Baroness Sherlock
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Pensions Bill
Baroness Sherlock Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, all noble Lords who have spoken have laid down a significant challenge to the Minister on this part of the Bill. I do not propose to add a great deal, but there are a few questions that I would like to clarify. First, in his opening remarks, I think the Minister said that one of the problems being addressed was that there were significant levels of incorrect awards of pension credit because various assets and income were not being taken into account if they happened after an AIP was set. Does he mean incorrect? Presumably, he does not mean incorrect if they were in line with the rules. If someone is not required to declare it then they do not affect the award, but maybe I misunderstood that point.
Secondly, there is a question about the additional changes of circumstances. I am struggling a little to understand what the department does and does not know about this. The impact assessment states:
“We have limited evidence for the additional number of changes of circumstance that are likely to be reported each year as a result of the change in policy”,
but the impact assessment provides an estimate of £17 million a year as the cost of processing additional changes of circumstances and reviews. What assumptions is that figure based on in terms of the number of changes of circumstances?
Picking up a point made by my noble friend Lord McKenzie, what estimate has the department made of the likely increase in fraud and error as a result of the abolition of AIPs? Will the Minister remind the Committee what sanctions will be imposed on pensioners who fail to report a change in retirement income or capital that is relevant to their award? I would also be interested to hear what kind of support will be given. Will he also take the opportunity to remind the Committee how pensioners will be informed of this, how they will be reminded and what discretion can be exercised in choosing whether to sanction them, and of course what appeal mechanisms are there. That would be very helpful.
There is then the crucial question of the likely effect on the level of pension credit awards to those who have, or would have had, an AIP. The impact assessment was encouraging at first because it states:
“Analysis suggests that many customers are not currently reporting changes which would lead to an increase in their entitlement so they may actually benefit from the simplification of the policy”.
Can the Minister explain the use of the word “simplification”? At the moment, if I have an AIP and an income only from pension and capital, I do not have to tell the DWP about any changes in income, but in future I will. How is that simpler?
On the question of level, the briefing said that despite the fact that many customers may be better off, most people will not be better off as the Minister and my noble friend Lord McKenzie have pointed out. It is obvious that they could not be if £80 million a year is to be saved. Also, my understanding is that not only will there be twice as many losers as gainers, if I have read this correctly the average gainer will gain £6.70 a week but the average loser will lose £13.10 a week, which is twice as much. Will the Minister clarify whether that is right and if so what average means in this context? Is it a mean or median figure?
On the impact by age band of abolishing AIPs, the briefing from the department says that it is not possible to break down savings by age band, but that the younger cohort of recipients who are more likely to be affected by the change in policy are less likely to have capital above £10,000 or other pension income. Will the Minister help me understand that distinction? Assuming that they are spared, these younger pensioners will go on to be over-75s, who would have been entitled to an indefinite AIP. Is the assumption that that cohort, when they reach 75, will still be less likely to have savings over £10,000 or other pension income and thus less likely to face a change in pension credit entitlement? In other words, is the distinction one of age or cohort?
Just out of interest, did the department make any assessment of the effect and cost of, for example, maintaining indefinite AIPs for pensioners above 80 or 85 or any other age level? There is then the question raised by my noble friend Lady Hollis on equity release. I have no intention of standing between my two noble friends on the question of how they should be treated, being a woman with an ambition to live to at least 75 myself. But this is a serious question, to which the Minister responded at Second Reading simply by saying that,
“equity release may not necessarily result in a reduction in eligibility for means-tested benefits and will depend on overall income and capital”.—[Official Report, 3/12/13; col. 193.]
Of course, that is obviously true; for some people it may, and for some it may not. The briefing on the subject that came from the department had a note attached to it that may have come from the Department of Health, entitled, Reforms to Care and Support: Financial Product Review. That said, on equity release:
“Some people do use this to fund the cost of domiciliary or home care. No data is collected on the number of people who take out equity release to pay for care but it is currently very limited”.
