(1 year, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberCompetition is by far and away the best regulator, and I pay tribute to all those in the House, including my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), who have pointed that out; I am delighted there is cross-party agreement. The point he made needs stressing: we are dealing with a limited number of regulators here today, but there are many other regulators and much of their task could be better done by following competition as the prime means of enforcing choice. I should say that I have declared my business interests in the register and none of my comments relate to financial services as a result.
The regulators would be well advised to heed that advice and, instead of intervening in detail and trying to make very difficult distinctions and definitions that affect a complex marketplace, with the interplay of so many different consumers and suppliers, just stress that if there is effective choice and challenge in the market, normally there can be no harm.
Labour has said that it could be that an online supplier of goods and services was not offering a good deal, but I am less worried about that if there are shops in my local high street, because I do not have to use the offer by the online provider. The online provider themselves will anyway be subject to the challenge of other online providers. One advantage that the online retailer has is that the cost of entry is so much less than that required by those who wish to set up a formal shop with a property. If an online retailer, however large they might become, starts to offer very poor deals or offers, there will be plenty of challenge to that emerging in the marketplace.
In a fast-changing world where the market is extremely good at challenging, developing and changing offers overnight, we need to be careful about becoming too prescriptive. We may come up with a perfect solution to perceived problems of some suppliers at the moment only to find that, tomorrow, there are very different problems from different suppliers and that much of it can be taken care of by that pursuit of competition.
My main concern about all of this for our country is that competition only works, in the benign way that we know it can, if we have sufficient capacity. There is a danger, encouraged by the Opposition and pursued by the Government, that today we are so keen to regulate, to intervene and to tax anybody who makes a good profit; to provide a subsidy to anybody who has a failing business; and to decide that the Government know best about what consumers ought to buy and ought to want, that we end up with too little capacity in a number of crucial areas. That means that, instead of helping the consumer, we hinder them. Instead of having moderate prices with few rises, we have even higher price rises because there is insufficient capacity to meet the market demand. Instead of providing that perfect background for entrepreneurial businesses, which Labour and Conservatives are united in wanting, we send a hostile message to businesses. Those businesses then find other places with greater freedoms and lower taxes as the ideal place in which to experiment, to set up and to seek to export from, rather than from the United Kingdom.
I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way. In relation to his very good point about capacity, what is his view about the need to ensure that we remain open for business internationally and remain an attractive place? Moreover, what is his view about the role of the regulators in that context, particularly the CMA, because of course capacity can come from other countries into our own market?
Indeed. I do not wish to go into the details of a recent case, because I have not studied all the documents, which would be necessary to do justice to both sides of the argument. Thinking back to when I was competition Minister—a good while ago now—when I was acting for the then Secretary of State, there was a difficult issue that arose over media challenge to the then existing limited number of media players where two of the new services wanted to merge together. I recommended, and we decided, that the two should be allowed to merge because they made a more effective competitor to what was already there, rather than taking the narrow pro-competition view that we needed to have two new challengers. The danger was that they would both fight each other to the death and leave the main media institutions—ITV and the BBC—unchallenged by alternative services.
The regulator has to understand that competition is not always furthered by blocking something; sometimes it can actually be furthered by encouraging the new. The main issue in competition law is often the definition of what is the market. I have already mentioned retail. If the market is online retail, we might want to stop a successful online retailer growing by acquisition, but if the market is retail, we might want a strong online competitor in order to challenge the previously dominant shop retailers. However, it is now coming to the point where it may be the other way around—where we need to be worried about the adequacy of the conventional retailer response.
Let me illustrate the importance of the central issue of capacity to the debate. One thing that has been extremely scarce—this has been blamed by many for the worst part of the inflation we have been experiencing—is energy. If the United Kingdom persists in saying that we do not want to get our own gas out of the North sea, we will not automatically transfer to green electricity; we will import gas from somewhere else. By doing so, not only will we damage our economy, as we forgo the jobs in the North sea and the cheaper gas, because the imported gas will be dearer; it will also be much worse for the environment, because by delaying or blocking the gas that we could get out, we will automatically import more liquefied natural gas. LNG generates at least twice as much CO2 as burning our own gas down a pipe because of all the energy entailed in compressing a gas, liquefying it, transporting it and then converting it back to the gas that we need to use. It is therefore a doubly foolish policy.
