Bill Esterson
Main Page: Bill Esterson (Labour - Sefton Central)(4 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesProfessor Winters, I am Graham Brady, and I am chairing the Committee. I know that you cannot see me and we cannot see you, so I am going to make sure everybody lets you know who is speaking to you when they are asking questions and making points.
I thank Professor Winters and Mr Riddell for joining us and helping the deliberations of the Committee. As Chairman, I am entirely independent. I will not be involved in the questioning, but I will be calling others to put their questions to you. I first call Bill Esterson, who is the shadow Minister. Could you introduce yourself before you start?
Q
Professor Winters: I can if I concentrate hard.
Q
Professor Winters: In general, the Bill is trying to do sensible things in a basically sensible way. The issues that arise are about whether or not it is drafted in a way that would allow it to be used for things beyond these intentions.
For instance, it says that the Government do not expect to make major changes with this Bill, yet the procedures that it will set up might allow a Government that wished to do so to make really quite dramatic changes through secondary legislation. As we know, and you know better than me, secondary legislation is not typically challenged. For instance, under the GPA—the agreement on government procurement—if I understand it correctly, the Government have the power to make changes in the coverage of the agreement. A lot of that is about new members, which seems sensible, but if I understand it correctly, it also seems to be about the coverage of sectors within the UK.
When we deal with non-tariff provisions in the trade continuity agreements, for instance, the mutual recognition agreements are very serious bits of trade policy, particularly for services sectors. I think a non-tariff provision would include things like sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and technical barriers to trade. These are mostly governed by EU law at the moment, and in implementing a trade agreement, the Government could change a number of them. Rather than having to bring them back to the legislature as primary legislation, they would actually be able to move through a secondary legislation process, so I think there needs to be a little more attention on the potential spread of the use of this. The Bill can also be extended indefinitely in five-year periods. That seems to me to be not in the spirit of the Bill, which is about cleaning up.
Let me make one last point. The Bill is obviously designed, in terms of trade agreements, to deal with the continuity trade agreements, but there are at least two cases that, so far as I can see, will fall under the Bill and will really go further than just tidying up the details so that trade can continue. The first is UK-Korea. Korea and the UK have signed a continuity trade agreement, but with a commitment to renegotiate a fuller and more ambitious free trade agreement within two years. So far as I can tell, any of that would essentially be covered under this Trade Bill. Similarly with Japan, we do not really know what the Government intend to discuss with the Japanese Government, but the analysis that we got last month was—what shall we say?—studiously unspecific. Essentially, it reads as if it is going to be basically a new agreement; in a sense, the table is blank, and stuff will be put on or taken off. However, so far as I can tell, because Japan had an agreement with the EU on 31 January, it will be covered by the Trade Bill. Korea and Japan are two major trading partners, and this might not get very much scrutiny, essentially because you can undertake quite major changes under the heading of the Bill, which I interpreted largely as a tidying-up Bill.
Q
Professor Winters: The WTO’s government procurement agreement is restricted to the set of countries that have signed it, so quite a lot of this Bill is about what we do when that set of countries changes: what concessions do we expect from them and offer them? That seems, in a sense, to be fairly uncontentious. The other element of coverage is that the Government lists in the annexes to the government procurement agreement the sectors, and the thresholds for procurement in those sectors, that will be open, subject to the GPA’s requirements. I think that the powers in the Bill permit the Government to change that as they will, rather than, given that who you allow to bid for different bits of procurement is a fairly major piece of public policy, having a process that is open to more scrutiny.
Q
Professor Winters: Yes. The traditional way that we have handled trade agreements and, as far as one can tell, the Government’s intention going forward, is to say that the Government negotiate these treaties under the royal prerogative but that, to the extent that they require changes in regulation in domestic law, these will come to Parliament. In cases where that would normally be primary legislation, those changes will have to be made by Parliament through the processes for primary legislation.
What this Bill does—and it is the same in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018—is say that a number of things can be changed by secondary legislation, even though they were originally set out under EU procedures through routes for primary legislation. It potentially brings to Ministers a number of issues one would generally expect to have the full scrutiny of Parliament. It would be a process that allows a little bit of scrutiny, the affirmative process, which, de facto, does not seem to result in very much. Again, in a sense, the worry is not that one might need these powers to tidy up a clause here or there, but that, in fact, quite serious issues would suddenly fall to the discretion of the Minister.
One of my colleagues, Emily Lydgate, has investigated this on environmental regulations under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, and it is fairly alarming. As far as I can see, one could fall into that situation through the Trade Bill in the sense that the Japanese or Korean trade agreement could agree something that would normally be subject to primary legislation within the UK but that can now be handled with secondary legislation under the cover of the Trade Bill.
