Baroness Williams of Trafford
Main Page: Baroness Williams of Trafford (Conservative - Life peer)Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, we have a number of amendments in this group. During the debates on this Bill, we have tried from these Benches to emphasise the importance of legitimacy and accountability in this new tier of government. By legitimacy, I mean, first, a direct connection with the ballot box in the new structure and, secondly, the prevention of one-party states in which the same political party has control of the post of elected mayor, the nominated combined authority and the nominated overview and scrutiny committee. In Committee, we proposed direct election to the combined authorities, so that the mayor was not the only elected post, but this did not find favour. Now we have a group of amendments that concerns overview and scrutiny committees, which are very important—more important than they might have been, had some of the amendments that we debated in Committee been agreed.
I am pleased that, following our debate in Committee, further, more detailed proposals have come forward from the Government. Some are welcome but some do not go far enough. Let me explain what I hope the Government will do. Our amendments would require the chair of an overview and scrutiny committee to be from a different political party from the mayor; that assumes that the mayor is a member of a political party. If that is not the case, the chair could be from any political party. An independent chair could work—we said that previously—but it would be better to have an opposition councillor who has been duly elected to their post as a councillor from within the combined authority area, not least because if one appoints an independent person it immediately raises the question of who appoints that independent person. To put it another way: how is independence guaranteed? The make-up of the overview and scrutiny committee also needs to reflect the number of seats held by each party in those local authorities making up the combined authority. Later, we have proposals on the electoral system that should be used so that the first past the post system does not encourage the development of a one-party state.
Our other amendments would also allow the committee to call in decisions made by the mayor and delay them—not for long—to allow further consideration when it is felt to be necessary. To do its job properly, an overview and scrutiny committee needs the power to call for information and to receive it. It will not be enough if the overview and scrutiny committees exist but are then prevented doing their job by a combined authority that prefers to keep things out of public scrutiny.
Amendments 35 and 37, which we support, would enable the overview and scrutiny committee to examine decisions before they are taken, rather than wait for a decision to be made; that is welcome. Amendment 34A, which I signed up to, would create an audit committee with an independent chair. I welcome that proposal as well. It is essential in this case that the chair is independent and appropriately qualified to do the job. In practice, it should cover the functions of a public accounts committee, an efficiency committee and a risk committee. This matters because the savings that could be achieved by public service reform and reducing duplication at a local level have been well established, but we now need to ensure that it all happens. The audit committee would be of significant help in delivering that objective.
The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, made mention of Amendment 41, and I will do likewise, with two questions for the Minister on that amendment. First, proposed new sub-paragraph (4A) states:
“An overview and scrutiny committee must publish details of how it proposes to exercise its powers in relation to the review and scrutiny of decisions made but not yet implemented”.
If the implementation period is very short, what power would an overview and scrutiny committee have under this measure to hold up a decision for further consideration? Secondly, and this is the point that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, raised when talking about proposed new sub-paragraph (4B), what is the objective in requiring an overview and scrutiny committee to,
“obtain the consent of the combined authority to the proposals and arrangements”?
I can see that there could be a situation in which the overview and scrutiny committee misses something, which would need to be put right by the combined authority. However, I certainly hope that this measure would not be used by members of a combined authority who do not wish to see the overview and scrutiny function work effectively. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on that.
Finally, all our proposed amendments have a common purpose in wanting to ensure proper accountability for the devolution that is about to occur. I hope the Minister will agree that they should be included in the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government (Baroness Williams of Trafford)
My Lords, all these amendments are about overview and scrutiny and the accountability of combined authorities. Making overview and scrutiny as strong and effective as possible is a priority for us. I was pleased in Committee by how clear it was that this is a shared priority across this House. The government amendments reflect the discussions I had with noble Lords from across the House, and I am grateful to them all for the expertise and experience that they brought to the discussions. Effective scrutiny not only ensures better decision-taking by those exercising new devolved powers but can be the safeguard against one-party states developing, and so prevent the loss of public confidence in the process of devolution.
Before discussing the various substantive issues on overview and scrutiny that have been raised, I turn first to government Amendment 81, which provides that any orders made under the powers in the new Schedule 5A to the 2009 Act will be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, rather than negative. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended this, and we accept the recommendation.
Before turning to the detail of scrutiny arrangements, I shall address Amendment 34A, which would require the combined authority to appoint an audit committee and for that audit committee to have an independent chair. In the case of local authorities, and indeed in the case of such existing combined authorities as the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, the audit committee is appointed by the authority. Audit committees usually comprise senior non-executive members of the authority and, where this is the local choice, may also include one or more independent members. We recognise the importance of audit committees. The role of that committee in any authority includes supporting the authority’s chief financial officer, the Section 151 officer. It is an integral part of the financial controls and internal checks of the organisation.
Without this amendment, the approach would be to allow combined authorities to appoint, as they see fit, audit committees drawn from the membership of the authority and, where they consider appropriate, include independent members. I am sure that none of us wants unnecessary prescription. However, I can see the case for a combined authority, given its particular structure, which may or may not include a mayor, to be required to have an audit committee appointed by the authority. I can also see the case that it might be appropriate for such a committee to have one or more independent members. I am not persuaded that it would be right to prescribe in every circumstance that the chair of the committee should be an independent member. Accordingly, I am prepared to consider the issue further for Third Reading, have discussions with noble Lords and, if appropriate, return with an amendment on this at Third Reading.
I will return at the end to questions asked by noble Lords. Turning now to the substantive issues, I first address the question of call-in. Government Amendments 38, 41 and 49 and Amendments 39 and 40 relate to this. The government amendments aim to strengthen the power of call-in for overview and scrutiny committees of combined authorities. With these amendments, combined authorities and their overview and scrutiny committees will be able to set up and operate effective and proportionate call-in arrangements. These come into play when there is a real need, but equally they cannot become a mechanism for delaying or for impeding the efficient conduct of business. Crucially, the call-in arrangements in any authority will be a local matter for the authority and its scrutiny committees to decide and agree.
Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)
I remind noble Lords about the rules on Report: we should not introduce new matters and nobody should speak after the Minister, except for matters for elucidation.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, for his comments; I certainly will go away and think about them. In making these amendments, we hoped that they would deliver the intention that both he and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, sought to achieve. No matter how the legislation is done, we could all point to examples where it is not quite perfect, no matter how good the intention and no matter how tight the legislation is—though I take the noble Lord’s point.
I turn, finally, to opposition Amendment 43, which seeks to give greater statutory force to the guidance about overview and scrutiny that may be issued under paragraph 2(9) of new Schedule 5A. As the Bill stands, that guidance is already statutory guidance in the sense that due regard must be given to it. I do not think that further statutory requirements about guidance would be right. As the House will appreciate, if the Secretary of State draws up any such guidance, he would of course want to seek the views of those who are expert in the field of overview and scrutiny.
I turn to some specific points and, first, to the point made by the noble Lords, Lord McKenzie of Luton and Lord Shipley, on why a combined authority should agree to the overview and scrutiny arrangements. It is important that scrutiny arrangements are agreed by the combined authority—though it need not be unanimous agreement—so that the authority embeds scrutiny into its arrangements and the culture of the organisation. It is certainly not a clause to be used to weaken arrangements; rather, it is to ensure a culture of scrutiny throughout the authority.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, can the Minister elucidate what happens if there is a stand-off because neither side agrees?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, that is an interesting question. I have witnessed many a stand-off in local authorities. The combined authority is obliged through its voting arrangements, whatever they may be—they will be different in different places—to come up with a resolution. I appreciate that it might start with a stand-off but I hope that it will be resolved in accordance with the democratic arrangements within the combined authority.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked about implementation, the short period of time and the powers of call-in. I hope I have explained to him that our new amendments give the Secretary of State the power to provide, by order, for a minimum call-in period.
