Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend. We have a tool here that can be used to drive back those who act badly—in this particular case, against a country illegally invading a neighbouring democratic state—so we should use this ability to sanction those involved and to increase such sanctions dramatically. I know Labour Members will be raising this issue, but they will have noted what he has said.

The UK and the US have imposed extensive additional sanctions on Russian individuals and entities under the Russia-specific sanctions regimes. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) may want to note, those regimes use broader designation grounds and, crucially, do not usually acknowledge an individual’s direct involvement in human rights abuses in Ukraine or elsewhere. That distinction matters, and this should be rectified by the UK Government. The symbolic and moral force of the Magnitsky sanctions is precisely to name perpetrators and link consequences directly to human rights abuses, and that is what sets them apart. In sheer volume, the contrast is stark. The US has imposed well over 5,000 such Russia-related non-Magnitsky designations, and the UK about 2,900. Yet despite this scale, the absence in most cases of any explicit human rights attribution in such regimes means an important opportunity for accountability is being missed.

As a mechanism in the Government’s foreign policy toolkit, Magnitsky sanctions have a huge potential. However, important gaps remain in their implementation, raising serious concerns about their overall effectiveness. There is no publicly available information on the number of Magnitsky sanctions evidence dossiers received by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. However, based on estimates since the inception of the UK’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020, the FCDO receives on average about two or three dossiers of evidence per month from civil society organisations, which often identify between three and 15 individuals or entities alleged to be implicated in human rights violations. This means that since July 2020, the FCDO has received evidence on anywhere between 360 and 3,000 alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. In stark contrast, only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under the global human rights regime and global anti-corruption regime, to date.

The limited number of Magnitsky sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. Designations tend to overlook broader command structures, instead focusing on isolated actors, excluding key backers or enablers and failing to adopt when sanctioned entities rebrand. For example, Chen Zhi is one of the many leaders of scam networks with bases in south-east Asia trafficking and torturing vulnerable individuals to compel them to scam citizens here in the UK and abroad. The news that the UK and the US sanctioned some of those responsible is always welcome, but those sanctions fail to target Cambodian Government figures who are themselves implicated in the practice, or who turn a blind eye to those violations.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on obtaining the debate and on highlighting how the Magnitsky sanctions could be used more effectively. Could he explain to the House, and for my benefit, what effect, if one applies sanctions to some foreign leader, dictator or person who is in a completely different jurisdiction, does a sanction actually have and how can it be made to bite on the interests of that person so that the sanctions are actually felt by that person?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

It has two effects. First, anything to do with any finance or movement or visitations to the United Kingdom are immediately ruled out and the seizure of financial entities can take place. Secondly, it influences other countries to do the same. America may work with us on that, too. Two of the greatest financial markets are then shut to an individual, who may be part of a Government, thus making it highly difficult for them to operate, or to come and enjoy themselves—a lot of that is done. They become pariahs internationally and that has a huge effect, because it influences what others near them will do when they realise they are about to lose their access to very important areas—cities and financial markets. It has already shown to have had a massive knock-on effect.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The whole point of the debate is to ensure that we know where the money comes from, that we know how it has been gained, and that the individuals must pay a penalty if they are involved in what is illegal or inhuman. The key point is that all those matters can be picked out by the Magnitsky sanctions.

I mentioned Myanmar earlier. Despite historically leaning on sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta for its role in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity against its civilian population after the 2021 coup, the UK has failed to target the State Security and Peace Commission, the military’s successor to the UK-sanctioned State Administration Council. Without additional sanctions, the State Security and Peace Commission, which was established in an attempt by the military to rebrand itself and rebuild financial ties with international partners, has effectively succeeded in its mission. That is exactly what we should have been tackling through the sanctions available to us, but we have not done so.