We need to expand our capacity in energy where it is available and we need to understand that there are huge economic gains to producing our own. We also need to be worried about national resilience. If we wish to say that we can defend our country and its allies, it is terribly important that we produce enough for ourselves. Having energy self-sufficiency is always critical to having a country with resilience and strong defences.
The electrical revolution seems to be popular in most parts of the House of Commons, with people urging the Government to achieve a faster electrical revolution, switching more and more people from being predominantly users of fossil fuel—most of us predominantly use fossil fuel with a petrol or diesel car and a gas boiler—to using electrical means for our main energy uses. If we are to pursue that electrical revolution, there needs to be a massive expansion in grid capacity and in cable capacity into everybody’s homes, offices and shops. It is simply not possible at the moment to generate the competition that we want for electricity against fossil fuels, and within electricity for renewables against more traditional ways of producing electricity, because the new renewable ways are so grid intensive and need so much more grid and cable capacity—we have to time shift them because they are often not available—that we are not going to get very far.
Already, I have helped with a major investment in my constituency, which was very welcome. One possible stumbling block was that the electricity companies could not offer enough power for the particular business development. There had to be an agreement over how much power the development could have available, because there was not limitless power for it to buy. The issue was to do with grid capacity. We will find that that becomes more and more common if we do not get on with dealing with this particular issue.
A very topical issue today is capacity in motor vehicles. If we are to have a full range of choice and enough domestic production, it is not a good idea to ban the sale and therefore the manufacture of petrol and diesel cars as early as 2030, when no other major country in the world is doing so and when there will still be quite a lot of buyers who want petrol and diesel cars. I urge the Government to understand what competition choice means. It means that people will buy electric cars when they want to buy them. They will buy electric cars when they are cheaper and better, and when they believe that the range is right and that the necessary back-up facilities are in place. I have no doubt that electric vehicle sales will grow, but it would be quite wrong to have an artificial injection of policy to ban older cars and prevent capacity and choice.
If the UK does not have battery production capacity, all we will do by banning petrol and diesel cars is destroy the successful industry that we have, which makes extremely good petrol and diesel cars, without having the replacement industry in place. It is not a simple matter of switching the production line from a diesel car one day to an electric car the next; it is a totally different product, built in a totally different way. An electric car needs a battery, which may be 40% of its value, and currently we cannot produce those batteries in any numbers to replace the capacity that we wish to cancel. I urge the Government to think again about consumer choice, competition and investment flows, because there is no way that people will want to invest serious money in the UK motor industry if its regulatory environment is more hostile than those elsewhere.
I was pleased to see my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister take a great personal interest in food production. I believe he held a very successful seminar yesterday and asked the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to go away and work up a series of measures. I do not doubt the enthusiasm of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, which I fully share and have often promoted, for us to grow much more of our own food in this country and to offer that much more choice to people in our supermarkets. However, when I look at the package of measures the Department has brought forward, there is hardly anything in it that would carry that ambition through.
The Department still intends to spend most of its subsidy money, most of its exhortation and a great deal of its regulation on encouraging farmers not to produce food, to wild their land and to achieve great things on managing the landscape for us all. That is all very nice, but it is possible to have perfectly attractive fields growing food, and that is clearly what we need rather more of.
We need to back the new robotics, artificial intelligence and electromechanical technologies that could transform the production of fruit and vegetables and other market garden products, as they used to be called, where we have allowed our market share to fall dramatically in the last 30 or 40 years. We are now reliant on imports, which limits choice, drives up prices and puts our national food resilience more in doubt because, were there to be problems with the supply from our normal suppliers abroad, I am sure we would be towards the back of the queue when it came to getting to what we needed.
I am conscious that others wish to speak in the debate, so I will not go into every sector, but the Government need to review sector by sector what they are doing that could help to increase capacity. Can they not reposition their subsidies, grants and direct investments, which they are making around the place on a pretty colossal scale, in a way that promotes that capacity and thus eases the position for competition? There is a particularly worrying trend at the moment—one that is bad for public spending and bad for business—that we make so many confused interventions that we need another intervention to deal with the previous intervention.
I will finish on the issue of high energy usage industries—steel, ceramics and other similar industries—which are gravely at risk. We have lost colossal capacity and market share under Governments of all parties since I have been around watching such things. The danger is that that loss will accelerate from here because we decide to impose the highest carbon taxes of any advanced-world country, as far as I can see—another major problem for the cost base of industries that are struggling to compete—and we then draw back in horror when we see that there could be closures and job losses, so the Government put some subsidies back in and we have a subsidy trying to countervail the tax. However, the subsidy is usually not as much as all the taxes combined, because when we add the 31% corporation tax—should there be any profits, and unfortunately there often are not—on top of the windfall taxes on the energy companies and on top of the carbon taxes on the steel and ceramics businesses, the tax burden is colossal and would be punitive were businesses to succeed and start making money. The demand for subsidy then becomes greater.
