Parliamentary Sovereignty and EU Renegotiations

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and John Baron

Thursday 4th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I can only agree with my right hon. Friend. Having said that, the Minister for Europe is nothing but a courteous and able Minister, and I am delighted that he is in his place. I would not want him to be under the illusion that we are suggesting that of him, but there has been a tendency to act out a charade, when actually we have been on the conveyor belt of ever closer union. We need greater honesty in this debate.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

My hon. Friend has raised the issue of sovereignty, and the draft decision document published this week by the European Union contains a section called “Sovereignty”. If ever there was a misnamed section of a document, it is this—perhaps my hon. Friend will come on to that. The one thing that this document does not return to the United Kingdom Parliament is sovereignty over the laws that are made for this country. Indeed, it promises a “red card”, which is no more than an extremely cumbersome method of qualified majority voting in the European Union.

[Mr Baron]

I cannot but agree with my hon. Friend.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and John Baron

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

I must remind the hon. Gentleman, who has sat in Committee with me for many hours listening to evidence about this, that strategy is not the same as having a plan. Yes, a plan may be knocked off course by events, but that does not mean that we should relinquish all the means or methods of reformulating the plan. That is what strategic thinking is about, and I shall apply further thought to that in my speech.

Let us face it: if we sweat about whether to take military action and that dominates our entire debate, we are missing the point. I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe on that. Our debate should be about the context in which we are making that decision. The decision should flow out of that context, not be the subject of the debate itself.

The Foreign Secretary demonstrated a laudable strategic perspective after a period of reactive and short-term initiatives, such as the reversal of the policy on Syria after the vote last year, which have left our policy in disarray and, one might even say, paralysis. The period of complete neglect of the Syrian situation has resulted in the ISIS situation that we face. That has not been helped by perhaps the greatest and most silent strategic shock to hit the western world—the almost complete absence of the United States from an active role on the world stage.

The Foreign Secretary still gave us a lot of conflicts. We will consider air strikes in Iraq, but not in Syria, which is the home base of ISIS. We said that we would not provide arms to the Kurds, but now we are. We continue to expect President Assad to stand down, but we will not do anything to make that happen. That has brought about the situation that we are in. The Government’s approach is over-precious about who our friends should be and careless of the consequences of the restraints that that places on our policy. We have to treat President Putin as a pariah, but we might need to use him as an ally to defeat ISIS and stabilise the middle east.

[Mr Baron]

I am listening intently to my hon. Friend’s comments, some of which I agree with. I suggest to him that perhaps caution is the right course of action for the Government. We must not forget that only recently, in the past 10 years or so, we have been to war in the middle east on a false premise and supported the morphing of the Afghanistan mission from defeating al-Qaeda into the much wider and disastrous mission of nation building. Many would also argue that Libya is turning into a basket case. Surely caution is not a bad thing, given our past errors.

Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and John Baron

Thursday 29th August 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I very much welcome the decision to delay the vote on whether we should take military action until the UN inspectors have had their chance to report. It makes no sense whatever for the west to make great play of getting the UN weapons inspectors in to inspect the site only to have a vote in the House without getting their report and without determining the evidence on the ground.

Perhaps the rationale for the debate has moved on. Welcome though that is, the debate gives hon. Members the opportunity to ask questions of the Government. I remain unconvinced by the arguments for military action that I have heard this evening. It is important that the House lays down markers, so that, when we have the next debate, the Government hopefully come to the House with better answers.

Let us begin with the evidence. There is no doubt that foreign policy should be based on firm evidence and grounded in legitimacy. We know there are no easy answers on Syria, but we must acknowledge that atrocities have been committed by both sides in this vicious civil war. There have been claims and counter-claims on both sides in relation to chemical weapons, and yet nothing has been verified. Even the JIC document, brief though it is, is in terms of probabilities and possibilities, but not of certainty. At the end, the JIC admits that it has no idea as to Assad’s motivation in committing to chemical weapons when he was gaining ground and winning the battle. We must therefore have careful consideration of the evidence.

[Mr Jenkin]

The JIC concludes that it is highly probably that the Assad regime is responsible for the attack. That is the consensus among all reputable intelligence services, including the Arab League intelligence service. I put it to my hon. Friend that the only people who contest the evidence probably do not want to believe the certainty that Assad did it. I include my hon. Friend among those people. He does not want us to get involved, and is therefore reluctant to believe in the certainty that Assad did it.

