Dormant Assets Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Kramer
Main Page: Baroness Kramer (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Kramer's debates with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I welcome the Minister to his first outing on the Bill. Before I get into the body of the amendment, I perhaps ought to declare an interest. I am a member of several boards of charities, and I work for a charity, so I am rather hoping that if we endorse this amendment, those charities might at some point benefit from it. Nevertheless, it is an interest to be declared.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for leading this debate in Committee, when he proposed what could be called a “full-fat” version of the community wealth fund initiative. In Committee, the Government argued that the local trust proposals, while interesting, are not sufficiently worked through, meaning that the DCMS is not in a position to make community wealth funds a beneficiary of dormant asset funds at this time.
Amendment 1 suggests a reasonable compromise and, on that basis, we hope that the Minister will be able to accept the amendment. The text would give the Government the power to establish a long-term pilot scheme, enabling small-scale investments to be made in local communities that have been left behind in recent years and for data relating to the social impact of those investments to be gathered and analysed. The amendment does not compel Her Majesty’s Government to act but gives them the tools needed to commission such a pilot.
The Government’s stated commitment to the levelling- up agenda was very much at the centre of their 2019 election campaign and, of course, they have subsequently argued strongly in favour of levelling up in many different guises and fora—we await anxiously, with bated breath and much anticipation, the arrival of the White Paper—so it is hard to see any reason why DCMS should exclude itself from that policy process and not agree to trial the community wealth fund approach.
My argument is simply that the proposal could act as a powerful tool in boosting deprived areas, putting small sums of money in communities’ hands so that they can invest in the facilities or services that would have the most local benefit—perhaps subsidising a community hall, running adult learning classes, supporting skills and training hubs and sports facilities, and improving digital connectivity. I am sure we could all come up with a long list of things that could directly benefit communities that have been left behind and require levelling up.
The other feature of this, which speaks to the amendment, is that much of the Government’s funding so far announced for levelling-up programmes is focused from the centre, so it is directed and targeted at precise places and communities. There is nothing necessarily wrong with that, but the community wealth fund, if trialled and piloted in the right way, would put money directly into the hands of communities that sought to benefit from them, giving a sort of bottom-up approach, one that I believe most of us in your Lordships’ House would very much support.
Stakeholders have repeatedly signalled a willingness to discuss their idea with Ministers. They are realistic about the difficulties of adopting community wealth funds with a big bang approach, which in my view adds rather more weight to the proposal for a time-limited series of low-risk pilots.
Finally, while I am on this point, I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle, who has made a valedictory speech and is therefore unable to contribute to this debate. We are grateful for her support for this amendment, as well as that of the Bishops at large. We are also, of course, very grateful to the right reverend Prelate for her wider service in your Lordships’ House.
We see this amendment as part of a levelling-up agenda and a way of empowering communities, as well as an opportunity to trial new and innovative ways of funding communities. We believe that this has a low-risk attached to it but would nevertheless give a boost, and some inspiration and thinking, to local wealth creation. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very delighted to support this amendment. My colleagues and I are great believers in empowering local communities. Indeed, in my years as an MP, I saw a number of local initiatives, driven by local people and community groups, that did some extremely good work but could not cope with the mutual demands of both providing their services and fundraising, so they were unable to grow to that kind of sustainable point that was so important in the community. It seems to me that the community wealth fund gives opportunities to those new initiatives, driven by local people, targeted very much towards the members of the local community and very much reflecting local need. It would seem ideal to do this under the structure of the dormant assets programme.
I have two other reasons for feeling that this is important. Later on Report, we will address issues of oversight over the kind of programmes funded through dormant assets. But it seems to me that there is no way that that issue can be addressed without recognising that the kind of resources for the detailed scrutiny and monitoring of programmes is in short supply. It seems to me that, when you have small local programmes, a well-structured community wealth fund arrangement can put in place that administrative oversight and make sure that, locally, the funds are well spent, provide value for money and are properly targeted. So that level of administration in fact makes up for a much broader weakness, frankly, within the overall dormant assets structure.