To have a competitive market would be extremely welcome. We have a market that is not nearly competitive enough. I ask the Government to look at what they are doing, because I think they are in danger of doing counterproductive and contradictory things: taxing too much, subsidising not quite enough and then inventing rules that stop people doing business.
I declare my interest as set out on the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am grateful to the Government for having reflected in the Bill so many of the recommendations in my Committee’s report on post-Brexit competition and consumer law policy. Although I am grateful to the Minister and shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), for thanking me for my work, I should humbly put it on record that there would be no report were it not for my colleagues on the Committee, my Clerks, and the witnesses who gave evidence.
I will not test the patience of the House by listing all the Committee’s achievements in this respect, but I will focus on one area that our report talked about—oversight of the Competition and Markets Authority and other regulators that operate in the digital market space—where provisions are missing from the Bill. The CMA is an independent regulator, but it is directly accountable to Parliament for the performance of its functions and duties. Only yesterday, we welcomed its chair and chief executive officer to the Business and Trade Committee to answer questions on topical cases, its annual plan, the draft strategic steer from the Department and, indeed, this Bill.
In practice, Committees such as mine only really scrutinise regulators, agencies and arm’s-length bodies on their day-to-day performance perhaps on an annual basis at best, or once there has been a failure. We recognised that ourselves in respect of issues at the energy regulator, Ofgem, which we only uncovered once there had been a multibillion-pound failure in the market. We gave ourselves an action in that report, as well as in our post-Brexit competition and consumer law report, to enhance our oversight of the CMA and other regulators to avoid this happening again.
It is not a new problem. As many Members will know, the noble Lord Tyrie, who chaired the Treasury Committee during the banking crisis, has written and spoken extensively about this issue. It is a challenge for most Committees. Gov.uk helpfully lists the number of agencies and public bodies sponsored by each Department, and that of my Committee has 21, including the Competition and Markets Authority, the Land Registry, Companies House, the Insolvency Service, ACAS, the Financial Reporting Council, the Trade Remedies Authority, and the Pubs Code and Groceries Code Adjudicators. That does not even include the Post Office or the British Business Bank.
I agree with everything the hon. Member has said so far. Does he agree with the proposal of the Regulatory Reform Group, which I chair, that there should be a specialist Committee to look at the regulators on an ongoing basis, in addition to the work that his and other Select Committees do in this House?
If I answered shortly with the word “Yes” it would ruin the rest of my speech, so I am going to keep reading through my notes. However, the hon. Member, having asked that question, will understand the direction of travel.
The Minister was pointing at himself, I think noting for the House that he of course has responsibility for all those organisations. He will know, from our Committee perspective and the role that Parliament has in the oversight and scrutiny of the Minister’s performance and that of his Department, that we can have capacity challenges. Other Committees have the same problem: the Culture, Media and Sport Committee covers 42 agencies and public bodies, while the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee covers 33, and so on. The Bill before the House, which I welcome, is a great example of an agency being given new powers, a wider remit, more work to do and the job of taking ever more wide-ranging decisions, but there is nothing in the Bill about enhanced accountability and oversight of the CMA. The challenge there is that we have to get the balance right.
Parliament will want the CMA to be effective in its core duty of promoting and delivering competition. In our evidence session yesterday, there was an interesting tension about whether we deliver effective competition by regulation and intervention, or by deregulation and getting out of the way. I think that illustrated the interesting tension between oversight of the Competition and Markets Authority and its independence. While the regulator must take clear decisions based on its legal duties and the required technical assessments, what will Parliament think if, over time, a number of interventions taken together paint a picture of the UK as not being a good place to start, scale up or exit a business? How will we know in this House if that is the case, and how can regulators be held to account for the impact of their decisions over time?
This friction came up again only today. We took evidence yesterday on the Microsoft and Activision case, which is a major intervention by the Competition and Markets Authority, and I understand the Chancellor has said this afternoon, about the Competition and Markets Authority, that
“I do think it’s important all our regulators understand their wider responsibilities for economic growth.”
