European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th January 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

12: Clause 21, page 25, line 5, leave out “(including modifying this Act)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the ability to amend the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 itself by statutory instrument in connection with the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I think we have got here earlier than some other noble Lords anticipated, which is why I may be speaking a bit slowly. They still have not arrived, so I give in—no, it is all right. Help is arriving at this moment. Amendment 12 stands in my name as well as those of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I shall also speak to Amendment 15, which is also in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

Clause 21 is, as one of our committees describes it, a major clause adding significant new provision for Ministers to make regulations to implement the withdrawal agreement’s Irish/Northern Irish protocol, including

“any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament,”

including modifying the 2018 Act. Unsurprisingly, our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in its report of 9 January, therefore describes this provision as,

“a most potent form of Henry VIII clause, allowing regulations to modify their parent Act in addition to creating a new legal regime that would otherwise require,”

an Act of Parliament. Amendment 12 would remove the ability in the current Bill to amend the 2018 EU withdrawal Act by statutory instrument in connection with the protocol. Amendment 15 would place a series of limitations on the regulation-making powers allowed for in this clause.

First, Amendment 12 would, as I say, remove the ability to amend the 2018 Act. It is both unusual and unexplained as to why the Government want to give themselves a power, with only the most cursory scrutiny, to amend primary legislation. I know certain newspapers took umbrage this morning at my warnings to the Government yesterday against ramming through legislation even if it contains deficiencies, and of them being unwilling to listen to reason. But here we appear to have a provision almost certainly written as a failsafe; I think the Government know that they will almost certainly have got things wrong. This is not a way to make good law. We do not like it and it should come out.

Amendment 15 is needed as, for unexplained reasons, there are no restrictions on the scope of the Henry VIII powers in respect of implementing the Northern Ireland protocol. That is in contrast to all the other Henry VIII powers in the 2018 Act and elsewhere in this very Bill—for example, in Clause 18. Amendment 15 would add the same restrictions as are in the 2018 Act, and indeed elsewhere in the Bill, on making relevant new criminal offences, setting up public bodies or imposing fees and taxation by secondary legislation. Given what is elsewhere in the Bill and in the earlier Act, I hope that the Government will accept these changes.

Crucially, Amendment 15 would also ensure that neither the Human Rights Act nor the devolution Acts could be amended or repealed by secondary legislation. It is probably the view of the whole House that changes to fundamental rights should be made only by Parliament through primary legislation, not by Ministers through secondary legislation. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, whom I am glad to see in his place, said yesterday, it would be,

“ a terrible precedent … if we altered the devolution legislation other than by primary legislation”.—[Official Report, 13/1/20; col. 532.]

Unsurprisingly, the Welsh Government particularly support proposed new paragraph (f) in Amendment 15, with its restriction to prevent UK Ministers using such powers as are allowed in this clause to amend the statutes that embed the devolution settlements. There is already a perfectly viable way of amending the Welsh statutes without primary legislation, where the National Assembly itself agrees to the change: through a Section 109 Order in Council.

Why have the Government written themselves these powers in Clause 21? Should the Government refuse to accept Amendment 15, particularly its proposed new paragraph (f), they will by that refusal feed the suspicion that they want this power to make changes to devolution settlements even where the National Assembly and the Welsh Government are opposed to such changes. I therefore trust that the Minister will accept this amendment and, today, rule out any chance of the Government using these powers to amend the Government of Wales Act without the consent of the National Assembly. I beg to move.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 12, to which my name is attached. This is quite different from most of the other amendments which have come before the Committee. It is in no sense political; it is a matter of process, not politics. Its significance lies only in the clause’s defiance of our normal parliamentary processes and the danger of establishing a very unfortunate precedent. There are two consequences: first, this modest improvement cannot be characterised as holding the Bill up; and, secondly, it cannot be said to be a wrecking amendment because it is nothing of the sort.

I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is no longer in his place—he was there just a few moments ago—because I listened carefully to his speech yesterday and I was struck by a point he made which then seemed to be followed by a number of noble Lords, albeit a small minority. I refer to the point he made about the Salisbury-Addison convention, which was agreed between the leader of a small group of Labour Government Peers and a large group of hereditary Conservative Opposition Peers after the 1945 election. The name is significant because it was a deal made between two individuals appropriate to those precise circumstances. It has limited relevance now, as was so comprehensively analysed by the 2006 Joint Committee on Conventions, on which I served.

That committee reiterated:

“In the House of Lords: A manifesto Bill is accorded a Second Reading; A manifesto Bill is not subject to ‘wrecking amendments’ which change the Government’s manifesto intention as proposed in the bill; and A manifesto Bill is passed and sent (or returned) to the House of Commons, so that they have the opportunity, in reasonable time, to consider the Bill or any amendments the Lords may wish to propose.”


In passing, I note that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, the then Leader of the Opposition, was on record as stating that the doctrine needed to be re-examined:

“Election promises can be vague and easily manipulated by governments, who reserve the right to jettison manifesto promises if things change. If governments can have the right, why cannot Parliaments too have a say on circumstances as they change?”—[Official Report, 24/1/01; col. 294.]


Similarly, the Joint Committee took a great deal of evidence on the issue of secondary legislation. It was told by all parties that the Salisbury-Addison agreement did not apply. In relation to this clause and this protocol, we therefore have to conclude that Salisbury-Addison is totally irrelevant.

This is not a wrecking amendment. The provision was not spelt out in the manifesto, and in any case secondary legislation was specifically excluded from the convention—and that was just a bilateral agreement excluding other parties and the Cross-Benchers and was overtaken by events precisely as Lord Strathclyde pointed out.