The noble Lord also inquired about the chair of the overview and scrutiny committee. Under the Government’s amendments, the chair of an overview and scrutiny committee can never be a member of a constituent council if he is a member of the same political party as the mayor of a combined authority.
I hope those responses are helpful and that, with them, the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her detailed response to our amendments and a raft of other amendments. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for his support for most of our amendments. I look forward to the Government bringing forward at Third Reading something on Amendment 34A and the audit committee. In respect of Amendments 35 and 37, I understand that the matter is already covered. I take the point on statutory guidance.
I do not 100% agree with the Government on Amendment 41 on the point that we discussed. However, it is fair to say that, together with the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, we have a substantial identity of view over a broad range of areas. We do not have an identity of view on everything, particularly around access to some of the documentation. However, for my part, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
(a) power to direct that a decision is not to be implemented while it is under review or scrutiny by the overview and scrutiny committee, and(b) ”
“(4A) An overview and scrutiny committee must publish details of how it proposes to exercise its powers in relation to the review and scrutiny of decisions made but not yet implemented and its arrangements in connection with the exercise of those powers.
“(4B) Before complying with sub-paragraph (4A) an overview and scrutiny committee must obtain the consent of the combined authority to the proposals and arrangements.”
“(h) as to the minimum or maximum period for which a direction under paragraph 1(4)(a) may have effect.”
“(3) Provision must be made under sub-paragraph (2)(a) so as to ensure that the majority of members of an overview and scrutiny committee are members of the combined authority’s constituent councils.”
“( ) In this paragraph—
“constituent council”, in relation to a combined authority, means—(a) a county council the whole or any part of whose area is within the area of the combined authority, or(b) a district council whose area is within the area of the combined authority;“registered political party” means a party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.”
“Requirements in connection with establishment etc. of combined authority
(1) The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 110 (requirements in connection with establishment of combined authority), for subsections (1) to (3) substitute—
“(1) The Secretary of State may make an order establishing a combined authority for an area only if—
(a) the Secretary of State considers that to do so is likely to improve the exercise of statutory functions in the area or areas to which the order relates, and(b) the constituent councils consent. (1A) If a scheme for the establishment of the combined authority has been prepared and published under section 109 the Secretary of State must have regard to that scheme in making the order.
(2) In a case where no such scheme has been prepared and published, the Secretary of State must consult such persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making the order.
(3) In this section “constituent council” means—
(a) a county council the whole or any part of whose area is within the area for which the combined authority is to be established, or(b) a district council whose area is within the area for which the combined authority is to be established.”(3) In section 113 (requirements in connection with changes to existing combined arrangements), for subsections (1) and (2) substitute—
“(1) The Secretary of State may make an order under section 104, 105, 106 or 107 in relation to an existing combined authority only if—
(a) the Secretary of State considers that to do so is likely to improve the exercise of statutory functions in the area or areas to which the order relates, and(b) the constituent councils consent.(1A) If a scheme has been prepared and published under section 112 the Secretary of State must have regard to that scheme in making the order.
(2) In a case where no such scheme has been prepared and published, the Secretary of State must consult such persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making the order.
(2A) In this section “constituent council” means—
(a) a county council the whole or any part of whose area is within the area or proposed area of the combined authority, or(b) a district council whose area is within the area or proposed area of the combined authority.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I know that we have already debated this but I promised to come back to it today, following the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report. I would also like to speak to Amendments 71, 72 and 77. I read with interest the DPRRC’s report yesterday and would like to respond with a detailed explanation of the reasons behind these amendments. Amendments 62 and 77 are designed to fast-track the establishment of a combined authority where circumstances warrant this, while maintaining all the necessary safeguards.
The current process for creating a combined authority under the 2009 Act is lengthy and consists of four stages. First, local authorities have to undertake a governance review. This involves the authorities concerned considering whether a combined authority would improve the governance of the functions which they are considering it might exercise. In doing this, the authorities usually engage with local partners and their communities, although they are not statutorily required to do so. The next stage is for the authorities to develop a scheme for a proposed combined authority. Together, the governance review and scheme provide the reasons for establishing the combined authority and how it will operate. The third stage involves the Secretary of State undertaking various considerations and a statutory consultation that includes being required to consult the very authorities that have undertaken the review, prepared the scheme and are seeking the establishment of the combined authority.
The fourth and final stage is that each House of Parliament must approve a draft order providing for the establishment of the combined authority, after which the Secretary of State can make the order in the terms of the approved draft. Past experience shows that it can take well over a year even to reach the point of the order being made. Noble Lords will see that inevitably, the process involves some duplication. In particular, where establishing a combined authority is agreed as part of a devolution deal, the duplication of local discussion, engagement and consultation can be substantial.
Amendments 62 and 77 provide a streamlined process for creating combined authorities where the risks of duplication are minimised. An example might be where a number of councils, as part of a deal, agree to the establishment of a combined authority. They have provided the Secretary of State, as part of these deal discussions, with sufficient information and evidence to undertake the statutory tests: that is, to conclude whether creating the combined authority is likely to improve the exercise of statutory functions in the combined authority’s area; and to have regard to the need to reflect the identities and interests of local communities and to secure effective and convenient local government. All councils in the area of the proposed combined authority then consent to its establishment.
In such a circumstance, the fast-track process would enable the Secretary of State to seek Parliament’s approval to the draft order, once he has fulfilled his statutory duty to consult such persons as he considers appropriate. With this streamlined process, the councils no longer have to undertake the lengthy process of developing a governance review and preparing a scheme. This is because the substance of these processes will have been undertaken in a different way and the Secretary of State will continue to be required to apply the statutory tests and the statutory consultation, which he would need to do in accordance with administrative law—the legal framework which applies in any case where the Secretary of State exercises his powers. He must have regard to all relevant considerations, must not have regard to irrelevant considerations, and his decisions must be rational and within the powers that he is exercising.
These amendments also provide that where the fast-track process is not being followed and councils are developing a governance review and scheme, the process can still be more streamlined than it is currently. The current requirements on consultation, particularly that the Secretary of State consult the authorities that have prepared the scheme, are replaced by a requirement that the councils, which will have engaged with their communities when preparing their scheme, must consent to the establishment of the combined authority in the terms of that order. The Secretary of State still has the option of consulting if he considers it necessary.
These amendments therefore facilitate the timely implementation of devolution deals which will be of critical importance to areas being able to respond quickly to the economic challenges and opportunities they and the country face today—helping to grow our economy, improving productivity and increasing our competitiveness. I hope noble Lords consider that these explanations address the DPRRC’s comments.
Government Amendments 71 and 72 will enable the Secretary of State to confer functions of a public authority on local authorities as well as combined authorities. Amendment 83 is consequential on these. These amendments are intended to make it clear that there is a level playing field for all areas to agree devolution deals with the Government, including areas where there is no combined authority.
