Defence Policy (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Baroness Helic Excerpts

Friday 30th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Helic (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure and an honour to follow the contribution from a noble and gallant Lord with so much knowledge and experience in the matters we are debating today. I start by congratulating my noble friend Lady Anelay and the International Relations and Defence Committee on this report, which offers a strong overview of the defence challenges we face and identifies gaps in the current approach.

The Government’s response, while necessarily incomplete pending the updated Defence Command Paper, candidly acknowledges that,

“we misjudged the pace of change and the range and severity of the threats we would face”.

This admission is welcome. However, I am concerned that despite it and despite our laudable support for Ukraine, elsewhere in Europe where Russia and its proxies are fostering instability, we are carrying on as if the Ukraine invasion never happened.

The threat of Russian-backed subversion in the western Balkans is real and active. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has successfully launched misinformation operations, cemented arms deals, embedded itself in critical energy infrastructure, compromised political leaders and leveraged the Russian Orthodox Church’s religious ties to its advantage. Today in the western Balkans, Russian intelligence operatives are actively involved in training and equipping paramilitaries and criminal gangs. GRU officers expelled from NATO and EU countries have found a new region from which to operate. As a result, nationalist leaders in the Balkans are fully aligned with Russia on Ukraine and work hand in glove with Moscow. Russia reciprocates this loyalty by generously supporting the territorial expansionist plans of its allies and frustrating NATO aspirations for a peaceful and stable Balkans.

Recently, we witnessed the type of instability Russia relishes, when Kosovo, which faces a continuous challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity from its neighbour Serbia, came close to conflict. Fortunately, the presence of some 3,000 NATO troops, including some from the United Kingdom, helped deter a serious challenge by the Serbian military massing on the borders with Kosovo.

Further north, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, much of the progress made in the aftermath of the 1990s war has been undone due to Russia’s allies in the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska, where corrupt, Kremlin-aligned nationalist politicians are actively working to dismantle the Bosnian state and secede. Recent actions, such as passing illegal laws, threatening to halt the jurisdiction of national institutions, forming paramilitary units and procuring weapons, indicate a dangerous path that could have devastating effects if left unanswered. The Balkans represent the soft underbelly of NATO, and any instability or conflict there would not be contained and would demand Europe’s and NATO’s attention. Instability could lead to major movements of people, chaos within European borders and the opening of a Balkan route for people smuggling, drug smuggling and arms smuggling.

Unfortunately, we seem to be repeating the same mistakes we made after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 by hoping for the best and attempting to drive a wedge between Russia and its local proxies through accommodation. Our collective response to the events in the Balkans over the past few years, particularly in the past few weeks, show that the West is committed to a western Balkan policy centred on Serbian President Vučić as a partner and a factor of stability. Embracing autocrats as factors of stability only strengthens their power and leverage, making them even greater dangers.

A comprehensive policy review and international push-back, with the clarity we have so valiantly shown over Ukraine, is urgently needed. The first and immediate step should be an increase in our defence footprint in Bosnia and Herzegovina by bolstering EUFOR Operation Althea. This would send a clear signal that there is a space for political dialogue, but not for armed conflict. It would also address the noble Baroness’s remark earlier that we need a framework within which we can work with our EU partners. This is a perfect framework that works for European stability. It is in our national interest and in the interest of stabilising the region.

EUFOR currently lacks presence in key strategic locations in Bosnia and does not possess the strength or equipment to tackle serious challenges to peace. It has 1,000 troops from 22 countries, with three helicopters sitting in Sarajevo. It is desperately short of capability to address the challenge it faces. By contributing troops to EUFOR or NATO HQ in Sarajevo, we could make a crucial difference, bring the country and region back from the edge and provide a credible deterrent to any attempt at security challenge.

I will pose three questions to my noble friend the Minister. First, does she agree that the situation in the western Balkans, and in Bosnia in particular, represents a real and present danger to European security? Secondly, does my noble friend agree that contributing troops to EUFOR or NATO HQ in Sarajevo is urgently needed to prevent conflict in the region? Finally, does she agree that centring western Balkan policy on Belgrade is a failed policy and that we need a new approach of supporting democratic states and allies in the region as a long-term stability choice?

I am old enough to remember the 1990s, when our policy on the western Balkans centred around Belgrade. It resulted in ethnic cleansing, genocide and a complete collapse of western policy in this part of the world. I hope we are not going to repeat this. The Government’s response to the committee report said:

“As we have seen starkly over the last twelve months, the repercussions—and costs—of responding after threats manifest into conflict are immeasurably greater than if those threats are adequately deterred or prevented in the first place”.


This is right; an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Yet, we are not holding to this lesson in the Balkans. Until we do, the situation will continue to deteriorate, and the risk will only grow.

In conclusion, just as at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, or in the run-up to World War One, it can be difficult to persuade the world that the Balkans matter. In the 1990s, European countries declared the “Hour of Europe”, then failed to respond with sufficient urgency to the crisis that resulted in horrific ethnic cleansing and genocide. The United States was forced to step up. This time around, however, the United States is looking east, and the burden will likely fall on Europe. Nothing less than Europe’s stability and the effectiveness of the NATO alliance are on the line. I hope that we have learned the lessons and that we will apply them.