Mental Health Bill [Lords]

Debate between Ben Spencer and Sojan Joseph

2nd reading
Monday 19th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)]

I rise to speak in support of the Bill. To begin with, I need to make a couple of declarations. I have a family member who is a consultant psychiatrist. I am now a non-practising general adult psychiatrist with an endorsement and years in psychiatry, and I previously worked as a consultant psychiatrist. I took part in the 2018 Wessely review as a panel member on the tribunal working group, and I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee in the last Parliament.

In a declaration of a more personal nature, this is an area that I feel passionately about. It is a great privilege to speak to this important piece of legislation and reforms going forward. The United Kingdom reforms its mental health legislation every 20 years or so. I did not want to correct the Secretary of State, but the first Mental Health Act was in 1959—I hope that was substantially before he was born, with reference to his earlier comments. The legislation has gone through various iterations from the original Lunacy Act and similar legislation in the 19th century. In the UK, we have always been at the forefront of reform to the law and to provisions and powers in this area.

It is important in this Second Reading debate to focus on what the Mental Health Act is and what it does. Members have talked more broadly about the challenges of delivering mental health care currently, but it is important to reflect that the Mental Health Act is very specific and precise. It is about the regulation of detention—sometimes for assessment, sometimes for treatment—of people with mental disorder, and has a range of powers on aftercare and guardianship. It is focused on detention and assessment, or treatment, of people with mental disorder. We need that because there are times when people with severe mental illness become so unwell that they are unable to recognise their illness. Their illness puts their health at risk—predominantly through self-neglect or non-treatment. It puts their safety at risk, again through self-neglect, as well as through suicide. And, less commonly but critically, it puts them at risk of causing harm to others.

The legal framework allows us to regulate compulsory treatment in that regard. It is absolutely critical that we have those powers so that, when people are so unwell that they do not recognise it and they lose agency, we can, as a compassionate society, take them into hospital and treat them, with a view to getting them back to themselves. I have used the 1983 Act countless times, applying it both to assessments and, as a section 12-approved doctor, to treatments, and I have used it as a responsible clinician. I suspect that I am one of the few Members of this House—certainly in this debate—who has had those roles and responsibilities.

In terms of framing, it is important to reflect that one of the key changes in the 1983 Act, which is such an important piece of legislation, was that it was about restricting powers and ensuring that there were strong procedures for reviewing detentions. As a former health professional in this area, I am certain that all professionals working in it are mindful of the scope of powers that the Act provides. When applying restrictions, people do not use these powers in anger or without a great degree of thought and contemplation. The most intrusive intervention available to us in the health service is to detain and treat people in hospital or in secure hospital settings. Those powers are not taken lightly.

A lot of concern was expressed at the start of the debate—and I am sure it will continue—about the way in which people have been treated in hospital. There have been some very high-profile scandals in which things have not worked well, to say the least, and care and treatment have been atrocious and abusive. However, people working in health and care in the UK are doing so because they want to see the best outcomes for their patients. Sometimes, they are limited in that because of the resources available. They do not use the Mental Health Act with a view to harming people, but with a view to helping them.

Being detained under the Mental Health Act is not a prime facie harm; it is a treatment and a good thing. If someone needs to be detained and treated in hospital, they need to be detained and treated in hospital. If I became so unwell that I needed to be detained under the Act, I would want to be detained. Thankfully, I am not in that position today—[Interruption.] At least I believe that I am not, although the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans), might have a different view on that. [Laughter.] Should I get to the point where I am so unwell that I cannot consider my own care, I would want the powers of the Mental Health Act to be used quickly, particularly if I were posing a risk to myself, my family and others, so that I can get better and back to living my life.

I pay tribute to Baroness May of Maidenhead, who kicked this off, and to Professor Sir Simon Wessely—a good friend—Stephen Gilbert, Sir Mark Hedley and Rabbi Baroness Neuberger for their work in the 2018 review. There is a lot of good work in the Bill, from the greater focus on advance care planning and the more frequent detention reviews, which I recognise may bring a workforce burden, to the provisions on nominated persons. I will not go into the detail in this Second Reading speech, but I will focus on a few general points on which I think a bit more work needs to be undertaken.