If the regulator does not already understand that and if the Chancellor does not have confidence in the regulator, we have a problem. What view should Parliament therefore take in the context of this Bill going through the House?
Clearly, independent regulators should not be interfered with by Parliament in making their day-to-day decisions. Parliament should be crystal clear that it is not our job to take those decisions. Expert regulators should not be told what they should do or think by, with the greatest respect to many colleagues in the House, generalist Members of the House of Commons. However, with increased powers and responsibilities—not least following our exit from the European Union, where there was inbuilt enhanced scrutiny in the European Parliament of these decisions—it is crucial that this Parliament steps up to provide the enhanced accountability required.
In short, the right to exercise independence and the requirement to be accountable are not mutually exclusive. As we have heard, there is a certain cross-party support for this position and an increased demand for reform, but there is not much in the Bill or from the Government that I have heard to facilitate that. There have been suggestions, which I generally support, that either we have enhanced capacity and resources for existing Select Committees to do more work in holding regulators and arm’s length bodies to account for their day-to-day work, or that we set up a new specialist Select Committee that takes on the job of having oversight of regulators across Whitehall. Some people will be concerned by the suggestion of additional Committees, either because of the perceived need for regulators to have to engage, inform and appease parliamentarians on a day-to-day basis and the amount of time that may take, or because of the influence that lobbyists may have on a fixed number of parliamentarians on the Committee tasked with oversight of the regulator.
It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey) and I cannot think of a subject that would generate more clicks than digital markets and the CMA. With that in mind, I mention that David Lloyd George, a long-serving and respected Member of this place, was known to remark to young Members who asked him in his later years how they should get on, make a speech and behave, that he had one main rule: Cabinet Ministers can make three points in a speech, junior Ministers can make two and Back Benchers can make one. So I shall try to make one fundamental point in my speech, which is about the accountability of the CMA.
Many Members, on both sides of the House, including the Chair of the Select Committee, have said—there was a session for Members of Parliament earlier this week at which I made similar points to the Ministers on the Treasury Bench—that, when we give power to an arm’s length body, we have to very careful about the use of that power. Members of Parliament, and the Government, must make sure it is exercised in the right way, as intended by primary legislation and by the policies of the Government of the day, in broad strategic terms. I do not mean we should do that day-by-day, decision-by-decision, where we second-guess our regulators. If we were to do that, we would get the worst of all worlds. Nobody sensible thinks that that is a good idea.
I chair the Regulatory Reform Group and I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. In recent weeks and months, my colleagues on that group and I have been thinking seriously about the broader regulatory system and how it can be improved to get the best outcome for our economy, and for individuals and businesses in this country. This is a good Bill. It does important things. I welcome the more flexible, less dogmatic, less box-ticky approach embodied in the Digital Markets Unit. That is a good thing. The Government are right to have taken into account a lot of work and thinking that has been done by many different people, both in this House and outside, over the past 18 months or so, and they should be commended for that.
However, I am worried about giving a lot more power to the CMA, if it is not checked. If it is not held to account more by this House and by the Government, we could inadvertently—the CMA has brilliant people who are trying to do their best job for the country—create an image of this country, or indeed of digital markets or any other market, that is not to the overall benefit of this country in comparison with our competitors.
In particular, I am thinking of the appeals mechanism. The Bill contains an appeals mechanism that is given a judicial review standard. That will mean—I can see two former Lord Chancellors next to me, who will correct me if this is wrong—that any appeal has to be broadly on judicial review grounds, which are on process, illegality and various other aspects that do not relate per se to the merits of the decision. In effect, if the Competition and Markets Authority has made a decision, having followed the correct process, not been irrational or done something illegal, and a party or parties do not agree with that decision, that decision cannot be challenged on its merits.
This suggestion has been pushed back in previous Bills that have come to this House when there has been discussion about whether the appeal standard should be a judicial review or a merit standard. In previous iterations, the House has always decided to take a merit standard. In this instance, we have taken a judicial review standard. That sends a subtle, but very important, signal to companies and investors outside of this country. They will say, “If something goes awry with the regulator in Britain, what is our appeal right?” They may feel that that appeal right is not sufficient compared with, say, the European Union, Singapore, the United States or wherever it is they are also thinking of investing. If they compare the two and we come off unfavourably, that will have a damaging impact on this country. That particular aspect of the Bill—the accountability—is very important.
I apologise, Mr Deputy Speaker, for not being able to join the debate until now.
