(7 years, 7 months ago)
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I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Telford (Lucy Allan) on securing the debate. I am a father of three. I am a Lancashire MP, representing many diverse communities in my constituency, and in our communities there are threats from both far-right and Islamic extremism. I am therefore well aware of some of the issues that we face on the ground in trying to keep all of our young people safe in today’s world.
However, I do not accuse people who question or criticise Prevent of being anti-security or trying to put at risk the society in which we live. I recognise that people have a right to question Prevent, and I recognise the issues that have been raised today. I have to say that I could not agree more with the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), who put it perfectly well, and my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston and Surbiton (James Berry) also made the point that we have to strike a delicate balance. The balance is between safety and security and our obligations to society; some of the very extreme threats and individuals who try to peddle that to our young people or people who are vulnerable to exploitation; and ensuring that policing is done by consent and that the relationship between the community and the Government is indeed collaborative and that they are working together for the best.
Of course we could fine-tune Prevent and do more to engage, build that trust and work with communities. I have said to my hon. Friend the Member for Telford that I am very happy to take her to a Prevent provider, or to meet either a provider or some of the local authorities to do that. I make that offer to all colleagues in the Chamber, to ensure that we start down the road of ensuring that people understand both sides of the argument.
One of the most moving things for me was speaking to a number of community groups involved in delivering Prevent. It is sometimes quite hard to argue with their point of view. When one meets people whose children have been saved from going to Syria to fight for Daesh, it is quite hard to say to them that the Prevent strategy does not help, that it has not helped to protect their children or even saved their lives.
As the Minister for Security, I have the privilege of knowing about many of the successes. We do not often advertise the successes, because we want people to move on with their lives. I am thinking of the 15-year-old in Lancashire who was radicalised by the far right and whose headteacher put him in touch with Prevent. He is now not only out of the specialist school he was in, but in mainstream further education, enjoying the prospect of a good life. I cannot advertise who those individuals are or put their names on a leaflet for everyone to see, because we want them to progress further in life.
The classic example is the difference between the three Bethnal Green girls and the two young men from Brent. The two young men from Brent had strong relationships with the local police and the leader of the council and were able to come back when they got to Istanbul, whereas we lost the three young girls from Bethnal Green. The key to this is building up that trust and those relationships between the police and the community.
I could not agree more. It also means that unfortunately we often know about the failures rather than the successes. The right hon. Gentleman knows from his long period as Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee that in the world of policing and security it is nearly always the failures that we hear about when there is an intelligence breakdown or someone slips under the radar. As someone who started in counter-terrorism as a young man in his early 20s, I can tell Members that something always gets through the net. One failure does not justify the scrapping of Prevent. I think that is important.
We all have a duty to do more to make sure that we challenge some of the perceptions that are peddled about Prevent, and to better investigate the stories that are sometimes put in the media. It was also in Lancashire that a child was reported apparently—according to the media—for saying, “I live in a terrorist house.” The child actually said, “I live in a terrorist house and my uncle beats me.” That story is never reported. The referral was a safeguarding referral about abuse of the child, but that was not good enough for some of the media, who chose to leave those details out and report in a lazy manner. We all have a duty to investigate and explore not only those local authorities that deliver Prevent, but the communities—
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2016, which was laid before this House on 12 December, be approved.
The threat level in the UK, which is set by the independent joint terrorism analysis centre, remains at severe. That means that a terrorist attack in our country is highly likely and could occur without warning. We can never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, but we are determined to do all we can to minimise it and keep the public safe. The nature of terrorism is constantly evolving. There are organisations that recruit, radicalise and promote and encourage terrorism, as well as those that commit terrible acts of violence against innocent people.
Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to disrupt the full range of terrorist activities. The group we propose to add to the list of terrorist organisations, amending schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000, is National Action. This is the 21st order to be made under section 3(3)(a) of the 2000 Act. Hon. Members will be aware that this is the first time we have laid a proscription order for a far-right group. The Government are committed to tackling terrorism, regardless of what motivates it. National Action is a group whose views and ideology stand in direct contrast to the core values of Britain and the United Kingdom.
I welcome the decision to ban this group. Have there been any deproscriptions since the last time the House passed an order proscribing an organisation in July?
It has not happened since July. Two groups have been deproscribed. The People’s Mujaheddin of Iran or the MEK was deproscribed at the High Court and a Sikh group linked to allegations of extremism made representations and was deproscribed as a result.
Despite its name, National Action seeks to divide communities and stir up hatred—actions that are entirely contrary to the interests of our nation. Proscribing this neo-Nazi group will prevent its membership from growing and prevent it from spreading propaganda, which allows a culture of hatred and division to thrive. It will also help to prevent National Action from radicalising people who may be vulnerable to extreme ideologies and at risk of emulating the terrorist acts it glorifies.
I have to be careful that we do not undermine the operational capability and effectiveness of the law agencies, which may take action. But it is certainly the case that, when an organisation is proscribed, it allows us to bring the full force of those agencies to bear on the threat posed by the proscribed organisation and the individuals within it. Within that, I would expect measures to make sure that any use of the internet for what is a kind of grooming is restricted or, I would hope, stopped completely, along with other measures. But I will leave that up to the security services and the police, as that will get the best effect, and it would be wrong of me to speculate further about what they may or may not do.
Although I cannot comment on the specific intelligence behind the decision to proscribe, I can provide the House with a summary of the group’s activities. National Action is a racist neo-Nazi group that was established in 2013. It has a number of branches across the United Kingdom, and conducts threatening street demonstrations and activities aimed at intimidating local communities. Its activities and propaganda materials are particularly aimed at recruiting young people. National Action’s ideology promotes the idea that Britain will inevitably see a violent race war, which the group claims to be an active part of.