Finally, last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. However, no action was taken against their key military and diplomatic backer, the United Arab Emirates, or their chief commander. That highlights a broader, troubling trend: to date, only a fraction of Magnitsky sanctions have ever been applied by the UK Government to perpetrators from countries considered strategic allies of the UK. That is a very important point to make; politics have an awful lot to do with this issue. As reported by REDRESS, several of the most notorious human rights abusers and corrupt actors, including in Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, China, Eritrea, the UAE and Egypt—we have mentioned Russia, too—have not been sanctioned by the UK.

I will now come to some examples of individuals and contexts that remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of involvement in corruption and serious human rights issues. Let me deal now with China. While the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in China’s violent repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from human rights organisations. REDRESS— I know, because I have seen the evidence—previously submitted it to the FCDO, calling for targeted sanctions on the following individuals and entities for their involvement in serious human rights violations in Xinjiang.

All of the following are sanctioned by the US—our ally—but not by the UK. The persons recommended for designations are: Chen Quanguo, party secretary of the Xinjiang Chinese Communist party and the key driver of the policy of genocide; Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps; Sun Jinlong, former political commissar of the XPCC, who was sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; Peng Jiarui, deputy party secretary and commander of the XPCC, sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; and Huo Liujun, former leader of the Public Security Bureau, sanctioned by the US on 9 July 2020. As somebody sanctioned by the Chinese Government myself—like you, Madam Deputy Speaker—for raising the issues of Xinjiang at the time, I think that that is a major omission. These are the key people—close almost to President Xi himself—who, when sanctioned, will really feel it. They are locked out of America, but have not been locked out by us. Will the Minister therefore outline what steps the FCDO will take to ensure that sanctions are consistently applied to all actors involved in human rights abuses and corruption?

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

Why is there no transatlantic co-operation on this? What does my right hon. Friend think is the cause of that lack of co-operation ?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I really do not know the answer to that question. All I can say to my hon. Friend is that we act individually and are supposed to co-operate, but that does not always work. We have seen with the Chinese and others that America leads the way and we half follow, or do not follow at all. My concern is that we do not champion such action in the way that we could and should as an upholder of human rights and freedom. This country has a huge record in that area and we need to use it much more.

I am not the only Member of this House to have raised concerns about the relationship between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the activities of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. What is going on in Sudan is brutal, bloody and huge, even in comparison to what is happening in somewhere like Gaza. It is an astonishing abuse of human rights and the value of life. The RSF is responsible for brutal murders, rapes, attacks on hospitals and significant numbers of killings, and yet this organisation has been supported heavily by the UAE. It is said that without the support of the UAE, there would not now be a major war going on in Sudan. There are really big questions to be asked here, because without those arms shipments and other support, there would not be the fighting and terrible consequences that we see in Sudan.

I wish to draw the attention of the Minister to reporting by The New York Times in June last year, which, citing US intelligence sources, references the involvement of Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Deputy President of the UAE, in co-ordination with the RSF and in his role as chair of two charities funding hospitals in Chad that have allegedly been used in the distribution of weapons to the RSF. The investigation further reports that the US envoy to Sudan confronted Sheikh Mansour personally in 2024 about his support for General Hamdan of the RSF. As the ultimate owner of Manchester City football club, Sheikh Mansour is possibly the most high-profile UAE investor in the UK economy. What are we going to do about that? That is a signal and serious problem for us.

Will the Minister confirm that, given the appalling crimes of the RSF, which fall squarely in the purview of the global human rights sanctions scheme, the Department has carried out a full assessment of whether representatives of the UAE Government may meet the criteria for sanctions, given the significant role the UAE is alleged to play in support of the RSF and the substantial influence of the UAE on investments in the UK economy and public life? If such an assessment has not been carried out, will the Minister say whether it is the Government’s intention to do so?

Individuals arbitrarily detained abroad are particularly vulnerable to torture, ill treatment and other serious human rights violations, from the moment they are detained. The Government’s own figures show that in 2024 the FCDO received 186 new allegations of torture and mistreatment from British nationals overseas. Arbitrary detention and related human rights abuses have long-lasting effects on those who experience them; following release, survivors must bear the physical, psychological and socioeconomic toll of their captivity.

