Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Hamwee

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have visited several Prevent schemes and I have heard from people who are deeply mistrustful of them. That is set out in various reports from the London Assembly if noble Lords would like to look them up. It is not simply campaigning and I think that is a slur.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I cannot cite schemes but I do not think that undermines my argument because Prevent is wider than individual schemes. As it happens, I agree with the noble Lord on his first point. My amendment does not propose a separate independent reviewer and I have noticed some frustration among past reviewers at their having to be somewhat at arm’s length, or slightly detached, from Prevent because it does not fall within their terms of reference. Perhaps I may say that I hope an appointment is made soon so that there is not too much of a gap in the process.

Where was I? I quoted the noble Lord and I think he still supports the proposition. I have mentioned the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about the lack of transparency and we have just debated an amendment on that. Whether it is on individual schemes or as a result of demonisation—if that happens, that is a problem too—there is clearly mistrust of the regime; perhaps I can put it as widely as that. On sensitive issues such as this, in my view, perceptions are fundamentally important.

In evidence to the Joint Committee, the Muslim Council of Britain—I am choosing to quote the council only because it is a convenient quotation; I know it has its fans and its critics—referred to,

“an undermining of trust and human rights and civil liberties in Muslim communities. The resulting self-censorship”—

something I have heard about from others as well—

“the lack of transparency and expansion of ‘Prevent’ risk being a threat to cohesive societies that can effectively respond to terrorism”.

In oral evidence to the committee, Liberty said:

“The Government have ignored calls”—


for an independent review—

“and seek to extend and reinforce the Prevent strategy without looking back at questions like what its interaction is with other legal duties in the criminal law … How is personal information being dealt with in the Prevent programme?”.

Keeping the strategy under review internally, to anticipate what we may hear from the Dispatch Box, or by anyone seen to be close to the programme, is not enough. It needs to be someone who is accepted as being independent. A challenge—that does not mean opposition—to the Government on this is important. We need to know what is working and what is not working. Who knows? The Government could gain a great deal of credit not just from the process of review but from its outcome. However, we do not have the review to reassure us. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

My Lords, I have attached my name to this amendment because it is an issue that goes to the heart of civil liberties in this country. The Prevent strategy is of great concern to me and to tens of thousands of others, particularly campaigners and those from ethnic minorities. As a Member of the London Assembly and the Metropolitan Police Authority, I visited Prevent projects and heard from local people and the practitioners themselves. I can assure noble Lords that there is mistrust, and even distrust, of Prevent in many places. One project I saw appeared to work well, but many did not.

A person is referred for political re-education through the Prevent strategy for opposition to so-called “fundamental British values”. I think it is the Government who are undermining fundamental British values and I should be referring them to Prevent. The Government are challenging informed debate and transparent government. They cannot continue to justify Prevent with their internal Home Office reviews; it is time to shine the light of public scrutiny on the whole process.

I must ask: why would the Government say no to this amendment? If the Prevent strategy is a success, if it does not discriminate against Muslims, ethnic minorities and campaigners of all sorts, and if it does not infringe too far our rights and freedoms, what is the problem with holding a proper review and what is there to hide? An independent review would surely prove the Government’s case and force all doubters, like me, to back down. The Government would be celebrating Prevent in all its glory, not trying to cover up the facts.

In the absence of reliable assessments of the Prevent strategy, we are forced to conclude the exact opposite. The fears expressed by the Muslim Council of Britain—that Muslims are being disproportionately targeted and are increasingly fearful of unjustified state intrusion in their lives—must therefore be accurate. The concerns of social workers, teachers and academics that they have been conscripted as oppressive counterterrorism officers must be taken seriously, and the idea that the Government are wasting money and scarce police resources on chasing people who pose absolutely no threat of harm must be assumed to be true.

The Prevent definition of “extremism” is,

“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values”.

Such a broad and meaningless definition means that too many people are getting caught in a trap. I urge the Minister to adopt this amendment and prove to us sceptics that Prevent is operating lawfully and effectively. As is often said in support of the Government whenever they want to curtail our rights, “You have nothing to fear unless you have something to hide”. I therefore have to ask: what are the Government hiding?

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Hamwee

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 34 and will speak to Amendments 35, 93, 100, 101 and 102. I retabled these amendments because I think I did not make myself clear in Committee and some of the Ministers’ replies seemed confused. It was pacifying to be soothed in that way but I still have a problem. The noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said:

“All decisions relating to the processing of personal data engage an individual’s human rights, so it would not be appropriate to exclude automated decisions on this basis”.—[Official Report, 13/11/17; col. 1871.]


My point was that there is confusion between the gathering of evidence, the processing and decision-making. My amendments do nothing to inhibit automated data processing or seek to move us back to handwritten records. Automated data processing is unaffected by my amendments, which focus on decisions based on data, however the data is processed. Data could be gathered, processed and analysed completely automatically with no human involvement—a computer could even generate a recommended decision—but where human rights are engaged, the final decision must be made by a human being.

