Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
Main Page: Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Labour - Life peer)My Lords, the Bill’s provisions on consumer contracts for goods build on existing legislation, such as the Sale of Goods Act, and on court- developed common law. Government Amendments 2, 4 and 6 are to ensure that the greater clarity the Bill provides does not override an existing common-law distinction between severable and entire contracts. A severable contract is divisible into parts, which are intended to be independent of each other, so different parts of the payment can be assigned to different parts of the trader’s performance. The amendments make it clear that, where a contract is severable, the consumer may have the right to reject those faulty goods or they may have the right to terminate the whole contract. That will depend on the nature of the goods and the fault and the details of the contract. In some cases, it will be quite right for a consumer to reject all the goods under a contract, even if it is severable. The existing common law recognises that and the amendments are to make it clear that the common law on this applies.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked in Grand Committee whether these amendments could create a new incentive for traders to try to make their contracts severable. I hope I have given reassurance that the amendments refer to an existing concept. A contract will not be severable simply because it is described as such but will depend on the genuine agreement and arrangement between the parties in the circumstances. The guidance to the Bill will cover when a contract is severable and when a consumer might be entitled to terminate the whole contract. As I have explained, these amendments are to ensure that the consumer’s clearer rights in Clause 20 should not override the common-law position for severable contracts.
Clause 20 reflects the equivalent provision for Scotland in the Sale of Goods Act—that is, Section 15B—and in related legislation. Therefore, for Scots law, Clause 20 is intended to restate the existing provisions without altering the common law. I beg to move.
I thank the Minister for agreeing to give us some extra time to look at these amendments, which of course were not seen in the Commons or in the Select Committee. Having had time to consider them, and in particular with the reassurance that has now been given by the Minister and the clarity that will be in the forthcoming guidance on the Bill, we are content with the amendments.
My Lords, I rise to move the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and to speak in support of others in this group. We will not be pushing our amendment to a vote as what it proposes and what our Amendment 21 in Committee asked for is now almost completely achieved in the Government’s Amendments 10 and 12. While it remains the case that a car salesman can deduct some of the price of a new car when taking back a faulty vehicle in accordance with its second-hand value, we are delighted that this will not apply to other faulty goods, which was our concern, and which the Bill’s original wording would have allowed.
I thank the Minister—there is a lot of that going on today—for considering so carefully our case made in Committee and for accepting perhaps 70% of it. It is a sort of advent present rather than a Christmas present but we are delighted with it all the same. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her kind words and acceptance of my amendment. I thank her for not wishing to press her amendment.
I thank the Minister for clarifying that she will be supporting Amendment 11 in my name, to which she has added her name, and moving her own Amendments 10 and 12, as we get to them. We will move our Amendment 11 in its place. I know that the Minister has put her name to it, but I think she will probably be moving Amendments 10 and 12 in their place. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 9.
If we are allowed to have a small word of congratulation, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan.
My Lords, this House, as we know, has had some major achievements in tackling high-cost and exploitative credit. Amendment 14 concerns a new, effectively unregulated and exploitative form of loan that has sprung up on our high streets. Along with other high-cost credit, it is found in low-income and deprived areas. It is known as rent to own. It works by consumers theoretically renting household goods—washing machines, fridges, TVs, beds—but with the rent eventually being used to purchase the product.
However, because it is deemed rent, there are few of the safeguards which would cover, for example, a bank loan, if that had been taken out to buy the same product. So there are no checks on affordability for a product aimed at consumers who are “credit constrained”—those are the words of the person who runs one of these big companies. There are no safeguards against the property being repossessed for missing a payment, because, until the final payment, the product is only rented, not owned. While the consumer is theoretically renting the product, though in their mind they are in the process of buying, a missed payment can lead to repossession.
