Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 13A, 13B and 15A. I have spoken on the principles associated with complexity and length in previous groups, and indeed my amendments echo my Amendment 17 in group 4, on which I have already spoken. The amendments would require, before a “judge alone” trial were ordered, that the case would genuinely be of sufficient complexity to warrant a trial by judge alone and would have a potential length of at least five months.

A great deal has been said about complexity, but I would just like to make some points about length. I do not accept that the likely length of a trial is itself any reason for abandoning a jury trial. First, it is the universal practice of judges to ask potential jurors when the jury is empanelled whether a very long trial would cause them serious difficulties. In the event of an affirmative answer from particular jurors, they are generally not required to serve for that trial. Indeed, I have never heard of a judge forcing a juror to attend who has serious difficulties on the ground of length and not accepting that reasoning.

Secondly, I suggest that jury expenses could be increased to permit jurors after a set number of weeks to serve on longer trials without significant financial disadvantage. If there were significant financial disadvantage, that would bring into play the judge forgiving the juror the right to attend that I mentioned earlier. Thirdly, I do not accept that length of trial, of itself, makes a trial unworkable in the absence of other factors. The very fact that we have had so many very long trials over recent years successfully tried and concluded with juries bears that out.

Finally, the length of trials can be, and I think often should be, better controlled by ensuring that charging decisions are made with a view to ensuring that unnecessary charges are not brought or pursued to trial, particularly when they would not lead to longer sentences, and evidence and the presentation of evidence are planned, contained and carefully organised with a view to keeping the length of trial under control. It is a relatively new idea that length of trial, of itself, should be a reason for dispensing with a jury and, frankly, without a great deal more evidence, I would reject that notion.

In view of our position generally on “judge alone” trials being ordered and, in particular, in view of what is going to be debated in forthcoming groups about the type of offences being added to, at this stage we will certainly be supporting the stand part propositions from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, in this group. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, I should advise the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 14 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I wonder whether at this point I might make a general point about the issues we are discussing. If ever I have seen a case of having your cake and eating it, this is it. Having listened to the Minister’s response to my Amendment 32, it is breathtaking to see the Government’s response to that compared with Clause 3. The amendment of Section 42A in Clause 3—on page 6 in subsection (4) —allows the prosecution and the defendant an opportunity to make representations. So the Government want to allow the defence, if they feel like it, to make representations that there should be a trial by judge alone. As it happens, I am with the Government on this; I agree with them on Clause 3 in broad terms. But I suggest that calling on principle as the justification for what they are doing in relation to these sorts of cases and the broader range of cases I referred to in my Amendment 32 is pretty hypocritical.