Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Henig Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Soley]

My Lords, I will intervene briefly, mainly to support what my noble friend has said.

On the previous intervention, the issue of offers of payment by the media to certain police officers is very much on our minds at the moment. In my view, this issue is not—and never has been—a really central and massive problem, but it has always been there. When I introduced my Freedom and Responsibility of the Press Bill 20-odd years ago, we looked at it then but it has never been dealt with so I would say it should be considered, particularly in the structure that Government are setting up. There will be a temptation for certain police officers to be paid by journalists. Usually, the journalist makes the approach, in my experience, when any offer is made. Journalists will talk about what they do on a confidential basis—“Do not quote me” and so on—but such things are said. Usually, the sums of money are not huge—perhaps £20 for a bit of information and a bit more for another piece of information.

We all have two or three concerns about this Bill, but on this particular aspect there is a danger of what you do if there is an issue of corruption, however small it is overall, and how it is dealt with. I hope that the Minister will deal with that point, which my noble friend made very adequately from the Front Bench, but has just been added to by my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey.

[Baroness Henig]

Before the Minister replies, I have a brief query that I would like to ask. Between discussing this in Committee and on Report, the Minister has laid an amendment about deputies, so I think we have covered this. I am therefore assuming that it is possible that the noble Baroness might be saying—and it was certainly what I understood when it was first mentioned—that a deputy might assume this role of acting commissioner.

When I looked at this in some depth, it seemed to me that this deputy post was not one that would be exempted from Section 2 of the Local Government and Housing Act. In other words, it was going to be a post where the incumbent would have to be politically restricted. If that was in fact the case and it was a politically restricted post, it would seem to me to be completely wrong for that person who is politically restricted to be able to act up. Am I correct in my understanding of that? When that deputy post was created, I had rather assumed that one of the reasons for it was that the deputy could act up, but having looked at it, I do not see how that could work. I would be most grateful if the noble Baroness would perhaps say something about that as well in her reply.

[Lord Dear]

If an allegation of corruption or any other crime is made against someone, whoever the officer might be, the procedure is well laid down, and I do not think that the Bill would change it in any way. The complaint is made to the chief officer of police, who has to record the complaint, which is automatically notified to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The IPCC can take over the inquiry or supervise it, and discipline remains a matter for the chief officer. If, in the doomsday scenario, the chief officer does not deal with the complaint properly, then it is for the police authority or, in this instance, the police and crime commissioner, to step in. I do not think the procedure would be changed by the Bill.

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[Baroness Browning]

My Lords, this amendment seeks to secure the appointment of an acting PCC from the panel rather than from the PCC's staff. I recognise the points made today and previously in Committee and remain open to suggestions about how we might secure a process of appointment for an acting PCC which provides the safeguards and political neutrality that I have described in previous debates and which would also provide assurance to a PCC that any appointment of a temporary stand-in would not endanger the continued delivery of the police and crime plan and objectives. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that I am very happy to consider taking forward the situation with the deputy, but the deputy is not politically restricted.

[Baroness Henig]

When I looked at the government amendments, there was no suggestion that there was an exemption under Section 2 of the Local Government and Housing Act. If there is no such exemption, is that post not restricted? It does not say that.

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Moved by

[Baroness Henig]

235: Clause 80, page 49, line 28, at end insert—
“( ) A report is to be prepared annually by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary assessing the extent to which the strategic policing requirement has been met in each police area and nationally.
( ) A copy of this report must be laid before Parliament.”

[Baroness Henig]

My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendments 235, 235A and 239. Can I just point out that I think there is a misprint on the groupings list? To clarify, this group should comprise Amendments 235, 235A and 239.

Amendment 235 is a response to the widespread fears of your Lordships expressed in earlier debates. It is also a response to the concerns of policing professionals, charities and businesses that an elected commissioner might, for obvious reasons, want to focus on a local mandate, and the fact that a lot of important, strategic national issues are somewhat hidden from public view. There is concern that all this might lead to cross-border national or strategic policing issues being relatively neglected under the Government’s proposed new model.