I am also very pleased to look at a pilot approach—this will be a case of trialling, reshaping and refining—because I am concerned to make sure that the money derived from the dormant asset funds is used in addition to the kind of services that ought to be provided, whether by central or local government. It will be really important for an entity such as the community wealth fund to work in tandem with local authorities but not substituting for what they can or should be doing. We do not want duplication of administration or service, and we certainly do not want to give central government an opportunity to further reduce the resources that it provides to local authorities on the grounds that the dormant asset fund and various charitable and local civic societies will do the work in its place and not require the normal support and resource that ought to be provided.
It therefore seems to me that this is very much a win-win approach, and I hope that the Government will take it on board. The Bill is an opportunity to expand what has been a very successful programme in significant additional directions, and this is certainly one of them.
My Lords, I have my name down in support of this amendment, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said, builds on one that we debated in Committee. As is always the case, when you come back to the subject, there is a risk of a great deal of repetition, and I do not wish to try the patience of the House with a long exposé. During the debate in Committee, the Minister’s predecessor, my noble friend Lady Barran, raised some significant concerns that the Government had about the way that this might operate. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has very neatly—if I may say so without sounding patronising—answered some of the points made then.
I will repeat, in four sentences, four reasons why I am attracted to community wealth funds. They are very local and can reflect the often highly idiosyncratic needs of a particular local community. They can provide a physical space—a building—as a focus for presenting and answering those particular needs. Thirdly, they can provide an element of professional help, without which a purely voluntary organisation can struggle. Fourthly—this is most important—they can provide the long-term capital needed to answer and build answers to the very deep-seated challenges that many of these communities face.
However, as my noble friend Lady Barran said—I am sure that if I could see my noble friend’s speaking note I would see that he will repeat it in a minute—this is a new approach and the Community Wealth Fund Alliance is setting out, brimming with confidence, hope and optimism. I certainly wish it well, but there will be difficult days ahead with hard decisions about structure, approach, governance and impact. The noble Baroness will probably raise that last issue in her speech in a minute. It is dangerous if you accept too rigid an approach in primary legislation; if it subsequently turns out to be less than ideal, you are stuck with it. So there is an element of “Be careful what you wish for”.
Then there is the issue of consultation. I think many of us would say that this was a case of putting the cart before the horse. Normally you have a consultation, get the results, draft the legislation and then discuss it in the light of what has been discovered, but that has not happened here and we are going at it the other way around. Whether we like it or not, that is where we are. So I can see why, unsatisfactory though that approach is, in the circumstances, the Government cannot and do not want to pre-empt the results of that consultation.
Conversely, primary legislation, like buses, does not come along very often; the next Bill might be in another five or 10 years—it is 15 years since the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and I discussed the Charities Act, and we have had probably had one since—but we need to send a signal of our support for community wealth funds. How do we balance those issues? I suggested that if the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, replaced “must” in his original drafting with “may”, that might provide an answer that would not force the Government, the Secretary of State and my noble friend on the Front Bench to set up a community wealth fund but would provide them with an option to do so in light of the consultation when they had the full outcome available. Since the noble Lord was kind enough to make that change, I am delighted to support his amendment.
My Lords, this amendment was triggered by remarks made in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, who was the very capable Minister then who was replaced by another very capable Minister. She was very open in response to a question that had been asked quite innocently. We wanted to put in an amendment in Committee a requirement to confirm that the dormant asset money would flow to charities or recognised and formalised social enterprises.
In her response, the noble Baroness said no, that the Government wanted to make sure that the money was also available to mission-focused for-profit companies. There was general shock around the Committee, as everyone talked about the Dormant Assets Bill as providing money to charity and social enterprises, and it sent me away to Google. Perhaps others in your Lordships’ House were far less naive than I, but there is a massive business growing in the social impact arena these days, which has become very attractive to the private sector.
To give your Lordships an idea of who is coming to play in this particular arena, I will refer to one of endless websites that contain copies of similar discussions: “Mainstream venture capital … funds”—we are talking about VC funds—
“are beginning to look for a new kind of unicorn—companies that will not only provide huge financial returns”—
we are talking here about 12% returns for modest venture capital, perhaps with earlier-stage money 20% returns—
“but also create huge social impact.”