This makes it all the more concerning that the list of British nationals currently subject to arbitrary detention abroad is long. I am going to read out the names on it: Jagtar Singh Johal; Ryan Cornelius, whose family are with us today in the Gallery; Jimmy Lai; Nnamdi Kanu; Christian James Michel; Matthew Alexander Pascoe; Ramze Shihab Ahmed al-Rifa’i; Charles Ridley; Mehran Raoof; Craig and Lindsay Foreman; and Ahmed al-Doush. I want to focus on two particular cases that exemplify the FCDO’s reluctance to use Magnitsky sanctions to challenge arbitrary detention: first, Ryan Cornelius; secondly, Jimmy Lai.

A case that underscores the ongoing failure of the UK Government—and, I have to say, that of their predecessor—to effectively employ Magnitsky sanctions to deter and punish those responsible for arbitrarily detaining and mistreating UK nationals is, of course, that of Ryan Cornelius, who has been arbitrarily detained in Dubai for more than 17 years. I want to mention the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca), who has raised this issue on a number of occasions. I congratulate him on his support for the Cornelius family. This arbitrary detention also applies to Charles Ridley, Ryan Cornelius’s business partner, but I will focus today on Ryan.

Unlike the case of Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ryan’s plight has been met with deafening silence, despite well-documented evidence of an unfair trial and the inhumane treatment that has been meted out to him. His detention has been found arbitrary by the UN working group on arbitrary detention. Ryan’s original 10-year sentence was extended by 20 years at the behest of the Dubai Islamic Bank, which has used his imprisonment as leverage to seize his assets, rendering his family essentially homeless.

The FCDO has been reluctant to engage fully with the detail of Ryan’s case from the very beginning. Even now, Ryan’s family—who, as I said, are with us in the Public Gallery—are repeatedly forced to set out the basic facts of his case at every single meeting with the FCDO or Ministers, despite the fact that they are fully known to them. Despite repeated calls from Ryan’s family and from MPs for sanctions against Dubai officials, the UK Government have taken no action. Not a single individual has been sanctioned for their role in this case.

I urge the Minister to look at imposing targeted Magnitsky sanctions on those responsible for Mr Cornelius’s arbitrary detention and asset seizure. I am going to list just eight people who are involved in the board of the Dubai bank: His Excellency Mohammed Al Shaibani; Yahya Saeed Ahmad Nasser Lootah, vice-chairman of the board of directors; Hamad Abdulla Rashed Obaid Al Shamsi, a board member; Ahmad Mohammad Saeed Bin Humaidan, also a board member; Abdul Aziz Ahmed Rahma Mohamed Al Muhairi; Dr Hamad Buamim; Javier Marin Romano; Bader Saeed Abdulla Hareb; and Dr Cigdem Kogar. I offer up the names of these people, all of whom are involved in this case, for the Government to think carefully about taking action. Unfortunately, Ryan’s case appears to be a clear example of economic interests taking precedence over human rights, largely because the UAE is such a major financial investor and trading partner.

I am afraid that that double standard is not limited to Ryan’s case. India—another country with a recent trade deal—continues to hold a British citizen in arbitrary detention without consequences. Jagtar Singh Johal, from Dumbarton, Scotland, was violently arrested in 2017 while in India to get married. He was tortured and has endured eight years of detention, which the UN working group on arbitrary detention has ruled

“lacks legal basis and is arbitrary”.

After lots of hearings—hundreds of them—prosecutors in India have failed to produce credible evidence against Jagtar, and the UK must now use every diplomatic lever to bring him home.

I want to return, finally, to the case of Jimmy Lai. The time has come, surely, for the UK to wield its sanctions authority against the officials responsible for repression in Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai’s guilty conviction for “foreign collusion” and “sedition” on 15 December, which paves the way for Hong Kong’s courts to sentence the 78-year-old British citizen to life in prison, is the final straw.