There was similar confusion in the replies of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, in regard to law enforcement and intelligence service decisions. She said that,

“the unintended consequences of this could be very damaging. For example, any intelligence work by the intelligence services relating to an individual would almost certainly engage the right to respect for private life. The effect of the amendment on Part 4 would therefore prevent the intelligence services taking any further action based on automated processing, even if that further action was necessary, proportionate, authorised under the law and fully compliant with the Human Rights Act”.—[Official Report, 15/11/17; col. 2073.]

Again, there is confusion between the processing, gathering of data and making the decision where human rights are engaged.

I repeat that my amendments allow for data to be processed automatically: they do not allow for a computer to make a decision contrary to someone’s human rights. Decision-makers can be supported by automated processing but the ultimate decisions must be made by a human being. We have to have this vital safeguard for human rights. After all the automated processing has been carried out, a human has to decide whether or not it is a reasonable decision to proceed. In this way we know where the decision lay and where the responsibility lies. No one can ever say, “We messed up your human rights. We interfered with your human rights and it is the computer’s fault”.

I am grateful to Liberty for drafting the amendments I have tabled and I hope that I have explained them fully and rather better than in Committee. I look forward to the Ministers’ replies. I feel strongly about this issue. These words have to be in the Bill so that it is absolutely clear that human rights are protected.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendments. The points that he made apply almost entirely to Amendments 91, 92 and 94, which relate to later parts of the Bill, including particularly the phraseology “solely” and in Amendment 94 “solely” or “partially”.

I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, decided to retable her amendments. What she said can be summed up as, “Human rights, so human decision”. Human beings will ensure transparency and accountability in a way that machines simply do not. The Minister smiled when the noble Baroness said that she was not sure whether she was clear on the last occasion. I rather wish that I could ask her to give us the reassurances and concessions that that smile might have indicated, but I do not know.

These issues are extremely important. I was thinking about them over the weekend and, although it sounds patronising, the Government are entirely correct to ensure that human rights are engaged in these subjects. Given how central human rights are, they cannot be thought of as an occasional peripheral, particularly not as regards law enforcement and security issues. I have come full circle to thinking that the protection of human rights should be spelled out at the start of the Bill, which would take us back to our debate on Monday about an introductory clause covering the protection of a subject where the right is not absolute because of the criteria of necessity and proportionality. I think that that should be made clear in the Bill and it would put what the noble Baroness is seeking to achieve in her amendments in the right context. I support her in this.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 75 in particular, but the whole issue of automated decision-making is extremely worrying.

As we have gone through this Bill, I have been desperately hoping that some of the most repressive bits are a negotiating tactic on the Government’s part, and that before Report they will say, “We’ll take out this really nasty bit if you let us leave in this not really quite so nasty bit”. I feel that this issue is one of the really nasty bits.

I thank Liberty, which has worked incredibly hard on this Bill and drawn out the really nasty bits. Under the Data Protection Act 1998, individuals have a qualified right not to be subject to purely automated decision-making and, to the extent that automated decision-making is permitted, they have a right to access information relating to such decisions made about them. The GDPR clarifies and extends these rights to the point that automated decisions that engage a person’s human rights are not permissible.

This could include being subjected to unfair discrimination. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, used the phrase, “unintended discrimination”—for example, detecting sexuality or diagnosing depression. The rapidly growing field of machine learning and algorithmic decision-making presents some new and very serious risks to our right to a private life and to freedom of expression and assembly. Such automated decision-making is deeply worrying when done by law enforcement agencies or the intelligence services because the decisions could have adverse legal effects. Such processing should inform rather than determine officers’ decisions.

We must have the vital safeguard for human rights of the requirement of human involvement. After the automated decision-making result has come out, there has to be a human who says whether or not it is reasonable.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I too want to say a word about Amendment 75. The Human Rights Act trumps everything. To put it another way, the fundamental rights it deals with are incorporated into UK law, and they trump everything.

Like the noble Baroness, I believe that it is quite right that those who are responsible—humans—stop and think whether fundamental human rights are engaged. The right not to be subject to unfair discrimination has been referred to. Both the Bill and the GDPR recognised that as an issue in the provisions on profiling, but we need this overarching provision. Like other noble Lords, I find it so unsettling to be faced with what are clearly algorithmic decisions.

When I was on holiday I went to a restaurant in France called L’Algorithme, which was very worrying but I was allowed to choose my own meal. If this work continues in the industry, perhaps I will not be allowed to do so next year. I wondered about the practicalities of this, and whether through this amendment we are seeking something difficult to implement—but I do not think so. Law enforcement agencies under a later part of the Bill may not make significant decisions adversely affecting a data subject. Judgments of this sort must be practicable. That was a concern in my mind, and I thought that I would articulate my dismissal of that concern.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Hamwee

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Committee may realise that there are sometimes occasions when none of us quite prepare for amendments and others where more than one of us does, but, as my noble friend knows, I rarely pass over an opportunity to say how offensive the phrase “hostile environment” is. Data protection should be a force for good in dealing with the way our society is going.

