Preparedness for National Emergencies

Debate between Ben Spencer and James Frith

Tuesday 2nd June 2026 Westminster Hall

[Mr Frith]

I will get on to preparedness and the impact of global events, including in the middle east, but I will come back to my hon. Friend on specifics. Responsibility for the overarching resilience system is led by the COBR Directorate in the Cabinet Office. Colleagues are rightly asking about the role the Cabinet Office takes in this work. It leads work on cross-cutting and high-priority risks, and in scenarios with major impacts, it uses the COBR mechanism to manage the Government’s response to major crises or events.

The UK Government define resilience as the ability to anticipate, assess, prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from shocks. The resilience landscape is extensive and encompasses natural hazards, deliberate attacks, geopolitical instability and so on. The foundation of the Government’s approach is the national security risk assessment, which identifies and assesses the most serious acute risks facing the UK over a two to five-year time horizon. Under the lead Government Department model, each NSRA risk is owned by a lead Government Department, ensuring that those with the most relevant expertise, relationships and levers are responsible for putting the necessary planning response and recovery arrangements in place for each risk area.

The Government are also taking steps to enhance our readiness for the highest impact, whole-of-system crises called catastrophic risks, including by explicitly embedding the leadership role of the Cabinet Office in our central crisis management doctrine, the Amber Book. Alongside that, the Government have an extensive programme of assurance to understand how prepared we are to assess risks, including through a dedicated red teaming capability in the Government Office for Science and independent expert panel reviews.

Together, this approach ensures that the Government collectively understand and are prepared for the risks the UK faces overall, which relies on a collaborative approach and a shared ownership across Government Departments. The Government are committed to working in partnership with both the devolved Governments and the local tier to effectively plan for and respond to risks wherever they occur.

The Cabinet Office leads for Government on the overall response to severe weather. That is, in effect, a co-ordinating role, as individual Departments lead for the response, planning and longer term resilience of the sectors they represent. A key component is the severe weather resilience network, which is chaired by the COBR Directorate and comprises representatives across Government Departments.

On the matter of heat, periods of high temperature and heat waves are not a new phenomenon, and their risk—in terms of both impact and likelihood—is well documented in planning advice from the Government. There are tried and tested arrangements in place to warn of impending extreme temperatures, to review preparedness and, if needed, to co-ordinate the Government’s response to the impacts that they may have.

On the devolved authorities, it is vital that the four nations across the UK work together to keep communities safe, so that we can ensure that we are most effectively using the different levers that each Government hold. On the matter of local resilience forums, it is also essential that we strengthen resilience at the local level, and the Government are committed to the stronger LRF trailblazers programme, which provides selected areas with the opportunity to test approaches and strengthen leadership. I encourage local MPs to engage with that leadership.

[Dr Spencer]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Frith]

I will not, as I want to make some progress, and I am afraid there is still a lot to cover.

On covid, several Members made excellent points about the need to recall, remember and learn from that damning period. One such example is the significant improvement made to our crisis response structures and capabilities in line with the recommendations made in the covid-19 module 1 inquiry. That included establishing the National Situation Centre in 2021 to improve the use of data in crisis response, creating a single Cabinet committee for resilience to ensure ministerial oversight.

On the issue of education and resilience, we must provide excellent training, and exercising is also essential to ensure that individual sectors can work together to prepare for, respond to and recover from crises. The Government have also established the UK resilience plan.

On the matter of AI, AI sovereignty is defined as the UK having resilient access to key AI capabilities. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) referred to the need to counter the increasing threats posed by AI that is housed and created away from these shores. Sovereign capability is vital, and the launch of the sovereign AI unit is vital as we transition towards that authority, as it will help the UK to win at strategically important parts of that value chain.

Civil society also plays an important role in the UK’s resilience, including the many voluntary, community and faith sector organisations that contribute to community-level resilience and emergency planning. The resilience of the UK’s critical national infrastructure is of central importance to ensuring that the essential services on which the public rely continue to operate. Given the fundamental and connected nature of those services, failure has the potential to cause cascading and catastrophic consequences. The resilience action plan’s all-hazards approach, combined with the priorities in the strategic defence review, the national security strategy and the 10-year infrastructure strategy, underpins the Government’s commitment to improving the security and resilience of CNI.

