All 7 Debates between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan
Monday 30th January 2023

(1 year, 1 month ago)

Commons Chamber
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Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
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T4. Labour’s dossier on waste in the MOD found that at least £15 billion of taxpayers’ money has been wasted since 2010. Can the Secretary of State explain why the Government are failing to get a grip on the defence procurement process and secure value for money for the taxpayer?

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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It is a really wonderful dossier, as far as dodgy ones go, because half the waste in it was under a Labour Government.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan
Monday 21st September 2020

(3 years, 6 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan  (Manchester,  Gorton) (Lab) [V]
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The GMB union estimates that by placing the Fleet Solid Support order with UK shipyards, the Treasury could see up to £285 million of the £800 million contract returned in taxes. The award of the contract could have long-term benefits for the shipbuilding sector and the wider economy, giving companies the confidence to train new apprentices and plan for the future. Will the Government support GMB’s call for the FSS order to be placed in UK shipyards?

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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We have already started a market engagement exercise and have had a healthy response. I intend to announce the procurement timetable for the warships in due course, after market testing has completed. We intend to encourage international partners to work alongside UK firms for the bid, which will build on the success of Type 31.

Foreign Fighters and the Death Penalty

Debate between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan
Thursday 11th October 2018

(5 years, 5 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.

Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.

This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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What these individuals who are suspected of an offence and many others have coming is justice. We will do everything we can to work with our allies to see that justice is administered in a way that follows due process and that takes place in a court of law, where there is a separation between the judiciary and the Executive, where people have a right to defence and to make an argument, and where the rule of law prevails. That is what they and anybody else who involves themselves in that type of terrorism has coming to them, and that is what we are trying to uphold.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
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May I also apologise for not being here at the start of the urgent question?

Wednesday was World Day Against the Death Penalty. The Foreign Office Minister in the other place spoke about the Government’s absolute opposition to the death penalty. The Labour party also opposes the death penalty. It is barbaric and was rightly abolished in this country more than half a century go. Yet, at the same time, the Government have agreed to help the US in prosecuting El Shafee Elsheikh and Alexanda Kotey, who could ultimately face the death penalty. I will say no more on this specific case, as it is subject to a High Court challenge.

The Labour party makes it absolutely clear that those who commit abhorrent crimes should face the full force of the law, but in bringing people to justice we should never sacrifice the very values that those who wish us harm seek to attack. We are therefore rightly concerned following the Government’s revelation that, on two previous occasions going back some years, the UK has co-operated with foreign states in cases involving the death penalty. Does the Minister agree that if the Government oppose the death penalty in principle, they must oppose it in every case without exception?

It was revealed in the court earlier this week that the Home Secretary had written to the former Foreign Secretary stating that

“significant attempts having been made to seek a full assurance, it is now right to accede to the mutual legal assistance request without an assurance”.

Can the Minister explain what “significant” means in this context? Also, what response was received from the US authorities when these requests for full assurance were made? Furthermore, what new material factor caused the Secretaries of State to conclude that assurance was no longer necessary, in contravention of the long-standing policy of successive British Governments and their commitments to opposing the death penalty in all circumstances? Why did the Government not renew the death penalty strategy in 2016? Is that an oversight? If not, when do they intend to come to the House to explain the matter? Finally, does the Minister agree that making exceptions undermines our own credibility on human rights issues around the world?

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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I think both the hon. Gentleman and I were slightly caught short by the speed of the previous urgent question. I will do my best to answer his questions. Our guidance for upholding our principled position on the death penalty and following MLA requests is contained in the OSJA, published in 2011. Paragraph 9(b) on the death penalty clearly states:

“Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to seek assurances, the case should automatically be deemed ‘High Risk’ and FCO Ministers should be consulted to determine whether, given the specific circumstances of the case, we should nevertheless provide assistance.”

It was our view that there were strong reasons not to seek assurances.