Q
George Riddell: Thank you; it is a pleasure to be here. I would characterise the Bill as creating the baseline of the UK’s trade policy. It tries to continue the basic trading conditions for rest-of-world trade that UK business currently enjoys.
That includes the continuity agreements. A lot of people, when commenting on those agreements, go straight to the tariffs: “If you don’t have a continuity agreement, you’ll face tariffs; if you do, it will continue as it currently is.” For the services sector, which I represent, there are also important establishment provisions within the services trade chapters of those agreements and mobility provisions that allow business travellers to travel between the UK and those third countries to supply services. The discussion about the continuity agreements and ensuring that the UK is able to continue to trade past 31 December this year is therefore wider.
The same goes for the government procurement agreement. The UK has enjoyed the status of the government procurement agreement at the WTO since its creation in 1995, although its membership of that particular agreement came through the European Union.
I will pick up two points that Professor Winters talked about. First, yes, new members join the GPA on a fairly regular basis. There are a number of ongoing accessions to the agreement, some with shorter timeframes than others. It is right that there is provision for the agreement to expand, as it naturally does, at the WTO. The other point is about the coverage and the entities. The UK list of covered entities is rather out of date. Many current Government Departments are not listed as part of coverage under the GPA, so the list is very outdated. Therefore, even if the thresholds the UK has signed up to as part of the GPA are not changed, there is a need for a technical update of the UK’s commitment to reflect the current machinery of government.
We are also establishing the TRA and bringing back powers from the Commission in Brussels to establish a trade remedies regime here in the UK. On the statistics front, which is very important in making trade policy, I would flag the interest in improving the trade in services statistics for the UK. Trade in services statistics are notoriously unreliable, and powers in the Bill could be used to make the UK a leader in how we measure services trade in this country and globally.
Q
George Riddell: If I understood correctly, Professor Winters’ point was about the potential for including new entities on the list and going further than the UK’s current commitments with regard to the GPA, leaving the continuity agreements question to one side. There are two aspects here. From my understanding of discussions in Geneva, they have been very focused on understanding what the UK’s current machinery of government looks like and how that could be represented as part of its GPA commitments. Certainly, the Government have said, from my understanding, that they do not intend to change the scope of the commitments, even if technical updates are necessary. I would not want to go further than that.
Q
George Riddell: Two initiatives have been undertaken recently. One is that the Office for National Statistics has launched its experimental trade in services datasets, which it is looking to continually improve. Anything that supported that initiative would certainly look good. For the past Trade Bill, in the previous Parliament, a number of organisations, such as TheCityUK, put forward written evidence with more concrete suggestions. I do not have that with me, unfortunately, but I am happy to share it.
Coming to the point on the data being notoriously unreliable, both the US and the UK claim that they have a trade surplus in services with each other. There have been a number of attempts by statisticians on both sides to try to bottom out why that might be the case. It goes to show that, often, trade in services statistics are indicative and a good rule of thumb, but putting too much faith in them is not necessarily a wise move.
Thank you very much. I should have introduced myself. I am Graham Brady, and I am chairing the session. I will call other Members to speak but will not ask questions myself. We will start with the shadow Minister.
Q
Nick von Westenholz: As I mentioned, one of the key issues that we have raised about the Bill and, indeed, the Government’s broader trade policy is to do with the way in which food imports are dealt with, in particular the standards of production of those food imports. I am sure that members of the Committee are well aware of many of the concerns that have been expressed for a number of months—even a number of years now—about the implications of future trade agreements for the standards of food imports.
The Trade Bill deals only with our existing agreements by merit of our former membership of the EU, and not with future trade agreements. It is really future trade agreements where many of the issues lie. Nevertheless, we think that this is an issue for this Bill because of something that has been communicated to us on a number of occasions in recent months. We had lobbied on the Agriculture Bill—[Interruption.]
Mr von Westenholz, we have a bell ringing at the moment, for a three-minute suspension of the sitting in the Chamber. It will stop shortly, but will ring again when the sitting starts. It is probably worth pausing while the bell rings.
Apologies for the interruption—do continue.
Nick von Westenholz: Not at all. I was just referring to the passage of the Agriculture Bill, to which a number of amendments were tabled attempting to address this issue of trade and food standards. It was often stated in our conversations with MPs about that Bill that it was not the correct vehicle for dealing with the matter, because it was a matter for the Trade Bill. We listened to that advice and we are looking at the Trade Bill as a legitimate and suitable piece of legislation to address the issue.