It notes London and San Francisco as two of the leading hubs for these kinds of investments.
I have no argument with a venture capitalist who puts money into social good. That is absolutely fine as far as I am concerned. But I am very concerned if that entity is seeking grants from the dormant asset fund and turning that around to enhance the returns to its investor, who is expecting a return around the 12% to 20% mark. I can see why it is extremely attractive to the for-profit company; after all, it is very hard in most circumstances for social impact to generate returns of that extraordinary size. But if there is a very significant grant coming from the dormant asset fund, one can achieve those kinds of benchmarks easily. I do not think that is the purpose that was embedded in the original Bill or the purpose which most of us who are associated with this have in mind.
The amendment is not an attempt to exclude all for-profit companies, because I understand that there are some areas where they have been very useful, for example in teaching financial literacy. It is to make sure that they are not plucking extraordinary returns as a consequence of grants from the dormant assets fund. Charities and social enterprises seeking funds and grant money may indeed find that they have some excess over the particular project that they have been working with, but their whole constitutional structure requires them to make sure that money flows back into good causes. I do not want this to turn into an opportunity for that money to flow back to large-scale investors.
As we all know, the oversight process in the Dormant Assets Bill—we will talk about this on the very last amendment—is very weak, because in the original concept the end users were going to be charities and social enterprises that were under constraint and governance of various different kinds. Therefore, an additional level of scrutiny was not a matter of significant concern. With this big expansion, and with the purposes to which the fund can be applied being essentially in the gift of the Secretary of State, this becomes a major concern.
We are all concerned about money being spent inappropriately. Nothing would be more damning to this whole process than a major scandal in which we suddenly have a newspaper describing circumstances in which money from the dormant assets fund has gone to an investor seeking very large returns. This could compromise not just that particular project but the whole programme. Frankly, I do not think that is a principle that should be allowed to proceed in this Bill, which is why I have moved this amendment.
My Lords, I rise briefly to commend the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on her alertness in uncovering this issue, and to make a very simple comparison with something that has occupied a great deal of time in your Lordships’ House lately: the water companies, and what we have seen happen with them, with, very often, hedge fund owners involved, massive profits being taken out and massive loads of debt. This is a terribly important amendment. I regret not attaching my name to it. I certainly would have done had I been alerted to it earlier. This is terribly important, and I encourage the noble Baroness to keep pushing.
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for their amendment and for their vigilance and scrutiny in this area. I am grateful also for their time the other day, when we had a helpful discussion.
Amendment 2 concerns the direction of the English portion of dormant assets funding and seeks to ensure that money cannot be used purely for profit but must have public good at its heart. It is already enshrined in primary legislation that dormant assets funding must be distributed to initiatives with a social or environmental purpose. This is a clear and core function of the scheme and it remains unchanged in the Bill. The Government of course agree that private profit is not the purpose of the dormant assets scheme.
The noble Baronesses’ concerns, as expressed in the amendment and their contributions today, relate to the scheme’s current support for social investment. As I mentioned in the debate on the previous group, dormant assets funding has provided £465 million to Big Society Capital and Access over the last 10 years. During that time, social impact investing in the UK has grown almost eightfold, increasing from £830 million in 2011 to £6.4 billion now, thanks in large part to those two organisations. It is largely by leveraging private capital alongside dormant assets that the market has been able to expand in this way, providing the voluntary, community, and social enterprise sector with access to billions of pounds of investment.
To give an example, dormant assets funding enabled Big Society Capital to invest £6 million in the Fair By Design fund, which aims to eradicate the poverty premium by 2028. Fair By Design invests in several initiatives, including some businesses with considerable impact which provide services in sectors such as energy, insurance, borrowing, transport and food, to support over 340,000 people across the country. Its work has helped those people collectively to save £12 million per year on goods and services for which they were previously paying more than those who were financially better off. The scheme advances important opportunities such as this for collaborating with the private sector and civil society organisations to amplify its impact, within the boundaries of governance structures which ensure that the money is managed appropriately.
