Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJohn Baron
Main Page: John Baron (Conservative - Basildon and Billericay)Department Debates - View all John Baron's debates with the Cabinet Office
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am happy to consider that request, because the ISC plays a very important role, but I do not want to raise, as perhaps happened in the Iraq debate, the status of individual or groups of pieces of intelligence into some sort of quasi-religious cult. That would not be appropriate. I have told the House that there is an enormous amount of open-source reporting, including videos that we can all see. Furthermore, we know that the regime has an enormous arsenal, that it has used it before and that it was attacking that area. Then, of course, there is the fact that the opposition does not have those weapons or delivery systems and that the attack took place in an area that it was holding. So, yes, intelligence is part of this picture, but let us not pretend that there is one smoking piece of intelligence that can solve the whole problem. This is a judgment issue; hon. Members will have to make a judgment.
I thank the Prime Minister for being generous in giving way.
The reason many of us in Parliament oppose arming the rebels is not only that atrocities have been committed by both sides in this vicious civil war, but that there is a real risk of escalating the violence and therefore the suffering. No matter how clinical the strikes, there is a real risk that they would result only in escalating violence. What assurances can the Prime Minister give, therefore, that this will not escalate violence either within the country or beyond Syria’s borders?
My hon. Friend and I have not agreed on every aspect of Syrian policy, as is well known. If we were to take action, it would be purely and simply about degrading and deterring chemical weapons use. We worry about escalation, but the greatest potential escalation is the danger of additional chemical weapons use because nothing has been done. This debate and this motion are not about arming the rebels or intervening in the conflict, or about invasion or changing our approach to Syria. They are about chemical weapons—something in which everyone in this House has an interest.
I want to make a bit more progress.
The international community also has a duty to do everything it can to support the Geneva II process, and any action we take—this is the key point—must assist that process and not hinder it. That is the responsibility that lies on the Government and their allies—to set out that case in the coming period.
There will be some in this House who say that Britain should not contemplate action even when it is limited, because we do not know precisely the consequences that will follow. As I said, I am not with those who rule out action, and the horrific events unfolding in Syria ask us to consider all available options, but we owe it to the Syrian people, to our own country and to the future security of our world to scrutinise any plans on the basis of the consequences they will have. By setting a framework today, we give ourselves time and space to scrutinise what is being proposed by the Government, to see what the implications are.
It depends on the case that has been set out and the extent to which international support has been developed—[Interruption.] I say to hon. Members on the Government Benches who are making strange noises that it is right to go about this process in a calm and measured way. If people are asking me today to say, “Yes, now, let us take military action,” I am not going to say that, but neither am I going to rule out military action, because we have to proceed on the basis of evidence and the consensus and support that can be built.
I very much welcome the decision to delay the vote on whether we should take military action until the UN inspectors have had their chance to report. It makes no sense whatever for the west to make great play of getting the UN weapons inspectors in to inspect the site only to have a vote in the House without getting their report and without determining the evidence on the ground.
Perhaps the rationale for the debate has moved on. Welcome though that is, the debate gives hon. Members the opportunity to ask questions of the Government. I remain unconvinced by the arguments for military action that I have heard this evening. It is important that the House lays down markers, so that, when we have the next debate, the Government hopefully come to the House with better answers.
Let us begin with the evidence. There is no doubt that foreign policy should be based on firm evidence and grounded in legitimacy. We know there are no easy answers on Syria, but we must acknowledge that atrocities have been committed by both sides in this vicious civil war. There have been claims and counter-claims on both sides in relation to chemical weapons, and yet nothing has been verified. Even the JIC document, brief though it is, is in terms of probabilities and possibilities, but not of certainty. At the end, the JIC admits that it has no idea as to Assad’s motivation in committing to chemical weapons when he was gaining ground and winning the battle. We must therefore have careful consideration of the evidence.
The JIC concludes that it is highly probably that the Assad regime is responsible for the attack. That is the consensus among all reputable intelligence services, including the Arab League intelligence service. I put it to my hon. Friend that the only people who contest the evidence probably do not want to believe the certainty that Assad did it. I include my hon. Friend among those people. He does not want us to get involved, and is therefore reluctant to believe in the certainty that Assad did it.
My hon. Friend is attributing motives to me, which does not do him justice. The bottom line is that we have asked the UN inspectors to go in and inspect the site. We should at least wait and see what they say when they return—[Interruption.] If my hon. Friend wants to intervene again, he is welcome to do so. We are talking only of a couple more days before we get the report. One hundred thousand people are already dead. We need only a couple of days to ensure we have a calm assessment of the evidence. That is not asking too much, yet the motion reads that the
“House…Deplores the use of chemical weapons in Syria…by the Assad regime”.
That is a statement of fact, but it is not correct until we at least have the UN inspectors’ report.
I will try to save the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) from saying for a sixth time what he has said. The JIC report comes to a strong conclusion. It says not that it is bewildered, but simply that it cannot put a “precise motivation” on the attack, and concludes that there are
“no plausible alternative scenarios to regime responsibility”.
As the motion states, it is not the responsibility of the UN weapons inspectors to attribute blame.
The JIC document states clearly that it cannot understand the “precise motivation”. The document is in terms of probability. I put this question to the House, and particularly to those who want to intervene militarily: what is the harm in waiting for the UN inspectors to come back and present their evidence? We should not forget that the west did its utmost to get those weapons inspectors to the site. At the very least we can wait a couple of days to see what they say after their due inspections. Otherwise, what was the logic of sending them there in the first place? Sending them there and not waiting for the report would not make sense.
The second question is of legitimacy. Is military intervention without a UN resolution legitimate?
International law is terribly subjective—there are no hard and fast rules, but the best we have is the UN. Is such action legal? Many have suggested that we should look to the concept of the responsibility to protect, which was introduced in 2005, but that is not linked to chemical weapons. R2P could have been invoked 100,000 lives ago. Therefore, the idea that it becomes relevant because chemical weapons have been used is a non-starter.
We must also ask questions about the military objectives—there are many questions on, for example, the scope of the operation and the potential for mission creep. What happens if Assad uses chemical weapons again or if the rebels use them? There are very few answers, and we need more. The decision to commit to military intervention and potentially to commit soldiers to war is one of the most serious the House can make, if the not the most serious. We need to base such a decision on firm evidence and not on speculation.
Many accuse those of us who question the idea of military intervention by saying, “You believe that nothing should be done. You’re in that camp that says, ‘We should wash our hands of it and let them get on with it.’” Utter tosh! So much more could be done on the humanitarian front. The refugee camps are desperately short of basic amenities. Britain has a good record—we have done a lot of the heavy lifting—but we could do a lot more, as could the international community. Tens of thousands of women and children are living in extremely poor conditions, and yet the west is saying, “There’s very little more we can do to help the humanitarian situation,” which is utter nonsense.
The west could also do a lot more on the diplomatic front. It makes no sense whatever to exclude Iran from the forthcoming peace talks, but that is what we currently intend to do. Iran is a key regional player and a participant in this conflict. Excluding Iran from the talks is utter nonsense. We need to go that extra diplomatic mile. This is a cliché, but it is true: you make peace with your enemies, not with your friends. We need to talk to the Iranians if we hope for a diplomatic solution. A political and diplomatic solution, and not a military one, is the only long-term solution to this vicious civil war. The Syrian people have suffered enough. We must have answers to those questions.