It is a complicated issue; there is no doubt about that. It is not necessarily straightforward to legislate in a way that manages the broader issue of ensuring that food imports meet standards of production equivalent to those that UK farmers are required to meet, but there are ways of doing it; some of the amendments tabled to the Agriculture Bill were well drafted to meet that aim. We certainly think that it is a shortcoming of this Bill that there is no provision for that sort of legislative approach.
Q
Nick von Westenholz: The Bill as it stands does not go beyond continuity agreements. The provisions in clause 2, for example, seem clearly to deal with those continuity agreements that we are currently party to, or were party to as a member of the EU. Going further would require new clauses, certainly; the reason why, as you imply, we want to explore whether that is appropriate is that the point has been made on numerous occasions in recent weeks that the Trade Bill is the appropriate vehicle for that.
Q
Nick von Westenholz: Sorry, the sound is not great, but I think that that question was about our potential concerns with the EU’s CETA deal and whether we have concerns about a UK-Canada deal.
Maybe the best answer is that all trade deals, whether they are continuity or future trade agreements, present opportunities for UK farmers. We are very keen to make that clear: we are certainly not opposed to the notion of free trade agreements, and we hope that they might present opportunities to increase our exports of our fantastic food.
At the same time, however, all trade agreements will also look to increase access to UK markets for overseas producers, which will increase competition for UK farmers. Again, that in itself is fine, but we want to ensure that that competition is fair—whether it is Canadian farmers, US farmers or anybody else. The reason why we talk about overseas farmers meeting equivalent standards to UK farmers’ is simply on the basis of fairness; we are certainly not opposed to trade liberalisation, as long as that liberalisation is fair.
Q
Nick von Westenholz: In principle, the idea of mutual recognition agreements can work. There is nothing that we would object to in an MRA in principle. An important aspect of this is that, if we simply try to hold overseas producers to precisely the same standards as UK producers, that might create as many problems as it solves. We need to develop a mechanism for comparing standards as easily as possible to certify, accredit or whatever it might be a degree or level of production standards that we accept as equivalent to our own.
A lot of the things I have mentioned already demonstrate the complexity and difficulty with some of these issues. That is one of the reasons why we have suggested the establishment of a trade and food and farming standards commission to get under the skin of all these pretty tricky policy areas and set out a road map for Government of the sort of policies and legislation needed to tackle the issues properly. We would like that to be established in law, under the Trade Bill or any other legislation, so that it reports to Parliament and contributes to some of the shortfalls in parliamentary accountability and scrutiny that have already been flagged to the Committee. We think that that is a very good and sensible idea. That commission would absolutely look at such things as MRAs and broader issues of how you manage and measure equivalence.
On the Trade Remedies Authority, we have not flagged any specific concerns other than to acknowledge that the constitution of the committee is very broad, and quite a lot of leeway is provided to the Secretary of State in the formation of that committee. We would like to explore further the possibility of ensuring specific representation for specific sectors if necessary. Having said that, we would hope that the TRA, even in its current format as set out by the Bill, would consult fully and take into account all parts of the economy when advising on trade remedies.
Q
Nick von Westenholz: There is the prospect of including those sorts of provisions in any of the deals that the UK Government are either currently negotiating or imminently going to negotiate. I am not sure that that is an issue specific to the continuity agreements. Countries all around the world are increasingly considering how such issues can be better accommodated in trade deals. Traditionally, they have not been part of trade agreements, although we have seen in the draft text between the EU and Mercosur, for example, provisions for preferential access to Mercosur for eggs where the production standards have been equivalent to animal welfare requirements in the EU, which is interesting.
This is a really important point: the UK Government should be seizing this moment to be a global leader in negotiating trade agreements that accommodate some of these sorts of policy areas, such as animal welfare, environmental impacts and climate change, and being creative and imaginative in how future trade agreements ought to look—not looking backwards and seeing how trade agreements have been done in the past, and merely looking to replicate those.
We will move to questions now, Mr Cranshaw, but that is very helpful. Thank you. We will start with Bill Esterson, who is the shadow Minister.
Q
Richard Warren: Certainly. We have a very good relationship with the organisation, as it currently exists within the DIT. There is only one live case—a case on welded tubes that are produced in Corby by Tata Steel, which I believe has been live for three months now—and we have had very good engagement with the organisation.