This case has no easy solutions. It is easy for everyone to say, “We want justice for the victims”, but the options before this Government, our security forces and our citizens do not include a magic wand to get people miraculously into a UK court or provide evidence that matches the statute book that we happen to have. The strong reasons that, we would say, mean that the rights of those individuals detained are better served by a judicial trial in the United States are that they have a better chance of proper representation in a court of law than if they were left in detention by non-state actors in a war zone in north Syria, sent to Guantanamo Bay—something that the Government oppose fully—or allowed to go back into the battlefield and wreak murder and death in the same way that they have been accused of doing in the past. Those were the options on the table that we as Ministers, charged with keeping people safe and balancing our obligations, and implementing the Government’s policy as set out in the OSJA, have to weigh up. We felt that there were strong reasons not to seek death penalty assurances when sharing the evidence for a criminal trial in the United States.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan
Tuesday 10th July 2018

(5 years, 8 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
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Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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I hear what the hon. Gentleman says and I understand his dividing line of accidental or unavoidable, but many more people are killed in this country as a result of domestic abuse than terrorism. Many more people are killed because of knife crime or violent crime every year than terrorism. It is the same; no one went out to look for that. That is the position. We could probably debate all day where we would draw the line. That is one of the challenges we face.

The Government are committed to ensuring that victims of terrorism receive effective support that is comprehensive and co-ordinated. That is why last year we set up the cross-Government victims of terrorism unit to co-ordinate support to UK citizens directly affected by terrorist events at home and overseas. We continue to work across Government, including with the third sector and private sector organisations, to improve and strengthen the support available so that victims receive the best possible support now and in the future.

The Government’s approach to digital fundraising platforms is to promote self-regulation, with the aim of ensuring that transparency and the public interest are protected. The Fundraising Regulator, working with a number of digital fundraising platforms, has developed new transparency requirements, which it consulted on and announced just last month on 7 June. These changes were incorporated into the “Code of Fundraising Practice”, the rulebook for fundraising in the UK, and the platforms have until the end of August to make any necessary changes to their systems and processes. Most digital fundraising platforms have already registered with the Fundraising Regulator. Several platforms chose to waive or cap their fees in relation to some of the incidents last year, including the Manchester terror attack.

Alongside the updates to the “Code of Fundraising Practice”, the Fundraising Regulator has developed guidance for online fundraising platforms, to help them meet the expected standards of transparency. Guidance has also been produced to help members of the general public who want to use these platforms to ensure that they do not inadvertently breach the code and that they consider how funds will reach the intended beneficiaries.

We expect non-statutory regulation under the Fundraising Regulator to work, but as a backstop the Government have reserve powers to regulate fundraising under the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016, should that prove necessary. We will not hesitate to do so, if that is the case.

These changes are already having an impact. One prominent for-profit funding platform has changed its practices; as well as being more transparent about its fees, it now offers donors the ability to make an additional payment to cover the fees, ensuring that the entire donation goes to the beneficiaries.

I have greater sympathy for a more directive approach when it comes to gift aid. Some digital fundraising providers include the gift aid amount when they calculate their charge. I think that is outrageous. Gift aid is taxpayers’ money that is given to charities; it is not meant for businesses that operate fundraising platforms. That is why my hon. Friend the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury has asked Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to explore options to ensure that gift aid is passed on in full to the charities to which it is due.

Separate to the work of the Fundraising Regulator in improving transparency and the regulation of digital fundraising platforms, work is underway with the charity sector to better co-ordinate charities’ response to major emergencies. This programme is being supported by the Charity Commission, working closely with a range of charities, fundraisers and regulators, including the Fundraising Regulator.

In January this year the Charity Commission organised a roundtable event involving 25 charities, regulators, fundraising platforms and others, to start to develop a framework for a more co-ordinated charity sector response to national critical incidents. Attendees agreed to the principle of creating a collective framework for co-ordinating such responses. They formed a working group to develop the framework and operating principles behind any future disaster response. That work is progressing well and focuses on the themes of first response, fundraising, distribution of funds, and recovery.