The group rejects democracy, is hostile to the British state and seeks to divide society by implicitly endorsing violence against ethnic minorities and perceived race traitors. National Action has links to other extreme right-wing groups abroad, including in Europe. In May 2016, National Action members attended the Buchenwald concentration camp, where they made Nazi salutes and posted images online.
The Government’s counter-extremism strategy challenges extremism in all its form. Alongside the strategy, our Prevent work will continue to monitor whether extremist groups have crossed into terrorism. The group is relatively small and has been in operation in the UK for only a few years, but the impact of its activities has been felt in a number of United Kingdom communities.
In the evidence presented to the Home Secretary by the agencies before the decision was made to proscribe the group, was there any evidence of any links with other organisations in different parts of Europe? We have seen that far-right groups tend not to operate in only one country.
I cannot expand on the intelligence behind this particular decision, but I agree that we see far-right groups with a European network, and being active both here and abroad. Far right groups from abroad are active in the United Kingdom as well.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
General CommitteesI fully support what the Minister is proposing. These are very important measures. However, in the past couple of years, a number of individuals have gone missing while on these orders, and statements have been made to the House by the Minister’s predecessor about the individuals who have gone missing. Can the Minister update the Committee on how many of those individuals have now been apprehended?
After the absconsion of two individuals—I think that that was the number—a review was done, looking at the operational failures that perhaps allowed that to happen, and that review was submitted to David Anderson, the reviewer of terrorism legislation. It would not be appropriate to give the details of the review, because obviously that might expose vulnerabilities in our capability, but certainly the lessons have been learned and addressed.
The right hon. Gentleman may not understand, but we do not comment on individual TPIM cases, for reasons, obviously, of operational security. However, he should take some comfort from the fact that the lessons from what led to those individuals absconding have been learned and measures are in place to do so. I can point him to the statistics for the number of people on TPIMs: there was one, and now we are at six for this year. I can certainly say that, where possible, we use them. We certainly do so as a last resort, but where we need to use them, we will. I think that we are in a better place than we were with control orders.
Under part 2 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, a TPIM notice can require the individual to reside in a property up to 200 miles away from their own residence without their consent, ban the individual from possessing certain weapons and require the individual to attend appointments arranged by the Secretary of State.
A key objective of the TPIM Act was to introduce a more focused regime that protected the public from the risk of terrorism but increased the safeguards in place to protect the civil liberties of those subject to the measures. There are several differences between the TPIM Act and the previous control order regime, including the strengthening of the legal threshold required to impose an order from “reasonable suspicion” under the control order legislation to “reasonable belief” for TPIMs. That threshold was strengthened even further to “the balance of probabilities” under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Additionally, control orders lasted for a maximum of 12 months, but there was no limit to how many times they could be extended. In a small number of cases, they lasted for more than four years. Under the TPIM Act, notices last for a maximum of 12 months and are extendable only for a further year. Evidence of new terrorism-related activity is required to justify a new TPIM notice.
An automatic right of appeal is built into the TPIM legislation. That allows individuals who are subject to TPIM notices to challenge through the courts the Home Secretary’s decision to impose them. However, unlike the previous control order regime, no TPIM has been quashed by the courts. In accordance with section 21 of the TPIM Act, the director general of MI5, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and the intelligence services commissioner have all been consulted, and they all recommend the continuation of the Secretary of State’s powers. I commend the draft order to the Committee.
(7 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, but I will come to that part of the Bill later on. It is certainly our intention to prosecute those corporations, or the corporate body, that allow their companies to facilitate tax evasion. Under the current system, an individual can be prosecuted for evading tax, and someone within a company can be prosecuted if they facilitate that evasion. At the moment, it is very, very hard to prosecute the corporate body. We are intending to make that change in our Bill. If the hon. Lady reads the Bill, she will see how we will do that. We will go after not only the corporate body here in the UK, but overseas companies. Being an overseas company will not be an excuse, and we will go after them in the same extra-territorial way that we do with the Bribery Act 2010.
I congratulate the Minister on his appointment to the Home Office.
In evidence to Parliament earlier this year, the private sector made it very clear that it is trying to co-operate with the Government. There were 381,000 suspicious activity reports made under the ELMER system, only 20,000 of which could be looked into. What support is he giving the National Crime Agency to allow it to have a better system to deal with those reports?
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and for his kind comments about my appointment.
First, we will remove those barriers to information sharing. Often some of the regulators or the bodies that we deal with say that they would like to pass on more to us, but feel that they are not protected from sharing wider information. We will remove those barriers so that the National Crime Agency can see the full chain of a financial instruction. We will also empower the NCA with a stronger disclosure order so that it can force people—it can go and apply for an order—to release documentation or to comply with questions about a particular transaction. Such an order currently exists in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, but it only covers fraud. We will now do the same for money laundering. We will also extend the time limit for a suspicious activity report. At the moment, there is a one-off extension of up to 31 days, but we would like to see that extended to six months, which means that the NCA will have much longer for its investigations.
I thank the Minister for his very full answer, but the real problem is that the system is old. The ELMER system needs to be replaced and renewed. Will he give the National Crime Agency the additional resources to pay for the new system to do all the things that he is suggesting? Without a new system, 20,000 simply does not go into 381,000.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that 381,000 referrals is a hefty amount to get through. First, we need to ensure that there is time to get through them. Secondly, what we do not want is what has happened in the past, which is that the private sector makes a suspicious activity report by default. If we can remove those excuses about why it cannot get to the bottom of a transaction before it passes it on, that will ensure that it passes on proper suspicious activities, rather than the ones that it can satisfy itself are not such a problem. In that way, we can cut out some of the referrals that are unnecessarily done.