At the risk of being a pedant, if no data are collected, how do the Government know that the number is very limited? I wonder if they are perhaps relying on the Age Concern survey referenced in the DWP briefing note, Abolition of Assessed Income Periods—Equity Release? I think probably not, however, because it suggests that the sample size was too small to be used for extrapolation. So I am sure that is not the source of it. But they must be able to make an estimate to be able to declare that the number is very limited, so can the Minister tell the Committee how many people the department estimates take out equity release to pay for care?
The importance of this question is to understand its implications. Even if the Minister takes the view that he does not regard this as being anything other than administrative easement, as explained by my noble friend Lord McKenzie, the Committee needs to understand whether there will be consequences for the treatment of income that may be needed to pay for care and, if so, how those costs will otherwise be addressed. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I shall deal with the equity release issue first. Assessed income periods were never intended to enable people to shield their income and capital from interaction with the means-tested system. Pension credit is a safety net benefit providing support for daily living needs for the poorest and, as such, should be a last resort.
Lord Freud
My Lords, my experience of cat skinning is that it takes quite a long time, so I am not sure that I can promise the aforesaid cat in its dematerialised form in the right time.
Baroness Sherlock
I am sorry, but I am pressing the Minister on the comment about the assessment of how many people use AIPs for equity release. The phrase I think he used at the beginning of his remarks was that this may be a minority of claimants, which is about as vague as it is possible to get in terms of a formulation. Can he shed any light on this?
Lord Freud
No, my Lords. We do not have any precision on this, and that is one of the reasons that we want to look at it in the context of social care. Clearly, one will need to build a better evidence base rather than me extrapolating from a very thin one. The cat is small; it is possibly a kitten.
On the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, about potentially retaining AIPs until the age of 75, while the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, talked about the age of 80, we do not have a breakdown of age from the sample of AIP reviews that we have taken, but we have no evidence to suggest that older pensioners have more stable incomes than younger ones. Retaining AIPs for older pensioners would prevent us driving many of the inaccuracies out of the system and would lead to a two-tier system, whereas we want to see a single, understandable regime for everyone. Older pensioners are more likely to have indefinite AIPs already in place in April 2016 because they are being retained, so they should not experience any significant changes to their reporting requirements.
On the more detailed question about numbers raised by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, on the breakdown between guarantee credit and savings credit, I do not have it to hand behind me right now, but I am happy to offer a letter providing that. I can confirm to him that someone who applies for pension credit can make a claim for housing benefit, but people will be encouraged to seek council tax support. As the noble Lord is fully aware, that scheme was localised in April of the current financial year.
Lord Freud
As the noble Baroness is fully aware, the dividing line is actually much more spread given the complicated transitional arrangements between one system and another. There is not the sharpness of a dividing line—I know the noble Baroness is fully aware of that because we have debated it in great detail. I am conscious that we are pressed for time.
Baroness Sherlock
There are three questions that the Minister did not answer. I am happy for him to write to me: I wanted to get them on the record so that they could be picked up before Report. I asked about the estimate of £17 million in the impact assessment for the cost of processing additional changes of circumstance. What assumptions was that figure based on in terms of the numbers of additional reviews or changes of circumstance?
I asked what estimate, if any, the department had made of the likely increase in fraud and error as a result of AIPs going. Also, the departmental briefing says that the younger cohort of recipients who are more likely to be affected by the change in policy are less likely to have capital above £10,000 or other pension income. Is it that cohort or because they are young and therefore when they become old that will no longer apply?
Lord Freud
My Lords, I will arrange to write to the noble Baroness. I think I can deal with the second point straightaway. We simply do not know whether it is an age or a cohort effect, so I cannot be clearer about that.
Baroness Sherlock
Baroness Sherlock
My Lords, as we move on to Part 5 of the Bill on private pensions, I want to take the opportunity to remind the Committee of my interests in the register. I have a remunerated interest as the senior independent director of the Financial Ombudsman Service.