Noble Lords have previously raised concerns that the Bill focuses on devolution to large cities with combined authorities, and asked how the Bill’s provisions apply in non-metropolitan areas where there may perhaps not be combined authorities. We are clear that devolution applies equally across England—to counties and towns as well as cities. As I have said, the Government are ready to discuss with any area the powers and budgets they want devolved to them and the governance arrangements they propose to support those powers. We want towns and counties to play their part in growing the economy, and we are offering them the opportunity to agree devolution deals and provide local people with the levers they need to boost growth.
It will be for local areas to decide over what geography they would wish to have those powers devolved. Where a functional economic area covers a wider area than a single local authority, a combined authority can be an excellent means for enabling local authorities to collaborate effectively and work across their administrative boundaries. But there are areas in which the functional economic area may comprise a single local authority, and where this might be the best geography over which to devolve powers and budgets. We are already discussing such deals with some areas and making excellent progress in areas such as Cornwall. Amendments 71 and 72 are necessary to enable such deals to be agreed. These amendments apply to county councils and district councils the same powers for transferring public functions as under Clause 6, which the House has approved, including the amendments approved on Monday.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has concerns about the potentially wide scope of powers that could be conferred under the provisions in Clause 6 and these new clauses without a statutory consultation. We responded to its concerns on Clause 6 by tabling Amendment 33, which was passed by the House on Monday. This requires the Secretary of State to lay a report before the House whenever an order is laid before Parliament under the provisions in Clause 6. This report would need to include details of any consultation.
Before saying more on consultation, I would like to address the point made by the Delegated Powers Committee that a duty to lay a report cannot be regarded as equivalent to a duty to consult. We do not see, and never have seen, the duty to lay a report as replacing a duty to consult. The purpose of the report is to ensure that Parliament has full information about the deal in question, including information about the powers being devolved, why they are being devolved and what outcomes are expected from that devolution. We see the report addressing the issue raised by the committee that there is no information about the kind of powers that may in any case be devolved. We have explained why this Bill is an enabling Bill. Equally, we recognise the importance of Parliament being fully aware of the nature of a deal when considering an order implementing it. That is the purpose of a report.
In relation to both Clause 6—before we introduced the additional requirement of the report—and to the equivalent provisions which Amendments 71 and 72 introduce into the Bill for transferring powers to county councils and district councils, including unitaries, the Delegated Powers Committee has concluded that they constitute an inappropriate delegation of powers. In our response to the committee’s first report, with the important points we have included, we made it clear that we do not share this view.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I thank the Minister for her detailed exposition of the issues around these two sets of amendments. I support the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, in asking whether we can take this forward to Third Reading, if necessary. These substantial amendments herald very significant changes to what has been the process hitherto. We had the Delegated Powers Committee’s report just yesterday—for some of us who were on other duties, not until this morning—and the noble Baroness’s presentation raises issues. Rather than asking the Government to withdraw the amendments, why do they not proceed while recognising that they are if necessary open to final amendment at Third Reading, which is only a few days away? Given the range of queries now emanating from our considerations—every time we look at this it raises more issues—it seems that we should try to structure a meeting with the Minister, and colleagues if necessary, between now and then to iron out as much of this as possible.
From our point of view, as my noble friend Lord Woolmer said, if we can speed up the process we would be supportive of that in principle. We certainly support extending the arrangements to individual counties and councils. That is not an issue but some of the process stuff is. One point that bothers me still is in relation to what the Delegated Powers Committee report said on Amendment 62. In paragraph 11, the report says clearly:
“We see the scheme process, which involves local engagement and consultation, as being wholly different from the process of discussion and negotiation which takes place only between the local authorities and the Secretary of State”.
I would accept having administrative law brought into play and prayed in aid as a constraint or parameter that the Secretary of State had to comply with. But introducing that sort of concept fairly late in the day is a bit unusual, and its context needs proper consideration.
On Amendments 71 and 72, we know that the innate problem is of having a difference between those of us who believe that there should be some parameters put into the Bill, but not to stifle initiative and innovation, and the Government’s view that they will oppose that. Notwithstanding that, it would be helpful for progress today and to get the best solution possible over these amendments if the Government would recognise that, if necessary and appropriate after further discussion, this would be open for amendment at Third Reading. That would otherwise save us making more difficult choices here and now.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for the comments that they have made. My noble friend Lady Eaton talked about the problems of delay, which are very real. The noble Baroness, Lady Jenkin, talked about Amendments 71 and 72 being necessary for places such as Cornwall. She is absolutely right.
My noble friend Lady Eaton asked whether an area that is not currently a combined authority can access the powers of devolution. She asked about areas without combined authorities. Again, without Amendments 71 or 72 it is not possible to confer powers on, say, Cornwall. Places such as Cornwall would be very concerned if the Bill did not have that power.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, asked why you cannot be in two combined authorities. Councils can be constituent members of one combined authority and non-constituent members of another. That is quite possible. I will give the noble Baroness an example before she gets to her feet. In Greater Manchester, Cheshire East is a non-constituent member of the Great Manchester Combined Authority for the purposes of, I think, business rates.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
No, it is not an opt-out but it is a non-constituent member for the purposes of some of the powers the combined authority might get for business rates. I think that is the reason that it is a non-constituent member. I apologise if the noble Baroness is still confused.
The noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, asked several pertinent questions, as always—
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
Will the Minister come back to the substance of the questions I asked? She may well do later in her wind-up to this bundle of amendments but, if that is all she is going to say, forgive me, she has not addressed the issues. We share the same wish for outcome but can she come back to some of the other issues I raised?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I was trying to say to the noble Baroness that for one purpose a local authority might be a constituent member of a combined authority; for another purpose—I gave the example of Cheshire East—it may be a non-constituent member of a combined authority. In other words, it has involvement with more than one combined authority but on a different basis, which I thought was the point she was making.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
If the Minister could write to me more fully, that would be helpful and then perhaps we can follow it up. I do not want to waste the time of the House.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I have just been passed another note about this. Another example is that York is a non-constituent member of West Yorkshire Combined Authority. In fact, I think that is why the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, was nodding so readily.
Lord Woolmer of Leeds
At what point in a mayoralty would a non-constituent authority become a constituent authority? How many elements of the combined authority’s functions would a non-constituent authority have to share in order for it to become a part of a combined authority? That presumably means that the mayor of the combined authority would be taking decisions or influencing decisions of the combined authority that were outwith the electorate of this non-constituent local authority. Am I right on that?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I hope I can answer this satisfactorily. Let us take the example of York, within Yorkshire. If York was to become a constituent member of some sort of Yorkshire combined authority it could not then become a constituent member of another combined authority, but I think it would be perfectly possible for it to become a non-constituent member of another combined authority for certain purposes. So in other words, if Cheshire East decided that it would, with consent, have a combined authority with Cheshire West and Chester, would that then preclude it from being a non-constituent member of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority? I do not think that it would—but I can confirm that in due course, if it helps the noble Lord.
Lord Warner
May I suggest that the Minister responds to the perfectly sensible proposition of my noble friend Lord McKenzie that we curtail this set of discussions so that we can make some progress?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I always try to answer noble Lords’ questions from the Dispatch Box. However, in this instance, I take the noble Lord’s point. With the leave of the House, I propose to withdraw Amendment 62 today and return to it at Third Reading.
“Removal of geographical restrictions in relation to EPBs
(1) The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 is amended as follows.
