Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Ludford
Main Page: Baroness Ludford (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Ludford's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to support Amendment 70, to which I was pleased to add my name, but I will first speak in support of other amendments which provide for a time limit for detention.
I first encountered this issue as a member of the inquiry into detention by the APPGs on Refugees and Migration, which reported in 2015. The evidence we received convinced me of the case. It is frustrating that, despite a wide consensus in favour of a time limit—including among a number of very senior Conservative MPs—we are still having to argue the case five years on. I hope that the Minister is not going to trot out the usual Home Office line that the law does not allow for indefinite detention, an assertion based on semantics. She knows full well that by “indefinite”, we mean “without fixed or specified limit”—to quote one dictionary definition.
It is the absence of a fixed or specified limit that is so problematic. In particular, it has been shown to contribute to serious mental distress among detainees, a point made in the literature review conducted for the original Shaw report, and reinforced by subsequent reports, including by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Home Affairs Committee and, most recently, by the Jesuit Refugee Service this year. That report emphasises the trauma experienced by detainees, which stretches beyond the period of detention itself and is relived indefinitely over the years to come. It found that the lack of a time limit laid down was particularly problematic, and that
“not knowing when one would be released was central to an uncertainty that pervaded the experience of detention. Both long detention and the indefinite nature of detention were also seen as increasing the injustice of its practice.”
When debate on this amendment started, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked the Committee to imagine how we would feel with that uncertainty—that draining away of hope. Gabby—not her real name—a woman helped by Women for Refugee Women, to which I pay tribute for its work in this area, put it powerfully. She said that
“indefinite detention destroys people. People who are imprisoned in detention already have mental health issues when they get locked up—and the longer you stay there, the worse it gets. My hair started falling out, and I had flashbacks to what happened to me before”—
she was referring to having been trafficked—
“Not knowing when you will be released had such an effect on me. I kept thinking: will I be kept here forever?”
I know the Minister will retort that no one is detained for ever—her definition of “indefinite”—but that is how it can feel when you do not know when it will end, which is the usual definition of “indefinite” in this context. Gabby was in Yarl’s Wood, and it is welcome that no woman is now being held there. Can the Minister say if any women are being detained elsewhere and, if so, where and how many? If she cannot answer now, will she write to the Committee afterwards?
The release of many detainees into the community in recent months demonstrates that detention does not have to play such a significant role in the immigration system—a point made powerfully by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the other day. In this context, will the Minister update the Committee on how the alternatives to detention pilot is going?
Turning to Amendment 70, damage to mental health is a common thread in the case for all these amendments. It was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, when he introduced the amendment. Medical Justice, to which I am also grateful for a briefing, wrote about the “devastating” health impact of segregation. It says that it has been found to lead to increased rates of anxiety, perceptual disorder, hallucinations, paranoia and suicidal thoughts, as well as serious physiological effects. The mental health risks for those with pre-existing conditions and other vulnerabilities are especially high. In particular, anyone who has suffered segregation as part of past torture might be re-traumatised by it.
Medical Justice also makes the point that segregation can be counterproductive. The Government’s argument that restrictions on segregation would jeopardise IRCs’ safety and security serves to ignore the deeper systemic problems that contribute to the “need” to remove people from association—for example, poor standards of healthcare, abusive or bullying attitudes or behaviour, oppressive regimes and the impact of indefinite detention itself. If the Home Office addressed these systemic problems, fewer people might behave in such a way as to call for segregation. The Home Office does not publish data on the use of segregation of vulnerable people. Could the Minister explain what they do not and commit to publishing this data?
Finally, as I read the Minister’s complacent response to the amendment in the Commons Committee alongside the briefing for Medical Justice, it seemed like the Minister was living in a parallel universe from the organisation on the ground. Indeed, the Member who moved the amendment made a similar point. I am confident that the noble Baroness will not display the same complacency, but I hope she will accept that there is a real problem here that must be addressed, even if she is not willing to accept the amendment itself.