I hope I can reassure noble Lords that robust systems are in place to ensure that the money funds projects delivered by organisations that prioritise impact. As a registered charity itself, Access employs strict eligibility criteria for its funding, which ensures that money flows only to those social enterprises and charities that it was created to support. Similarly, £2.5 billion from Big Society Capital and its co-investors is being used to support over 1,500 social enterprises and charities across the country. Both organisations apply layers of due diligence to ensure that the intermediary fund managers with whom they work also have impact embedded in their approaches. Fund managers applying for Big Society Capital funding are required to present a social impact plan during the due diligence process, and Access requires its funds to be held in finance structures that cannot be used commercially.
As these existing structures have operated effectively over the past decade, we do not consider it necessary to place in primary legislation a requirement such as that proposed by Amendment 2, though we understand the concerns the noble Baronesses had and the vigilance which led them to table it. The scheme already ensures that funds go towards organisations with the overall aim of delivering public good, and we will ensure that this continues to be the case.
Ultimately, it remains the Government’s priority to afford people the opportunity to have a say in how funds are distributed in the country, including whether social investment should remain a priority. That is why we have committed to a public consultation to welcome wide-ranging views on how these funds can best have an impact on social and environmental priorities in England. Those are the reasons we cannot accept the amendment, and I hope that the noble Baroness will be satisfied to withdraw it.
My Lords, I am glad to have raised the issue and I will be withdrawing the amendment, but I hope very much that the point that I have made will carry through into the Government’s thinking, because this is a constantly changing field. As the Minister knows, with mission-focused companies there is nothing to say that they cannot pay their directors what they like; they can pay what salaries they like and make what returns they like to their core investors. We very much hope that in the reporting requirements that he will talk about later there will be real clarity around this issue. He can expect to find quite a number of Written Questions asking him to detail those kinds of benchmarks, so that we understand what is actually happening with this dormant assets fund. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my name is attached to Amendment 4 and I would gladly support Amendment 5. Government Amendment 3 is definitely an improvement on the previous situation, which was unclear; the Government were sure they would have a public consultation but were not really required to do so.
When the original Dormant Assets Bill was passed, the purposes for which dormant assets could be used were on the face of the Bill in primary legislation. Consultation, now that the Secretary of State is in a position to expand that range significantly, is absolutely vital. In Amendment 4, we reflect some of my ongoing frustrations with consultation after consultation: they fall to the attention of the usual suspects and, indeed, the responses of the usual suspects are very often taken into serious consideration, but they never get out into the wider world. When there are lots of diverse views, perhaps supported or mentioned by only small handfuls of people because they have never occurred to others, those tend to go into the “dismiss” bucket almost immediately.
I know how difficult it is to structure a consultation that really does consult. I say that from the position of having been a Minister during the coalition years, when I wanted to use a consultation to bring in new ideas as well as to get people’s responses to possible avenues that we might go down. It was a sheer battle with my own staff to devise such a consultation and questionnaire and to leave space for open responses and gather them in. It is not the norm; I am very well aware of that. I do want to press the Minister, because this should be going to a much wider range of groups than might normally keep an eye open for a consultation —the wide range of social enterprises and charities that go out to various communities, particularly deprived communities. Those communities tend to be the least alert to the fact that there is a government consultation happening or to knowing how to respond to it.
Then there is Parliament. Most of us understand that secondary legislation is not worth the paper it is written on in terms of getting parliamentary opinion or any potential for amendment, so it is important that the relevant committees of Parliament are engaged with something as significant as this. I press the Minister: we understand that he has moved some way, but we need quality. The style is perhaps there but there is no quality or content behind it to give us full reassurance. If he will not accept Amendments 4 and 5, can he at least give us a verbal assurance of the kind of quality that we want within the consultation itself?
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I was reassured by my noble friend’s introductory speech and the deal that has been hacked out between him and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has, in part, shot my fox because I wanted to talk about the usual suspects, which she referred to. That is the danger, although I say to the signatories to Amendment 4 that it looks to me like a pretty good list of usual suspects in that amendment. I was not sure that we were not just going back down the track that we were trying to avoid going down.