Some of these stores show little forbearance over a missed payment, despite the fact that the consumer may have already paid well over the true value of the goods by the time they come to miss a payment. Furthermore, the prices charged are pretty exorbitant, far exceeding normal retail prices, even including any interest had a bank loan been used to pay for the item. I found a washing machine priced from £400 to £600, depending on which outlet I went to, but it was £1,560 at one of the rent-to-buy stores—up to four times the price. A table which was £200 at Argos was £468 at BrightHouse, one of the rent-to-buy stores. The APR, which admittedly it prints in some of its brochures, is between 60% and 90%. Adding up all these so-called rents amounts to far more than the list price, plus what interest would be paid if the item was bought with a bank loan.
Furthermore, the companies add in compulsory and expensive insurance, even though the goods still belong to the shop, so probably do not even need insuring. BrightHouse told me that the insurance on a £600 product would be £150 over three years. That is far higher than any of us would be able to get for a normal contents insurance. And the insurance is with its wholly owned, Malta-based insurance company or via its Isle of Man company. To add insult to injury, its marketing uses that favourite trick to tempt the buyer, highlighting the price per week rather than the total cost. So the price of a Samsung gold laptop is splashed as £13 a week, albeit that the full cost is £1,392, which includes 94.7% APR. It is little wonder that more than a quarter return their goods within the first 13 weeks of purchase, by which time they will have paid quite a chunk of money for just three months’ use of the item. In the case I mentioned, £170 would have been paid for something that might retail for only £500.
It is also little wonder that there is money to be made in this way. One of BrightHouse’s companies, Caversham Finance Ltd, made £30 million profit before tax, despite its trading company’s annual report stating:
“2014 was … challenging … with customers under pressure from continued high inflation, low wage growth and … the government’s much heralded changes to the welfare system have increased uncertainty for a significant portion of BrightHouse customers who are completely or partially reliant on benefits”.
We have it even from the companies themselves that they are targeting these products at customers who are completely or partially reliant on benefits. Is anyone surprised that I question the business model of a firm that profits from selling high-end goods at over-the-odds prices with compulsory expensive insurance to some of the most vulnerable in society?
Amendment 14 requires a company to set out the total price of the goods including the cost of the credit agreement. It bans making insurance compulsory and it requires the Government to set out guidelines both on checks on affordability and on possible repossession. This is not an attack on any weekly payment system, which can help those on lower incomes with their household budgeting. However, the business model used by companies like BrightHouse is so stacked against the consumer that it is little short of exploitation. I therefore hope that the Government will accept this measured approach, which does not ban this form of credit; it simply introduces greater transparency along with some safeguards. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Government share the noble Baroness’s concerns about the risk of consumer detriment in the hire-purchase credit market, particularly to the vulnerable consumers that she has described to the House. I wrote to the noble Baroness on this subject recently and want to take this opportunity to underline that this does include rent to own and we are talking about the same issue.
We have stated before in Committee that consumer credit regulation transferred to the Financial Conduct Authority on 1 April this year. The rules for the consumer credit market, put in place by the FCA, were made with the stated aim of: ensuring that firms lend only to borrowers who can afford it; increasing borrowers’ awareness of the costs and risks of borrowing unaffordably; and ensuring that consumers have access to support if they have financial difficulties.
Accordingly, the FCA rules for hire purchase and conditional sale agreements, including rent-to-own agreements, specifically require firms to provide pre-contractual explanations and information to a consumer before a contract is made. These rules are in line with European requirements, including setting out the total amount payable, the cash price of an item and the total cash price if there is more than one.
Firms must also adhere to debt collection rules, including treating customers in default or arrears difficulties with forbearance and due consideration; and assess creditworthiness and affordability, including the potential to impact adversely on the consumer’s financial situation, and the consumer’s ability to make repayments as they fall due. Where firms sell insurance products, they must do so in line with the FCA’s requirements around assessing consumers’ eligibility to claim on a product, and the high-level principle of “treating customers fairly”. Firms must also give a separate price for the insurance product and explain whether it is compulsory.
These rules are in force now, and the FCA can enforce breaches of its rules— there is no limit on the fines it can levy and, crucially, it can force firms to provide redress to consumers. The FCA keeps all its rules under review and continually considers whether further interventions are needed in the consumer credit market. It will set out further thinking early in the new year.
