(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461J. I thank my noble friend Lady Goudie, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for supporting it.
The amendment seeks to add a new clause after Clause 191 that would pardon women who have had a conviction or caution for an offence abolished by Clause 191. Because of the existing 1861 legislation, abortion is classified as a violent crime. The record means that these women will permanently have to declare it as part of a DBS check, thus continuing the damage caused by this offence. It would ensure the removal of women’s details from police systems.
Like Amendment 459C, Amendment 461J seeks to right a wrong and an injustice. Of course, it is not the first time your Lordships have sought to do this, when something which has been unlawful and unjust is abolished. I am referring to the changes of the law on homosexuality and what followed.
The amendments in this very large group that seek to amend or get rid of this clause—passed as it was by a vote of 137 to 379 on a free vote in the Commons—will form the debate this afternoon. For example, Amendment 455, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, seems to profoundly misunderstand what it means, because if abortion remains criminalised after 24 weeks of gestation then, under the current law, only women who have an abortion after 24 weeks of gestation are targeted by the police, even when, in most cases, they have had a spontaneous miscarriage or a stillbirth. That amendment would make no difference to the current cruel situation, but the noble Baroness actually says she wants to get rid of the whole clause anyway.
Amendments 456 and 456A, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, would, essentially, reverse the change agreed in the Commons and mean that abortion would remain criminalised. But I am aware that some noble Lords who are very concerned about this clause also support reproductive rights for women. We have already had many meetings about this, with the royal colleges and others. I ask that, between now and the next stage, those of us who take the view that reproductive rights are important but have concerns should continue those discussions.
Unlike what the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, said in her speech on the clause standing part, this clause was not plucked out of thin air in the Commons. It is the product of years and years of trying to mitigate the criminalisation of women under cruel and awful circumstances. There have been entreaties to the DPP, discussions with the policing bodies and discussions with our legal systems, and every single one of them—I could bore the Committee by giving dates and facts—has taken the view that Parliament has to take a view on this matter. This is not something that can be mitigated by changing guidelines or rules. Indeed, Parliament took a view on this and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland a few years ago. As I said, this had no detrimental effect.
This clause seeks to ensure that women in England and Wales are no longer subject to year-long investigations and criminal charges—the kind of situation that the noble Lord just explained. Since 2020, around 100 women have faced police investigations. Six have gone to court; one has been sent to prison. The clause will not change the wider abortion law, or the existing time limits of the 1967 Act. It is supported by 50 organisations, including the medical royal colleges, violence against women and girls groups, every group that represents abortion providers in the UK and other women’s organisations. We should discuss our concerns about the clause and whether it does the job we want it to do, but there is support for it. Fifty countries in the world have not criminalised abortion. Why on earth should we in England and Wales?
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 456C, but I support Amendment 456, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. The purpose of tabling Amendment 456C is to see if a compromise can be achieved between those who favour Clause 191 in its present form and those who are strongly opposed to it.
Late-term abortions are, of course, already lawful if they fall within the permissive provisions of Section 1(1)(b) to (d) of the Abortion Act 1967. Those paragraphs, of course, permit late-term abortions if there is a serious risk to the health of the mother or a serious risk of abnormalities in the unborn child. But Clause 191 goes very much wider than that. It would permit a mother, without any restriction in law, to abort a child right up to the moment of birth. I find it very difficult to make an ethical or moral distinction between killing a child immediately after birth and killing a child immediately before birth. One has been born, the other has not, but I cannot discern any difference in principle.
My Lords, I agree that all investigations in this matter should be conducted with great sensitivity. I take the noble Lord’s points, but at the end of the day you have to establish a principle. May I complete my point before the noble Lord intervenes further? If there is powerful evidence that the mother has wilfully terminated the birth of a child immediately up to the moment of birth, it is right that Parliament should set out a process whereby she has to be investigated. If she falls within the defence, she will have a defence. I admit that that would not prevent an investigation, but at the end of the day you have to determine where you stand on whether or not this House is really going to guard human life.
How will we know? The noble Viscount needs to tell us how you would know that it was not the loss of a baby through natural circumstances? Who will decide?
It would be part of the process of investigation. In that context, I sympathise very much with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which would provide a further filter. There should be a prosecution only in cases where there has been a clear breach of the law. These are very sensitive matters and need to be conducted sensibly. But we have to stand on principle here.