One critical issue is our ability as a sector to participate in trade remedies investigations, and particularly to finance them. I do not think it will be any surprise to people in the room that those cases cost an awful lot of money, particularly at this stage, when, frankly, industry in the UK does not have the same level of expertise that our European counterparts do. Bringing in external legal support and external consultancy has been critical, and our ability to do that as a sector has been severely disrupted by coronavirus. To put it bluntly, discretionary spend within many manufacturing companies, including in the steel industry, has effectively been halted. I say that to point out that we have asked for an extension with the TRA, and it has been as flexible as possible in providing us with an additional three months. I provide that case as an example to show that we have a very good working relationship with it .
In terms of how well, practically, those investigations will operate on an ongoing basis, and whether we feel that we are getting a fair hearing, I cannot comment on that yet, in the sense that we really are at the very first stages of the first investigation. We have another two or three investigations to go through this year. If I was to comment again at the beginning of 2021, I would probably have a more informed opinion.
To touch on the second question, about the membership of the Trade Remedies Authority, that is an important point. I would say that it is probably the only outstanding issue specifically within the trade remedies element of the Bill that we would still be pushing for reform of. In terms of the non-executive membership selected by the Secretary of State and appointed by them and the chair, there is no stipulation about how, or where from within industry and wider society, those members will be chosen.
That is an important point, because nowhere does the Trade Bill, the customs Bill or the secondary legislation actually define the role of the non-executive membership of the Trade Remedies Authority. All reference to decisions by the Trade Remedies Authority— recommendations to the Secretary of State—are referred to as, “The Trade Remedies Authority will do x or y.” Precisely what the role of those non-executive members is is still somewhat vague.
I understand that the Government will have left it that way to provide maximum flexibility and to allow for the organisation to grow into its role and to find its feet. But, from our perspective as industry, while it remains vague, we can have anything, from the board or the non-executive membership merely providing an admin task—looking over the funding of the organisation, the remuneration of staff and so on—right through to it having influence on the recommendations that the organisation ultimately makes on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures.
Therefore, while we have that ambiguity, industry is keen to see representation from a cross-sector of business. Everything from unions through to manufacturing interests and people who may be classified as trade remedies experts, who may have a slightly different view on trade remedies to industry, should be represented on that organisation to show there is a spectrum of views.
Q
Richard Warren: To a certain extent, it depends, ultimately, on the role of the non-executive membership. If the non-executive membership functions as a board providing steering for how the organisation operates on an admin basis, you could say it was less important. If the membership has a high level of influence over the outcomes of those investigations and the recommendations that are made, we would say it is extremely important.
On the same token, if the board membership was made up exclusively of trade lawyers from firms that have exclusively represented exporting producers, one would say that the outcome of those investigations may be biased. On the opposite end of the spectrum, if you had the entire membership made up of people who had a more protectionist bent, again, that may result in a biased outcome. While we have ambiguity around the role of the non-executive membership, industry will err on the side of caution and say it should represent a range of views so that it can come to a balanced decision on whether those measures are in the interests of industry and the wider UK economy and its workers.
Q
Ian Cranshaw: We started this journey back in January 2017. Previously, I would have said that policy has moved quite quickly—that was before coronavirus, where, obviously, policy has been delivered in a matter of weeks or months. However, I think some credit goes to the Department for International Trade, which has gone from a standing start, with a handful of 30 or so trade policy experts on trade defence instruments within the EU. Now, we have a significant and very capable resource in the Department. At the same time, when the Trade Bill passes, they will establish the authority, which will have 100, growing to 130, staff whose level of expertise has grown significantly over the last three years. We have seen many of them, and we have had good exposure to many of the employees of the Trade Remedies Investigations Directorate.
But the point I would make, and what that highlights, is that when they were developing that knowledge, who did they turn to for expertise and the nuance of how to carry out an investigation, how to assess the injury margin and how to build a case to prove that there had been inappropriate trade behaviour by a competing company or nation? That was really about turning to the manufacturers. One of our member companies has welcomed a continuous stream of TRID or TRA officials into their facilities, explaining how to build the case, because that case has to satisfy WTO criteria. It is a significant piece of work. Mr Warren mentioned the cost of building the case, and companies do not go into this lightly.
The second part of your question was about the make-up of the TRA board and how to achieve the balance. The Minister, Mr Hands, said that you do not necessarily invite people with a specific ideological position to the board—we really want trade experts. All that I would say is that trade experts are not necessarily trade remedy experts, and often that representation from the manufacturers or trade unions—some labour point of view; labour with a small “l”—generates and delivers real balance for any non-departmental public body that has to look at the entire scenario, certainly in a period when we are looking to build back better.
