European Union

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I will leave the matter of the institutions—it is obviously too sensitive a point—but why would South Korea not have agreed a bilateral arrangement with a country such as Britain in any case, given that we are one of its allies and so on? Why would the South Koreans want to take protectionist measures against us if they are prepared to make a free trade agreement with the rest of the European Union?

[Mr Lidington]

The terms that one is able to extract in the context of such a negotiation will be more favourable if one can negotiate as part of a bloc of 500 million consumers. What the EU was able to offer South Korea collectively was access to a market of 500 million. The UK on its own would have been able to offer access to a market of 50 million to 60 million consumers. That is not an insignificant number, but it is a tenth of the size of the European Union as a whole. That difference in scale means that European countries have greater weight and leverage when they are able to get their act together and negotiate en bloc.

The third reason I believe it remains in our national interest to stay an active member of the European Union is that membership enhances our ability to influence events abroad. On issues where there is a genuine common European interest, where the national interests of the 27 member states converge, it makes sense for those member states to act together, pool our influence and speak with a united voice. One voice representing 500 million consumers is heard more loudly in Beijing, Delhi and Brasilia than 27 separate voices. However, it is equally the case that where EU member states do not agree, it is right and proper that, as sovereign nations with our own national interests, we speak and act independently. It is also right that foreign policy and security and defence policy should remain matters where unanimous agreement is required for a European position to exist.

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[Mr Jenkin]

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[Andrew Percy]

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[Emma Reynolds]

Yes, we are going to divide the House, and if the hon. Gentleman had let me get to the second page of my speech, which I intend to be shorter than that of the Minister for Europe, he would have found that out.

I oppose this motion—we oppose this motion—as it bizarrely commends the Prime Minister for the outcome of last week’s summit. The truth is that it was the worst possible result for the country. We have never been so isolated: 26:1. I say to the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) that there is a difference between us and the other nine non-eurozone member states because the other nine are at least in the room, contributing to a decision that will have an impact on our economy. If the eurozone crisis deepens, it will have profound implications for our economy.

[Mr Jenkin]

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[Dr Julian Lewis]

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[Mr Stewart Jackson (Peterborough) (Con)]

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[Mr Jenkin]

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[Dr Lewis]

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[Emma Reynolds]

I promise hon. Gentlemen that I will give way, but I am attempting to give a shorter speech than the one we just heard.

Sometimes a veto is necessary as a last resort, but it is a negative device that can be used to prevent change that we oppose. Back in the early 1990s, John Major used the veto at the Maastricht treaty summit. He got something in return—an opt-out from the single currency, which the Labour Government used to full effect while we were in office. However, the veto cannot be used as a positive device to force change that we want, as the Prime Minister demonstrated last week. He failed not only to secure the changes he demanded, but to stop the changes he opposed. The former Prime Minister got something in return for his veto; the current Prime Minister got nothing in return. It was a phantom veto; it failed to stop anything.

The truth is that the UK has never been outvoted on financial services in the 38 years during which we have been a member of the Common Market. The Prime Minister has defended nothing—walking out of the summit, leaving us weaker, not stronger. It is the greatest failure of peacetime diplomacy in more than half a century. Our partners do not recognise the Britain that walks away from a battle. As one French woman said in a vox pop to The Observer at the weekend:

“I’ve never seen the British give up.”

This is not the bulldog spirit; it is a form of diplomatic defeatism.

It is not surprising that other European leaders did not even give the Prime Minister a hearing. They were completely taken by surprise by a list of demands that did not seem to have anything to do with the discussions in the summit. Not one single line in the summit’s conclusion refers to financial services. Baroness Thatcher pioneered a single market to be decided by qualified majority voting and signed the Single European Act in 1986. The Prime Minister sought to overturn that decision last week, arguing for a removal of qualified majority voting in single market decisions. Needless to say, the Prime Minister’s handbag was not as powerful as Baroness Thatcher’s.

[Mr Jenkin]

I hope that the hon. Lady will make the position of her party clear. Would she have signed up to the presidency conclusions agreeing to a treaty of 27 in principle—yes or no?

[Emma Reynolds]

First, had we been in government, we would not have been asleep at the wheel for the first nine months of this year. Secondly, we would have built alliances, not burned bridges, and we would not have found ourselves in a situation at the summit in which nobody agreed with us. We had no support from any of those member states.

It is clear that the Prime Minister spectacularly mishandled the summit by failing to prepare the ground, failing to talk to European leaders in advance and failing to build alliances. The Foreign Minister of Poland, until fairly recently one of our strongest allies, singled out the UK for criticism in a recent speech. It now transpires—[Interruption.] Conservative Members might be interested to hear about this. It now transpires that even our lead diplomat in Brussels, the British permanent representative, learned of the Government’s negotiating position only 48 hours before the summit. What a cack-handed way to prepare for important negotiations. No wonder the blame game has started in Whitehall between the Treasury and the Foreign Office.

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[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Indeed I have.

Other myths have been circulated. It has been suggested, for instance, that the Prime Minister’s actions caused Britain to lose a seat at the table. Given that the United Kingdom was never going to take part in the Merkel-Sarkozy pact and thus potentially be subject to EU sanctions—I assume that the Opposition would be quite comfortable with that—I would not expect us to be invited to the monthly EU meetings that will start in January 2012. If the Prime Minister had signed up, the United Kingdom would still not be sitting at that table, because we are not in the eurozone, The veto changes mean nothing structurally in terms of UK influence at those meetings.

Another myth is that the Prime Minister’s veto has created a two-tier European Union. That is complete tosh. We have a eurozone of 17, and a whole new group of Schengen countries. In 2004, when we signed up to the EU accession, a group of countries decided to allow entry to workers from the accession countries, but only Britain allowed them to hold the burgundy passport immediately. Other countries decided to move at a completely different speed.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

Very briefly.

[Mr Jenkin]

If there is a two-tier Europe, it was created by the formation of the euro, and its foundation was the Maastricht treaty. Those who supported the Maastricht treaty cannot now complain that we have a two-tier Europe, because they voted for it.

[Chris Heaton-Harris]

I entirely agree. The Prime Minister’s actions were, in fact, a timely reaction to the signs of caucusing of the 17 eurozone countries, and those countries that rely almost completely on Germany for their trade.

There are so many myths. There is, for instance, the myth perpetrated by the BBC’s Stephanie Flanders—or, at least, the person who wrote what was on her autocue—that the Prime Minister used his veto to protect a tiny part of our economy. In fact, financial services accounted for a £35 billion trade surplus last year, 2 million jobs in the United Kingdom, and £54 million paid to the Exchequer in taxes.

The truth is that these constitutional treaty changes are the result of yet another EU summit that skirted around the problem of eurozone debt without paying off one cent of it. Many commentators, and some politicians here and abroad, may well have had a fun weekend pointing fingers at the UK and pulling shocked faces at the fact that a British Prime Minister dared, after nearly two decades, to engage properly in negotiations by setting out a solid position at the beginning rather than just saying yes. Let us now get down to negotiations. Let us talk. I commend this excellent motion,.