Regarding the noble Baroness’s specific points about contract enforceability, lenders are already required to serve a statutory notice under the Consumer Credit Act before enforcing the agreement or repossessing goods. Goods cannot be repossessed without a court order if the consumer has paid at least a third of the total amount payable. The FCA also sets out how firms must undertake affordability assessments before entering into an agreement, including taking reasonable steps to assess the customer’s ability to meet repayments in a sustainable manner, without undue difficulties.
To underline that point, the FCA has had full use of these powers since 1 April and can make use its broad enforcement toolkit to punish breaches of its rules. The FCA also has flexible rule-making powers to take further action where it deems it necessary in the protection of consumers. The Government believe that this, alongside the existing protections set out in legislation, provides robust protections for consumers in the conditional sale and hire purchase markets. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for that and indeed for the letter from her colleague the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, on 13 November. This is a little like the last debate. We keep being told that all the regulations are there and that everything is fine but then we hear from Citizens Advice, Debt Line and other organisations that people are getting into trouble with these payments. The figure that was given to me in a meeting this week with BrightHouse that a quarter of the people are actually having to stop payments after 13 weeks suggests that there is something wrong. We are back into, “Don't worry about it: all the rules are there”, but the evidence on the street is that people are taking out these products when they clearly cannot afford them.
I have two other issues. One is insurance. It used to be very common to have to buy travel insurance when you went through a travel agent, but the Financial Services Authority, as it was at the time, stopped that. If the answer to my noble friend Lord Harris’s question is that compulsory insurance purchased through that company so that you cannot shop around is permitted at the moment, we hope that in future the FCA will say that it is not permitted.
I leave the other issue with the Minister because I do not expect a reply at the moment. One of the great advantages of being regulated by the FCA of course will be absolute access to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It would be helpful to know whether that will be made known to all customers of these companies. I hope that the FCA will hear this and we do not continue with the idea that just because something is being regulated there are no problems, because sadly there are. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Stevenson. It addresses a serious, indeed often fatal, weakness in consumer protection. When a dangerous fault occurs in an electrical product, there is no adequate mechanism whereby other owners of that same dangerous product are notified of the need to exchange it. The amendment therefore requires manufacturers to inform enforcement authorities about the number of consumers affected and the extent of damage and injury that has been caused. It also requires the Secretary of State to publish information on dangerous products.
It is estimated that approximately 40 to 45 deaths a year are caused by faulty appliances. Although there is a system for recalling dangerous products, it is deeply flawed because of the difficulties of alerting consumers who bought such faulty products and because of unjustifiable delays on the part of some manufacturers in recalling products, even once they know them to be unsafe. Such cases relate to potentially fatal faults arising either from fire, electrocution or carbon monoxide poisoning. Indeed, probably more than 1 million faulty products are still in people’s homes.
The problem is that manufacturers currently have no legal obligation to declare how many such dangerous applications are in circulation. Furthermore, once a manufacture becomes aware of faults, there is no specified timeframe within which they have to act to have others recalled. Some manufacturers have taken years to take action after accidents caused by their appliances. The BIS guidelines are that recall should be expected as soon as the manufacturer becomes aware of the problem, but that is not specific enough. Even more important, perhaps, it is not mandatory. Sadly we see preventable deaths occurring because of failings in the recall system.
I spoke in Committee about the case of Santosh Benjamin-Muthiah, a 36 year-old father of two who was killed in 2010 by a fire caused by a fridge freezer that had been recalled. The manufacturer had been aware of the fault three years earlier but failed to issue a safety notice until 2011—in other words, a year after the death of Santosh Benjamin-Muthiah. By that time, half a million defective fridge-freezers had been sold. Even two years after the recall started, there were probably 100,000 still unidentified in people’s homes.
In another case, Beko was fined £76,600 for failing to inform trading standards of a serious risk posed by some of its cookers. Despite being aware of the fault in 2009, Beko notified trading standards only in 2013. Hotpoint recalled dishwashers with a fire risk a whole year after Which? had raised concerns about them. So there are problems of late starting but, even once something starts, the average success rate for product recalls is only between 10% and 20%.