I am not going to keep stealing other’s summaries of how we are trying to work, but the Government have already said that they want to rebalance the economy and put more investment in certain areas. The chemical sector is focused in the north-west of England and the north-east, along the Humber—areas that require significant investment, and they need to know that they are competing on a level playing field. All of that, with a balanced view and a balanced board, would really help to ensure that all views and positions were reflected appropriately in policy development.
Q
Ian Cranshaw: Sorry, I heard that the question was about chemical regulation. Was it about whether chemical regulation is covered in the Bill?
Do you think that it should be covered in the Bill? It is not, as it stands. Do you think that it should be, and why?
Ian Cranshaw: There is an awful lot of work going on in chemicals, and the Government are keen to deliver a chemical strategy. That is something that DEFRA has covered over the past couple of years, and it is right that we have one. We have no issue with the amount of regulation on the chemical industry. We are dealing with sensitive products, and they ought to be regulated in the way that they are. Again, we have had a good hearing from the Government, but it is about the criticality of making sure that any deal with the EU—this is key for us—can include access to data sharing, because we do not need to replicate the testing of individual chemicals to build up a UK database when a perfectly functional database exists at the European Chemicals Agency. There is plenty of provision elsewhere for chemicals and chemicals regulations, and I do not necessarily think that it needs to be in the Trade Bill.
Q
Ian Cranshaw: That is probably me for me, because Richard is focused on steel. It is really important. We want a Trade Remedies Authority to be established, fully functioning and delivering support for UK industry from 1 January next year. Chemicals go into every other manufactured good. There are chemicals in the automotive sector; there are chemicals in chlorination of water; there are chemicals in putting the aroma into the natural gas that we all use in our stoves every evening. Chemicals does have downstream industries that will all be impacted, so we need a strong chemicals sector.
If I am honest, looking at remedies and chemicals, there are not a huge number of current remedies in place in the EU, so when the Department transitioned those remedies that were relevant to the UK, did a call for evidence and assessed exactly which remedies should be brought into the UK, of the 23 remedies that existed in the chemicals sector, only two were transitioned into UK law. I am not suggesting that it is a huge area, but it is a very significant area, and those two remedies that are in place are very important to those companies, and to downstream industries in the UK. One of them is producing fertilizer, and it is the major supplier of that fertilizer in the UK, so you can appreciate that its availability to UK farmers is absolutely crucial to their operations. If they were exposed to unfair trade from external operators, that really would be a significant loss to UK capability, especially when we are looking at supply chains and ensuring that our really critical production is safely onshored at the moment.
We have until 10 past 4 for questions, so perhaps we will see whether they are drawn out by questioning.
Q
Rosa Crawford: The TUC is in contact, and works very closely, with trade unions around the world, in advocacy for trade deals that promote good jobs and strong protection for workers’ rights and public services. We find that in other parts of the world, there is much more meaningful engagement between Government and trade unions, as well as with employers in trade negotiations. In our partners in Europe—in countries such as Austria and Sweden—there is routine consultation with the Government on the negotiation offers in trade negotiations.
Outside the EU, in countries such as the US, there is systematic and ongoing consultation by Government of the unions on the text that they propose. In the UK-US negotiations that have just been launched, we know that our US counterparts have seen a number of proposals that the US negotiators are putting to the UK Government. On the UK side, we have not seen any part of that negotiation so far. There is a much more meaningful engagement and a process whereby unions can comment on the text of the negotiations and have that input taken on board, which is very important, so there is a process whereby texts can improve to reflect what workers need in them.
As an example, the US unions were able to comment on the USMCA labour chapter and add significant improvements that prevented, for example, restrictions on freedom of association in Mexico. We would want that process in the UK trade negotiations and so we would want the Trade Bill to outline and affirm that trade unions would be engaged in the process of trade negotiations and would be consulted on the text, and that that would be the process going forward, not just for the continuity agreements but for all agreements. We would obviously also want that for the UK-EU negotiations, which we have not had that engagement on.
I would flag that there has been some movement in terms of Government consultation with members of the expert trade advisory groups that the unions sit on roughly half of. It has been indicated that we may get to see confidential material associated with trade negotiations on the condition of signing a non-disclosure agreement, but it is important to flag that the non-disclosure agreement is currently drafted so broadly that unions are concerned that it would limit what we are able to say in terms of our public advocacy. A balance needs to be struck between the legal restrictions placed on organisations and their ability to comment on the text of negotiations.
We welcome the fact that it looks like the Government are taking some steps forward in consultation, but it is currently not in the shape that we think is adequate and we have concerns about the restrictions they might place on us. We seek engagement with the Government on that, as the TUC and unions going forward. In the Bill specifically, a reference and an affirmation that unions will be consulted on the process of trade negotiations—as well as Parliament, which is crucial for democratic scrutiny—is key for us.