My noble friend has reminded the Committee of the provisions of paragraph 4. Over the last few years the state has extended the mechanisms for immigration control very significantly to letting of property, employment, bank accounts, driving and so on. We may be told that the various departments have memoranda of understanding between themselves with the Home Office to deal with all this, but that is an inadequate way of dealing with them. I do not think I will be the only one in the Chamber to think that. Home Office errors are reported embarrassingly frequently. The exemption covers so many rights: rights held by data subjects to access rectification and erasure, and the right to know who is processing data and why, including when data is obtained from a third party.

Liberty, with its usual energy, has provided us with 13 pages of briefing on this amendment. I do not propose to read them all to the Committee. No doubt the Government have read them and are prepared to respond, but I reserve the right to do so on Report if necessary. It reminds us of the work, if we needed reminding, of Lord Avebury, who said that the equivalent, very similar provision with which he was dealing was,

“in danger of being oppressive, deeply worrying to the immigrant community living among us, and one which is in grave danger of infringing the provisions”—[Official Report, 21/7/1983; cols. 1274-75]—

of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Minister will be relieved that I have not yet succeeded in emulating my late, much-missed noble friend to the extent I would like—I never will, but I will continue to try. His words are even more pertinent now, extending beyond the immigrant community to families and employers, to give two examples.

Like my noble friend, I would be interested to know examples and justifications for how the exemption might be applied. Presumably it would facilitate sharing between public services used by an individual, government departments and the Home Office to check the individual’s entitlement. The Government have said that they want to make the immigration system as “digital, flexible and frictionless” as possible. Initially that seems admirable, until one delves into issues such as this. Liberty asks whether the provision extends to activities such as running a night shelter or a food bank, which might well benefit undocumented migrants. Providing shelter and providing food could be construed as activities which undermine “effective immigration control”—to quote the Bill. Would a school have to provide a person’s address without their knowledge and without their even having committed an immigration offence? Underlying all this, what effect could such a provision have on migrants’ willingness to engage with public services?

Other noble Lords will probably have received a briefing from the Migrants’ Rights Network. It is about a legal challenge which it is starting against the NHS’s data sharing, but it is relevant here. The director of Migrants’ Rights Network said:

“We are gravely concerned that immigration enforcement is creeping into our public services, especially the NHS. And therefore, it is important to challenge this data-sharing agreement which violates patient confidentiality, and discriminates against those who are non-British”.


The lawyer acting for Migrants’ Rights Network says in the press release what I have heard from many workers in the field: that the data-sharing arrangement,

“is leaving migrants too scared to access healthcare services they are entitled to, for fear their address and other public information may be passed onto the Home Office. This could have a particularly negative effect on children, pregnant women, people with disabilities and victims of trafficking and abuse”.

It could have a severe effect on public health as well—we will debate all this when we deal with NHS charges in the regret Motion on Thursday.

The data subject will not know that data are transferred to the Home Office for immigration control purposes. The exemption seems to apply to immigrants and those connected with them, and those suspected of having an immigration offence in contemplation, thus turning them into an inferior class of citizen. It allows, or perhaps requires, data controllers, including the Home Office and its various arms, processing information for immigration purposes to ignore the principles on which the use of data is founded under the GDPR and the Bill and protection is applied.

I think that your Lordships might gather that we are very unhappy with this provision. It needs more justification than I think is capable of being provided, although we will of course wait and see.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the Minister, who is not in his place at the moment, said earlier that he could not understand what I meant by repressive measures, but paragraph 4 of the schedule is exactly what I meant and it is why this amendment would remove it.

The inclusion of an immigration control exemption in the Bill is a brazen violation of the data protection and privacy rights of migrants—both documented and undocumented—and of their families and communities in the name of immigration control. In effect, it removes all the Home Office’s data protection obligations as they relate to its activities to control immigration, as well as those of any other agency processing personal data for the same purpose or sharing data with another agency processing it for that purpose.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, it is not the first time that the Government have tried to limit data protection rights on immigration control grounds. In 1983, Clause 28 of the then Data Protection Bill had an identical aim, setting out broad exemptions to data subjects’ rights on grounds of crime, national security and immigration control. The Data Protection Committee, then chaired by Sir Norman Lindop, said that the clause would be,

“a palpable fraud upon the public if … allowed to become law”,

because it allowed data acquired for one purpose to be processed for another; and here is another power grab by this Government.

Clause 28 was rightly removed from the 1983 Bill, but today we see it resurrected with even more breadth and even less definition of its objectives. No attempt whatever has been made to define the new objective: nowhere in the Bill or its Explanatory Notes are the notions of effective immigration control or the activities requiring its maintenance defined. I simply do not understand the colossal cheek this Government have to put something such as this into a Bill and then present it in this House—I can understand it going through the other place but certainly not here. It is virtually impossible to come up with an exhaustive list of all the activities that might be included under this, or of individuals who might be affected. The potential list, as, again, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out, could go far beyond the immigrants themselves and could apply to almost anybody, including some in your Lordships’ House—at least, I hope that some in your Lordships’ House might be involved in shelters and food banks.

I urge the Government to think again. This is probably one of the really nasty bits that the Government have an option to take out, so I hope that they will listen to us.