(2) Omit subsections (3) and (4) of section 88 (EPBs and their areas).
(3) In section 95(2)(a) (changes to boundaries of an EPB’s area: conditions), for “conditions A to D” substitute “conditions A and D”.
(4) In section 98(3)(c) (preparation and publication of scheme for new EPB: conditions) for “conditions A to C” substitute “condition A”.
(5) In section 99 (requirements in connection with establishment of EPB), after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) Subsection (3B) applies where the Secretary of State is considering whether to make an order establishing an EPB for an area and—
(a) part of the area is separated from the rest of it by one or more local government areas that are not within the area, or(b) a local government area that is not within the area is surrounded by local government areas that are within the area.(3B) In deciding whether to make the order, the Secretary of State must have regard to the likely effect of the creation of the proposed EPB on economic development or regeneration in each local government area that is next to any part of the proposed EPB area.”
(6) In section 102 (requirements in connection with changes to existing EPB arrangements), after subsection (2), insert—
“(2A) Subsection (2B) applies where the Secretary of State is considering whether to make an order under section 95 and—
(a) part of the area to be created is separated from the rest of it by one or more local government areas that are not within the area, or(b) a local government area that is not within the area to be created is surrounded by local government areas that are within the area.(2B) In deciding whether to make the order under section 95, the Secretary of State must have regard to the likely effect of the proposed change to the EPB’s area on economic development or regeneration in each local government area that is next to any part of the area to be created by the order.””
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I always hesitate to respond to the noble and learned Lord, because he always comes back at me, but I am sure that he is right about the statute. It is more about the symbolism of that leadership. I know that one should avoid unnecessary legislation, but this is crucial. This is a very thin Bill in terms of pages; in terms of its significance, it is hugely important. Some of us are looking for some reassurance in statute that the essential point of what the noble and learned Lord said will continue in future.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I start by thanking my noble and learned friend for putting everything so succinctly and eloquently in summing up what is the case in the NHS in relation to devolution, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, for again eloquently outlining his amendment.
Amendment 66 puts certain limitations and conditions on the conferral of health powers on a combined authority or another body working with a combined authority. In particular, it requires the Secretary of State to consider that various conditions are met; that the other body must be a body corporate with a chief accounting officer; and that a memorandum of understanding is produced and reported against. It also prevents the Secretary of State intervening except in certain circumstances.
As we have discussed, Amendment 28, which was passed, and others in its group would enable any limitations or conditions to be specified in an order transferring health functions and were intended to provide assurance that any future devolution arrangements will continue to uphold existing accountabilities and national standards for the NHS.
Most of the limitations and conditions that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, outlines could be specified in an order using those provisions if doing so were considered appropriate in the context of a bespoke devolution deal. For example, we could enable the conferral of health powers to a combined authority to be accompanied by a condition that it must also meet current statutory duties held variously by the Secretary of State for Health, NHS England and clinical commissioning groups, thereby ensuring continuation of current NHS accountabilities and standards.
Lord Warner
Before the Minister responds to that, perhaps I may add to it. I read from her statement on Monday evening, where she makes it absolutely clear that, under Amendment 28, we would be conferring on the combined authority many of the duties, such as,
“the duty to seek continuous improvement in the quality of services, reduce health inequalities, promote the NHS constitution”,
and to,
“seek to achieve the objectives in the NHS mandate”.—[Official Report, 13/7/15; col. 439.]
As I understand it, what she is saying openly and transparently is that those duties get transferred to the combined authority through the order. If someone then says to the Secretary of State, “I don’t like the way health inequalities are going on in Cornwall”, or wherever, presumably, the Secretary of State can say, “Tough. I passed an order through Parliament which enabled me to offload that duty to this group of people for a period of time”.
Is the Minister saying that she did not mean what she said on Monday, or have we got this wrong?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am not going back on what I said on Monday. I think that I made clear on Monday that the accountability and functions of the bodies do not change.
Baroness Walmsley
On a point of elucidation, the Minister said that the Secretary of State could impose those conditions. Is there any circumstance in which the Secretary of State should not impose such fundamental conditions as she has outlined?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Sorry, would the noble Baroness say that again? I apologise.
Baroness Walmsley
I was just saying that the noble Baroness said that the Secretary of State could impose conditions such as meeting the current statutory duties of the Secretary of State or NHS England. I wondered whether there would be any circumstances in which the Secretary of State should not impose such conditions, because I think that they are pretty fundamental to standards.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I do not know of any such situation where he should not, but obviously each deal will be different. I cannot speak to a theoretical situation, but no one is suggesting that the Secretary of State loses the powers, particularly in respect of his ultimate accountability to Parliament for the provision of NHS services.
Most of the limitations and conditions that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, outlines could be specified in an order using the provisions, if doing so were considered appropriate in the context of a bespoke devolution deal. For example, we could enable a conferral of health powers on a combined authority to be accompanied by a condition that the combined authority must also meet the current statutory duties held variously by the Secretary of State for Health, NHS England and clinical commissioning groups.
Further safeguards are already provided by other provisions in the Bill. Before making an order to transfer functions, the Secretary of State must consider that such a transfer will improve the exercise of statutory functions. The Secretary of State is also bound by various duties in relation to the health service when exercising his functions. These are set out in the NHS Act 2006, and concern duties such as the duty to act with a view to securing continuous improvement in the quality of services and to have regard to the need to reduce health inequalities. Such duties would be relevant here and, in making an order transferring health service functions, he would be obliged to discharge them.
The order implementing a particular devolution deal must be debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament, and Parliament’s consideration will be supported by the laying in Parliament of a report setting out the detail of the deal, a new requirement under the provisions in Amendment 33, which the House passed on Monday. Those reports will set out and explain the full deal—that is, the wider context in which any order is being made. Hence, the report will set out and describe any memorandum of understanding that councils in the area, the combined authority and the various NHS bodies involved have agreed. That memorandum of understanding will describe and make clear the nature of the devolution agreement, including the degree of permanence or how long it is expected to last. We can see this in the MoU which Greater Manchester has entered into.
Amendment 66 would also require a combined authority to publish an annual report on its deal in relation to health. As we have noted previously, there will be a process for evaluating the progress on each deal agreed with each area as part of the deal. For example, the Greater Manchester deal has an extensive programme of evaluation, with evaluations being public documents available to all with an interest in the area and the progress that it is making. In this context, it is not appropriate to make a requirement about the reporting or evaluation of some particular aspect of a deal—indeed, an aspect that may not be in all the deals which are agreed.
We do not feel there is a need to restrict the ability of the Secretary of State to intervene as set out in Amendment 66. The Secretary of State is already under a duty when exercising functions in relation to the health service to have regard to, always subject to the interests of the health service, the autonomy of the bodies exercising health functions.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am sorry to intervene again but surely the whole problem is that the Secretary of State may in fact devolve that to a combined authority under the Bill? That safeguard ultimately may not apply. That is the problem. Look at Clause 6(4). The very fact that by an order-making power a government department or a Minister of the Crown can be abolished takes away that essential safeguard. This is a local government Bill, essentially written for local government duties. I can see how it fits, but once the NHS is taken in, we are talking about a very different order. No one is objecting to what is happening in Greater Manchester—I applaud what is happening there. At this stage, all we are asking is for the Minister to allow us to consider what she has said and bring it back at Third Reading. She is, I know, trying to be very helpful.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am trying to be helpful, although I am not sure that I am being very helpful. I indicated to the House on Monday that we are considering with a view, as appropriate, to returning at Third Reading to the question of whether to exclude from functions that can be transferred those regulatory and supervisory functions of national regulators responsible for regulating public authority functions. However, I would add that our consideration is not about how to exclude them on an order-by-order basis but whether to take these regulatory functions out of the scope of the Bill. This would put beyond doubt—whatever devolution deals, including health, were agreed—that the position of the regulators, such as Monitor and the Care Quality Commission, would be untouched, as indeed would the NHS constitution and mandate and all the NHS standards of care and access, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay pointed out.