Q
Rosa Crawford: Yes. The TUC and unions were concerned about the fact that we were not consulted on any of those 19 continuity agreements before they were ratified and the fact that they were negotiated with countries where there are significant concerns about workers’ rights expressed to us by the unions in those countries.
To give two examples, the UK has now signed continuity agreements with South Korea and Colombia. In South Korea, for many years we have been expressing concern, with trade unions in South Korea, that freedom of association has been routinely overridden, with trade unionists thrown in prison for peaceful protest for workers’ rights, including two union leaders imprisoned last year who were only freed after a concerted global campaign. Trade union offices are raided and exploitative conditions are prevalent in large Korean multinationals such as Samsung. The UK signed an agreement with them that has no enforceable commitment on workers’ rights within it. Although there is a mention of International Labour Organisation standards, there is no enforcement mechanism for that, and therefore there can be no reprisal through the agreement and no penalty for abuse of workers’ rights.
We also have significant concerns about Colombia, which is one of the parties to the UK-Andean agreement. Colombia is listed by the International Trade Union Confederation as the world’s most dangerous country to be a trade unionist, with routine murders of trade union leaders, widespread repression of freedom of association and a real rolling back of rights, in contrast with the commitments made in the peace process by the Government. The fact that the agreement was signed, again without an effective enforcement mechanism on workers’ rights, is very concerning to us and indicates that these agreements will not be used to increase respect for workers’ rights, but will actually make it easier for companies to go to places where it is easier to exploit workers because human and trade union rights are not respected.
Q
Rosa Crawford: Trade unions have expressed concern that there was no enforcement mechanism in the EU agreements with South Korea or Colombia either. However, the EU is now engaged in a process of reviewing the enforcement mechanisms in its trade agreements—[Inaudible.]
Q
Rosa Crawford: The TUC has confirmed that the Bill does not give assurance that the UK’s public procurement rules will promote respect for workers’ rights or environmental standards in its accession to the World Trade Organisation’s government procurement agreement. The GPA as it stands has no requirement for members to promote social standards in their tendering process.
The UK’s Public Contract Regulations 2015, which you mentioned, transpose provisions in the EU procurement directive of 2014, which states that Governments must ensure that public contracts uphold international, environmental, social and labour standards. Importantly, those regulations also include provisions about a price-quality ratio, which is intended to ensure that public authorities select tenders on the basis of quality and positive social impact, rather than price alone. We are worried that once we leave any kind of relationship with the EU and we just have to rely on the UK’s public contract regulations, the UK Government may roll back on those commitments to promote social standards through the tendering process.
We know the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet have talked many times in the past about wanting to repeal EU-derived rights around working time, agency workers directives and other important protections for workers’ rights. We are worried that that may be the direction of travel with procurement as well, which is why we seek an addition to the Trade Bill that states that the GPA schedule that the UK files will make sure that it at least replicates article 18(2) of the EU’s 2014 public procurement provisions, which makes it clear that social standards must be part of the criteria used for settling public contracts, and that contractors must uphold those international labour and environmental standards. We would want the UK to go further than that and actually make it a compulsory criterion that the highest standards are used by contractors who receive public money, because that is the way to ensure that we get the best quality public services and provisions through our procurement arrangements.
We are concerned at the moment that we do not have a rigorous enough process of selecting tenders that always have the highest social standards, and that has had a terrible impact on the quality of services that we get, so it has had real public health implications. With the pandemic that we are facing now, we have had cases such as the Government choosing to import 40,000 protective gowns from Turkey on the basis that they were presumably lower priced than gowns they could get from a country that has higher standards. As we all know, all those gowns had to be impounded, as they did not reach NHS standards for safety. It is worth remarking that, in Turkey, there is extreme repression of workers’ rights.
By choosing the contractor with the lower price and the lower protection for workers’ rights, it leads to a much worse result for the public, and obviously there is a cost as a result. If there were concerted Government support for domestic manufacturing and domestic producers, and a preference was provided through the provisions in the GPA and through domestic legislation for providers who upheld workers’ rights and promoted the higher standards of workers’ rights, we would see more contracts going to UK manufacturers where there are strong trade union agreements, good protection for workers, decent pay and generally better conditions that promote a much more sustainable approach to business. Ultimately, there will be a better product for the public, which meets a public health need.