The current voluntary and slightly haphazard approach is clearly not working. On the one hand, manufacturers fail to recall—due either to cost or to worries about reputational risk, in which case sanctions are inadequate. On the other, despite the producers’ best efforts, current practice is dangerously inadequate, leaving thousands of faulty products in circulation.
In Committee, we asked the Government how many cases of preventable deaths were documented. The Minister responded by letter, saying that she was unable to provide the number of fatal injuries caused by unsafe electrical appliances. However, the DCLG fire statistics do have the data, which show that there were more than 16,000 fires a year caused by faulty products, leading to 15 deaths and nearly 800 injuries. Electrical Safety First’s research into consumer attitudes towards product recalls demonstrated a strong appetite for change. Its report, Consumer Voices on Product Recall, found that a quarter of people thought there was already a central repository of all recall information. So the website called for in our amendment would create what many consumers assume already exists.
Only one-third of consumers always fill in the registration form down at the bottom of the packet when they buy electrical products—we have all seen it there. Six out of 10 say they would be more likely to fill it in if reassured that the information would not be used for commercial gain. Only an independent database, as proposed in our amendment, would deliver this peace of mind. An industry-led list would not encourage people to register, because they would believe that their details would be used for marketing. Of 17 registration forms analysed, only one mentioned safety as a benefit of registration—so it is no wonder people do not think they want to sign up. It is simply not the manufacturers’ priority and it will not become their priority until legislation compels them to take action. Peter Dartford, President of the Chief Fire Officers Association, said:
“The reality is that it is the manufacturers who have created these risks and it is their moral and legal responsibility to ensure these risks are eradicated from homes”.
At the inquest into the death of Mr Benjamin-Muthiah, the coroner called for the creation of a simple, easy to use, government-funded or national website where all faulty products could be registered and accessed by consumers and retailers. He called also for increases in the fines for manufacturers who failed to notify and the creation of a code of practice on product recalls. Our amendment would strengthen consumer protection in line with the views of the coroner, of consumers and of the fire officers, to say nothing of the views of the families of those who have died needlessly. I beg to move.
My Lords, about a year ago, in my capacity as chair of the National Trading Standards Board, I had a meeting with what I think was then called the Electrical Safety Council, now rebranded as Electrical Safety First. We were not discussing this issue but it was raised as one of the concerns that the then Electrical Safety Council had about the way in which the recall system worked.
My noble friend highlighted a number of concerning issues. These include, for example, the length of time that often seems to elapse between manufacturers becoming aware of a product failure or an incident, even one leading to an inquest, before they take action to recall products. Their recall efforts are often minimalist in trying to make sure that the message reaches consumers.
I hope that the Government are not simply going to tell us that self-regulation works best and that the systems in place are adequate. The examples that have been cited and the fact that this remains a continuing concern show clearly that action needs to be taken along the lines of my noble friend’s amendment.
I genuinely thank the Minister for using this opportunity to announce that today. I also thank my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey for his support for that. I welcome the review and I hope that it will consider one of the problems with the European system at the moment. It covers only goods that are sold in more than one EU country, not those sold either only in this country or only in this country and non-EU countries. I note the Register My Appliance initiative, but there is a problem with it which I hope the Government’s review will consider. The industry-led solution led by the AMDEA continues to be an opt-out system—you have to opt out if you do not want your details used for marketing purposes. It will make people reluctant to register if they know that they will get more junk mail or e-mails from product manufacturers.
I am advised by the people at Electricity Safety First that the system as set up will be used for marketing unless you opt out, and we know the difficulty with that. I trust that that can be looked at in the review.
My Lords, the noble Baroness makes a good point, and I will certainly take it away and suggest that we add that to the review of product recalls.