I am sure that this is not the intention of the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark in new clause 5, but we believe that, at the moment, there might be unintended consequences for reducing the charitable funds raised to help victims of terrorism. Were the new clause to become law, some of the digital fundraising platforms might stop people setting up fundraising pages for the victims of terrorism, resulting in less charitable funds being raised. There is also a risk that funds already raised by established charities, using professional fundraisers, which could have been used to support victims, could not be used for the proper purpose. There does not appear to be a clear rationale, as I said earlier, about where we draw the line. I hope that he understands why I cannot support the new clause.

I assure the Committee that work is underway to improve the transparency of digital fundraising platforms and the co-ordination of charities’ responses to major incidents, including supporting victims of terrorism. I am happy to facilitate a meeting with the hon. Gentleman and the Minister with responsibility for charities to talk that through directly. As a Security Minister, my locus is over terrorism, but the wider regulation of charities across the whole sector—all types of charities—is the responsibility of another Minister. I am happy to present the hon. Gentleman’s intentions in this new clause to that Minister and then arrange a meeting between them.

I hope that I have reassured the hon. Gentleman that we are working through the Fundraising Regulator and the Treasury to ensure that his concerns are met. At the same time, we are trying to balance the modern technology of the world, which a lot of people use to fundraise and collect donations.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
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I support the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark. I am from Manchester—I am a former Lord Mayor—so I saw what happened there and I know how people feel. Millions of pounds have been raised in Manchester, because people there are generous. I think that they would find it offensive if someone was profiteering from the money they had donated in response to such a terrible attack. Is that acceptable?

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Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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I do not believe the place for Government negotiation is in primary legislation. The ball is firmly in the court of the European Commission. Our position is an unconditional offer on security. The only time I ventured from the shelter of security to engage publicly on a European issue was when Michel Barnier said recently, in a rather dismissive and offhand manner, that we would not have access to any of these issues as a third country. That does not reflect the examples of special relationships with Europol, of which there are at least two—probably more.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned Denmark, which is unique as a member of the European Union that has pulled out of Europol. Switzerland and Norway, which are not EU members, have good access to Europol for the sharing of data. The point is, when the European Commission has wanted to, it has extended a bespoke or special unique relationship. I venture that the United Kingdom has contributed, shaped, funded and supported many of these European organisations. Europol was created predominantly by the United Kingdom, and it shares huge amounts of our data—our citizens’ data and our intelligence—with other European countries.

It is important that our unconditionality is taken on board and embraced by the Commission. My public venture to Mr Barnier, apart from a quip about gambling with safety, was that security was not a competition. We are not talking about trade. It is about working together, where the sum of the parts is greater than the individual contributions.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan
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As I have said, I served as a vice-chair of the security and defence committee of the European Parliament, so I am aware of how important co-operation is. Does the Minister agree that if we want to be successful against terrorism we need to improve co-operation? We have benefited from co-operation.

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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We absolutely have. It is not just about scale or who is better at one thing over the other; it is genuinely that in such activity the sum of the parts is greater. The United Kingdom has developed a clear lead on counter-terrorism policy through our intelligence services and police services learning to work together on domestic issues quicker than our European allies. That needs to be scaled up to working internationally. At the same time, we need to navigate the real obligation of the state to protect its citizens’ data. It is not a free-for-all.

The hon. Member for Torfaen is right, and we are totally determined to get there through negotiation. It is not that we disagree; I simply take the view that primary legislation is not the place for individual parts of a negotiation. The new clauses would not make any difference, because the Government would not be bound to the outcome but just be saying, “This is what we intend.” The Prime Minister has said what our position is and what we want. I have said it to the Committee, and we have said it to the European Commission. It has been said on a number of occasions and no piece of primary legislation will change that. We agree with the intention, and I understand the symbolism of putting an objective into the Bill, but it is not necessary. As long as I am the Security Minister and the Government are negotiating, we wish that to be the case, and that is what we are asking for.

The hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth worries about the new Brexit Secretary, but we are all in a team with collective responsibility and he was probably not aware in 2014 of the clear importance of intelligence and security sharing and how it makes a difference to saving lives every single day. Most recently—two weeks ago—the United Kingdom contributed a significant part towards foiling a plot in Cologne involving a terrorist who had managed to make ricin and was making a bomb to devastate that city and its people.

