Railway Expansion

Bill Esterson Excerpts

Wednesday 27th April 2011 Westminster Hall

[John Pugh (Southport) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. I want to talk about a number of schemes associated with such places as Colne, Skipton, Bidston, Halton, Burscough, Todmorden, Fleetwood and so on—places that I know flummox Hansard reporters, so I will give some clarification on those at a later stage.

I would like to start with a largely unquestioned truth that I think most people will buy into, which is that connectivity between centres of economic activity further stimulates whatever economic growth and activity one gets there. I am also happy to agree with anybody who suggests that growth cannot be stimulated simply through connectivity—by building a railway line or a road. A classic example in the north-west is Skelmersdale, which has an excellent motorway joining it to the rest of the world, but which still has a very poor economic performance.

In the past, in bolder days, it is true that Governments built roads to nowhere and built rail tracks that are not used. Private developers also have a sharper eye for what needs to be done. Normally, however, one connects areas on the assured assumption that people or goods will want to travel along the line of connection. In the beginning of rail, the assumptions that were made were very bold indeed. People built trains out into the wild west in the United States. They built trains through the south American jungle. I have even been on a train through a mountain in Switzerland. I am not sure that the Department for Transport would consider such a project in these days, but certainly people were very bold and imaginative. They even built train services—very good train services, at one stage—to the English coast, although they have curtailed some of those in recent years.

They were all, by and large, high-risk ventures with potentially high returns. Increasingly, as time went on, private developers got less of an appetite for that and the state was expected to shell out more to fund, subsidise and back whatever rail infrastructure was put in place. Of course, with state involvement came a gradual sense of entitlement. People feel entitled to connections, whether by road or by rail. In many parts of the country, where the rail connections have gone, they grumble and have grumbled for many decades since they departed. There is, however, an acceptance by most people that the quality of the connections, whether by rail or road, have something to do with the size of the place and how isolated it is.

In the early days of rail it soon became apparent that they had one very big competitor—roads. Roads are an obvious substitute. Certainly, in the 1940s and 1950s roads were seen as an almost lethal competitor, and so we got what we call, or might be regarded as, a managed contraction—an ill-managed contraction—under the much-defamed Dr Beeching. I say it was ill-managed because all sorts of peculiar things were done. For example, Blackpool was deprived of a railway line simply because not enough people bought tickets in Blackpool. The fact that thousands and thousands of people bought tickets in Glasgow to go to Blackpool and then return did not seem to affect the planning they engaged in then.

We have inherited that structure, which did not necessarily occur for the right reasons and not necessarily on a wholly rational basis. In turn, we have had to pick up the economic consequences that that structure gives us. Since then, clearly, there have been changes. Some changes are favourable to rail development, some not so. Recently we have seen oil prices rise and road congestion become an increasing worry to Governments of whatever persuasion, and we have seen environmental concerns move to the front of the stage. Counter to expectations—it was assumed that rail was in decline—we have seen that, despite prices, an element of overcrowding and occasional poor reliability, rail use has increased dramatically. I saw the first transport plan during the course of the previous Government, and even that predicted a decline in train use that was never fulfilled. People were genuinely surprised—I was on the Transport Committee at the time—to see that trend reverse. It did not just reverse as far as passenger traffic was concerned, but for freight traffic as well.

What has not changed significantly, or has not increased, is what I would call the rail reach—the speed with which trains move around the place and the overall capacity of the system. That is despite lobbying from groups and communities across the country. Normally, such lobbying has not been for anorak-based nostalgia schemes, but for quite modest, sensible, rationally argued enhancements—restoration of linkages, replacement of curves that had been taken out by Beeching—and in places where there is clearly some sort of demand, and where a demand case can be made. Those are not demand cases based on nostalgia, but on what people consider to be hard economic realities.

We have to ask the question why. Why, despite the increase in ridership—if I can put it like that—and despite the fact that the rail service has survived relatively intact since the days of Beeching, have we not extended anywhere at all to any great extent? That is something of a puzzle and I have tried to explain why. Several different explanations can be given. One is a belief among hard-edged planners at the Department for Transport that all schemes are necessarily based on sentiment and nostalgia, and not on a dispassionate review of the economic facts. Another explanation—this is clearly a major consideration—is the fact that in rail terms capital works are very expensive so far as signalling is concerned, particularly since privatisation. Signalling has almost become a private monopoly, and it is very hard to get the price down. If there is any kind of plan that involves alteration of signalling, we can expect the figures to increase dramatically beyond expectation.

Another reason why schemes are hard to progress is that unlike roads, the rail planning process is fairly opaque. The fragmented character of the rail industry—with Network Rail providing the track, and train operating companies with relatively short-term leases providing the railway carriages—means that people often work to short-term considerations with limited horizons. The fact that there are a number of players involved—including planning authorities, transport authorities and whoever supports the scheme locally in business terms—means that progressing a rail scheme is no easy matter. Anybody who has been associated with any campaigns of the kind I described at the start of this peroration will know how difficult it is to get all the ducks lined up. One good reason—or one bad reason—why we do not seem to get anything to happen is that we have not actually done anything. All those schemes have remained in the pending tray for as long as I can remember, so all the fear, bias, anxiety and expectation that people have about such schemes remain exactly in place.

[Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman who represents a neighbouring constituency. He talked about the difficulties of developing new railway schemes. Does he think that it is easier to make more use of the existing network, and what the opportunities are there? There is a scheme in my constituency that he is familiar with—the plan to build a new station in north Maghull. I think that he will go on to talk about the same railway line. That would be a much easier scheme, because that is a development on the existing network. The economic benefits of that should be relatively easy to attain. I wonder what his thoughts are on the cuts that the Government have pushed through, which mean that that scheme and many others on the existing network have gone.

[John Pugh]

Strangely enough, and I hate to be parochial, I am not completely familiar with the scheme the hon. Gentleman mentions, even though it is close to my constituency. I will say that Governments, and Network Rail in particular, have found it quite easy simply to develop what we have, rather than extend beyond that. Certainly, in discussions I had with Network Rail in the previous Parliament, it was fairly clear that that was the mandate it was being given by Government—to sweat the assets it had, rather than do anything as venturesome as actually building a new track, or putting a new line down anywhere. What the hon. Gentleman suggests is certainly complementary to what I am suggesting, rather than the opposite.