My Lords, that is very good news and I think that it will be welcomed by consumers as well as by me. In the light of our steps forward, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I move Amendment 26 on behalf of my noble friend Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and myself. In doing so, I draw very much on my experience on the Financial Services Consumer Panel, but also, I regret to say, on countless examples since, when we have witnessed financial institutions acting in breach of any fiduciary duty towards their customers and in ways that are highly prejudicial to the whole of the UK’s financial stability and reputation. Most recently, as we saw last week, the FCA had to impose £1.1 billion of fines for manipulation of the foreign exchange market. Exactly in whose interests were those banks working? It was not the interests of individual customers nor, indeed, of the totality of customers.
First, I thank my noble friend Lady Drake for her support on this. Actually, she said it all—ignoring fiduciary duty fails the consumer and the economy as a whole
The Minister has asked what difference the amendment would make. Fiduciary duty does not mean just reasonable care and skill. Fiduciary duty means putting your customer first; not allowing your interest to conflict or to override theirs. The fiduciary duty is quite different from reasonable care and skill. The wording is that these bodies should be subject to a fiduciary duty which they then must provide with reasonable care and skill, but the fiduciary duty is greater than reasonable care and skill. It is about avoiding conflict of interest and about making sure that the decisions you take are in the customer’s interest—albeit the decisions should also be taken with reasonable care and skill.
If I am looking after £1 million of someone’s money, I must put their interest in that money first; and the way I then invest it must be done with reasonable care and skill. That is the extra ingredient that we are seeking to add. Clause 49 by itself—good though it is to include “reasonable care and skill” as it covers financial services—does not include this wider avoidance of conflict of interest, by putting the consumer’s interest first.
No, this will not help get redress. That is not what we are interested in. We want to prevent these things happening. Yes, compensation was paid for PPI—mostly out of the banks’ profits. But that should never have had to be paid—we do not want these things going wrong in the first place. As my noble friend said, rules are not enough; it is a culture change that we need.
We need it written in a Bill that when you are looking after someone else’s money you have a fiduciary duty towards them. There must be some lawyers in the Chamber tonight. They understand fiduciary duty, but it seems that banks do not. As for the other problem and the question of what difference it will make, we do not just want compensation for consumers. Frankly, I want a few hangings. None of the people who mis-sold PPI is in prison. I do not think that any of those people on whom £1.1 billion in fines have just been imposed will be prosecuted. We need this in a piece of legislation, so that if people break it, they can answer for it.
I therefore hope that, even if I do not push this to a vote tonight, the Government understand that we do not simply want reasonable care and skill. Where people’s life savings—their pensions—are in the hands of someone else, whom they cannot check on because they cannot look at their day-to-day decisions, that person must at every moment put the consumer’s interest first. That was what this amendment was trying to do.
I hope that, even though I will now ask to withdraw this amendment, the Government will look at something that is still going wrong, and will not simply say, “The rules are there and are sufficient”, because clearly they are not. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, this is a different sort of amendment, which stands in the names of my noble friend Lord Stevenson and myself, and which seeks to protect the consumer who has had something done in their house and a faulty installation has occurred—not simply a faulty installation such as a table being put in the wrong way round, but where there is a risk to the person concerned. Instead of having to have the installers back in to try to put right whatever they have done wrong, it would give the person concerned the right to move to a refund without having to accept a repair first.
The rest of the Bill is very good where it says that there should be only one repair, and that, if that does not work, you can get the money back. However, there are circumstances in which we think they should not have to have a repair done first; they are in their own home and something has happened which makes them feel at risk. Examples of this sort of thing are where a trader has tried to install a dishwasher but floods the whole kitchen, a bathroom floods the kitchen below—which I have seen happen quite recently—or an electrician is sent to install a new shower, and manages to wire the shower to the electric light bulb rather than to the mains. Again, sadly, that is not just a figment of my imagination. A gas engineer may make a complete mess of putting in a new boiler and cause a gas leak, leaving the consumer thinking, “I don’t want these people back in my house—they don’t know what they’re doing. I want them out before they do any more damage, and I want my money back so that I can get someone in who’s a little more trustworthy”. However, as the Bill stands at the moment, the trader may say, “No; I’ve got the right to come in and sort it out before I give you any money back”.