Does my hon. Friend agree that one problem is that there seems to be a bit of a misreading from Ofcom to this appeals mechanism? The Government will have to look again at merit-based appeals, because judicial review principles are just too narrow, in order to deal with the potentially powerful and wide remit of the CMA. On the point about undertakings and breaches of undertakings, it seems that, on the current reading of the Bill, this will have a retrospective effect on undertakings prior to this legislation coming into force. I support the legislation, but does he agree that this needs very careful reading to make sure that we do not have either unintended consequences, or too big a reach for what will be a very important process?
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for those points, which he made incredibly well. Retrospective decision making is worrying—reaching back to decisions that have already been made, notwithstanding whatever the future holds. That, again, goes to my central point about the impact of the Bill and the impression of this country as somewhere to invest and to do business in areas where the CMA will have considerable power.
To go back to the Lloyd George maxim and the one point that I want to make in this speech on accountability, a key part of the work of the Regulatory Reform Group, to which the Chair of the Select Committee referred, is to point out that this Parliament—both Houses—needs to have an enhanced view in looking at our regulators. We need to consider, on a day-by-day basis, how the regulator is performing. Is it applying the strategic policy statement that the Government have given it? Is it doing things in the right way? How is it dealing with stakeholders? We should not just have what happens currently: a Select Committee gets involved and calls the big boss—the chief executive officer, or the chair—when there is a big mistake, a mess-up, and it is in the newspapers. That is not sufficient. We need to enhance that. Both Houses should be involved. We have made some detailed proposals as to how to do that in our first report and we will continue to do that.
This point of accountability may seem academic, it may seem legal, and it may even seem political at times, but it is fundamentally about the economy and the competitiveness of this country. If we can have greater accountability, our excellent regulators’ authority will be enhanced because they will know, business will know, people will know and consumers will know that we have a better functioning system. In that context, with those changes, I strongly support the Bill.
I just heard the verbal nod from him to say that he continues to do that.
I will come to the CMA in a second. In answer to the hon. Member for Washington and Sunderland West, whom I congratulate for the APPG’s work, the CMA is continuing to monitor the online secondary ticketing market, including the issues that have been reported about refunds and cancellations as a result of the pandemic. The Government welcome the CMA’s report, but we believe that we have the measures in place to ensure that consumers have the information that they need to make informed decisions on ticket resales. The Bill will give the CMA significant new civil powers to tackle bad businesses ripping off consumers, so we do not see the need for additional regulatory powers. However, I agree with her that enforcing the existing regulations is key. I thank her for her work in this area.
I will briefly cover some of the other issues. On judicial review, which was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden, we have heard that the entire purpose of the Bill is to ensure that we tackle an area where a small number of companies have dominance in many parts of our lives. That is not necessarily a bad thing, so this is not an attack on big tech. None the less, some of the challenger firms mentioned by the hon. Member for Pontypridd, although they may be household names, are rightly scared because of the relationship they have with big tech. We must get the balance right by ensuring that there can be an appeal on judicial review standards, but it must not be something that a company with deep pockets can extend and extend. Because the harms happen so quickly in a tech business, the remediation needs to take place as quickly as possible.
I will finish the point and then I will happily give way. Judicial review will still subject decisions to careful scrutiny. The CMA will have to justify how it arrives at its decisions, and the competition appeal tribunal will be able to quash decisions if there have been flaws in the decision making or if processes have not been adhered to. There will be a participative approach to regulating the sector, with SMS firms being consulted formally and informally to help ensure that actions are reasonable and proportionate. The CMA will also be required to publish guidance on how it will take major decisions and publicly consult before making decisions such as designating a firm with SMS, making PCI orders and imposing conduct requirements. Indeed, companies will be able to make a full merits appeal should there be a penalty. Does my hon. Friend wish to intervene?
The CMA remains accountable to Parliament. That will not change. The CMA already has to present its annual plan to Parliament following a consultation, and that will continue. The CMA’s board and staff may also be called to give evidence before parliamentary Select Committees. The Government will continue to appoint the CMA’s key decision makers, including its board, as well as providing the CMA with a strategic steer, highlighting key areas of focus. It will continue to be accountable for its individual decisions via appeals to the competition appeal tribunal, the specialist judicial body with existing expertise, and, in relation to its new powers to inform consumer protection laws, via appeals to the High Court. I have talked about how the CMA is operationally independent, but if the DMU is seen or felt to be going off track, the CMA’s board is accountable to Parliament, so it will be responsible for all decisions in the new regime.