My Lords, the campaign for a time limit on detention has deservedly gathered pace over the past 10 years. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, mentioned, two parliamentary committees reporting in 2019—the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Home Affairs Committee—urged a 28-day limit. The Joint Committee on Human Rights made two important points. The first was that indefinite detention—the noble Baroness dealt with that term—
“causes distress and anxiety and can trigger mental illness and exacerbate mental health conditions where they already exist.”
Secondly, it pointed out that
“the lack of a time limit on immigration detention reduces the incentive for the Home Office to progress cases promptly which would reduce both the impact on detainees, and detention costs.”
It therefore called for a 28-day limit.
The Home Affairs Committee pointed out that some people are being held for more than three years, which is intolerable. It said:
“Failure to provide justification for continued detention will only compound detainees’ frustration and may lead to self-harm and violence in immigration removal centres.”
It welcomed the Home Secretary’s commitment at the time that he—that must have been Mr Javid—would
“consider ending indefinite immigration detention in response to Stephen Shaw’s follow up report.”
It went on to say that
“a maximum immigration detention time limit is long overdue … lengthy immigration detention is unnecessary, inhumane and causes harm.”
I understand that the Government’s policy guidance says that there should be no detention without a realistic prospect of removal, but this appears to be routinely breached.
My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 43 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and to speak to other amendments in this group. Amendment 43 seeks to remove paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act in relation to EEA and Swiss nationals, and there is a reason why it is drafted only in relation to EAA and Swiss nationals.
These Benches and others have consistently opposed the suppression of data protection rights of migrants and free movers, which paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 imposes. My noble friend Lady Hamwee made a very powerful speech when moving an amendment on Report of the Data Protection Bill to remove said paragraph, which she said was “very far-reaching indeed” and even
“gives scope for quite considerable fishing expeditions.”—[Official Report, 13/12/17; col. 1588.]
One of the safeguards lacking from the Data Protection Act is the protection of Article 8, on data processing, of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Because the Government refused to include the charter as retained EU law on exit, all we have is the European Convention on Human Rights, and once again there are rumblings about the ECHR. Yesterday, the headline in the Sunday Telegraph—I had to go out and buy it, which was rather galling, because it is behind a paywall—was:
“Boris Johnson set to opt out of human rights laws”
and that meant the convention. Here we go again. The Sunday Telegraph reported that Mr Dominic Cummings, no less, has previously attacked the European Court of Human Rights, and
“has warned that voters would expect the jurisdiction of European judges to end in the UK as part of the Brexit process”—
those pesky European judges. At least the newspaper had the grace to add that the ECHR and court were not part of the EU system, but there is that attempt to cross over and interlink the whole time. There is a connection between the UK’s adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Brexit process, in the sense that the Government are resisting giving the EU a formal undertaking to adhere to the convention. The Justice Secretary told a radio programme this weekend:
“The idea that we’re going to leave the convention is for the birds.”
The trouble is, one might have thought the same about the idea that the Government might renounce part of the withdrawal agreement—until they did, in the Bill being debated in the other place this afternoon. Indeed, in April 2016, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, said:
“The case for remaining a signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights, which means Britain is subject to the European court, is not clear.”
She said the case was not clear and she, of course, was subsequently Prime Minister.
The deputy counsel to the Joint Committee on Human Rights advised that implementing the GDPR—the general data protection regulation, the EU’s data protection law—would arguably not be enough on its own to ensure a data adequacy finding for the UK if the Data Protection Bill fell short of standards required by Article 8 of the charter. You can double this if our membership of the European Convention on Human Rights is also at risk. The knock-on effect if the UK fails to get a data adequacy decision will mean that the prospects for law enforcement co-operation with the EU, or business transfers of data to EU and EEA countries, will be dim indeed. This point was made repeatedly in proceedings on the Data Protection Bill and, indeed, on various Brexit Bills in this House. The weakness of human rights safeguards makes the loss of data protection rights for migrants even more significant.
I thank noble Lords for the points that they have made on these amendments. Perhaps I may address Amendments 43 and 72 together, as they both concern data protection.