Our amendment would provide clarity for both parties in those circumstances, allowing customers to say: “I no longer trust you because I feel at risk—I want my money back”. I know from Committee that the Government have some sympathy with our point and with our concerns about this, but they argued that in such cases—which I think the Minister understood—the consumer retains the option to seek damages in court. However, that is not what the Bill should require. Taking a trader to court is very difficult for a consumer; they have to instigate legal action, which itself is complicated, expensive and uncertain. More than that, it takes a long time, and if you want a hot shower the next day you probably do not want to wait until your case comes to court before you can get someone in to put the hot water in the right place.
A survey undertaken by Which? showed that nearly half of consumers thought that you should not have to give the trader the chance to fix the problem in those circumstances. We know that the aim of the Bill is to provide clarity on consumer rights, both to the trader and to the consumer, so surely any of these sorts of disputes should be kept out of court and dealt with in this way. If a kitchen fitter says, “I don’t need to give you a refund now; I have the right to come back and repair this”, we do not want that conversation to end with, “I’ll see you in court”. We want the Bill to make it clear that the consumer can get a refund at that stage.
I hope that the Bill will mostly avoid taking the legal route, but it is a shame that it seems the Government felt that that would have to happen in these circumstances. We therefore hope that the Government, having thought about this amendment again, and given that it is only about residential premises, will support it. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Baroness missed one sort of case. The plumbers, electricians or whoever they are make a charge for coming in the first place, and when they get there, say, “This will need a part that we’ve got to order”. You have already paid for the visit, they demand the money for the parts before they go any further, and they sometimes never turn up again. The noble Baroness can add that to the list.
My Lords, the Minister said that not all traders are rogues. She obviously meets a different lot from those whom the noble Baroness, Lady Oppenheim-Barnes, comes across. The noble Baroness knows very well that some of them are rogues.
Some of them are. However, the Bill throughout is very much about the ones who are not good. If all traders were good, we could throw the Bill away. Frankly, we do not need it for John Lewis. It does not need this Bill in order to be good to us. The Bill is about bringing everyone up to the standards that we expect from all traders. It is fine to say that a good trader will come back. If it is a good trader, the customer will trust it and have it back. That is fine. However, what we are after here are the cases where there is something dangerous in the house or where the householder feels at risk from the trader being back.
If I understood the Minister properly, she said that customers have some choices. They can phone Citizens Advice, which of course will give them only advice—it cannot negotiate—or it will give them a template for a letter, which in the circumstances I do not think would be a lot of help. Alternatively, they can go to a website, although I think that a lot of consumers would not find that very helpful at that moment either.
In fact, the Minister has said the same as I have said: the only route you can take is to seek damages in court, which is what our amendment was trying to avoid. We were trying to say that where someone has been in your house and they have done something so badly that you feel at risk, you should be able to get your money back without that person coming back into your house. Clearly, that is where we and the Government have a different view. In those circumstances, I think that we leave consumers as vulnerable as they are now. They are in no worse a position but, at the same time, their position is no better. That is regrettable but it is clearly the decision that the Government have taken. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 28 and I emerge once again from my long and deep perusal of Hansard, having not been present in Committee. I want to focus on the important matter that has been raised by my noble friend Lady Oppenheim-Barnes on the question of displaying rights at the point of sale.
I have read the amendment carefully, but I want to focus initially on a couple of issues. The amendment states:
“Suppliers of goods and services to which this Part applies shall be required to display at the point of sale essential information in plain and intelligible language and in a reasonable format which explains to customers the relevant rights and responsibilities of consumers under this Part”.
How does one define “essential information”? I note proposed new subsection (3), which states:
“The detail shall be developed by the British Standards Institution”,
but I would like to point out that in proposed new subsection (2), which states that the,
“information shall be proportionate to the transaction”,
two issues arise. I would argue that it is very broad and not clear enough, as with proposed new subsection (1), to be on the face of the Bill. When one is talking about being “proportionate to the transaction”, one has to bear in mind that sales take the form of so many different types of products. There could be a very high volume of low-priced products, so there would be an immediate issue of how to tackle it.