My reason for supporting the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, was to make sure that we would make a big effort to get down to the smaller organisations, which often had unique insights into the problems of a particular area. From my point of view, I rather doubt whether that goes well into legislation, but it is the sort of area where a good strong ministerial Statement, given on the Floor, would reassure a lot of us that there will be words that we can go back to if the consultation does not reach as far, as deep and as wide as some of us think it should.
My Lords, this amendment deals with additionality. It was the intent of the original Bill, which placed a responsibility on the Big Lottery Fund alone to ensure that the moneys were additional to expenditures that one would expect a government department to make; I assume that means any level of department, including local authorities. That seems to be a fundamental concept which sits behind the dormant assets fund. In our early discussions, the Government constantly confirmed that the principle of additionality was an immovable one for this Act.
One should always spend some time looking at government websites. I was slightly surprised to find a government announcement from June 2021 of financial support for voluntary community and social enterprises, to enable them to respond to the coronavirus. This was a very good thing which I have no criticism of; however, according to the announcement:
“The government has pledged £750 million to ensure VCSE can continue their vital work supporting the country during the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, including £200 million for the Coronavirus Community Support Fund, along with an additional £150 million from dormant bank and building society accounts”.
In other words, that means dormant asset funds. Technically, this does not say that the Government have said to the folks at the dormant asset funds, “We want £150 million from you to support this activity, because we don’t really want to put in more than £750 million”, but it is a very grey area. Anyone reading this would assume that the Government were announcing what they would regard as the use of funds under their control.
I am very concerned, because additionality can be a very grey area. What should be the responsibility of the local authority of a particular government department? What should be the add-on which comes from the dormant assets fund, with its focus on supporting the additionality that is provided by the charity and social enterprise sectors? Therefore, I have very quickly drafted an amendment requiring the Secretary of State to certify that as far as he knows, the additionality principle is in play. I am slightly surprised that the Government have not said, “The Secretary of State only wants this to be additionality and is delighted to sign a piece of paper confirming that this is how the money will be used.”
That is the rationale behind this important amendment. From the announcement I read a moment ago, it is not difficult to see that the creep across the boundary is relatively easy. The initial dormant assets fund was under £1 billion. The new assets that will be brought into scope as a consequence of this Bill amount to a minimum of an additional £2 billion. As expansion goes beyond that, that number will keep increasing, so we are talking about very large amounts of money. The Treasury could view this as an opportunity to constrain public sector debt or to enhance particular spending programmes.
It is very important that we get an assurance from the Minister that this amendment is not needed, otherwise, it will be necessary for me to press it. I have been listening to the response from the Minister, but my noble friend Lady Barker, who is a specialist in this field and far more expert than I, will be the person who is really listening. I will see whether she is satisfied—if not, I will ask the House to pronounce on something that I believe is fundamental.
My Lords, this is an important topic. It took quite a bit of our time in Committee, has been raised again today and runs as a thread through our concerns. We have had some discussion with the Minister between stages, and useful discussion it was.
We acknowledge that additionality has been built into Amendment 7 in the next group, but we are very sympathetic to the call from the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Barker, for the Secretary of State to certify as part of the regulation-making process that funds will indeed be on top of existing government commitments. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has made quite a compelling argument. Dormant assets are going to grow. There are many other sources of dormant assets not included within the current scheme. I could see a hungry Treasury, worried about the supply of funds in the future, seeking to make use of substitute funding from dormant assets. I think we will need to be thoroughly convinced by the words of the Minister this afternoon if he is to avoid us having a further Division.
If the Government have no plans to pull accounting tricks, I would have thought that there was no issue with accepting this amendment or perhaps introducing a new text either at Third Reading or when the Bill moves to the House of Commons to put this issue beyond doubt. That is what I am listening for this afternoon and hoping to hear from the noble Lord.
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Barker, for tabling Amendment 6 on the additionality principle. I also thank the noble Baronesses for their time in the productive discussion that we had on this issue. I hope that during the course of my remarks I can reassure them and other noble Lords that the intentions of this amendment are sufficiently covered both in the 2008 Act and through the Government’s Amendment 7, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, just alluded.
