Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Justice
Lord Garnier Portrait Lord Garnier (Con)
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My Lords, I begin by confessing to having been at the media law Bar for the past 45 years or so, so I know a little bit, but not a huge amount, about the subject we have been discussing. I want to salute the enthusiasm of the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Cromwell, and my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston. As I said at Second Reading, this is a subject that needs to be discussed. It needs a through and very comprehensive debate.

The Long Title of the Bill is:

“A Bill to make provision about economic crime and corporate transparency; to make further provision about companies, limited partnerships and other kinds of corporate entity; and to make provision about the registration of overseas entities”.


Having read that, I go on to admire the ingenuity of the drafter of these amendments to fit them into the Long Title because, whereas there is a debate to be had, and it must be had, about SLAPPs, I question whether this Bill is the appropriate vehicle for that debate. That is a procedural issue.

My second point is that when I began at the defamation Bar in the mid-1970s, the economics of the media world were entirely different. Print media were riding high. They were selling millions of copies. The Sun was selling nearly 10 million copies a day. The Daily Mail, owned by Associated Newspapers, was selling a huge number of copies a day. Social media and online media had not been invented.

I used to be instructed by newspaper groups to go to the Queen’s Bench Masters’ corridor, acting for defendant newspapers, to run up legitimate legal arguments—they were not made up—which were there to starve the claimant, in those days called the plaintiff, out of the claim. The newspapers knew very well that they had a case to answer, but they had more money, so the police officer, schoolteacher or nurse who had allegedly been defamed in the local or national newspaper, unless they had an immensely rich backer, was never going to be able to withstand the onslaught of daily interlocutory applications made against them. Sometimes the master would accede to some of the applications that we made, and sometimes they did not, but the newspaper did not care because it had the cash. The individual—the claimant or plaintiff—did care, and sometimes was frightened off by the prospect of having to spend vast sums of money to recover his or her reputation in court.

The boot is now on the other foot. The print media is impoverished and no longer as rich as it used to be; the regional press is decimated, the local press more or less non-existent, and the national press is under some considerable strain. If you want to make money in the media world, you do not do it by publishing printed newspapers—you do it through the broadcast or online media. What we are now seeing is that those who are in the legitimate, perfectly lawful and praiseworthy business of writing as journalists, and those who publish written journalism in hard copy as publishing companies, are finding it increasingly difficult to withstand the economic might of those who disagree with what they have to say in their newspapers. Do not get me wrong: I entirely sympathise with people such as Catherine Belton, who was sued by various Russians—a range of very rich people. But one would get the impression from listening to the noble Lords who have spoken so far that the courts are weak and feeble arbitrators of the disputes that are before them.

For the last 45 years, I have seen cases struck out—I like the American expression, to strike, that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, used a moment ago. For the last 45 years, and long before that, before I was out of nappies, Queen’s Bench judges in the High Court in the High Court in London—and I dare say in Edinburgh and Belfast as well—have been striking out cases that were abusive, vexatious or frivolous. What the courts have to deal with is not just the law but the evidence. Just because a worthy defendant complains that they are the victim in a SLAPP case, the court cannot simply take the allegation on the face of it—it has to look at the evidence. By and large, evidence is something that you get to at trial, albeit it that evidence is occasionally tested at the interlocutory stages of an action.

While saluting the enthusiasm of the noble Lords who have spoken in favour of these amendments and who have ingeniously used this Bill to run the argument, I urge the Committee to be cautious, because the number of SLAPP cases is remarkably small compared to the number of writs issued each year. It is important that this Committee does not mislead the public about the extent of the problem. Legitimate claims have repeatedly been incorrectly described as SLAPPs by the media—but of course the media has an interest in calling them SLAPPs, for the economic reason that I have described.

In the recent case of Banks v Cadwalladr, decided by Mrs Justice Steyn only last year, she said:

“Ms Cadwalladr has repeatedly labelled this claim a SLAPP suit, that is a strategic lawsuit against public participation, designed to silence and intimidate her. I have set out a summary of my conclusions in paragraph 416 below. Although, for the reasons I have given, Mr Banks’s claim has failed, his attempt to seek vindication through these proceedings was, in my judgment, legitimate. In circumstances where Ms Cadwalladr has no defence of truth, and her defence of public interest has succeeded only in part, it is neither fair nor apt to describe this as a SLAPP suit”.


Despite this, Mr Banks’s claim continues to be referred to as a SLAPP by large sections of the media. Of even greater concern is the reference by some journalists to individuals taking out what they call SLAPP orders—whatever they might be—echoing the media’s disingenuous campaign against privacy rights, including by pejoratively referring to privacy injunctions or agreed confidentiality clauses as gagging orders.

I do not want to be misunderstood. SLAPPs are a problem, but their prevalence is wildly overstated, and it seems to me—after 45 years of jogging around this racecourse—that solicitors are unlikely to be complicit in many of them. I rather suspect that more solicitors are dealt with by the Law Society, the SRA or the police for stealing client money than for running SLAPP cases.

Let us please just settle down a bit and not get overexcited by the one, two or three Russian oligarchs who have made an allegation that they have been defamed and who, on the evidence, have sometimes been proven right and sometimes wrong. The essential point is that a dispassionate judge, dispassionately looking at the evidence, will make a dispassionate ruling on what he or she has found, as Mrs Justice Steyn did in the Banks case, and the world goes on.

Being sued is indeed expensive and annoying, and it enables lawyers to be instructed and charge fees—I am afraid that is part of the way we do things in this country—but to suggest that SLAPPs are a plague and a menace just on the say-so of one, two or three cases, of which a number of us may or may not disapprove, does not prove the case. There is much work to be done to look into the question of SLAPPs and much debate to be had, but this Bill is not the place to have that debate. I applaud the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and other noble Lords who have brought forward these amendments because the matter needs to be discussed, but it is not properly discussed within the confines of this Bill.

Baroness Wheatcroft Portrait Baroness Wheatcroft (CB)
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My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, speaks as a lawyer. I speak as a journalist, with a long career in newspapers. I declare my interest as chair of the oversight committee at the Financial Times. I assure the noble and learned Lord that the very presence of the possibility of SLAPPs weighs very much on the minds of journalists. As he explained, newspapers no longer have the sort of money that might have funded the types of cases that he described and indeed worked on, but now there are some very important cases that they do need to pursue, and for that reason I very much support all the amendments in this group.

I will give just one example: the case of Wirecard, which was company fraud on a massive scale that cost a lot of people a lot of money. One brave journalist on the Financial Times had pursued the case for a long time, against huge opposition from the company and those around it who were making money from it. His editor was prepared to allow him to continue to pursue the case, at which point the German company hired a well-known London law firm which threatened all sorts of litigation and also criminal proceedings. It accused him, without any base, of having been interested in manipulating the share price of Wirecard in order to make a great deal of money. At that point, the Financial Times was risking a great deal of money and a huge hit to its reputation. The law firm bombarded the company and the journalist with letters threatening all sorts of things, but the Financial Times decided to stick with it. In the end, as we all know, that was the right decision and some people were able to salvage some honest money that would otherwise have been lost to an almighty fraud.