On smart devices and tech resilience, the Government take an actor-agnostic, risk-based approach to supply chain resilience. Instead of reacting to individual firms or components in isolation, we must focus on the structural choke points and systemic dependencies that create national-level vulnerability, regardless of where in the chain they are. While cellular modules present some specific cyber-threats, those can be mitigated in effectively the same way as any other cyber-risks. Therefore, existing work to strengthen our cyber-resilience will impact how vulnerable sectors and organisations are to threats via the cellular internet of things.

In conclusion, the Government continue to regularly engage the public and parliamentarians on risk and resilience through our annual statement to Parliament, which gives a strategic overview of the current risk picture. The next annual statement will be made in July this year, and it will provide detailed updates on progress made to deliver against the commitments over the last 12 months.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Ben Spencer and James Frith

Consideration of Lords message
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Spencer]

I thank the Chair of the Select Committee, who is also trying to break us out of the groundhog day that we seem to have found ourselves in.

The Lords amendment does not fetter the Government’s policy options, nor does it prescribe how proportionate transparency should be achieved. It simply puts a line in the sand for the Government to act on this hugely important issue.

To return to the AI and the Gruffalo,

So on went the story through the deep dark wood

To be loved by its readers, as a good book should.

Yet the AI pondered, as it wanted it now.

“I’ll simply just scrape it”, the AI did avow.

When he was musing, he stumbled across

The author reclining on a patch of green moss.

They had glasses and notebooks and ideas galore.

They had printed five books, but were working on more.

Their eyes came to meet—they were in for a fight.

Both wanted the story, but who was right?

The answer is both, if reasonably sought

For content, not stolen, but licensed or bought.

Be clear what you’re taking, be transparent and true,

And recognise the content and its real value.

Then there’s no monster nor bad guy, just an allegorical rhyme

And a plea to listen and take action in time.

[Mr James Frith (Bury North) (Lab)]

I hope that the shadow Minister sought permission to misappropriate Julia Donaldson’s wonderful work. It is hardly an example that any of us should follow.

We are back here again. I put on record my thanks to Government Front Benchers for their engagement on this issue. It was particularly welcome to see the Secretary of State, in his appearance on “Sunday with Laura Kuenssberg”, take such a human approach to recognising the concern that exists in the creative industries and give a commitment to the nation about the seriousness of what comes from this place.

I also welcome the Minister’s comments that the creative and tech sectors will be involved in the next phase of this work, because that is essential. However, I would like to stress two further points. First, that involvement must reflect the breadth of the creative industries, from music and publishing to games, film and beyond—the necessary mix of expertise. That means the creative sector rights holders and business affairs professionals being involved, alongside the tech experts who understand the complexities of data flows, metadata structures, and the practicalities of any opt-out system or tech solution that is to be developed, notwithstanding the Secretary of State’s clarification that the Government no longer have a preferred position.

We look forward to the consultation and its findings being open and transparent, because while all the creative sectors share in the value of copyright as a principle that is tech and sector neutral, the way that commercial licensing models develop in practice will differ, and it is not for the Government to second-guess that. That is not a problem; in fact, it is a good thing. The emergence of bespoke commercial partnerships is precisely how the Government can achieve their objective of driving effective licensing, but to get there, we need sector-specific insight and specialist input, not a one-size-fits-all approach. I welcome the commitment to include Back Benchers, stakeholders and leaders of industry.

Crucially, the Government must consult and liaise with all of us on the formation of these groups, including their terms of reference—this cannot be presented again as a fait accompli. Too often, we hear of officials thinking or mulling things over, but not sharing what those thoughts are or what the implications of their latest thought could be. With the best will in the world, they cannot know the business as clearly as industry does. I believe that the prospects for both industries have improved as a result of this ping-pong process and the arguments we have been having, both in this House and in the other place.