I appreciate the concerns to protect data subjects’ rights and to ensure that data sharing for immigration control or enforcement purposes does not prevent people living in this country accessing public services to which they are perfectly entitled. However, I cannot agree to these new clauses, because they would not be proportionate or constructive amendments to the Bill, or indeed address the concerns behind the amendments, and I shall say why.
They would restrict immigration authorities in performing their lawful duties in respect of immigration control, including being able to confirm a person’s immigration status, and they would be unable to prevent potential prejudice to the immigration system. Essentially, the new clauses would expressly prohibit the Home Office from using a necessary and lawful exemption in the Data Protection Act 2018, should it have cause to do so. The immigration exemption has been debated previously in this House and concerns raised have been addressed on those occasions.
The exemption applies to restrict specified data subjects’ rights where the maintenance of effective immigration control, or the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control, are likely to be prejudiced. Rightly, it should apply to anyone who is subject to immigration control, including EEA and Swiss citizens. The new clause proposed in Amendment 43 would therefore constitute a difference in treatment on the grounds of nationality. We do not believe that that can be justified, as one purpose of the Bill is to ensure that there will be no difference in treatment between EEA citizens and those from the rest of the world when it comes to immigration policy.
Amendment 72 would have a similar effect in creating a difference in treatment based on nationality. The effect of the amendment in the clause would be to maintain the current position, so that one particular aspect of the compliant environment—data sharing—would not apply to those who now benefit from free movement. The amendment would have no effect as far as non-EEA citizens are concerned, and data collected in relation to them could still be used for immigration control or enforcement purposes, thereby treating them unequally under the law.
With regard to the immigration exemption dealt with in Amendment 43, it might help if I expand on the safeguards built into the Data Protection Act. The exemption can be applied only on a case-by-case basis and only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. It cannot be, and is not, used to target any group of people, be they EEA citizens or otherwise. Nor does the application of the exemption set aside all data subjects’ rights; it sets aside only those listed in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2. A further limitation is that the exemption can be applied only where compliance with the relevant rights will be likely to prejudice the maintenance of effective immigration control. This “prejudice” test must be applied first, and, as a result, the situations in which the exemption can be used are significantly limited. The noble Lord, Lord Oates, asked me to give numbers. I cannot do so at this point, but I will see whether I can access them.
Furthermore, the exemption may be applied only so long as the prejudice can be seen to be evidenced and must be removed thereafter. It is not used to restrict access to personal data that would allow a person to further a claim; it is used only where we need to restrict access to sensitive data—for example, details of ongoing enforcement operations.
The exemption has been found to be lawful by the courts, and the ICO has issued robust guidance on how and when it may be used—guidance that the Home Office adheres to. Furthermore, the Home Office has robust safeguards and controls in place to ensure that data is handled securely, lawfully, ethically and in accordance with all relevant data protection regulations. I say again that the Home Office must at all times comply with the GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 when data is shared.
Similar to Amendment 72, Amendment 74 seeks to limit the use of data. To reiterate the points that I made to noble Lords during the recess, I reassure them that the services that we provide to third parties for checking immigration status information about EU settlement status can be accessed and used only to check an individual’s immigration status and the rights associated with that status.
I will explain how users can view and prove their immigration status under the EU settlement scheme. Individuals can authenticate securely on the “view and prove your settled or pre-settled status” online service, where they can view their immigration status information and choose to share it with third parties for a variety of reasons. To take the example of right-to-work checks, the individual selects the option to share their right-to-work information and is given a time-limited code, which can be emailed or given to the employer. The employer uses the share code, along with the individual’s date of birth, to access just the information needed to confirm the individual’s eligibility to work, via the “view a job applicant’s right to work details” service on GOV.UK. The information provided to the employer can be previewed by the individual and contains only information relating to their right-to-work entitlements, along with the individual’s name and facial image for verification purposes and the expiry date of the leave, where appropriate. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who asked me to reiterate this point, is satisfied with my explanation.
