions of conflict who we choose to help, as we have done for Ukraine, Hong Kong and Afghanistan. There should not be a reward for illegal and very dangerous crossings. We will not support the new clause, but can I ask the Minister to tell us when the Government intend to publish their replacement for the suspended family reunion route, as I think she intimated they would in the previous debate, and whether the intention is for it to be capped?

[Anna Turley]

New clause 11, tabled by the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, seeks to reopen the refugee family reunion route and greatly expand eligibility to wider family members. The Government took the difficult decision to suspend the refugee family reunion route in September 2025. That was done in response to immediate pressures placed on local authorities and public services by the rapid rise in arrivals in recent years.

The family reunion route had grown exponentially, placing significant and unsustainable pressures on local authorities and public services. Grants rose from approximately 5,500 per annum between 2015 and 2022 to more than 20,000 in the year ending September 2025. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we cannot have a situation where families are sending men on dangerous journeys, through other safe countries, to reach these shores with the intention to bring their families. We are extremely keen to prevent that. We want to ensure that there is a sustainable route for families that are genuinely fleeing war and persecution to come to this country, and that was not it.

Suspension remains in place while we are developing the wider reforms to the family migration system. I know that colleagues are on tenterhooks, and I wish I could expand on that further, but I can assure them that they do not have very long to wait at all—as I am sure they can see from the increased media frenzy around these issues. I will not pre-empt the Home Secretary’s announcements, but I reassure colleagues that those announcements are well on their way and they do not have long to wait.

The system we want to see will be fair, controlled and sustainable. The Government recognise the importance of family unity and the distress that separation can cause. We also recognise the contribution that families can make to helping refugees integrate. However, we must ensure that our approach takes account of the capacity of communities to support those arriving.

I want to be clear that suspension does not mean that family members have no way of applying to come to the UK. Other family routes remain available where people meet the relevant requirements, with provisions such as fee waivers available, and a consideration of any exceptional circumstances where an individual may not meet the criteria set out in those routes. In addition, applications under the suspended route that were submitted before the suspension came into force continue to be processed.

New clause 11 would go considerably further than simply restoring the previous arrangements. It would require the Government to establish a new and expansive refugee family reunion scheme within six months, and prescribe a significantly wider group of qualifying family members, including parents, siblings, unmarried adult children and siblings up to the age of 25 and other unspecified family members. This is highly likely to lead to considerably more people arriving than ever before, without any necessity for their sponsor to support them.

The new clause would also cut across established routes that already make specific provision for these relationships, including Appendix Child Relative for vulnerable children joining a close relative with protection status, and the Adult Dependant Relative route for adults requiring long-term, personal care. Those routes contain carefully designed eligibility, dependency, care, maintenance and accommodation requirements. The new clause risks creating an overlapping route for the same cohorts without specifying any safeguards that would apply, potentially undermining the workings of our wider family migration system.

The new clause would further enable children to sponsor their parents and siblings, which is something that was not possible under the previous route. We must consider the incentives that such a change would create. If a child reaching the UK alone could subsequently provide a route for other family members to join them, there is a real risk that smuggling gangs could exploit that expectation, leading to more children being sent on dangerous journeys, including on small boats. That would put children at greater risk of abuse and death.

The proposals tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough should also be considered together. Amendment 54 would have provided that requirements being imposed must demonstrate that arriving family members could be suitably supported and accommodated by their sponsor. Together, these proposals, if accepted, would pre-empt the Government’s ongoing work that I have mentioned on our future family migration framework by constraining our ability to consider refugee family reunion alongside the wider reforms that we are making. It would be premature to prescribe the outcome of that work in the Bill. They are also likely to lead to a large increase in arrivals, which would further exacerbate existing pressures on local authorities and public services.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough should consider how the consequences of such a surge in arrivals, if these proposals were enacted, would be managed. Where would families live if suitable accommodation had not been secured? Who would meet their immediate needs if their sponsor could not support them? Do we expect already stretched local authorities and public services to support those arrivals? If children are allowed to sponsor, as he proposes, a child cannot be expected to obtain a sufficient income or secure suitable accommodation for an arriving family, so who would meet those needs? What assessment has he made of the additional resources that would be needed, and how does he propose these costs should be met?

Those responsibilities simply cannot be left for local authorities to resolve after families arrive. They have practical consequences for homelessness services, temporary accommodation, children’s services and school places, as well as the local people who rely on those services. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough to withdraw the new clause.