The principle of additionality has successfully under- pinned the scheme since its inception and will continue to be a core principle of its distribution across the UK. In line with the proposed wording in Amendment 6, the 2008 Act already describes additionality as the
“principle that dormant account money should be used to fund projects, or aspects of projects, for which funds would be unlikely to be made available by … a Government department”
or devolved Administration. Therefore, the principle as defined by this amendment is already enshrined in legislation.
Can I just ask for some clarification? Does not that responsibility apply only to the one distributive entity—to the Big Lottery Fund, or whatever it is called—and very conspicuously not to any other distribution sources or to the Secretary of State?
Without having the 2008 Act in front of me as well as the Bill, I am afraid that I may not be able to give the noble Baroness the speedy response that she seeks.
I shall address the point that she also raised—while seeking an answer, if I can give her a definitive answer now—about the £150 million that was released last June. As she noted, the scheme released £150 million of dormant assets funding to support the response to the Covid-19 pandemic and recovery across England. That was distributed by the four spend organisations in line with the 2008 Act. In this instance, it is important to note that the funding was entirely separate from the UK-wide charity support package of £750 million, which was announced in April 2020.
The reference is in Schedule 3 to the 2008 Act—on page 24—under Part 3, headed “Reports and Accounts”, where it says in paragraph 9(3), in relation to the Big Lottery Fund:
“The report shall set out the Fund’s policy and practice in relation to the principle that dormant account money should be used to fund projects, or aspects of projects, for which funds would be unlikely to be made available by”—
and then it lists
“a Government department … the Welsh Ministers … the Scottish Ministers, or … a Northern Ireland department”.
That does not appear to apply to anything other than the Big Lottery Fund. When the 2008 Act went through, the only distribution entity was the Big Lottery Fund. There are now three others, and the new Bill anticipates potentially creating more distributors, whose responsibilities will be directed by the Secretary of State.
I fully accept that, in the original concept and structure of the Act, additionality was a fundamental underlying principle. That does not appear to have carried over into the expansion that is embedded in the new Bill. That is my concern.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that, and I hope that what I go on to say will address that point. If there is a change in distributor or an additional distributor is established, there are already powers in the 2008 Act to amend the legislation to ensure that any new or additional distributor must similarly report on their policy and practice in relation to the additionality principle. The noble Baroness is very welcome to intervene again, if I have not addressed her point.
The question to consider is not about the definition of additionality but where the accountability for that principle should lie. We fully support all the points raised in Committee regarding the fundamental importance of ensuring that the principle is adhered to, but we believe that how the 2008 Act positions the additionality principle, plus the new provisions in government Amendment 7, is the right approach to ensuring this and I welcome the opportunity to clarify why.
The Labour Government which brought in the 2008 legislation ensured that the accountability for the additionality principle lies with the named distributor responsible for all the funds across the UK, rather than the Secretary of State. This Government agree that it remains the most appropriate place for its inclusion in primary legislation. As we outlined in Committee, Schedule 3 to the 2008 Act requires the National Lottery Community Fund, the current distributor of dormant assets funding across the UK, to set out in its annual report its policy and practice in relation to the additionality principle. These reports must be laid before Parliament, and this Bill does not change that requirement. In fact, Amendment 7, to which we will come in a moment, seeks to bolster this further by requiring additionality to be included in periodic reports of the scheme’s effectiveness, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, noted. Your Lordships’ House will continue to have the opportunity to scrutinise how the National Lottery Community Fund approaches this in practice. This will ensure that funding continues to be directed to causes which fulfil the scheme’s objectives while being additional to central or devolved government funds.
As has been noted, the principle as it stands is critical to the scheme’s success, and our partners in industry have made it clear that their participation is reliant on it. As this is not central government funding, and as the Government have limited control over only the English portion, it is appropriate that the primary accountability for the principle should sit with the UK-wide distributor of the funding and its accounting officer—namely, the National Lottery Community Fund. Indeed, the fund is well versed in making this assessment, as an additionality principle also applies to its other portfolio of funds. To date, there has never been a breach of this principle of which the Government are aware.