As long as I have breath in my body, I shall do everything I can, but I do not believe that primary legislation is the place for our negotiating objectives. I will happily arrange it for anyone who is in any doubt to visit our police officers to see how important that is.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan
Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
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I shall be brief. I would like the Minister to take a couple of my questions into account when answering those raised by other Members. It is clear that this whole area gives a lot of power to officers, and that the term “hostile activity” risks casting an extremely wide net; in essence, anyone could be subject to the Bill’s invasive powers. Will the Minister explain how any confidential material obtained at the border will be protected? How do the Government intend to ensure that these powers will not lead to ethnic and religious profiling? In view of these broad powers, will the Minister also clarify whether any training will be given to officers?

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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First, the use of, effectively, no-suspicion stops on our border is not new. In fact, as we heard from those giving evidence to the Committee last week, lots of stops happen on our border, because borders are particularly vulnerable spaces. There are screening stops, in which people are asked questions about where they are coming from or going. There are also customs and excise stops, which go beyond that, and in which people are stopped and their bags and luggage are properly searched, perhaps in a side room. That is detaining, in a sense. It is not for a long period of time; it is certainly not as long as some of the scheduled stops that we will talk about.

Until someone is arrested, their access to legal advice and so on is different, because our vulnerability at a border, and our need to establish who, what and when, is really important for our national security. That is why many of those stops, in different guises—whether customs or identity screening—have been in place, sometimes, for hundreds of years. This is a development of that. In the Terrorism Act 2000, passed by the last Labour Government, the feeling was that, given our vulnerability at the border in a fast-moving world of millions of passengers, it was important to give our Border Force and our law enforcement community the ability to establish that information.

Some 89% of all stops at the border are done in under an hour. The vast majority are inward not outward, but to the point made by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, I also have a constituent who was stopped when outward bound. My constituent was held up, and a family holiday and lots of money were effectively lost. Having met the hon. Gentleman, we have started a piece of work to look at exactly what we can do to minimise that. A good example would be asking whether it is really necessary to stop someone on the way out; they could perhaps be stopped only on the way back in. If we do not think they are going to travel to fight in Syria, but we think they might be going to do something else, we could just wait until they come back, and people are much less likely to suffer financial risk if they are done.

In answer to the question by the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton, only officers who are specially trained are allowed to conduct a stop, search and detail. I think it would be illegal, and it would certainly be against the powers, to do it for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. That would cover doing it on the basis of race or anything else. The no-suspicion power has been incredibly useful and has caught a significant number of terrorists, predominantly due to the fact that they have been stopped and data or biometrics has been seized. We have seen a number of cases. There was a guy from Wembley, I think, who was convicted of murder based on material recovered from a stop.

There will be safeguards in this new power. Our terrorism stops are reviewed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I have asked the Judicial Commissioner, Lord Justice Fulford, to review the use of the hostile state power on an annual basis. One of the reasons why we have introduced this is that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation had serious concerns that in the past we were using a counter-terrorism power to stop people on a national security or hostile state concern. This is our response to what I think was David Anderson’s recommendation to take that forward.

The hon. Member for Torfaen and the Scottish National party have spoken about no-suspicion and the fact that we should have reasonable grounds. The biggest challenge is that the way our intelligence is presented to us can often be very broad. It can be based on a method, on a threat on a date, or on a plane, rather than on a person. The Government’s reading of the law is that if we had to have reasonable grounds, it would be too narrow for us to be able to respond to some of that intelligence threat.

It may even be that we have gone to a state of “critical”, where an attack is imminent but we do not know from which direction. I have personal experience, doing this job, of where we had some “reliable” intelligence about an attack in one part of the country, but in fact an attack happened in an entirely different place at another end of the country. The information was enough to consider raising the threat level, but not enough to know exactly where it was happening. I remember having rather an uncomfortable night, going out and having in the back of my head what I had been told might happen; while I was pleased that it did not happen, something else then happened elsewhere. It is a challenge; it is a difficulty. It is the way our intelligence is often presented to us, and that is why we need a no-suspicion stop.