I digress slightly and want to go back to the Committee stage, as I took a keen interest in the speech given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I am interested and glad to see that she has stepped back from promoting the idea of consumers’ statutory rights being read to them, or given to them at the point of sale. Perish the thought that this might happen and that on a busy Saturday long queues form at petrol stations while cashiers struggle to meet legal requirements in reading customer rights when selling non-petrol or non-food goods. I am sure that the noble Baroness did not necessarily think about that aspect, and she may well have thought at that stage that such information could be placed on a receipt. Then there was the matter of gaining consistency in this aspect of the law in tandem with effecting adequate training for cashiers and sales staff. I feel that, inadvertently, we may have prevented a gain in incidents on the shop floor as a result of consumers becoming somewhat impatient while waiting to be served.
The important point was made in Committee that communicating consumer rights is relevant for each product sold and could be open to confusion when a trader’s policies and terms exceed the statutory rights. There is a danger that reading out rights might act as a negative or chilling factor by implying, perhaps tenuously, that the product might just be defective.
I wanted to put this amendment in context because I am pleased at least that my noble friend Lady Oppenheim-Barnes has reduced that position in her amendment so that information on consumer rights should be displayed but only at the point of sale. However, as she might expect, I am not in favour of this being set in law either. I believe that it is proportionate to set firm guidelines, which came out of the implementation group, and to go for a voluntary approach.
I believe that this particular departure will undertake a number of key points. First, it will lead to a behavioural change for businesses to display information on the rights of consumers. Secondly, it will be pour encourager les autres; in other words, other businesses will do the same. Thirdly, consumers will become more attuned and astute, so that where businesses are not voluntarily displaying high-level information on their rights, they will be pulled up. There is a caveat that after a while consumers will tire of seeing the same old notices being displayed and looking even more tired than themselves.
For all those reasons, I do not agree with the idea that this amendment should be set in law, so it should not go forward.
If I have understood the noble Baroness, Lady Oppenheim-Barnes, correctly, it was probably the noble Viscount who, on 13 June, signed into law those rights. I congratulate him on that and on writing into law that all these rights should be made available. That is very welcome and I thank him on behalf of consumers that he does want them in law, although, at the moment, I think he is saying that he does not. Anyway, we congratulate him on what he did on 13 June.
The noble Baroness, Lady Oppenheim-Barnes, is absolutely right that this amendment is crucial to whether the Bill will work. It will not work if consumers do not know their rights. The little placard that is often next to the till which says, “This does not affect your statutory rights” is completely meaningless. We know from work by BIS that two-thirds of consumers do not know that if a major appliance breaks down 18 months after purchase they still have a right to have it repaired or replaced, even though they did not purchase an extended warranty. So we know that people do not know their existing rights.
The difference is that we agree with Citizens Advice that these rights can be set out briefly and simply. You do not even need to say, “Under the Consumer Rights Act”, although it is very nice to give credit to those who put it through. You can simply say, “You have 30 days to return this item if it is faulty”. That does not seem very difficult. I think people can understand it. I think it is all right if it is on the bottom of their till receipt rather than by the side of it. These things can be done quite easily.
There is a political difference here; it is a difference within the implementation group. The consumer groups want this information clearly written and available so that consumers keep on seeing it. Businesses do not want it. The Government are saying, “Let’s listen to business. They don’t want to do it”. I think if we listen to consumers, they would want to do it. The ongoing champion of consumers is right. Let us get this in the Bill and let consumers know what their rights are.
I thank my noble friend for his intervention. I knew that he laid those regulations under the EU directive in your Lordships’ House, so I hoped that he might be here and I am delighted that he is. My noble friends and the noble Lords opposite will realise that this is a great disappointment to me. I can see that the Government are not of the same mind. The objections which have been put forward are a bit punitive to what is a very simple—