We feel there is no evidence that the principle needs to be altered, and we believe the current approach is serving the scheme well. It has been upheld for 10 years, and we do not think it necessary or desirable to significantly change a demonstrably successful approach.
Is the Minister saying he is making a commitment from the Floor that, when additional distributors are added—and this Bill contemplates that —they will be put under the same additionality requirement as the Big Lottery Fund?
The commitment is already made in the 2008 Act. If there is a change in distributor, or if an additional distributor is established— and I should stress that there are currently no plans for that—there are already powers in the 2008 Act to amend the legislation to ensure that any new or additional distributor must similarly report on their policy and practice in relation to the additionality principle.
However, we have responded to the noble Baroness’s desire to see the Secretary of State more specifically held accountable to the principle, and we have reinforced its importance even further by including it within Amendment 7, which we will come on to shortly, on reviewing the scheme and reporting to Parliament. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said in Committee:
“We must also be able to work out from all the reporting that we do get to see that the principle of additionality is being adhered to.”—[Official Report, 21/6/21; col. GC 9.]
We thoroughly agree, which is why our Amendment 7 will ensure that the report must include any policies and practices of the principle by the Secretary of State as well as the National Lottery Community Fund. This provision responds to requests made by noble Lords that the Secretary of State should be held more expressly accountable for ensuring that and explaining how dormant assets funding is used in ways that are genuinely additional to central Government expenditure. This demonstrates our ongoing commitment to ensuring that the principle continues to be honoured, including the ways in which funding flows to distributing bodies and on to beneficiaries.
That is why we cannot accept the amendment. I hope I have reassured the noble Baronesses that we understand their concerns, and that is why we have brought forward the additionality provision in our review and reporting amendment, Amendment 7. I can see the noble Baroness is rightly consulting the 2008 Act for the references to it. I hope on that basis she will be content with what we have proposed and content to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I want to add just a word or two. My noble friend Lady Barker said that the Oversight Trust had relatively few staff; my understanding is that it has one staff member. I have great respect for the trustees; they are highly capable, totally dedicated people. But resource matters when you are dealing with a complex world. The original oversight body was designed to cope with a situation in which the amount of money in play was relatively small—under £1 billion—and the primary recipients of the end funds were going to be charities and social enterprises. The Charity Commission is involved in the disciplinary process, and there are clear structures that social enterprises have to follow if they are formally to be social enterprises.
We now all accept that the Government consider that the language allows for-profit companies to be recipients of the funds, provided they are mission focused—although nobody can tell me what mission focused looks like. If you are looking at the statutes of a particular company, there is no formal constraint on what is paid to directors in the form of salaries, no definition of acceptable returns to the original investors, and new distributors can be added. We are talking now about a pool of assets of a minimum of £2 billion, and that is just stage 1—it could easily expand to £4 billion, £7 billion, £8 billion or even £10 billion as more and more entities or organisations are captured within the scope of those eligible to provide dormant assets to the fund.
This is an attempt to ask the Government to set up a structured review to make sure that the Oversight Trust has the capacity that it needs, recognising the significant increase in complexity and responsibility. That is not in any way to denigrate anybody who is involved today with the Oversight Trust. I do not know how they do it, frankly, with one staff person. The time has come for expansion of this group, and what we are listening for from the Government is real recognition of the importance of detailed oversight.
My Lords, our colleagues on the Lib Dem Benches have made a pretty compelling case here. It is obviously good that we have the Oversight Trust but, with a staff complement of one, anything it does will be light touch. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, makes quite a lot of sense in terms of reviewing arrangements and determining whether further legislation is needed to improve its effectiveness. For that reason, we happily support this amendment.
If the Minister cannot accept the amendment as drafted, perhaps he can explain to the House how the matter is to be kept under review, and how the Oversight Trust can be strengthened to ensure that it does its work, because, clearly, oversight is very important in all of this. We need to have that assurance and guarantee that things are as they should be.