Beijing has trashed the Sino-British joint declaration, crushed the freedoms it promised Hongkongers and the world, and imprisoned nearly 2,000 political prisoners, including Jimmy Lai. I have long called for the Government to hold the Hong Kong authorities to account for their persecution of the pro-democracy campaigner, who is guilty only of performing his duties as publisher of Hong Kong’s Apple Daily newspaper by speaking to diplomats and other overseas officials.

Not a single Hong Kong individual is named on the UK sanctions list, which sets out all the people, entities and vessels sanctioned by Britain. In comparison, the US has sanctioned 11 officials from the top of Hong Kong’s Administration downwards. How is it that this country, which used to administer and run Hong Kong, has not sanctioned a single person in that process? The three judges responsible for Jimmy Lai’s outrageous guilty verdict—Esther Toh, Alex Lee and Susana D’Almada Remedios, two of whom were called to the bar in London—should be immediate targets, as should the prosecutors: Maggie Yang, Anthony Chau, Ivan Cheung, Crystan Chan and Karen Ng Ka-yue.

Despite the clear role that Magnitsky sanctions could play in these cases, the Government do not treat them as a core foreign policy tool for protecting British citizens abroad. They should not be reserved for politically convenient situations but applied consistently, particularly when we have economic leverage over the perpetrating state. The UN special rapporteur on torture has formally recommended the use of Magnitsky sanctions to deter state hostage taking, and survivors themselves have repeatedly called for their use.

I will listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say, as I think the House wants to get a sense of where the Government are moving on this and whether they intend to increase the level of sanctions or speed them up. If they do so, they will receive my support and, I believe, the support of the Opposition side of the House. These are important moments, and this debate is important.

When this House passed the Magnitsky Act, we did so in good faith. This singular tool would help us in the fight against the abuses of powerful people, particularly in the defence of British citizens who have been wrongly detained and are without the ability to defend themselves. It will help our fight against the powerful people who have control over others who have no redress and no hope for their future.

With the rise of totalitarian states and their satellites, who threaten our very belief in freedom and due process, and who are tearing apart what we call the international rules-based order—such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran—this facility is needed more than ever. Its use is to deter others as much as to punish those who have acted without the law, and such action should be co-ordinated among our allies.

This House has to hold the Government to account—that is our task—and that is what today’s debate is all about. If we do not speak for those languishing under the control of others and the power of powerful states, then who will? I say to the Government simply: this is not parti pris, and nor is it personal; it is an idea that originated here in this place. It is the idea of freedom—freedom of the individual and their protections under the law. For those who carry out the most heinous crimes, there has to be some kind of sanction. The Magnitsky sanction is the best tool that we have. We should surely use it, and use it well, and we must make sure that those out there realise that if they get up to these most disgusting and debilitating acts, they will face a consequence and that consequence will last as long as they do.

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[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)]

Let me start by thanking the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this debate. He always speaks with conviction and passion; he has been absolutely consistent on these issues for a very long time, and I recognise his leadership as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation. We fully support him and every colleague in this House who stands up for our values and has been sanctioned as a result—including your colleague the hon. Member for Sussex Weald (Ms Ghani), Madam Deputy Speaker.

I am grateful for all the contributions today, which have been constructively critical. I assure the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green and all Members that our teams will take the individual cases raised seriously, and I will try my best in the time available to respond to all the key points.

I emphasise from the start that I share the ambition of Members across this House. I take on board the challenge—indeed, I made many similar points in opposition on these issues in similar debates. I emphasise to colleagues the extraordinary work of the officials at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and of other teams across Government who work on these issues. I have to be honest: resource is finite, but we have invested substantially and we will continue to do so. We have set ambitious targets, including on enforcement, which I will come to, but I pay tribute to those people and recognise that they have been awarded for that work within the Department, and rightly so. That work is having a genuine impact, because sanctions are one of the most powerful tools we have to protect our security and advance our foreign policy, including in the areas described today.