This group of amendments looks lengthy, but its aim is remarkably precise. Amendment 62ZC to Clause 32 is actually very simple; it retains the power of the Secretary of State to put in place the consolidation of small pension pots but removes the part of the sentence that limits this to the pot follows member form of consolidation. I will focus my contribution on Amendment 62ZC, as the other amendments in the group address the consequences arising from that specific change. The Government believe that action is needed to address the large number of dormant small pension pots which will arise under auto-enrolment when employees move to new jobs, as they do on average 11 times in their careers. We from these Benches agree that action is needed, but not the form of action proposed.
The impact assessment confirms that the Government considered two default transfer options. The first option would be pot follows member, where small pension pots follow the member to the new employer’s pension scheme. The second is an aggregated scheme in which the small pension pots are transferred to an aggregator such as NEST. The Government had two choices, and I believe strongly that they made the wrong one.
As it stands, the clause allows only for pot follows member. Our amendments would allow the possibility of using a default aggregator model without the need for new primary legislation. I propose to comment on the problem in order to demonstrate why I believe that the Government’s proposed solution is flawed, to put forward an alternative, and then pose some questions to the Minister. I promise to do it as quickly as is practical.
I turn first to the context. The core issues of trust and confidence which we have discussed previously are still centre stage in getting people to start and to continue saving for their retirement. We were reminded afresh by my noble friend Lord Hutton that we do not have a savings culture in this country in Committee last week. This Bill and auto-enrolment need to give people the confidence that they need to save for their old age. but how can we demand that people save if they do not trust the saving vehicles and they do not trust the pensions market as offering value for money?
The pensions market is not a typical retail market where the consumer chooses the product. Under auto-enrolment, the consumer does not choose the product at all—the employer does. The employee choice is either to stay in or opt out and lose the employer contribution completely. There are also many intermediaries in the pension supply chain. Pensions are a complex product; they lack transparency, and while large employers may have the resources to pay for good advice and assessment of fund performance, SMEs may not. The demand side is weak.
The pensions market also has some very big players who offer pension fund products, asset management, and annuities. The OFT says that the four largest players have between them 68% of the assets, 76% of the schemes and 61% of the members. The results are predictable; the combination of a concentrated supply side and a weak demand side is bad for savers and allows conflicts between the two to go unresolved, which is not in savers’ interests. Those characteristics of the pension market combine, as the OFT report puts it, to make the market “dysfunctional”. The OFT concluded that,
“competition cannot be relied upon to ensure value for money for savers in the DC workplace pensions market”.
Future clauses and amendments deal with the criticisms raised by the OFT in its report, but this clause and our associated amendments deal specifically with the challenges of small pension pots created by auto-enrolment. The Government estimate that 50 million pension pots will be created by auto-enrolment by 2050, 12 million of them under £2,000. Already, one in six people have lost track of their pension pots, and there are 1 million unclaimed pension pots out there. The evidence is clear that the Secretary of State needs power to make regulations automatically to transfer and consolidate small pension pots. We all agree that a default consolidation mechanism is needed for those people who do not make an active choice to transfer their pensions. The point of contention is how this should be done.
Lord Bates
Yes, and our hope and belief is that there will be higher standards. That cannot be issued by diktat and has not been covered. We are simply giving the powers and setting out the framework as to how we will go about that, but that discussion has to be had with the pensions industry. The conversation is ongoing and we will certainly be reporting on that progress.
I turn to some of the specific points that have been raised. The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, talked about the level of support and seemed to be fairly sceptical about whether there was any.
Lord Bates
The noble Baroness always asks an honest and genuine question, and I am trying to give an honest and genuine response, which is to say that we are not necessarily comparing like with like here. Although people understand how the pot-follows-member scheme might work—in other words, they will have just one pot, and everything will be transferred into it—they do not necessarily understand what the noble Baroness is proposing in terms of alternatives, whether they are single, multiple or virtual aggregators. Therefore, to give a clear-cut position on that is somewhat difficult.