For other services such as health, benefits and banking, users can share basic information about their status under the settlement scheme and the process works in exactly the same way. Checking organisations can access the information on a time-limited basis, via the “check someone’s settled or pre-settled status” service. The information provided in this service represents the minimum amount of data required for those checking organisations to perform their duties, and again includes the individual’s name, facial image, the leave they have been granted and the expiry date where applicable.
Third parties do not have access to the immigration database. An individual must choose to share their immigration status through the “view and prove” service before it can be viewed by third parties such as employers. Picking up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, the police do not have access to the EU settlement scheme or the immigration database, but we are working with other parts of government to develop system checks to share immigration status for specific purposes such as health and benefits. For example, we will provide information to the National Health Service to support it in establishing whether an individual is entitled to access free healthcare.
I hope that noble Lords are now assured that we are committed to delivering immigration status services for the purposes of checking immigration status information only. These services have been designed to protect the personal information of those with EU settled status and have been built around GDPR principles, including that of data minimisation, ensuring that the information available to third parties is only what is absolutely necessary. I hope that, with those words, the noble Baroness is happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her answers but the first is, again, the disingenuous objection that the amendment focuses only on Swiss nationals and is therefore discriminatory on the grounds of nationality. I repeat something that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said at least twice: it is up to the Government to extend it to all migrants if they wish.
Can the Minister tell us—she may have to write to me—whether any other EEA countries have exempted immigration data in their implementation of the general data protection regulation? Also, she said that the Data Protection Act was compliant with GDPR, but that remains to be seen. I think it is doubtful because that regulation, which I worked on as an MEP, provides no blanket exclusion of immigration data. The Minister did not respond on the prospect of a data adequacy decision from the European Commission. Winning this decision is of huge significance to our security and our businesses.
The combination of this part of the Data Protection Act, not retaining the charter and constant noises about the European convention is not designed to increase the confidence of the European Commission in granting a data adequacy decision. Not getting that will seriously prejudices the chances of the cross-border police co-operation that is vital to this country. The UK has made a huge contribution in that area in building up the EU justice and security measures, as was shown when Theresa May was Home Secretary about six years ago and we had the mass opt back in to all the vital measures. If we are unable to continue that, we will not be able to access information required to catch serious criminals and it will prejudice the security of British citizens. Also, if we do not get a data adequacy decision, it will be much more difficult for businesses to transfer data across the EEA—tech businesses are particularly reliant on data—using other, clunkier routes.
Already, a shadow has been cast on the ability to get a data adequacy assessment by the surveillance provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act and others; that has been the subject of several court cases in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. It is dangerous to undermine further the chances of a data adequacy decision. There are higher things than the Home Office’s wish to have constant access to this data.
Hope springs eternal. I thank the Minister for what she said on Amendment 74, which I will read carefully in Hansard. Unfortunately, she is not giving me any comfort on the other amendments, including Amendment 43, which I moved. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I offer the Green group’s support for all the amendments in this group. We have already had a strong, informative debate, so I will not take up very much of the time of your Lordships’ House.
I wish to address a couple of points. On Amendment 46, on comprehensive sickness insurance, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, powerfully and clearly set out the discriminatory effects of this surprising—possibly illegal—application of the rules. I am particularly concerned about the differential gender impact: invariably, it is women in caring situations who do not have their own income who will be affected by this.
I want to speak briefly to Amendment 44 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This can be described only as a modest and reasonable request for transparency, democracy and scrutiny from the Government. It asks them to show what their plans are for looking after the group—that will inevitably, by definition, be made up of more vulnerable people—affected by the inability to apply for settled status within the deadline. Debating this amendment in the other place, as well as in your Lordships’ House, would be a chance for scrutiny, as well as constructive engagement, the pointing out of flaws and making suggestions for improvement. Will the Minister consider this? We can assume, I hope, that we will receive many assurances from the Government about how they intend to use the right to late applications. The Government clearly already have in mind how this is going to look, so surely it would not be that difficult to set it out on paper.