We think it is very important to send a signal with the Trade Bill that the Government’s accession to the GPA will be linked with making sure that the highest social standards are embedded in our public procurement criteria, and that that will be used as a key component for selecting tenders—not just price, but quality and the overall investment in sustainable development, good jobs and strong protection for workers’ rights.
Q
Rosa Crawford: As I outlined at the start, the crucial trade relationship that we believe the Government need to secure is that with the EU, which is our closest and most integrated trading partner and where the majority of our exports go. We are crucially reliant on—[Inaudible.] The trade agreements that the UK Government have secured through the continuity agreements do not represent anywhere near the importance to our trade. Although there will be some gains for certain sectors, it is not anywhere near as important for the EU. For us, the crucial thing about the continuity agreements is the lack of engagement with unions on them. They have been agreed on terms that we do not believe are advantageous to workers—for example, they do not have enforceable commitments around workers’ rights in them, which facilitates capital and UK businesses to go to countries such as Colombia, where the respect for worker’s rights is much lower.
For us, the crucial trading focus of the UK Government must be on securing a good deal with the EU. We do not believe that continuity agreements can substitute for those or, indeed, for agreements with the US or Japan, or Australia and New Zealand, which have launched in the last few weeks. We agree that there is a place for agreements—
Thank you very much. Do you have any initial observations on the Bill, or would you like to move straight to questions?
George Peretz: It is a short Bill and the Members are familiar with it, so while there are a number of issues that I am sure people will want to discuss, I do not have any opening observations.
Q
George Peretz: Did you say the scrutiny provisions?
The scrutiny provisions.
George Peretz: I am sorry, I am having slight difficulty hearing you.
The scrutiny elements of the Bill.
George Peretz: Yes, I thought I had heard it correctly. The first point to make is that the scope of the Bill, as set out in clause 1, is clearly confined to agreements with countries that had either a free trade agreement or an international package agreement with a free trade agreement with the EU before exit day. In that sense, it is limited, but none the less it is not quite right to portray it as simply a roll-over Bill, because the Bill does not prevent the Government from entering into an agreement, with a country that had such agreements with the EU—such as Japan or Canada—that is significantly different from the agreement that that country had with the EU before the United Kingdom left the EU. The absence of scrutiny provisions in the Bill needs to be seen in that light: that the agreement that the Government negotiate with Canada or Japan, for example, might look somewhat different—in fact, there is every reason to think that they probably will look somewhat different—from that which both countries entered into with the EU, most obviously because for those countries, an agreement with the United Kingdom is not the same as an agreement with the EU—it is a different market. Both countries will have different objectives and concerns in relation to the United Kingdom from those they had when negotiating with the much larger EU.
When one looks at the provisions of the Bill, which essentially do not provide much scrutiny at all, it is important to have that background in mind. There is the debate, with which Members are probably familiar, about the extent to which it is appropriate for there to be parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements. I can give you some thoughts on that, if you like. It is important with this Bill, however, to make that preliminary point.
Q
George Peretz: In this country, or elsewhere?
Either would be good.
George Peretz: I am just trying to think of an example. I suppose a case that ran into trouble, at least in part because it was accepted that there was not adequate scrutiny at an early stage, was negotiations between the EU and the United States on the transatlantic partnership agreement. Essentially—you would have to ask someone else for the precise detail—the EU side ran at what the European Parliament and member states were prepared to accept. That is one potential difficulty.
The issue with free trade agreements now, compared with what they looked like in the 19th century, when Richard Cobden could trot off to Paris to negotiate a free trade agreement with Napoleon III in a week or so, which involved a few tariff reductions, is that they are a lot more complicated than that now. Particularly once you move away from tariffs into other areas, agreements now require a lot of potentially important decisions on questions such as how matters of food safety are regulated, or the terms on which professional and other types of services are regulated, like auditing. Those are very sensitive indeed; they can profoundly affect both the public generally and particular interests.
So there is always the risk that, if an agreement has not been scrutinised properly at an early stage, a Government will go too far and then not be able to get the necessary legislation through Parliament. That is less of a risk inherent in our system, particularly in the present Parliament, given that the Government have a healthy majority, so it is not politically that likely. Also, the Government can quite often control agreements by secondary legislation anyway. But that can be a bit of a problem, and the TTIP negotiations turned out to be one.
