Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBarry Sheerman
Main Page: Barry Sheerman (Labour (Co-op) - Huddersfield)Department Debates - View all Barry Sheerman's debates with the HM Treasury
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Following the financial crisis, the Government fundamentally reformed the UK’s system of financial regulation, replacing the failed tripartite system with a set of regulators with clear responsibilities and objectives. We have also taken concerted action to improve conduct across the banking sector, and to deal with the abuses and unacceptable behaviour of the past. The Bank of England has rightly been put back in charge of financial stability, and the Financial Conduct Authority is a watchdog protecting consumers from sharp practices and making sure bankers comply with the rules. Quite rightly, the powers and governance of those important organisations are reviewed closely and the Bill makes some modest changes to them.
The Bill has three main aims. The first is to further strengthen the governance, transparency and accountability of the Bank of England so as to put it in the best possible position to fulfil its vital role in delivering monetary and financial stability. It allows the National Audit Office into the Bank for the first time in its centuries-old history. The second aim is to build on concerted action the Government have already taken to drive up standards in financial services by extending the senior managers and certification regime across the sector, including a tough new duty of responsibility for senior managers. The third aim is to support the creation of a secondary market for annuities, protecting consumers by extending the remit of the Pension Wise guidance service and introducing a requirement which, in effect, ensures that certain individuals who are seeking to sell their annuities have received appropriate financial advice.
Does the hon. Lady agree that one of the real problems in the culture of banking, which we all want to get right, is the role of auditors? Auditors should have been there, should have spotted the dangers and should have blown the whistle, but they did not. Is it not the case that the Bill still does not address the accountancy profession and auditors?
The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight the importance of auditors. Others in this place will consider the role of auditors in the crash, but I think what he will welcome in the Bill is the fact that the National Audit Office, for the first time, will have the ability to do value-for-money studies within the Bank of England.
The hon. Gentleman rightly points out the importance of the NAO’s having the right resources. I have not had any representations about this particular move, but I am sure it will make its feelings known, should it require those resources.
The Bill also makes changes to the court. We will simplify and strengthen the governance of the Bank by transferring to the whole court the powers previously given to the oversight committee to oversee the Bank’s performance. Following discussions in the other place, to help guard against group-think, we have amended the Bill so that a majority of non-executive directors on the court will still be able to initiate reviews of the Bank’s performance without needing to secure the agreement of the whole court.
We will integrate prudential regulation more fully into the Bank by ending the PRA’s status as a subsidiary of the Bank. The PRA board will be replaced by a new Prudential Regulatory Committee with sole responsibility within the Bank for the PRA’s functions. That is modelled on the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee. We will make these changes while still protecting the PRA’s operational independence, and we will continue to ensure transparency on the amounts raised by the levy and what the Bank spends in relation to its functions as the prudential regulator.
In order to strengthen governance and make the structures of the Bank more consistent, the Bill harmonises the legislation underpinning the Bank’s three policy committees: the MPC, the FPC and the proposed PRC. It moves the MPC to a schedule of at least eight meetings a year, from the current 12, and updates requirements for the timing of MPC publications, implementing the remaining recommendations of the Warsh review, entitled “Transparency and the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee” and published in 2014.
Alongside these changes, the Bill builds on the existing arrangements and the strong working relationship between the Bank and the Treasury by updating the formal framework for how the Bank and the Treasury should engage with each other on the public funds risks and the financial stability risks of firm failure. These changes will improve co-ordination while maintaining the existing clear and separate roles of the Bank and the Treasury in the event of a crisis.
I am slightly concerned that the Bill moves us towards a system of less tension and a cosier relationship between the Bank and the Treasury. That would worry me and other Members. Is it true? I always thought that that tension was healthy.
The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight the importance of the Bank’s operational independence, which Gordon Brown introduced in 1997—it was his greatest legacy to our country—but he will note that his colleagues’ motion calls for a stronger role for both the Treasury and Parliament and arguably for less independence for the Bank. It is popularly known as the people’s quantitative easing, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not support his Front-Bench team on the reasoned amendment.