[Mr Baron]

My hon. Friend is attributing motives to me, which does not do him justice. The bottom line is that we have asked the UN inspectors to go in and inspect the site. We should at least wait and see what they say when they return—[Interruption.] If my hon. Friend wants to intervene again, he is welcome to do so. We are talking only of a couple more days before we get the report. One hundred thousand people are already dead. We need only a couple of days to ensure we have a calm assessment of the evidence. That is not asking too much, yet the motion reads that the

“House…Deplores the use of chemical weapons in Syria…by the Assad regime”.

That is a statement of fact, but it is not correct until we at least have the UN inspectors’ report.

[Mr Baron]

The JIC document states clearly that it cannot understand the “precise motivation”. The document is in terms of probability. I put this question to the House, and particularly to those who want to intervene militarily: what is the harm in waiting for the UN inspectors to come back and present their evidence? We should not forget that the west did its utmost to get those weapons inspectors to the site. At the very least we can wait a couple of days to see what they say after their due inspections. Otherwise, what was the logic of sending them there in the first place? Sending them there and not waiting for the report would not make sense.

The second question is of legitimacy. Is military intervention without a UN resolution legitimate?

[Mr Jenkin]

And legal?

[Mr Baron]

And legal.

[Mr Jenkin]

They are two different things.

[Mr Baron]

International law is terribly subjective—there are no hard and fast rules, but the best we have is the UN. Is such action legal? Many have suggested that we should look to the concept of the responsibility to protect, which was introduced in 2005, but that is not linked to chemical weapons. R2P could have been invoked 100,000 lives ago. Therefore, the idea that it becomes relevant because chemical weapons have been used is a non-starter.

We must also ask questions about the military objectives—there are many questions on, for example, the scope of the operation and the potential for mission creep. What happens if Assad uses chemical weapons again or if the rebels use them? There are very few answers, and we need more. The decision to commit to military intervention and potentially to commit soldiers to war is one of the most serious the House can make, if the not the most serious. We need to base such a decision on firm evidence and not on speculation.

Many accuse those of us who question the idea of military intervention by saying, “You believe that nothing should be done. You’re in that camp that says, ‘We should wash our hands of it and let them get on with it.’” Utter tosh! So much more could be done on the humanitarian front. The refugee camps are desperately short of basic amenities. Britain has a good record—we have done a lot of the heavy lifting—but we could do a lot more, as could the international community. Tens of thousands of women and children are living in extremely poor conditions, and yet the west is saying, “There’s very little more we can do to help the humanitarian situation,” which is utter nonsense.

The west could also do a lot more on the diplomatic front. It makes no sense whatever to exclude Iran from the forthcoming peace talks, but that is what we currently intend to do. Iran is a key regional player and a participant in this conflict. Excluding Iran from the talks is utter nonsense. We need to go that extra diplomatic mile. This is a cliché, but it is true: you make peace with your enemies, not with your friends. We need to talk to the Iranians if we hope for a diplomatic solution. A political and diplomatic solution, and not a military one, is the only long-term solution to this vicious civil war. The Syrian people have suffered enough. We must have answers to those questions.

Arms to Syria

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and John Baron

Thursday 11th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I take on board what my hon. Friend says, but I think it does him no service to try to create the impression that those of us who suggest that we should not arm the rebels are insisting that we do nothing. It is actually quite the opposite. I think there is an awful lot that we could be doing—on the humanitarian front and on the diplomatic front. I will return to the issue in a minute or two, if my hon. Friend will bear with me. I will allow him in again, if he wishes to come back to me.

If I had another concern, it would be that, as has been hinted at already, the civil war in Syria is in many respects a proxy war being fought out at different levels—whether it be Sunni versus Shi’a Muslim; the old Persian gulf rivalry of Iran versus Saudi Arabia; or indeed the west versus Russia and China. The risk of pouring more weapons into this conflict and of pouring more fuel on to the fire is that we not only increase the violence within Syria but extend the conflict beyond Syria’s borders in very large measure. That would be a mistake of historic proportions.

Returning to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr Newmark) about doing nothing, I would suggest that there is a lot more that we can do, particularly on the humanitarian and diplomatic fronts.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Newmark]

rose—

[Mr Baron]

I give way first to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin).