With these perhaps not entirely satisfactory explanations, I hope the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Warner
There was a lot of heat but not much light, I suggest, from that debate. I say to the Minister that I am still thoroughly confused as to whether the Government are talking about transferring duties, powers, functions or responsibilities—there is a raft of words that may look as though they are the same, but they are not. On Monday night, the Minister talked about the conferral of duties from the Secretary of State. If, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is suggesting, the Secretary of State’s duties in the 2012 Act are absolute and apply to the whole of England—I think he is probably right—I do not see how they can be transferred under an order-making power in this Bill. We need to come back to this at Third Reading. We need something specific about the NHS in the Bill. It may not be the detail of my amendment, but, at the moment, we are in danger of creating considerable confusion around the world in terms of the NHS and what is intended by the Bill in relation to its responsibilities. In the mean time, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“( ) At the same time as laying a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under this section before Parliament, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report explaining the effect of the regulations and why the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to make the regulations.
“( ) The report must include—
(a) a description of any consultation taken into account by the Secretary of State,(b) information about any representations considered by the Secretary of State in connection with the regulations, and (c) any other evidence or contextual information that the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to include.”
“Power to transfer etc. public authority functions to certain local authorities
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations—
(a) make provision for a function of a public authority that is exercisable in relation to a relevant local authority’s area to be a function of the local authority;(b) make provision for conferring on a relevant local authority in relation to its area a function corresponding to a function that a public authority has in relation to another area.(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may include further provision about the exercise of the function including—
(a) provision for the function to be exercisable by the public authority or relevant local authority subject to conditions or limitations specified in the regulations;(b) provision as to joint working arrangements between the relevant local authority and public authority in connection with the function (for example, provision for the function to be exercised by a joint committee).(3) The provision that may be included in regulations under subsection (1)(a) includes, in particular, provision—
(a) for the relevant local authority to have the function instead of the public authority,(b) for the function to be exercisable by the relevant local authority concurrently with the public authority,(c) for the function to be exercisable by the relevant local authority and the public authority jointly, or(d) for the function to be exercisable by the relevant local authority jointly with the public authority but also continue to be exercisable by the public authority alone.(4) Regulations under subsection (1)(a) may, in particular, include—
(a) provision for the making of a scheme to transfer property, rights and liabilities from the public authority to the relevant local authority (including provision corresponding to any provision made by section 17(4) to (7) of the Localism Act 2011); (b) provision to abolish the public authority in a case where, as a result of the regulations, it will no longer have any functions.(5) In this section—
“function” (except in subsection (4)(b)) does not include a power to make regulations or other instruments of a legislative character; “Minister of the Crown” has the same meaning as in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975;“public authority” includes a Minister of the Crown or a government department;“relevant local authority” means a county council in England or a district council.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendment 73 would have the effect of lowering the voting age for local government elections in England and Wales from 18 to 16. There is no doubt that the Scottish referendum debate was unique in the way that it engaged the public and secured the participation of 16 and 17 year- olds in a way that we have not seen before—I absolutely acknowledge that, as well as the other factors that may have engaged the people of Scotland.
It is clear that lowering the voting age to 16 for local elections in England and Wales is a major change to the fundamental building blocks of the country’s democracy. The starting point for making such change would seem to be that those democratically elected to represent the people of this country consider all the issues involved, seek the views of those they represent, and seek to recognise where public opinion stands on the issue and what would maintain confidence in ensuring that the elections are free and fair and give genuine voice to the people. They discuss the issues and, having carefully weighed the argument and recognised where consensus and opinion lie across the country, decide whether or not to make the change.
This should be the approach to deciding whether to make fundamental changes to our election systems. It is entirely consistent with this approach for the Scottish Parliament to decide the voting age for local government elections in Scotland, and there the Parliament has now decided to reduce the voting age to 16.
It is clearly right for Parliament to consider whether there should be a change to the franchise for local government elections in England. However, noble Lords may wish to reflect on whether it is appropriate that such a fundamental electoral change should be instigated in your Lordships’ House—an unelected Chamber—rather than in the other place. Whatever the quality of the many and varied discussions we have had today, we can all agree that, although the quality of our debate is high, we have necessarily not had the wide-ranging consideration which can happen only following a debate across the country and after hearing the views of many on the issue. In short, whatever merits there may be in making this change to the franchise for local elections, today is not the time and this Bill is not the vehicle.
As to its merit, noble Lords will know that the Government have no plans to lower the minimum voting age. In most democracies, including most of the EU member states, the voting age is also 18. In the EU, only Austria allows voting for 16 year-olds. The age of 18—not 16—is widely recognised as the age at which one becomes an adult and gains full citizenship rights. In 2014, the Select Committee which conducted an inquiry into lowering the voting age to 16 noted in its report that the available evidence suggests that the public are in general satisfied with the voting age as it is.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, spoke about the broader issue of the transition from childhood to adulthood, which deserves fuller consideration than as an adjunct to the Bill. He talked about the vulnerabilities, in many ways, of 16 and 17 year-olds to various external influences.
I shall refer to comments made by noble Lords in this House on that point. In the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill 2012, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said:
“My Lords, given the time, happily this is a short amendment. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 established that people under the age of 17 years are to be treated as children and therefore have to be questioned or interviewed in the presence of an appropriate adult, but people of 17 years of age and up to 18 are not treated in the same way. The Government have dealt with what has been an anomaly about treating 17 year-olds as adults for the purposes of bail, and that has now been changed to lift the age to 18. It would seem to be consonant with that approach if the appropriate adult provision was also extended from 17 years of age to 18. This is a straightforward matter”.—[Official Report, 15/2/12; col. 882.]
During proceedings on the, Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, noble Lords opposite recognised that:
“Anyone who is the parent of a teenager or whose children were recently teenagers knows that at that age a person is on the cusp of adulthood. They are moving out of childhood and into adulthood. It is often a very difficult stage where young people appear to be very mature and yet at the same time they are childlike and vulnerable”.—[Official Report, 23/7/14; col. 1201.]
That was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws.
The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, talked about discriminating against 16 and 17 year-olds. Deciding whether or not to give the vote to 16 and 17 year-olds is not a question of removing some inappropriate discrimination; it is about what is appropriate for 16 and 17 year-olds, who are at the point of moving out of childhood and approaching adulthood. Many things are not appropriate for people at that point in their lives. They cannot marry without parental consent, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said; they are treated in special ways in various aspects of the criminal justice system; and they cannot join the Army without parental consent.
For the reasons I have set out we cannot support the amendment and I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw it for two reasons only: first, this is not the Bill to decide a huge issue such as this; and, secondly, we are an unelected Chamber and it is not for us to propose a change in the franchise.