I dare say that we are as one in recognising and wishing to respond in the most effective manner possible to the ever present and, indeed, growing threats to many of the so-called protective services or national and strategic threats, which cross police force borders or require specialist attention. The sort of crimes I refer to are such things as cyber crime, threats from terrorism, extremism, serious and organised crime, people trafficking and the more sporadic—potentially devastating—impact of civil contingencies. There is a whole number of national incidents.

I do not wish to raise an apocalyptic spectre of crimes and emergencies, but it is exactly because these important issues are not the currency of local, political, policing debate that I am concerned that it might not be at the forefront of a commissioner’s attention. There is a risk that commissioners may—for understandable reasons—not give full weight to national issues. Anybody who has attended local, public policing meetings or read the results of public consultations about policing priorities will understand that local people are interested in local issues. One example is born out of recent excellent research undertaken by my home police authority, Lancashire, which revealed that most people’s priorities for an elected Lancashire commissioner were going to be tackling quite low-level crime. Anti-social behaviour and environmental issues such as littering and abandoned cars were the sort of issues that people wanted commissioners to address.

I have experience of consulting local people on their policing priorities. I used to always give people a list of issues on which we wanted to consult them. It would always include anti-terrorism and other matters but the public always said “We do not want anti-terrorist activity to be at the top of the list because that is a national responsibility”. When asked how this should be paid for they said that the Government should pay. They always put national issues at the bottom of the list. As I went round the county, this happened every time.

Even at a time in Lancashire when the Irish situation was quite difficult—and Heysham was quite an important area for activity which meant that the Lancashire police were engaged in considerable anti-terrorist activity —none the less people in Lancashire did not want their precept to be spent on that kind of activity. That worried me then and it worries me even more now because I think that tendency will be even more emphasised in this new regime.

What I propose as part of the solution to act as a substantial check and balance on commissioners and force actions is to have an annual report to Parliament by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. I am sure I do not need to remind the House that it has a long and distinguished track record in both identifying and trying to identify the best ways of closing the gap in protective services. It is perfectly placed to provide an annual guarantee that the gap does not widen in the years to come, or, if it does widen, that it can alert Parliament that this is happening.

My idea of an annual report to Parliament draws on similar recent and successful provisions that have enabled Parliament’s concerns about the potential impact of certain Acts to be monitored and to some degree ameliorated. I am thinking here of the distinguished work of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, as the independent reviewer of counterterrorism legislation. That is just one example of a way in which activity could be monitored, so that Parliament could get some sense of how things are working out. I understand that the amendment would impose a new duty on the inspectorate’s already, no doubt, hard pressed resources, but the national issues are so important and the consequences of us failing to ensure adequate provision for national strategic policing requirements are so great that an annual assessment would be one way of monitoring the situation and measuring what forces are doing. It would help commissioners in their debate with local people to emphasise how important these national strategic requirements are. It is in that spirit that I beg to move the amendment.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I had not promised to give the detail of the strategic policing requirement, which is currently under negotiation. I am happy to give noble Lords a situation report on where negotiations stand regarding the definition of the strategic policing requirement. That is the most that I can do.

[Baroness Henig]

My Lords, I have listened closely to everything that has been said. I thank noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I have listened very carefully to the Minister. I agree that under the present system there is a recognised way of reconciling local and national police authorities; I do not think that is in doubt. The problem is that we are embarking on a completely new structure of police governance. Everything that we are used to is being changed, and not incrementally but quite radically. I think that we all accept that. My amendment seeks to reassure the public, given that we are faced with this completely new and untried system. We owe it to the public to reassure them that under the new system cross-border crime, serious criminal issues and national crime will be tackled by local forces.

We have heard a lot about commissioners. I am sure that good commissioners will act as the Minister thinks they will; it is the not-so-good commissioners and the areas where local people may be let down which are the problem. I do not see that this measure is such a lot to ask for when reports are prepared in many areas of our national life. Why cannot they be prepared by the inspectorate in this area? I do not understand why this is such a novel suggestion. I keep being pushed to press amendments to a Division, but I really would like to test the opinion of the House on this matter.