It was drawn to my attention today that Adrian Boulding of Legal and General, one of the largest pension providers, in today’s Pensions Expert, formerly Pensions Week, says:
“the concept of your pension pot following automatically to a new employer is now not far off. The long-term benefits of people having ‘one big fat pension pot’, as the minister likes to call it”—
I think the Minister he is referring to is my right honourable friend Steven Webb—
“will be greater consumer engagement, more informed decisions, greater buying power and better pension outcomes. All well worth striving for”.
Baroness Sherlock
I thank the Minister for that response and am also very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this discussion. The noble Lord joked at the beginning that the Turner commission had been quorate. I think when he reads Hansard he may find that slightly less funny than it seemed on the face of it. If I was sitting where he was sitting and two-thirds of the members of the pensions commission told me that I had got this wrong—auto-enrolment and all that flowed from it was based on their recommendations—I would be thinking very hard indeed at this point.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Turner, for what seemed to me a pretty damning indictment of the fact that, although we may share an objective, the way the Government are going about trying to achieve this will not tackle the very grave consequences of market failure in the pensions market for savers who are depending on the results of those investments for their retirement income. As my noble friend Lady Turner pointed out, that is one of the most significant issues facing not just the Government but, frankly, this Committee.
I am sorry. I have a great deal of respect for the Minister but I am afraid that he was unable to answer the major questions that came up today. I do not blame him for that. He did not invent the policy: it was invented in another place and he is doing a good job of defending it. But the fundamental questions are out there unanswered. The noble Lord, Lord Turner, pushed home the consequences of that market failure on high costs and charges and what that does to savers’ incomes, and the fact that, despite the Government's best intentions, pot follows member simply does not contain within it the means for addressing that.
The noble Lord also pointed out the consequence of what happens to savers’ incomes in retirement of not getting that right now. Those effects will run for a long time. I was very grateful for the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham. Given the origins of this Bill, I thought it was a brave and helpful intervention. But the questions that he posed about how pot follows member can deal with old pots and multiple moves are still sitting on the table. It will be interesting to hear whether there is some small movement on auto enrolment pots, but we will still have the issue of significant numbers of dormant small pots.
We still do not have an answer, as my noble friend Lady Drake pointed out, to the problem of people who are leaving the labour market altogether either to become self-employed or simply to leave the labour market. What happens to those pots?
We did not really get an answer as to why, when so much of the Bill is remarkably loose, the Government suddenly get very prescriptive in this area and solely specify PFM on the face of the Bill. As my noble friend Lady Drake pointed out very powerfully, there are some major difficulties of implementation. The Minister is calling for speed and action now. He must know that the barriers to implementation described by my noble friend Lady Drake are such that he is not in a position to press that button now. If he is, he might want to respond to the questions that she posed about the IT challenges, the standardisation challenges, the huge issues of implementation and the need to build consensus across the industry to prioritise savers’ interests. If he feels that the Government have all those cracked, I encourage him to stand up and intervene and tell me now. Otherwise, there is a lot more work to be done. All this amendment is trying to do is to make sure that that work does not abandon the alternative option—which may in the end be the saving of our shared objective—when there is no need to do so at this stage.
I am also concerned about some of the points that the Minister raised in response to there being no single model. I would be very happy to work with the Government to see if we can build consensus around a single model of an aggregator. If that is what the Minister offers, let us work together to try to do that.
The Minister said that there would be more consolidation in pot follows member. Leaving aside for one moment the serious concerns about the judgment made in the impact assessment raised by my noble friend Lady Drake and the noble Lord, Lord Turner, if pot follows member does not tackle the full range of risks that have been described, then that simply does not answer the question. The Minister again gave an argument that most annuity providers would require a minimum level of pot and the point of decumulation, but again he did not take on the point made by my noble friend Lady Drake, which is that being able to buy in bulk in the market, which an aggregator could do at the point of decumulation, actually opens up whole opportunities in that area.