There are protections for journalistic material and legal privilege. Because the seizing at this stop would not be under suspicion, the examining officer would have to apply to the Judicial Commissioner for that to be further examined, and the Judicial Commissioner could say no. We have included protections for journalists, lawyers and so on, to ensure that that happens, because we do not want the power abused, especially when we are talking about a hostile state rather than terrorism. Of course, hostile states are pretty clever at how they try to penetrate or come into the country.

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Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. All such schemes, including his, restrict people’s right to a lawyer, one way or another. They either say, “I don’t trust your lawyer, so you can have my lawyer,” or—this is how the Government are doing it—“We have exceptional grounds, authorised by a chief officer, because we are suspicious of something”.

The hon. Gentleman makes a point about police stations, but many of these examinations are about establishing who, what, where and when. We should remember that in the port stops power, to balance the removal of some rights, these verbal discussions are not admissible in court as evidence, unlike in a police station, where everything said can be taken down in evidence and used. We give that protection, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) pointed out.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan
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I accept what the Minister says about trying to balance rights by not allowing such conversations to be used as evidence, but would it not be better and in the wider interest to allow the use of solicitors from a pool and be able to use those conversations as evidence?

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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If I were to propose such a restriction on which lawyers could be consulted, I would find difficulty in the House of Lords. Let me proceed.

Accepting the amendments would in effect offer an opportunity to those engaged in activity of such severity to frustrate and obstruct an examination. Let me address the key point raised—the evidence we heard last week on restriction of the right to consult a solicitor in private. We must be clear that schedule 3 would allow use of the power only when an officer at least of the rank of commander or assistant chief constable has reasonable grounds for believing that allowing the examinee to exercise his or her right to consult a solicitor privately will have certain serious consequences.

The provisions are largely modelled on similar provisions in PACE: namely, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that private consultation will result in interference, injury to another person or hindering the recovery of property. Due to the potential severity of an act of terrorism, schedule 8 to the 2000 Act outlines additional consequences that might justify allowing the legal consultation to take place only within the sight and hearing of a qualified officer. Those include interference with information-gathering relating to an act of terrorism, alerting a person and making it more difficult to prevent an act of terrorism.

Schedule 3 to the Bill contains a similar consequence as a ground for allowing non-private legal consultations, namely the consequence of interference with information gathering about

“a person’s engagement in hostile activity.”

The need for the restriction is clear. It is there to disrupt and deter a detainee who seeks to use their right to a solicitor to pass on instructions to a third party. It already exists in legislation in schedule 8 to the 2000 Act, which the Bill seeks to replicate. In giving evidence to the Committee, the chair of the Law Society’s criminal law committee questioned why this restriction went beyond the equivalent provisions in PACE code H, which relate to a situation where an individual has been arrested on suspicion of a terrorism offence. PACE code H provides that:

“Authority to delay a detainee’s right to consult privately with a solicitor may be given only if the authorising officer has reasonable grounds to believe the solicitor the detainee wants to consult will, inadvertently or otherwise, pass on a message from the detainee or act in some other way which will have any of the consequences specified under paragraph 8 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000.”

Those consequences include harming others or tipping off terrorism suspects. In such circumstances,

“the detainee must be allowed to choose another solicitor.”

We have considered that carefully, but there are two main reasons why it is not feasible from an operational standpoint. First, in the circumstances described, where the police are concerned that an individual will use their solicitor to pass on instructions, allowing them access to a different solicitor in private will not prevent that possibility. The solicitor might be completely oblivious to the fact that their client is using them to pass on instructions to a third party. For instance, a detainee might ask the solicitor to contact someone and pass on a specific message, such as the fact that they are being detained and their location, with the solicitor unaware that the message will trigger some prearranged activity.

Secondly, inviting the detainee to choose another solicitor is not as straightforward at a UK port as it is at a police station. Unlike a detention under PACE, where there is time and access to a duty solicitor, it might take a substantial amount of time for an alternative solicitor to arrive at a UK port. To offer that option up front to the detainee, who is already presenting reasons to believe they are up to no good, provides another means for them to obstruct and frustrate the examination against a ticking detention clock.