Lord Tyler
My Lords, the noble Baroness’s last remark has really irritated me because I have worked hard to prevent the views of the House being treated as not significant simply because, at the moment, we are unelected. I have worked hard to achieve some election. Indeed, if there had been slightly different circumstances in 2012, the previous Government’s Bill would have been sorting out this issue by now.
In the mean time, I am extremely grateful to colleagues on all sides of the House for the serious way in which they have approached this issue. I am particularly grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, because he went to the heart of the matter. I can reassure him that in Scotland this issue was treated seriously; the debate was very thoughtful, and when the Scottish Parliament came back after the referendum they recognised that young people had taken the issue seriously. Given his experience, I hope he will agree that it is a fact of life that if you give people responsibility they will become more responsible. Anyone in your Lordships’ House who thinks that suddenly we are going to be swamped with huge numbers of irresponsible, immature 16 and 17 year-olds who will swing elections should worry about older people. I am 73 and I do not pretend that I am always entirely logical on all issues.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, was part of a Government which did not merely effect a change in personnel; they abolished a whole range of councils without any local choice in the matter at all. I am afraid that one must take his criticisms of this amendment with that background in mind. The Government’s current proposals effectively impose, as it were, a life sentence on the form of governance of combined authorities. That does not apply to the mayoralty in other authorities.
Your Lordships will recall that several councils whose people chose to have an elected mayor have, in light of the experience, changed their minds and, perfectly properly and democratically, decided that that should no longer be the case. It seems quite invidious that when councils were compelled to have a referendum—not by local demand but by the Government—they are stuck with that choice for evermore. The noble Baroness has adduced a perfectly consistent, logical argument and we on these Benches will support her should she choose to divide the House.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, this amendment seeks to remove Section 9NA of the Local Government Act 2000, which currently provides that, where a council has been required to hold a mayoral referendum under an order made by the Secretary of State, and where that referendum has been successful and a mayor duly elected, the mayoral model of governance cannot subsequently be changed except by a further Act of Parliament.
I recognise the strength of feeling that the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, brings to this debate and her view—I do not know whether it is the view of the people of Bristol—that the people of Bristol should have the opportunity to hold a governance petition for a referendum on a change to their governance arrangements. In summary, if I have understood the noble Baroness’s arguments, she would like the people of Bristol to be in the same position as they would have been in if they had, in 2011, had a petition for a mayoral referendum, and in the resulting referendum in 2012 had voted to have a mayor.
Were this to be the situation, I accept that the people of Bristol could petition for and hold a further referendum at any time from May 2022 on whether to switch from a mayoral form of governance to some other form of governance. The people of Bristol are not in that situation. The situation in Bristol is that Parliament agreed that there should be a referendum on whether to have a mayor, and the people of Bristol voted to have one. Accordingly, as noble Lords will have heard me say in Committee, I cannot accept this amendment on the grounds of both precedent and principle.
I have spoken previously about the precedent established by the arrangements put in place for establishing the London mayoralty, whereby Parliament instigated a referendum through enacting primary legislation and the electors subsequently voted for a mayor. The arrangements were then put in place by a further Act of Parliament. There is no provision in these arrangements for the people of London to vote that they no longer want a mayor.
I have also spoken about the position in Bristol, where Parliament instigated a mayoral referendum under the Local Government Act 2000 through both Houses approving an order establishing a referendum and the people of Bristol then voted for a mayor. That form of mayoral governance was then established under the Local Government Act 2000. As in the case of the Mayor of London, mayoral governance in Bristol can be changed only by a further Act of Parliament. The amendment before us would mean that the electors of Bristol could, if they chose, have a referendum following a governance petition, and if they voted to end the mayoral model, it would end.
I have also been quite clear that, in those cases where a mayor has been introduced wholly by local choice, it is right that wholly local choice should be able to end the mayoral governance. However, in the case of Bristol, a change of governance should be by both local choice and some decision of Parliament specifically related to Bristol.
Following our previous discussions, I have been considering what further options there could be for properly involving both Parliament and the people of Bristol in such a decision. I do not believe the noble Baroness’s amendment would properly involve Parliament in a decision about Bristol. However, the Bill provides a means for Parliament to be involved in various ways with specific places in the course of implementing a devolution deal.
Clause 10 provides that, with the consent of the councils involved, regulations can be made that modify an application in particular cases of the provisions of Part 1A of the Local Government Act 2000. Among other things, this makes provision about mayors, including provisions about mayors in Bristol’s situation. As we have discussed during the passage of the Bill, any regulations under Clause 10 powers need to be approved by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament, and the intention is to make such regulations where this is necessary to implement an agreed devolution deal.
Accordingly, as part of an agreed devolution deal with Bristol, through its approval of Clause 10 regulations —which would provide the opportunity not afforded by this debate for full consideration of the issues for Bristol—Parliament could indicate its willingness to see the electors of Bristol have a choice through a referendum to end, if they wished, the Bristol mayoralty. Having said this, it is, of course, entirely a matter for the councils involved in any such deal to decide what powers they wish to be devolved to them and what changes in governance arrangements they wish to propose. While the Government are ready to have conversations with any area about any proposals, I cannot prejudge what the outcome might be in a particular case. On that note, I hope noble Lords will be prepared to withdraw their amendment.
Baroness Janke
My Lords, I thank the Minister—I meant to thank her initially—for her time spent discussing the amendment with me. I would like to put that on record.
The noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, mentioned that, when something becomes unpopular, people suddenly want to put an end to it and this threatens all sort of things. This is not the case. We have had plenty of unpopular decisions in our city which have not necessarily ended up changing the system of governance. In fact, several attempts by the local paper to introduce a mayor failed dismally. It was only after Ministers came to Bristol, marketed the concept and made lots of promises that people believed them. If we are really talking about trust, moving forward and giving responsibility, this is a very poor basis on which to do so.
The Minister has already said that this is modelled on and relates to the situation in London. It does not. I have spoken to colleagues in London and the whole situation there was completely different. This is an anomaly. There was no legislation put before Parliament to enable a Bristol mayor. I put to your Lordships that it is entirely disproportionate that one city should have to come to Parliament to change its system of governance. It is out of spirit with the Bill, it is out of spirit with the feeling of the people of the city, and it is entirely undemocratic. On the basis of the arguments I have heard, I should like to test the feeling of the House by putting it to a vote.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 75 is not one which we on these Benches can support. I declare an interest as an elected local councillor in the London Borough of Lewisham.
Although this amendment is concerned with elections to local councils in England, I mentioned in Committee that we had a referendum in 2011 on changing the voting system for elections to the House of Commons. That was wholly rejected and I have seen nothing following on from that result, or anything that has happened subsequently, which leads me to believe that the country wants to change the voting system for any elections. I also mentioned that we have got ourselves into a bit of a mess in recent years. We have managed to heap on voters a whole plethora of voting systems and that is not a good thing to do. I accept that, where a proportional system has been chosen, it should remain. However, I would like to see us use fewer systems.