We impose sanctions to isolate those responsible, to restrict their ability to act and to change their behaviour, as well as to send deterrent and other messages beyond those we target. However, sanctions must be focused, enforceable, legally sound and backed by the right resources and credible evidence. We maintain the integrity of our regime through the strictest interpretation and the solidity of the evidence underpinning sanctions. I want colleagues to understand that, because it is important for the functioning of the regime as a whole.

Since this Government came in, we have set ambitious targets on sanctions, and we have introduced more than 1,000 new sanctions designations against individuals, entities and ships. We have laid 15 new statutory instruments before Parliament, including to create a new regime on irregular migration, to which the shadow Minister referred. We have already designated 32 individuals and entities under that. We have played a leading role in the snapback of sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Those are just some of the examples showing that sanctions are not just symbolic gestures, but practical tools that are tightly focused and have a meaningful impact.

The UK covers Magnitsky-style sanctions under two regimes: the global human rights regime and the global anti-corruption regime. Under this Government, we have delivered more than 60 designations under those regimes. In 2025, we sanctioned 29 individuals and entities under the global human rights regime, going after scam centres in Cambodia and targets in Sri Lanka, Georgia and the west bank. Many colleagues have raised those areas and issues.

We have also delivered 164 sanctions taking action on human rights violations, war atrocities and gender-based violence. We have imposed sanctions on individuals, entities and organisations responsible for supporting or inciting violence against Palestinian communities in the west bank. In June 2025, we sanctioned the Israeli Government Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich in their personal capacities, in response to their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian communities. I mentioned the Cambodian scam centre package, which froze 20 UK properties worth more than £125 million, directly disrupting criminal activity in the heart of London. That activity impacted on British citizens on our streets, but was also linked to global corruption networks.

In November 2024, under the global anti-corruption regime, we sanctioned three notorious kleptocrats who had siphoned wealth from their countries, along with their enablers, including family and financial fixers. We froze more than £150 million in UK assets and sent a strong signal of support to Angola and other countries. We targeted an illicit gold network centred on a Kenyan-British smuggler who was using corruption to move gold out of southern Africa. In April 2025, we sanctioned corrupt officials and judges in Georgia and Guatemala and a pro-Russian network in Moldova, exposing their activities and supporting democracy and the rule of law.

Magnitsky sanctions are not our only tool. We also have the wider geographic regimes. Just in December, we sanctioned nine individuals and entities under the Syria regulations for abuses committed under the Assad regime and during last year’s coastal violence. We have to ensure that sanctions are robust, legally sound and evidence-based and that they stand up to the most robust scrutiny, and I am sure that colleagues understand why.

Russia has been highlighted by many Members today. We have taken concerted action on that front, and it is making a significant difference. Last year, we sanctioned more than 700 individuals, entities and ships under the Russian regime. We were the first G7 country to sanction all four Russian oil majors. The US followed suit, and that has had a direct impact: Russia’s oil revenues have dropped to their lowest level since the invasion began. I know that there is strong support across at least the majority of the House on those issues, and I have listed off the many other Magnitsky sanctions designation packages.

I am conscious of the time, and I will try to respond to some of the points that have been raised. It is worth making the point that often there are similarities between the different regimes. We co-ordinate very closely with partners, particularly the European Union, the United States, Canada and others. We try to bring the weight of the world to bear on these issues at crucial times, but I emphasise to colleagues that the legal bases for our sanctions regimes are different. There are different legal and judicial processes, and that is why there are often differences. Because of where nexuses of individuals and entities are, there are also often differences in where our sanctions can have the biggest impact. Sometimes that is what underpins what otherwise appears to be incongruity between regimes, but we always try to bring them together.

The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green specifically mentioned the Cambodian scam centres and Chen Zhi. I emphasise that Cambodia arrested Chen Zhi and extradited him to China this week, and that the National Bank of Cambodia liquidated Prince Bank on 8 January, so there has been a significant impact as a result of that package. Obviously, the sanctions are only one part of the response to these networks; there are other measures that countries can choose to take in response to very serious allegations.