I want to briefly follow on from what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, said about technology. These days, what people have to do practically and how they manage their lives is increasingly digital. Maybe you have put a reminder to yourself in a digital calendar to do something. The deadline is there and you have done the right thing, but we all know that sometimes technology goes wrong: computers die and people lose passwords. The Government should be able to ensure a steady recording and reminder process. They do not perhaps always have a great record when it comes to IT projects, but this should not be very difficult or very costly. It would provide people with a security blanket, which is what all these amendments seek to do. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said in her introduction, we are talking here about enabling people to exercise the rights to which they are entitled. Surely that is something that the Government want to make as easy and practical as possible.
My Lords, this group of amendments, and the later group on the grace period, are somewhat interrelated. However, as I will not be speaking to that group, I want to make all my remarks now.
Amendments 44, 45 and 46, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, with support from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and the noble Lord, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth, on Amendment 46, are designed to address concerns about late applications and the need for the EU settlement scheme to remain open. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has fully explained, it would ensure that those granted pre-settled status get a reminder of the need to apply for full status and can, in the meantime, enjoy access to social assistance and housing. It would also rule out a retrospective requirement for private health insurance, which is what comprehensive sickness insurance means in this context, if a person with settled status applies for citizenship. I also fully support all the comments made by my noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham.
A week ago, in a debate on applications for citizenship, the Minister told us that
“if people who were previously here as a student, or as self-sufficient, lack this”—
“this” being CSI—
“it does not mean that an application will be refused. The British Nationality Act allows for discretion to be applied around this requirement in the special circumstances of a particular case.”—[Official Report, 7/9/20; col. 579.]
I do not think we were told what the nature and criteria of the exercise of this discretion would be. Perhaps the Minister can tell us a bit more about this.
I have received a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford.
My Lords, I will have to read what the Minister has said when I pore over Hansard, but I do not think that I am reassured in relation to the grace period SI. This SI refers to how the provisions of the EEA regulations 2016 continue to have effect despite the revocation of those regulations by this Bill—but it is the EEA regulations, unlike Appendix EU for the settlement scheme, which require CSI.
In accordance with the promise made by the then Home Secretary Theresa May in 2017, CSI would not be required as part of a settlement scheme application, but the grace period SI, by referring to the EEA regulations, as opposed to the rules under Appendix EU, that is EU settlement scheme rules, appears to be reintroducing the requirement for CSI. This is complicated and perhaps I have not properly understood it, and I will have to pore over what the Minister says.
Representatives of the 3 million were told by an official at the end of last week that there appeared to be a mistake, although this is only hearsay—perhaps this official did not understand any more than I did—but immigration lawyers who are trying to advise EU citizens on this think there is a problem. Referring to the EEA regulations incorporates a requirement for CSI—that is to say private health insurance—which has not been required during the settlement scheme application to date, but suddenly, in the grace period, it will be. Citizenship will also be required, but there is a discretion for that. Unlike for citizenship, there does not even appear to be a discretion to exempt it for settled status.
Clearly, the Minister, who is shaking her head at me, thinks I have continued to misunderstand this, but I remain less than reassured, and I hope I will manage to get it clearer in my own head. Perhaps more importantly, people whose profession it is to understand the EEA regulations and the settlement scheme, as opposed to a mere legislator, might be reassured by the Minister’s words, and I will defer to her.
I hope the noble Baroness takes a look at Hansard. These are not the easiest things that we are discussing, but I understand the grace period SI does not affect the criteria for the EUSS status. The SI is protecting the EEA rights of those who have them at the end of the transition period. I know we will speak further, and I know that she will read Hansard, but I hope in reiterating that point again, she will feel happy that the amendment is withdrawn.
My Lords, previous speakers have forcefully made the case on this question. When you really think about it in the round, it really is quite extraordinary the degree of charges in fees imposed on people by the immigration system. We discussed on earlier occasions the fact that fees on immigration applications for visas are set well above the administrative cost of processing those applications. On top of that, obviously, people pay tax and national insurance. Then we are to impose the health surcharge on top of that, as an additional tax on people who have come here not to be on holiday and swan around but to work and contribute to life in this country. It seems a kick in the teeth that, even if you work in parts of the health or social care system—and I shall come on to that—you have to pay to use the services in the premises that you work in. That seems quite extraordinary, and it might be looked back on as such in future.