As the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Kramer, have said, Amendment 9 has been tabled with a view to ensuring that the Oversight Trust is appropriately resourced and empowered to monitor the distribution of dormant assets funding. The DCMS and the National Lottery Community Fund have worked closely with a range of partners to ensure that the right levels of accountability and transparency are in place for the organisations that are given the task of distributing dormant assets money in England. We have sought to support their independence while respecting that dormant assets funding is money which comes from the public.
The four spend organisations’ operations are regularly reviewed by the Oversight Trust, which, as the noble Baroness said, is an independent organisation that ensures accountability and transparency in each of the spend organisations’ activities. I should flag that the trust’s reviews are not conducted in-house; it commissions external experts to conduct them independently. The Oversight Trust does not intervene in day-to-day operations, which are of course the responsibility of the organisations’ boards; rather, its aim is to ensure that each remains true to its objectives, which involves having oversight of the general operations of the spend organisations, as referred to in subsection (2)(a) of the new clause proposed in the amendment. In particular, the Oversight Trust is required to ensure that the four organisations are well governed and that their strategic plans and budgets are in accordance with their objects; and to review their achievement of social impact and transparency of financial and impact reporting.
Those powers are formalised in legally binding governance contracts between the Oversight Trust and each organisation. These contracts empower the Oversight Trust, for example, to remove directors in the case of significant mismanagement; to approve any changes to remuneration policies; and to be involved in the process of appointing new chairpersons, including ratifying their formal appointment. The contracts set out the key processes to enable the Oversight Trust to fulfil these responsibilities, and the trust may make reasonable requests from each spend organisation, in addition to those set out in the governance arrangements, if necessary, to help it meet its obligations.
The Oversight Trust receives quarterly updates, conducts annual deep dives and publishes quadrennial reviews on each organisation, which is required to co-operate to ensure that it can perform its duties effectively. This includes a commitment to participate with the independent review panel and to provide any information and assistance that may be necessary. We therefore do not believe it would be necessary or appropriate to provide the Oversight Trust with further powers in legislation for it to perform its current mandate effectively.
Access to up to £500,000 per annum from the English portion ensures that it can draw on sufficient resources to fulfil these important objectives. We are confident that this enables the Oversight Trust to meet its objectives, but we continue to keep that under review. Last year the Oversight Trust published its first quadrennial review, which focused on Big Society Capital, with the review of Access following in June this year. The next review, which will be of Fair4All Finance, is due next year.
I am very glad that the noble Baroness has had the opportunity to meet the Oversight Trust. Since Committee, my noble friend Lady Barran has met the trust as well, to press the importance of in-depth quantitative impact data. The trust has been working with the four organisations that it oversees on this issue, including through its annual governance review meetings. The trust provides robust governance, transparency and accountability over the four organisations’ use of dormant assets funding in England. As ever, though, we are mindful of our commitment to consult widely and with an open mind about the best social or environmental uses of this money.
When the Government consider the outcome of this consultation, we will also need to determine the best approach to ensuring continued good governance over the scheme. This could include asking the Oversight Trust to consider expanding its role to oversee any additional bodies if necessary and appropriate. If so, we would review whether the trust would need additional resources to fulfil a broader remit. It is worth noting that the trust would not be involved in decisions around what, if any, new distributing bodies may be chosen in England.
As it is too early to pre-empt the outcome of that assessment and, given that the Oversight Trust is independent and not an arm’s-length body, I hope the noble Baronesses will agree that it would be inappropriate in the Bill to mandate its role in the way that the amendment suggests. However, we have included a requirement to report on the uses of dormant assets funding as part of the Government’s Amendment 7. The National Lottery Community Fund will also remain responsible for ensuring that funds are distributed in line with legislation. We hope that this, alongside our record to date in ensuring that the distribution of funds is appropriately monitored, will provide the noble Baronesses with reassurance that this is an area that we will continue to take very seriously.
While the Minister is on his feet, could he tell me with a straight face whether he thinks that £500,000 a year is sufficient for the wide range of responsibilities that he just described? He might wish to talk to some of his colleagues who work in the world of consultancy.
We do; we keep it under review and, if the oversight trust took on a broader role, would review whether it would need additional resources. For the reasons I have set out, we cannot accept Amendment 9, and I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw it.