Another issue with lack of scrutiny is much more difficult to find examples of, because it is not something from the textbook of finding examples. None the less, it is a fact, which people involved in trade negotiations fairly freely acknowledge, that it can be quite helpful to a Government to be able to say, “We are under scrutiny from our Parliament. We simply cannot make concession X, because we have discussed this with our own Parliament and know very well that it’s going to be very controversial; it’s going to be very difficult for us. We simply can’t do it.” That can be quite a useful negotiating tactic. As a lawyer, one is quite familiar with a situation where one is in negotiations with the other side and it is actually quite helpful sometimes to be able to say, “I’m afraid my client is very unreasonable; I simply can’t accept that.” That is quite a useful way of resisting certain types of pressure, and I think the same is true in trade negotiations, so it is another advantage of scrutiny.
Q
George Peretz: On the first question, plainly an unsatisfactory situation would have happened, had the United Kingdom left the EU with no deal last year. It is plainly an unsatisfactory situation if you have a whole set of powers in one Act of Parliament that are conferred on an authority that does not actually legally exist, because the legislation that sets it up has not at that stage been passed. That is what happened with the Trade Bill in the last Parliament. It is a bizarre situation, which is bound to create legal problems of one sort or another. There would have been challenges, no doubt, to the validity of the decisions taken by the Secretary of State, given that the mechanism by which he took them had no satisfactory statutory basis. The Department for International Trade told the world that the mechanism that it had adopted to get round that problem would have been sufficient to deal with it. We will never know whether it was right about that, but I think it would have created a set of legal issues that probably everyone could have done without if trying to—[Inaudible]—effective trade remedies. It will certainly be better if, at the end of transition, when all this comes into play, there is a strong remedies authority in existence, doing the job that the 2018 Act gives it.
The structure of the 2018 Act did seem to me sensible. I wrote an article that laid out the—[Inaudible.] It is the largely technical task of looking at the potentially legal point—[Inaudible]—a factual question about whether the various tests of dumping, subsidy domestically and so on have been met, through an independent authority that would be able to assess those reasonably objectively. It is charged with those functions. And there is the essentially political job of assessing the public interest, which is carried out by the politicians, who are directly accountable to you in the House of Commons. That seemed to me to be a sensible divide, and that is what the Government have done. That division of competence seemed to me to be broadly right.
A final point about the composition of the Trade Remedies Authority, going back to what I just said, is that the TRA’s job is in large part a technical one. It has to make a series of quite difficult legal and economic judgments that are essentially technical ones, but it does have a job of assessing the economic interests of the United Kingdom, which involve somewhat wider criteria. There is a case for the non-executive directors having to fit a number of those criteria; it is always desirable for there to be a diverse group of people on bodies such as this, because diversity brings strengths of its own. To focus on the particular task of this body, it is almost certainly helpful to have people who have experience of industry, because they will understand a lot of the issues and concerns that the TRA will have to grapple with. It would be helpful for some of the board to have backgrounds in law and in economics, because those are essential aspects of the TRA’s work, and it helps to have people right at the top who are familiar with such things.
Mr Peretz, thank you very much. I am keen to get one more question in in the time we have available, if possible.
Q
Simon Walker: I am Simon Walker. I have been the chair of the Trade Remedies Authority for three months—a fairly recent appointment. From my limited exposure, given that I only made two visits to the office before the lockdown, I can report that the authority to be, which is still part of the Department for International Trade, is in good shape and raring to go.
Q
Simon Walker: I am not sure that falls within the purview of the Trade Remedies Authority to be. It seems a broader question than that. The TRA’s decisions will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, because the final decision maker on our recommendations is the Secretary of State. If she rejects our recommendation, she must table her reasoning before Parliament.
Q
Simon Walker: I do not think I do, to be honest.
Q
Simon Walker: There are two underway at the moment, which are both transition agreements. One is about welded steel and tubes, and the other is about rainbow trout. Those two transition arrangements are in process at the moment. I cannot pretend that it will always be cheap to lodge a claim with the TRA, because it will require quite a lot of legal and technical expertise, so I would not want to over-sell that. It is a very substantial meta-seeking recommendation from us on the base of anti-dumping and fair subsidies or the need for an economic safeguard. It is a major intervention in economic process that I think justifies significant resource going into it.
Q
Simon Walker: I suppose the big worry about anti-dumping in general is that an overseas producer will seek to eliminate domestic competition in a predatory way and then force up prices as soon it has put its UK competitors out of business. That is at the heart of the issue, but there are infinitely more subtle variations of that, particularly if the exports come from countries where there are hidden or perhaps unfair subsidies of different sorts or where there is a disguise. The absolutely crucial thing is that there have to be UK producers of that product. If a product which happens to be massively available in another country is dumped cheaply in the United Kingdom and there are no UK producers, there is no domestic interest in that. That kind of unfairness aspect is fundamental to everything that we are going to be doing.