I also referred to the fact that I thought that one of the worst systems was the supplementary vote system. I have observed many counts where people have only put a cross in the second column, which means that their vote is discounted. Therefore, I would like to see a reduction in the number of systems being used, and we certainly cannot support the amendment tonight.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, this amendment is about the voting system for local government elections in England and Wales. Like Amendment 73, it would introduce a fundamental change to these. As I explained in the case of the earlier amendment, we are clear that issues such as this need to be considered in a far wider context than this Bill. Even in terms of timescale, when STV was introduced in Scotland, the review of the 32 local authorities took two years, and clearly in England that would take much longer. Notwithstanding any of the arguments for or against the amendment, as I said in the previous amendment, this is not the Bill to be talking about changes to the franchise. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, pointed out, the people of this country said no to the alternative vote in 2011—I was one of the people who campaigned against it. Again, it is not the place of an unelected House to propose changes like this. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, if it is not the role of your Lordships’ House to scrutinise legislation, it is hard to see on what basis this Bill has started in this House. If your Lordships are not permitted to move amendments or to discuss matters of direct concern about one-party states being created in combined authority areas across a number of parts of England, then I think it is the responsibility of your Lordships’ House to be able to do so.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, raised a number of objections. We mentioned Scotland, and the truth is that if it still had a first past the post electoral system in local elections, the Labour Party would have been wiped out in Scotland at that level as well. I do not argue that that is in the interests of our democracy; nor do I argue that it is in the interests of our democracy that there are no Conservative councillors in a number of our northern cities. This is not good for democracy. The only way that you can solve the problem is for someone to take an initiative.
I am reconciled to the fact that the two big parties in this country do not want change, because it suits them not to have change—at least, it does in England and Wales. Actually, however, we have a higher responsibility. We operate now in a world of multi-party politics. It is wrong that votes are not equal and that one-party states can be created through the first past the post electoral system. That is what the Government are perpetuating, and it is entirely appropriate for your Lordships’ House to take a view on that. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Beecham
It will be interesting to see what the Daily Mail, the Telegraph and the Express make of the noble Lord’s suggestions when they come to be debated. I suspect that he may find those words reappearing in their columns. We will see.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords who have spoken this evening, particularly my noble friend Lord Marlesford, who has given a good warm-up act for his Bill, which we will discuss on 11 September and to which I will respond. I will return to the matters he has raised this evening when we consider that Bill.
Amendment 75A would require the Secretary of State to lay a report in Parliament on the introduction of higher bands of council tax in the areas of both combined and local authorities. The Government have stated their determination to keep council tax bills low. The last five years of council tax increases are the lowest since council tax was introduced in 1993 and have even been lower than inflation. We already provide local referendums, triggered at a threshold of a proposed increase over 2%, so that people can have a say on the levels of their council tax.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, compared different areas. Of course, councils will ultimately have a say on the level of council tax that they raise. Many councils have frozen their council tax over the last few years. We do not support higher council tax bands, or a council tax revaluation which would be required to implement them. Revaluation and higher council tax bands can lead to higher council tax bills for hard-working people. We are clear that council tax is not a wealth tax but a charge for the use of local services.
The current banding system reflects the fact that many larger homes make slightly greater use of local services, but it intentionally is not a poll tax or a domestic rate. The Government have already taken a number of steps to tackle property tax avoidance by a small minority of wealthy people, and also increased stamp duty on the highest valued homes.
Given these explanations, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
The reply I was disappointed in was actually that of the Minister. She knows, as does everyone here who has spoken in this debate and has a local authority background—I could not speak for the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford—that what effect there is on local authority revenues can be entirely neutral. It is a way of distributing the load. Therefore, to say that if you are in favour of having extra bands at the top in the name of greater fairness, that is unfair to the very rich, is itself a bit rich, given that at the moment, many of them are paying council tax of £20 a week. That is less by far than what people on one-fiftieth of their income, with a property value of one-tenth of theirs, are paying in their local patches. My amendment is cost-neutral, in the sense that the impact depends entirely on where the individual local authority pitches its band D. It can collect exactly the same money as it collects now but in a fairer way or, going back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord True, it can decide that it wants to use it to raise more resources, primarily from those who can most afford to pay—the broader shoulders of those who are multimillionaires, many of them billionaires—towards the cost of the additional functions of economic growth such as connectivity, transport and building our infrastructure. A lot of that will rightly be carried by local government, but it does not have the revenue to do it and has no means of finding it.
You can approach it whichever way you like. You could use it to raise more revenue or you could decide, if you are of a more conservative disposition, that you do not want to raise any more revenue but none the less, you are mildly troubled by the fact that someone in a property worth £400,000 is paying the same as someone in a property worth £40 million. I myself would be mildly troubled by that, and I am surprised that that view is not shared more widely by some of your Lordships.
The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, has given us a much more ambitious plan than I was proposing. What I am trying to do is simply to keep this issue in people’s minds. The longer you leave it, the worse the problem becomes. We can either try for a big bang down the road in which you will hear from the losers but not from the winners, or we can start making some incremental adjustments. The easiest way to start doing that is at the very top, where most people have a pervading sense of the unfairness of the extent to which council tax bands have outgrown the value of house prices. There is no longer the co-terminosity that existed when we devised this system—in which I was a player—back in the early 1990s.
The time is late, and I will stop there. Obviously, I will withdraw the amendment, but I say to the noble Baroness that it is rubbish to say that this is all about trying to raise council tax—and she knows it. She knows from her local government experience that this provision could be neutral in terms of the money it raises, or it could not be neutral and you could raise more money. It is about rebalancing in a fairer and more equitable way the relativities of property values within any local authority—full stop. If she is on the side of not balancing those relativities in a fairer way, I can only say that I am deeply disappointed in her response tonight. None the less, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord True
My Lords, since we are told that this is a probing amendment, perhaps I might be probed. I come with apologies to the House at this late hour, particularly to the Minister, who has done an absolutely outstanding job in leading the House through the Bill. However, when the amendments on London were tabled in Committee at the last possible stage, a lack of notice prevented me attending. Perhaps as leader of a London borough, a member of the leaders’ committee of London Councils and one who was present at the meeting that has been alluded to several times, I might be allowed to speak for rather longer than I would otherwise do. I will try not to test the patience of the House, but the issues are important.
A meeting of the London congress, lasting one hour and in the presence of mayor Boris Johnson, is not a suitable occasion for dissecting in detail a document that is laid before the committee. It is true that yesterday at the congress of London Councils, with the mayor, general assent was given for discussions to continue on the potential strands of devolution in London. We believe that boroughs can and should do more. However, assent to continuing work in progress should not be taken to indicate universal consent by all those present and all the boroughs represented to all that is on the table or, if I may say so, some of the things that may be lurking in briefcases under the table.
London is very different from other areas being considered under this Bill. It already has a very powerful elected mayor and a regional government. It has scrutiny arrangements and a London Assembly, which is imperfect in many ways, I agree, but which for now exists—although I wonder about putting two forms of government or congress alongside each other. It also has 32 London boroughs, about which Whitehall and others are sometimes rather sniffy. Many of those boroughs freely co-operate and we know no law to make us do so. My own borough shares services with Merton and Kingston. We run joint children’s services as a community interest company with Kingston, which is monitored by a joint committee supervising those services across the two councils. We are also setting out joint staffing with Wandsworth. Working with Wandsworth, we will be larger than Newcastle and Luton combined, and certainly bigger than Bristol or Manchester City Council. We are only one sector of a huge and hugely diverse capital. The boroughs have a legitimate place and voice and should not just be shuffled aside in these discussions.