Despite those reservations, I draw the Committee’s attention to two important safeguards that govern the exercise of such a direction. The first will ensure that a direction may be given only by an officer of the rank of assistant chief constable. The second will ensure that the officer present during the detainee’s legal consultation must not be connected with the detainee’s case. I reassure the Committee that the safeguards to the schedules have been carefully considered, following lessons learned through the exercise of the equivalent police powers, the work of the independent reviewers of terrorism legislation and our engagement with the public in respect of the existing powers for counter-terrorism purposes.

In relation to the amendments before us today, I stress that we should not hinder the ability of our law enforcement professionals to disrupt and deter those who present a threat to this country due to their involvement in terrorism or hostile state activity. Accordingly, I invite the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North to withdraw his amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan
Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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TACT—Terrorism Act 2000—offenders’ data can be retained if a national security determination is made by a police chief irrespective of whether or not they have been convicted. If someone is convicted of any offence—certainly a serious offence or terrorist offence; I will seek guidance as to whether this applies to a minor offence—their DNA data can be detained for a much longer period, if not indefinitely. This mainly concerns people who have been arrested but not convicted. That is why this measure is important. It is specifically aimed at the more serious offences of terrorism. One of the other challenges in the law is that if someone is arrested under PACE, it may be for terrorism, but it might not be for a terrorist offence. What someone is arrested for defines the subsequent powers that we have. We would like to match that to allow a PACE arrest to lead into us retaining that data.

To give the hon. Member for Scunthorpe some reassurance, the Biometrics Commissioner will review this. If he feels next year or the year after that we are holding data for too long or for too little time, no doubt the Government of the day, as the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North says, would be wise to listen to those recommendations, return to the House and do something about it. That is why we have these independent reviewers, tribunals or whatever they are making a judgment on us. Any responsible Government will listen to their advice.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
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Clearly there is an issue of trying to balance liberty and security. One of the points that the written evidence from Liberty pushes is that

“the retention of innocent people’s DNA has a disproportionate impact on people from BAME backgrounds. Estimates vary, but it has been projected that between a half and three-quarters of young black men have had their DNA stored on the DNA Database.”

What is the Minister’s view on this?

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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I would need to see whether Liberty means people convicted or people arrested but not convicted. If people are convicted of offences, it does not matter what their background is. They are convicted of an offence and their data is stored.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan
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They are not convicted.

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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In the terrorist space, it would reflect the threat of the day. Undoubtedly, at the moment the single biggest threat to us going about our lives in the United Kingdom is from Daesh/al-Qaeda. There is our proscription of National Action and a growth in the number of people from the neo-Nazi far right. If we had had a DNA database in the ’80s, the vast amount of the DNA would probably have been from those of Irish descent linked to Irish nationalist and loyalist terrorism. I am afraid the database reflects the threat of the moment. Nearly all the terrorist operations I have ever seen are intelligence-led—they are not rustled up. It is a thoughtful, deliberate process. I do not think the database is indiscriminate or that it targets people based on their black and minority ethnic background. It is just a reflection of the threat we face at the moment, and I suspect that it will shift. In 10 years’ time, the hon. Gentleman and I might be standing here talking about another section of society. In the north-east of England, far-right referrals to Channel outstrip Islamist referrals. If that were to feed into the terrorist threat, in a few years’ time we may see a greater amount of DNA retained from white British people in the north-east.

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Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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It is important to talk about whether we need a review. I say that we do not need a review because a lot of the perception issues out there are peddled by myths rather than facts. When you start to examine the facts, you realise that there is an element of Chinese whispers. People go round and round in circles and everyone else is now in a space in which people are confirming facts that are not facts, and the myth is undermining the policy in itself. If you look at the core of where some of these myths come from, it is from the enemies of Prevent, not people with a genuine worry about Prevent.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan
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The point I am trying to get across is that there are major organisations that are not buying it. I gave two examples to the Minister: the Muslim Council of Britain and 500-plus affiliate organisations across the country, and the Muslim Women’s Network, which is the largest organisation of its kind. What steps are you taking to make sure that they buy into this? We need that.