In some ways—I will have to message Sir Simon after this to ask his forgiveness—the Bill is a missed opportunity in that we have are not moving towards fusion law. For the benefit of those who are not all over the detail, at the moment the UK has two pieces of legislation regulating how to treat people in the absence of consent. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came about from case law in the ’80s and ’90s and was codified in 2005. That Act broadly regulates physical health treatments for people who lack the capacity to consent—we have focused quite a lot on capacity in the recent debates on the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. The principles of the 2005 Act are autonomy and the functional capacity and best interests tests for people who lack capacity, meaning that we test someone’s capacity, and only if they lack capacity can we intervene in their best interests, sometimes by using deprivations of liberty.

The Mental Health Act arose from a very different pathway. In its first days, it was more about the regulation of asylums. The Act is about status and risk. The gatekeeper conditions for the current Mental Health Act are that a patient has a mental disorder of a nature and a degree that requires assessment in hospital because of the risk to their health and to the safety of others. Capacity does not feature whatsoever.

We have two pieces of legislation. One applies to the most severe mental disorders and deals with status and risk, and the other deals with autonomy and best interests. I strongly believe that the two need to be merged. We should use capacity and best interest frameworks to regulate treatment of mental disorder in the absence of consent—there are ways of doing that. I like the fact that we are starting to incorporate a bit more in the Bill.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Member not think that the deprivation of liberty safeguards, which, unlike the Mental Health Act, help to hold those who lack capacity in an environment that is not secure or locked, such as a hospital, are useful, and that bringing the two provisions together is unnecessary?

[Dr Spencer]

The hon. Member is of course very knowledgeable given his background as a mental health nurse. I would like to see in the Bill a provision setting out that, in order to detain someone for the purposes of health or safety, they must lack decision-making capacity for the detention to be authorised. For the prevention of harm to others, there are reasons to overcome autonomy in decision-making capacity, but I would like to see an additional component specifying that if the detention for assessment and treatment in hospital is purely based on health and safety and not on risk of harm to others, the patient must also lack capacity. Otherwise, people who have full and intact decision-making capacity can nevertheless come into the scope of the powers.

The liberty protection safeguards are a bit of a mess, quite frankly, and the DoLS were clearly a substantial mess. It is interesting that the legislative scrutiny of the Bill points out that it is a missed opportunity not to tidy up some of the interface between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act—a point that I will come to a little later in my speech. In terms of parity of esteem, bringing forward fusion law and gelling the Acts closer together needs to be the direction of travel. I hope that we do not have to waste another 20 years until we get the opportunity something like that.

There is something else that we need to reflect on. It comes to my other points about the focus in the Bill, but I will reiterate it. The core focus of the Bill is on reducing detentions of people from black and minority ethnic groups, who are over-represented in detention. One of the key focuses in fixing that must be on socioeconomic deprivation—where we see socioeconomic deprivation, we see severe mental disorder following—but I worry that the Bill is a missed opportunity and will not do what is required to deal with those disparities.

There are three problems with the Bill, and two things that I wish to flag. I am sensitive to the concerns that have been raised about people with autistic spectrum disorders and learning disabilities, and the advocacy regarding such people being in hospital. Being in a general adult ward is a challenging environment as it is, and it is particularly challenging for someone with an ASD or a learning disability. People can get stuck in hospital not really going anywhere. That concern applies to most disorders—I do not think it is unique, given the lack of community support services. I disagree, however, with the focus on ASD and LD above all other conditions. If we want to talk about non-progressive conditions, I do not understand why a brain injury, or Korsakoff’s dementia for example, are not within the scope of this measure. I do not understand why, rather than using the Bill to take people out of section 3 of the Mental Health Act, something like a bolstered treatability test is not used, which is what was in the Act before it was modified in 2007.