I emphasise these points for two reasons. First, yesterday a few noble Lords seemed to be dangerously near to suggesting that your Lordships’ House should forgo its proper constitutional role in scrutinising this Bill, not least in relation to its significance in terms of the relationship between the Executive and Parliament. Indeed, one or two noble Lords seemed to be on the verge of bullying us with threats of reform to this House. As a very long-term advocate of reform, I say, “Bring it on”. The 2012 reform Bill, with which I was much involved, received a massive majority of 338 in the Commons with all parties giving it majority support—so it is over to you, Mr Cummings. Indeed, I would repeat Mr Clint Eastwood’s remark: “Go ahead, punk, make my day.”

Secondly, we must distinguish between on the one hand this amendment and the few others which seek to instil proper parliamentary process, avoiding precedents which future Governments could exploit, with more substantial political changes to the Bill on the other.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

To be clear, the information I have from my officials is that this will be done by the affirmative procedure. It is important to stress that point. Further, returning to the protocol, which has not been fully discussed in this particular debate, the question is: what do the two amendments seek to do? While we have no intention of in any way seeking to unravel the Wales Act or the Scotland Act, there will necessarily be elements in the Northern Ireland Act which will have to be explored and addressed, with full consultation—I express that clearly—with the restored Executive and Assembly. They will have this element for the first time: it was not there before. For example, the issue of democratic consent to the wider Northern Ireland protocol would represent a necessary adjustment to the Northern Ireland Act. This could only be taken forward by full dialogue and discussion with the restored Executive to ensure that the four and eight-year cycle that needs to go forward is inside the heart of this approach. There are also going to be elements, which we have anticipated, of disapplication of certain elements of retained EU law as they affect Northern Ireland. They too, in a domesticated form, would need to be adjusted using these powers.

We fear that there may be a hindrance of our ability to adopt the decisions of the Joint Committee, bearing in mind that that committee was established between the UK and EU. We will need to be able to move that forward in real time and this too will require a power similar to that which we have set out. Another thing we must be on top of is that we have, in this scenario, a potential restriction which might impact on the very issue which I thought might be more expansively explored—the unfettered access part—for reasons which will be touched on in the debate to follow. This debate has taken a turn that I had not anticipated—the notion that a power is now being granted to the Government to undo that which has been set before: if you like, the magisterium of the law which sets up the elements of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. That is not the purpose of this rule. Rather it is to allow the Government, where necessary and through full consultation with the powers of Northern Ireland, to deliver the elements that will emerge in the ongoing negotiations and in any other concomitant parts, to ensure that we are ready to deliver the required elements by one year from today. If we fail to do that, we run the risk of undermining our international obligations. That would then create the problem that this is designed to try and avoid.

It would be very easy for me to say: “You have just got to trust me”. That is not what I am trying to say, and it would be foolish as noble Lords should not try to trust me. The important thing is to test me, and to test the Government. That is why, as well as putting these points to the House now, and setting out the areas in which we do need these necessary powers, I am happy to put that in to a note which I will supply and make available to all noble Lords who are interested in this, so they can see where we believe this power will be required to deliver the very thing that Northern Ireland wants: safety and security within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That is its purpose and that is, principally, why we are here tonight. I am tempted to quote from Clint Eastwood, but the only quotes I could come up with are:

“Do you feel lucky, punk?”


and “Make my day.” I am not sure either one is particularly relevant.

In conclusion, the purpose of this is to ensure that Northern Ireland is safe and secure as we move forward and is in such a place that the protocol will function in its entirety. Equally, and most importantly—it is a genuine pleasure to say this—there is now a restored Executive and an Assembly where these matters should be discussed and whose voices must be heard and heeded. In the year ahead, we commit to ensuring that Northern Ireland is a full component part of the debate and discussion on the issues of Brexit. That is something which I have not been able to say for a very long time.

On that basis, I cannot support the amendments as they have been tabled. I understand where they have come from, but I am afraid I cannot give comfort in that regard. However, I am committing to set out exactly why we believe these powers are necessary in the area of Northern Ireland and why they are there. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Baroness will recognise where I am coming from on these matters.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I am afraid that that does not answer the points noble Lords have made. It is not so much that the powers are needed for Northern Ireland, but there should be restrictions on them. I am sorry, because the Minister is normally brilliant at the Dispatch Box and very well briefed. However, had he read Amendment 15 he would have seen what we were trying to write in by restricting those powers, such as not undermining the Government of Wales Act. He would have understood that we were not questioning that some of the powers will be needed for Northern Ireland—we will come to that in a different debate—but the way they have been set out in this clause. Unlike Clause 18, which I quoted, Clause 21 does not have the restrictions on those powers that exist in the other clauses in the Bill or, indeed, in the 2018 Act.

Our concern remains. It is good to have a northern voice. Most of us here are Welsh or from the West Country, where we feel this very strongly. The Minister is saying that these powers were not designed to undermine devolution and that the intention is not to use them that way, but that is not good enough. When something is put in an Act of Parliament, it is a power. No matter that it is not intended to be used that way, the power is there. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, there is already another way. Although I cannot see that the Government of Wales Act would need to be altered for Northern Ireland, if it does there is a perfectly good way of doing it. Denying the restriction, whether it is new criminal offences or anything like that, which exist for all the other Henry VIII powers, is very hard to substantiate, simply because it is to do with Northern Ireland. Not accepting that the other devolution settlements should be in any way accessible to these powers is unsatisfactory. As other noble Lords have said, even the word “repeal” is like waving a red flag at the way these powers could be used.

Having heard from the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, my noble friend Lord Howarth, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I hope that the Minister might look again at the wording of these amendments and understand why we have real worries about them. Perhaps he would be willing to meet before Report. Otherwise, it will be necessary to try to circumvent these powers in a way that happens elsewhere, but not in relation to the Northern Ireland protocol. I leave the Minister with that thought and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.