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Moved by

[Baroness Henig]

236: Clause 85, page 52, line 28, at end insert—
“(2A) The inspectors of constabulary may carry out an inspection of, and report to the Secretary of State on, the performance by a police and crime commissioner or a police and crime panel of its functions or of any particular function or functions.”

[Baroness Henig]

I rise to speak to three amendments, which, taken together, seek to preserve the checks and balances and independent assessment of performance within the current system that the Government have drawn on so heavily in creating their case for change; namely, the excellent work of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary.

Right at the beginning of our work on the Bill, the Government told us that HMIC unearthed the evidence for the failings of the present system, which necessitated the abolition of police authorities as quickly as possible. Indeed, in the absence of an analysis of the results of the Home Office’s public consultation on their reform proposals and the rather limited utility of a Cabinet Office report now five or six years old, the findings of HMIC’s inspections of 22 police authorities could be charitably described as the nearest thing the Government have for an evidence base on which they can build the case for change—at least as far as the suggested evidence for the weaknesses of the old system goes.

When it comes to this clause of the Bill, it very much surprised me—and may well surprise many of your Lordships—that, far from the excellent work of Her Majesty’s inspectorate being valued and taken forward into the new era of elected accountability, it has been relegated to the sidelines. In fact, the inspectorate is no longer going to be called upon to inspect the whole range of policing accountability but is going to be focused on forces.

I find this a little odd. We are told that commissioners and their panels are the necessary drivers of change, the fulcrums on which the hopes of reforms are going to be founded. They are going to have the role in driving efficiency at local level, not the Home Office from the centre any more. Yet these crucial new transformative individuals and bodies are not to be subject to the same level of inspection in the public interest as police authorities. I find this quite strange. Surely it cannot be right to limit the scope of inspectors who could provide valuable, impartial and expert information to the public on complex areas of policing and police finance, including the efficiency of those overseeing that finance. Budgets are going to be tight in the next few years and the new system is going to be very costly. I find it hard to believe in the new system, which many of us think will increase costs. These costs will add up and may very well eat into the policing budget. It is therefore not unreasonable that inspections should be able to oversee how those costs are running and whether things are operating reasonably.

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[Baroness Henig]

I thank the Minister for that response. However, I do not think that he fully understood what I was arguing. I was not arguing that everything is wonderful in the present system; in fact, until recently, police authorities were not inspected. It is only quite recently that they became inspected, which had a tremendously focusing impact. Police authorities operated much more effectively once they were inspected, which has taken place only in the past two or three years if my memory serves me correctly. If elected councillors sitting on a police authority can be inspected, I do not understand why commissioners who have been directly elected cannot be. I do not understand the difference: they are both elected, albeit perhaps in different ways.

One reason why I have perhaps less confidence in the panels than the Minister is that I have yet to believe—and we are now on Report—that they will have any power. We keep talking about checks and balances. The panels have some rather pathetic veto powers requiring a two-thirds majority vote, but their input is not that great. I do not have much confidence that they will have any great impact on the way in which a commissioner operates.

My standpoint, funnily enough, has nothing to do with police authorities working well or not; my standpoint is the public. The whole point of the system is to serve the public. One of the strengths of policing in this country is local accountability to local people. It is local people that I am thinking of. They should have the reassurance on some sort of regular basis that commissioners are operating effectively—I do not see that there is anything wrong with that. I find it difficult to accept the repeated suggestion that I am asking for all sorts of radical and extreme things, when it seems that very sensible and basic issues are being raised. All I am suggesting is that it would be sensible for commissioners to be inspected, because it would give the public reassurance.

I am sorry that the Minister finds that so difficult to understand, because it seems to me to be very straightforward. However, in view of the lateness of the hour and because I do not want to test the patience of the House any further, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 236 withdrawn.