None Portrait The Chair
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I am sure the Minister will answer, not me.

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Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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I am open to the hon. Lady’s suggestion. In fact, where Prevent works best already, those communities do help. In parts of Birmingham there are some good examples where those communities have helped to shape Prevent with the local Prevent co-ordinator, and it has a really good impact. I am completely pragmatic about how we design Prevent below the national level of the Government and about how it is delivered. On the point made by other colleagues about funding, I understand the pressure on funding. That is why the pilots we are looking at have a multi-agency approach, which again will broaden it out. The Home Office will fund those three pilots centrally, so it is not a pressure on the local authority.

A review of Prevent is not necessary. There are a lot of other things to do with Prevent, to improve it and evolve it, but I do not think that reviewing it is right. There are a lot of statutory bodies already out there. The lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism could, I am sure, do a review if she wants to: she is the lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism. There are independent commissioners out there who can look at these things from outside. Andy Burnham is undertaking a strong review.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

First, the Minister uses the figure of 500, which we welcome, if we have been able to achieve that, but that figure of 500 is from over 9,000. If we look at the ratio, it is 1:18. Does he not want to see more improvement than that? Secondly, what is the loss if we have a proper review?

Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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My rebuttal to that would be: what is the gain? What would the reviewer do? Yes, we can be more accurate; we can reduce from 7,000 referrals to fewer, but what is interesting is that in the two years of the published figures we see exactly that. Prevent is evolving; we are seeing better reporting and we are seeing the sections of society that are and are not reporting. We see exactly the same proportions that we see in wider safeguarding referrals. In Prevent, 30% of the 7,000 need other safeguarding. They do not need to go to Prevent for terrorism purposes, but they go into other safeguarding for domestic abuse or something else. That is exactly the same percentage as we see in the wider safeguarding. If Prevent is the entrance to getting my children better safeguarding, I am happy with that. If somebody is taking an interest in behaviour or actions being inflicted on a child or vulnerable person, I do not mind whether the person who spots it is a Prevent officer or a safeguarding officer; we just want it to be dealt with.

The hon. Gentleman is right that these figures allude to Prevent’s accuracy, but they also allude to its success, in my book. That is the first start point. A review that is frozen in time is not necessary when Prevent is starting to have real success. The Government think that people realise that it is for all of us and not just for the Muslim community. It is for all of us.

I will finish the point about the review by saying that I spoke recently to the headmaster of a pupil referral unit in one of the toughest parts of Lancashire. He had a 15-year-old boy who was referred for neo-Nazi, far-right extremism. The Prevent team came in and the boy is now in mainstream further education college, with a multi-ethnic group of friends, doing his higher-level qualifications. If hon. Members know anything about pupil referral units, they will know that very rarely do 15-year-olds move out of them. The headmaster said to me, “Give me Prevent every time; I wish I had it for the broader spectrum of troubled people.”

I am afraid I cannot agree with the Opposition that we need a review. I am happy to engage, to sell the policy more and to correct the perceptions, but I think a statutory review in the primary legislation is unnecessary.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Ben Wallace and Afzal Khan
Ben Wallace Portrait Mr Wallace
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Q Does it oppose the lack of reasonable grounds, the no suspicion?

Richard Atkinson: No.

Afzal Khan Portrait Afzal Khan
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Q I would like to ask about the confidentiality between the solicitor and the client. It has been long-established that that is a privileged sort of advice. You also said you understand where the legislation is trying to go and why the Government are trying to pass it. Is an alternative available where both could be achieved without compromising and losing one?

Richard Atkinson: I do not think the two prevent one another. Obtaining legal advice, bearing in mind that the individual has to answer questions, is not going to stop the objectives of the legislation or investigation. As I have already indicated, if there are specific concerns about the individual adviser, they can be met in the way that the codes of practice attached to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act currently address the matter. So, no, I do not think there is any problem in maintaining legal professional privilege and achieving the objectives that are sought.