He made the point about good and bad schemes and that there should not be any bad schemes. I completely agree with him, but there are 200,000 pension schemes in this country. The chances of getting all those up to an optimum level before this is introduced are frankly unrealistic. Given that, the point made by my noble friend Lady Drake stands even more strongly. Even if the Government could guarantee to get all those schemes up to what they would regard as an acceptable minimum standard in the context of the criticism of market failure made by the noble Lord, Lord Turner, and even if they could do that fast, there will still be a significant difference between the best and worst returns. For reasons I will explain in a moment, that seems to be very difficult in the context of auto enrolment.
I was pleased that the Minister managed to find some backing for his scheme from a survey. Did he say that the survey was conducted by the ABI?
Baroness Sherlock
That is marvellous. So the ABI backs a scheme and the survey conducted by the ABI backs the scheme. That is excellent. I think it still leaves out some possibility that there may be other people out there who do not back the scheme. Perhaps it was the other way round. Either way, I think it is the same point made differently. None the less, I take the point and thank him for sharing that with us.
The Minister also made the point that there will be real attractions—and he quoted someone from Legal & General saying that it was clear that the direction of travel from the Government was for pot follows member. There are—but, of course, this is a Bill, not an Act. It is open to Parliament to make a decision if it does not agree with what the Government are proposing, and so far this Committee clearly does not agree with what the Government are proposing. Not one person who has spoken backed the Government’s plan; all backed the alternative. So we still have an opportunity. He also went on to say that many advantages have been mentioned of people having one big, fat pension pot. Of course, there is no reason why that big, fat pension pot could not be sitting in a well performing, well regulated, successful aggregator.
That takes us to the fact that we have two significant public policy dilemmas or issues. The challenge that we have here is made all the more significant by the fact that it comes on the back of auto-enrolment. This is not an individual employee making a choice to go to a pension fund, place their money in it and take their risks in the market. This is somebody who is not choosing, but is simply choosing a job, and by doing so will be forced by default, if they make no other choice, automatically, without their express consent, their pension pot will be moved from their previous employers to their new employers. That is in the context whereby already the state has auto-enrolled them. So step one, without any active consent, we have auto-enrolled them in a pension scheme. Step two, when they move jobs, without any active consent we default moving it with them to the new employer. Doing that in a context where the level of return that they might have expected to gain with the old employer could, potentially, be significantly higher than that which might be enjoyed with the new employer, creates the possibility that the state is creating consumer detriment on a significant scale. That is a very serious challenge, and in that context I suggest that the Government’s proposal of pot follows member has a very high bar to pass.
Finally, the other public policy point is that, if one of the consequences of this is that significant numbers of savers end up with lower retirement incomes than they might otherwise do, that is bad for them, but it is also bad for us as a country. I think that my noble friend Lady Drake quoted from the impact assessment, which suggested that the gains and losses would balance out across the piece. Even if that is true, and I do not know the impact assessment well enough to be sure—I do not have enough confidence in it yet to be confident of that—that does not help us individually. On average, the life expectancy may be X, but if mine is significantly below and yours is significantly higher, the difference matters quite a lot to me, because although on average we may both die at 84, if I die at 60 and you die at 100, that does not make me happy. So the consequences for individuals are really quite significant.
Given all that, there is also the fact that the distribution will mean that, if savers do not go into retirement with the kind of incomes that the Government expect them to have, the whole strategy for retirement on which this is predicated begins to be called into question. So this whole Bill is predicated on an assumption that future generations of savers will have higher retirement incomes because of all these actions taken. It is, therefore, absolutely incumbent on all of us to make sure that the Government get this right. All this amendment does is to put the aggregator option into the Bill. I urge the Minister to accept it and to work with us in doing that. We will definitely return to this matter at a later stage but, since this is the Moses Room, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.