A lot of questions have rightly been raised about Sudan and the work that the Government are doing on that issue. The Foreign Secretary, the Minister for Africa and I place a great deal of importance on that, and building a consensus on ending that horrific war is a core part of the Government’s diplomatic efforts, including with other regional partners and the UAE. The Foreign Secretary is in regular contact with the Emirati Foreign Minister, and the Prime Minister has also spoken to his counterpart. We will continue to use all necessary means to bring an end to the war in Sudan, which is having a devastating impact on its citizens.

A number of colleagues have asked questions about Hong Kong. Of course, we call on Beijing to repeal Hong Kong’s national security law. We are closely monitoring the situation there, and we keep sanctions under close review. I am not going to speculate on future designations, for obvious reasons, but particular cases have been raised. The case of Jimmy Lai remains an utmost priority. Diplomats continue to press for consular access, and they attended his trial. The Prime Minister has raised Mr Lai’s case directly with President Xi, and we are in close contact with his family and representatives. Of course, we want to make sure that he receives proper treatment, and we are deeply concerned about some of the allegations made about his treatment in prison.

On the case of Ryan Cornelius, I want to acknowledge that his family have been in Parliament today. We continue to support them and, indeed, the family of Charles Ridley as well. The former Foreign Secretary raised their cases with the UAE Foreign Minister last year, and I understand that he and the Minister for the Middle East, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), met the families in September. We support their clemency applications, and of course we raise those and other cases with appropriate authorities at the right time.

Jagtar Singh Johal’s case has also been mentioned. We continue to raise serious concerns about that with the Government of India at every possible opportunity.

We have not stopped our Myanmar sanctions. Since the coup, we have sanctioned 25 individuals and 39 entities.

Very important concerns have been raised about Roman Abramovich and Chelsea football club’s assets. I draw colleagues’ attention to what we have said on that, and to the Prime Minister’s action on the licence.

Colleagues have also expressed strong concerns about the shadow Attorney General. As the Prime Minister set out yesterday, the Conservatives have some very serious questions to answer on this issue, which is completely unfathomable to me and deeply disappointing.

On the question of enforcement—

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

What about an annual report?

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Gentleman mentions the importance of reporting to Parliament, and I can assure him that I have been scrutinised in this place many times. I have sent a letter to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and to Lord Ricketts in the other place, to set out the full detail of all the work we have done. I am committed to reporting regularly to Parliament on these issues; indeed, I have held private meetings with many Members from across the House to discuss their concerns, and I am absolutely committed to continuing to do that.

On the issue of enforcement, I think some of the criticism was somewhat unwarranted. This is an issue that I have regularly championed. I agree with the principles of what colleagues have said, but I point out that in November the National Crime Agency announced that, based on the intelligence it gained in Operation Destabilise, it supported international law enforcement partners in seizing $24 million and over €2.6 million from Russian money laundering networks with links to drugs and organised crime. There have been over 128 arrests as a result of that operation alone, with over £25 million seized in cash and cryptocurrency—another issue that has been mentioned. In 2025 alone, OFSI issued four major civil monetary penalties, totalling over £900,000—I think some of the figures Members have used are not quite accurate—and for its part, HMRC concluded a £1.1 million compound settlement for trade sanctions breaches in May.

The shadow Minister asked for figures. I am happy to write to her with further details, but to give one example, OTSI has received reports or referrals about 146 potential breaches of sanctions and it has a number of investigations under way. I do not want to comment on them, but I do want to assure hon. Members that we take all the considerations they have raised very seriously. Sanctions, including Magnitsky-related sanctions, are an important tool, and we will continue to look at all such possibilities. I welcome the challenge, and we will continue to rigorously pursue not only the designation of such regimes, but, crucially, the enforcement that makes the difference.