[Mr Jenkin]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I am listening carefully to what he is saying. Has he considered the risk of how this debate and his motion will be interpreted? The arms are pouring into Syria from the Sunni factions in Qatar and Saudi, and the Russians are pouring weapons into Syria, yet we seem to be sending the message that we will do nothing for the other side—the forces of democracy and freedom. Is that the message that my hon. Friend wants to send, because it may inadvertently be the message that the Russians will understand from this debate?

[Mr Baron]

I think my hon. Friend does himself a disservice by misunderstanding the stated intention of this debate. It is not that we should do nothing; it is that we as a Parliament should have a say and that our explicit authorisation should be given before any arming of the rebels. We are not making a decision today about whether we should or should not arm the rebels. The motion is very clear that no decision should be made about arming, or, rather, that no policy should be implemented about arming

“without the explicit prior consent of Parliament”.

That is an important distinction. Let me move on, because the issue has been raised before.

The argument is often made that we are to do nothing. Well, there is an awful lot more we can do. On the humanitarian front, for example, why are many refugee camps desperately short of basic amenities? Britain has done more than its fair share—I do not deny that for one moment—but the bottom line is that there are still desperate shortages, so we could do even more there. On the diplomatic front, most people would accept that there can be no military solution to this problem in the longer term; there has to be a diplomatic solution. Why, then, as is presently the case, is the west trying to exclude Iran, a key player in the region and within the country, from the forthcoming peace talks being arranged by the Russians? Time will tell when those talks take place, but there is no doubt that there is an intention at the moment to exclude the Iranians, which is nonsensical.

European Council

Debate between Bernard Jenkin and John Baron

Thursday 8th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Turner, to serve under your chairmanship. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) on orchestrating this debate. I will make my comments relatively short, because I am conscious that other hon. Members wish to speak. Having said that, I believe that the EU summit is a defining moment, and a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to create a better relationship with the EU. I sincerely hope that the Prime Minister seizes that opportunity and seizes the moment.

[Mrs Anne Main in the Chair]

It is my belief that we need a fundamental renegotiation of our relationship with the EU, based on free trade, competitiveness and growth, and not political union and deadweight regulation. That is a relationship that other countries enjoy. One is not speaking of utopia or a textbook theory. Other countries enjoy such a relationship. For example, Switzerland has meaningfully good relations with the EU and trades with it freely, but it is not weighed down by political regulation and moves to ever closer political union. Such a relation reflects the fact that in 1973, and then in 1975, the British people voted for a free trade area and not political union. It reflects the fact that people generally are fed up with mindless interference from the EU. It reflects the fact that businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, are fed up with regulation, some 90% of which comes from Brussels.

Such a relationship would reflect the fact that taxpayers are fed up with the increased cost of the EU. If one takes into account the diminishing rebates, the budget will come to around £40 billion over the next seven years. That would pay for a 6p cut in small business corporation tax in each of the seven years. My goodness, would that not be the spur for growth that we all want and are wishing for? I also believe that such a relationship would reflect the fact that this Conservative party—my Conservative party—is fed up with promises to rein in the EU, when very little has happened over the almost 40 years that we have been a member.

I am slightly more sceptical than most that we can work the repatriation of powers. There has been a lot of talk about that, but our history in repatriating powers has not been good. Let us take the working time directive as an example. We all remember the great hullabaloo about the importance of extracting the opt-out from that directive. It will be no surprise to hon. Members here that that directive was reintroduced through the back door. What are we doing now, before the summit? Once again, we are talking about repatriating powers such as the working time directive. If my memory serves me correctly, that power was supposed to be repatriated some time ago.

[Mr Jenkin]

The problem is that the word “repatriation” is open to confusion. The basic principle of the EU legal system is that powers cannot be repatriated. There is a judicial doctrine—the doctrine of the occupied field—and once member states have delegated a power to the European Union, it cannot be recovered. There is no mechanism for doing that, which is why we need a fundamental change in our relationship with the European Union to address the fundamental problem. The problem is the treaties.

[Mr Baron]

As I said at the start, I do not buy the repatriation of powers. I want a fundamental renegotiation of our relationship with the EU based on free trade, competition and growth. Such a renegotiation would recognise the fact that we want good relations with our EU neighbours, and we want good trade relations in particular, but we recognise that we need to engage better with the faster-growing economies throughout the world. In many regions of the world—those of the BRIC economies—growth rates are so much faster. This is not a little Englander approach; it is a globalist approach that recognises that we need to engage better with those faster-growing areas.