The Government have, of course, announced that healthcare staff who qualify for their new NHS visa will be exempted from paying the surcharge, but other healthcare and social care staff will still have to pay up front. People like cleaners and porters will be forced to pay thousands of pounds for the period of their visa. The visa cost is rising in October to £624 and payment has to be made for every year the visa covers, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark itemised that. It could amount to over £6,000, if my memory is correct—I cannot remember the exact figure; it is getting a wee bit late—for a family of four with a three-year visa. That could cause considerable financial hardship on top of visa renewal fees that they are trying to save up for, then having to pay for the immigration health charge. They may also be subject to “no recourse to public funds,” which we discussed in the last group. It is not a double or triple whammy—it is a quadruple whammy, I think.
The amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, are thoroughly justified, as is Amendment 65, which my noble friend Lady Jolly spoke to so eloquently. The contribution of volunteers to the health and social care system is obviously considerable, and it does not seem right to make them pay the immigration health surcharge. I hope the Government will find some compassion in their response this evening.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for tabling Amendments 54 and 55 and to the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, for tabling Amendment 65. As noble Lords have noted, in May the Prime Minister asked the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care to exempt NHS and care staff from the immigration health charge, because of the exceptional contribution that they make to healthcare in this country. This exemption will apply to relevant applications and, once our new immigration system is in place, will apply regardless of nationality.
Given that broader scope, we feel that Amendment 54 is unnecessary. On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, on volunteers, the Department of Health and Social Care is developing guidance on who will be eligible to apply for the surcharge reimbursement scheme and will publish that shortly. That involves consultation with the sector, but I would be happy to agree to the meeting that she requested in the meantime to discuss this with the Minister.
I am pleased to say that applicants for the new health and care visa, which was launched on 4 August, are automatically exempt from the charge, in that a draft statutory instrument incorporating this exemption has been laid before Parliament. Those professions eligible to apply for this visa include doctors, nurses and other critical health and care staff. The visa also includes reduced visa fees, and dependent family members are also able to benefit from that. The Department for Health and Social Care is working on a reimbursement scheme for staff in the health and care sector who either do not meet the requirements of the health and care visa or are in the UK on a different visa. More details on that scheme will be published in due course.
We have a fantastic service in our National Health Service. It has been provided by people from all over the world from, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, pointed out, its inception, before we joined what became the EU, and that will be the case long after we leave it. The immigration health surcharge is designed to help support this by ensuring that temporary migrants who come to the UK for more than six months make a fair contribution to the wide range of NHS services available to them. Income from the charge contributes to the long-term sustainability of a health service of which we are all, especially at the moment, justifiably proud. It has raised approximately £1.5 billion in much-needed income for the NHS since its introduction in 2015 to the end of the financial year 2019-20. This income has been shared between the four devolved health administrations in line with the Barnett formula, helping to fund the National Health Service across the UK.
We are introducing a new single immigration system once free movement ends, and our expectation is that people of all nationalities, including those from EEA countries, will pay the surcharge if they are staying for temporary periods of longer than six months, unless an exemption applies. Certain groups of people are exempt from the requirement to pay the surcharge, including those on the health and care visa. Others benefit from a discounted rate. Meanwhile, as I am sure noble Lords will appreciate, the Government are in the process of negotiating reciprocal arrangements with the European Union, and it is important that we do not undermine those negotiations through this Bill.
Amendment 55, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, seeks to exclude NHS employers from having to pay the immigration skills charge, where they are recruiting EEA or Swiss citizens. The Migration Advisory Committee has previously supported, in its September 2018 report on the impact of EEA migration in the UK, the continued application of the skills charge without exemptions for particular sectors, alongside salary thresholds as a way to protect against employers using migrant labour to undercut the domestic workforce. The Government stand by this requirement. Immigration must be considered alongside investment in, and development of, the UK’s resident workforce. This is all the more important in the face of any uncertainty caused by the current Covid-19 pandemic.
For the reasons set out, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment tonight.