I can confirm that valuable discussion is ongoing between the Government, the Mayor of London and London Councils, which we support, about potential strands of devolution. It is unfortunate that, sometimes, the geometry of these discussions is asymmetrical. For example, some of the more eccentric elements in what was a curate’s egg of ideas on planning published last Friday were discussed by the Government with the mayor but not with London Councils, the powers of which are to be overridden by the mayor. That does not create the climate of trust that is vital to success in devolution discussions between different levels of authority.
I referred to the diversity of our capital and the diversity of the strands of the policy being discussed, which have been listed by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. In my submission, it is unlikely that, over such a vast canvas of place, policy and authorities, a single statutory institutional model will fit every contingency. It is already obvious that, in London, some areas of policy, under the Little Red Riding Hood garb of devolution, actually mask the wolf of centralisation, whether up to City Hall or further up the pecking order in the bureaucratic jungle. We need to know exactly how we are to proceed in these critically important areas under discussion. Work could begin now and has already begun across London without the need for statutory institutions in many of these areas. We should get on with it and not inhibit those authorities that are already trying to do things by navel-gazing too much over the legal text. I do not subscribe to the amendments before the House; nor do I, or my group on London Councils, subscribe to the text put forward for the governance model for London.
There is a clear conflict in some areas—I have referred to housing and planning—between devolution and centralisation. These issues are not easily resolved, but they have to be discussed. They will be harder to resolve if the illusion persists that the boroughs are the problem. If we had had the power in our borough to develop some dormant and semi-dormant public sector land, it would have been developed long ago. It would have been developed with provision for local schools and amenities that some of the proposals advanced last Friday sadly lacked. Why can we not give a council the right to acquire public sector land that is not used? The value of the land could remain vested in the state, and we could just get on with a community brief that delivers some of these houses and schools and things that people want. Why is it that local boroughs—London boroughs—are too often just put in the firing line and told that they are not part of the debate? I ask that they should be.
The massive expansion in the population of London that is now envisaged must be addressed on a regional basis, considering infrastructure, travel to work and so on. It is like the expansion in the Victorian era. It simply cannot be contained by pouring concrete within the line of the GLA borders drawn on a map. It is bigger than just the Mayor of London, the London boroughs and the nation. Of course a great many things will have to be done within the London boroughs and the London area. We all acknowledge the need to play a part in that, but we need a broader discussion. If we confine it to this, we will miss many points.
I will not go into the details of the amendments. They have been explained at some length by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. I do not agree with them; they are premature. Amendment 75C, as I read it, locks any committee that is formed into existence on terms that may be varied, whereas its duties may be dissolved only by legislation. Although councils have to consent to go in, the fact that it is statutory gives the Government of the day a lock on a committee’s dissolution. In that sense, it is rather reminiscent of the euro. Once you are in, you are in. Hence, in my view, there is a need for prior consent. It is a one-way lock that the noble Lord is putting forward. There are some very worthwhile experiments and ideas on devolution under consideration, but those ideas may or may not work. Their success will depend on whether future Governments sustain the revenue streams in the areas they propose to devolve. That is something on which no Government have a great record.
Devolution is a great idea. I am all for it if it is what it says on the tin, but I and, I know, a number of other London leaders of a similar mind will want to see a little more of the nature of the contract before we sign or consent freely to a statute’s being passed into law. It would be a very difficult world if we were to be given these new functions, about things where we were required by law to fill holes the Government or the NHS later left behind. We might find ourselves being forced to cut even faster things we are already called on to reduce.
I do not want to appear wholly negative. I am not negative. I think this is a very worthwhile discussion. There is good, positive work in progress. But I hope no one is under the illusion that everybody is already signed up to the details in the small print. I do not think it should be pre-emptive or placed in any statutory gridlock before full and general consent from the London boroughs.
Some strands of these policies may be able to be advanced more quickly than others. But I am a realist: I understand the appetite of City Hall to keep control and not devolve fully. But I am also a localist and I think my right honourable friend the Secretary of State is, too, so I hope that careful thought will be given to balancing those factors as we look to the future in our capital instead of, as all too often happens when a new policy is made and when there is a great idea, as there is underlying this Bill, people going forward insisting on a single-institutional answer and trying to force varying and diverse problems, policies and solutions into one straitjacket.
Let us finish what is already on the table before us in the Bill before bringing in London, before calling for another not quite yet properly cooked dish of London pie and mash. It is not quite ready yet; do not let us rush it out of the kitchen, appetising though the pie and liquor may well be, if we can get to the point of agreeing the solution.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as discussions on these amendments have demonstrated, the ideas for devolution in London to London councils are interesting and varied. As I have explained many times in previous debates, there is an expectation that local areas will do just that and come forward with proposals to support devolution for their areas, and of course London is no exception.
I know that London boroughs and the Greater London Authority are working on a package of reform proposals, and I was very pleased to meet the noble Lord, Lord Tope, and others—I think that it was last week; time goes very strangely in this House—and interested to hear their thinking. We expect boroughs and the GLA to come forward to us with those proposals in the coming months. I recognise that the proposals may need a strengthening of London governance arrangements, and I can see how the proposals in the amendments may provide the kind of governance arrangements that might be needed.
However, for now, I suggest to noble Lords that we continue at some later stage our discussions on what the most appropriate changes would be to provide the London governance needed for future greater devolution and how such changes might best be provided for in this Bill. Therefore, I ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in that brief debate. Insofar as what the Minister said, yes, of course, we will withdraw the amendment at the appropriate time, but it is good to hear that a package of proposals is being worked on which might entail strengthening of governance arrangements.
The point of having amendments now is that the Bill is just about to pass from this House. This is a legislative vehicle, which is why it is an opportunity to test the water on what might be an appropriate structure to deal with the emerging devolution proposals.
Clearly, the noble Lord, Lord True, is heavily involved in all this—it is an integral part of what he does—and I accept entirely that, as he said, there is a desire to continue with the work in progress of developing these thoughts. It is not a done deal in the sense of what he said. I accept, too, and can well imagine that devolution in London is heavily impacted by diversity and the need to build a climate of trust with government. Given the massive expansion in the population, to which the noble Lord referred, I acknowledge, too, the need to look at this on a regional basis and the need for broader discussion.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Tope, for his support for the draft amendments, on the basis that they are probing amendments to try to set down and understand some parameters. A key question that emerges from this is whether the legislative hurdles that they seek to address are real—I think that this is one of the issues that London Councils had concerns about.
I accept that this is not necessarily about locking people into particular institutions. It is an attempt to understand where these sorts of devolution arrangements that London boroughs wish to enter into can be enabled under existing legislation or whether something is needed in addition. Perhaps we could hear more specifically from the Minister. We had one discussion on that and it seemed that, in some areas, there was acceptance that additional legislation would be required. We have got the sense this evening that this is the case—this Bill will go to the other place in September and October but it will have been passed in some shape or form by the end of this year—so this is a missed opportunity if London devolution, as London wants it, needs the benefit of some tweaking or changing of legislation. Can the Minister address that point?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Lord for that—it may be that some tweaking of legislation is required; we have on other parts of the Bill similarly alluded that the tweaking of other legislation might be required in order to align it with this Bill on devolution. The discussions have started well but I request that we give a bit more time to this and discuss it in due course.
“2A In section 91 (exercise of local authority functions), in subsection (1), after “an area” insert “all or part of which is”.”
“(2B) An order under subsection (1)(c) may include provision for a function exercisable by a local authority in relation to an area all or part of which is comprised in the combined authority’s area to be exercisable by the combined authority in relation to the combined authority’s area.”